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I. Introduction
As franchising' grows both in the United States and abroad, cases of
franchisor 2 opportunism continue to increase. The franchise industry and
many regulators insist that there is no evidence of systemic problems
with franchising, and that any historical problems were addressed by the
disclosure regime implemented with the passage of federal disclosure
1. The legal definition of "franchise" depends on local law. See FRANCHISE DESK
BOOK: SELECTED STATE LAWS, COMMENTARY & ANNOTATIONS (W. Michael Garner ed.,
2001). Frequently, the distinction between a franchise and a distributorship is the
payment of a franchise fee. See, e.g., Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 169 (8th Cir. 1987). However, this is not dispositive,
especially where payments are required as a condition of continuing the business. FTC
Informal Staff Advisory Opinion 00-2, Jan. 24, 2000 at Bus. Franchise Guide (hereinafter
BFG) (CCH) 6506. In some cases, the courts use "franchise" and "distributorship"
interchangeably; although, where a distributor does not qualify as a statutory franchisee,
the arrangement may not fall within the reach of franchise statutes. E.g., Upper Midwest
Sales Co. v. Ecolab, 577 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). In some Commonwealth
cases, courts use the term "independent contractor" for what would be regarded in the
U.S. as a distributorship or franchise. In the U.S., the term "business opportunity" may
be used to describe a distributorship arrangement, and is often a pejorative term when
used by regulators. The regulatory creation of a "Fractional Franchise," which is defined
in section 436.2(h) of the FTC Rule makes matters more confusing. See BFG 6080,
6173.
2. The franchisor is the company which licenses the trademark, and the franchisee
is the licensee. Some franchisees are also franchisors, such as AmeriHost Hotels. Julie
Bennett, Hotels and Franchising-Is Adding a Hotel to Your Portfolio a Good Idea?,
FRANCHISE TIMES, Feb. 2000 at 24, 25. The largest Burger King franchisee, Carrols
Corp., is also a franchisor of Taco Cabana and Polio Tropical. Carrols Halves 2nd-Q Net
on 10.5% BK Comp-unit Slide, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 1, 2003, at 11.
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requirements thirty years ago. This paper sets forth a wide range of
abusive practices found in hundreds of legal cases from around the globe
and across franchise systems. The majority of cases cited are recent
cases. Virtually all of the cases cited deal with abuse occurring after
signing of the franchise contract; abuse not covered by federal disclosure
rules. Franchisors use arbitration clauses and forum selection clauses to
minimize franchisee claims of abuse and ensure that any claims made are
kept out of publicly available records. In the face of these abuses, there
is regulatory inaction and constraints on the ability of courts to rectify the
abuses permitted under contracts of adhesion.3 Regulatory capture and
the limitations of judicial intervention ex post are significant
impediments to reining in franchisor abuse which must be addressed in
the United States, as they have been in some foreign countries, by
franchise relationship legislation.
Any analysis of franchise regulation must take into account
franchise realities, both with respect to the contract itself and the
sophistication of the parties entering into the contract. As one court
observed:
Although franchise agreements are commercial contracts they exhibit
many of the attributes of consumer contracts. The relationship
between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing,
although not universal, inequality of economic resources between the
contracting parties. Franchisees typically, but not always, are small
businessmen or businesswomen ... seeking to make the transition
from being wage earners and for whom the franchise is their very
first business. Franchisors typically, but not always, are large
corporations. The agreements themselves tend to reflect this gross
bargaining disparity. Usually they are form contracts the franchisor
prepared and offered to franchisees on a take it or leave it basis.
Among other typical terms, these agreements often allow the
franchisor to terminate the agreement or refuse to renew for virtually
any reason, including the desire to give a franchisor-owned outlet the
prime territory the franchisee presently occupies.
4
A car wash franchisor told the Federal Trade Commission (FTC):
3. An adhesion contract is a contract drafted by a stronger party (e.g., franchisor)
and presented to the weaker party, without giving the later party the opportunity to
negotiate terms. As noted in this paper, civil law countries take a different view of
freedom of contract; the adhesory concept was introduced to the U.S. by a lawyer who
had fled Europe. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
4. Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 365, 373 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (internal citations omitted). But see, E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28
(1999) ("Many courts ... have not shared this attitude toward franchisees.").
2004]
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[F]ranchisee[s] don't even know how they are getting screwed and
half of them are so stupid. The people that call me to buy a franchise
are so dumb, they don't even know what to ask or how to do it. And
I could screw every one of them if I wanted to. But I don't, and I
don't [sic]. And it looks like other franchisors do and they are getting
really good at it.
5
Franchisors speak of a partnership between franchisor and
franchisee,6  but the legal approach taken by franchisors has been
positivist, adversarial, and centered on a commercial model targeted at
unsophisticated consumers. Conceptually coherent but
counterproductive in practice, (both for franchisor and franchisee) this
approach is at variance with the trend in consumer law both domestically
and abroad. Some franchisees are large corporate entities, but many
franchises are purchased by individuals with a limited business
background. Franchisors speak of the sophistication of two parties to a
commercial business contract, but the evidence belies this, as does the
franchisors own marketing strategy.7
The International Franchise Association (IFA) has said that a
business format franchise involves three elements: "(1) the licensing of a
protected trademark, (2) no negotiability on the part of the franchisee,
and (3) ongoing interaction between the franchisor and the franchisee."
8
To the extent that the franchise relationship is one between a
sophisticated commercial entity and an unsophisticated franchisee
signing a contract of adhesion, regulation of the relationship must take
into account the potential for post-contractual overreaching and abuse of
the weaker party.
A majority of countries that regulate franchising have a disclosure
regime alone, and do not regulate the franchise relationship. 9 This
5. Lance Winslow, Car Wash Guys International, phone message to ANPR Hotline
(Comment 84), May 22, 1997, 10:10 pm, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/84winslo.htm. Winslow, whose business
address was a mail drop, was subsequently the target of an FTC complaint.
http://www3.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/carwashcmpt.htm (posted 8/09/00).
6. INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, IFA's FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES
GUIDE 34 (Fall/Winter 2000). "Go Into Business For Yourself, Not By Yourself"
proclaims the glossy cover. Robert T. Justis & William Slater Vincent, ACHIEVING
WEALTH THROUGH FRANCHISING (2001). The back cover reads: "THE OPPORTUNITY
TO BE IN BUSINESS FOR ONESELF BUT NOT BY ONESELF!" in red capital letters
1" tall. See id.
7. E.g., Be Your Own Boss: A Franchise Formula Unlike Any Other, available at
www22.inetba.com/harrisresearchinc/franchise.ivnu ("You can own a Chem-Dry
business for as little as a monthly car payment.").
8. Tele-Communications, Inc. v. C.I.R., 95 T.C. 495, 511 (1990) (testimony of
William B. Cherkasky, President, Int'l. Franchise Assn.).
9. Philip F. Zeidman, Another Precinct Reports In . FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept.
2000 at 45 (noting "Venezuelan Resolution" as one of "relatively few ... efforts at the
[Vol. 109:1
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especially impacts unsophisticated purchasers who do not realize that the
impressive-looking offering circular is the extent of franchise regulation.
The authors have heard from franchisors that to require a different
standard for less-sophisticated franchisees would be unworkable and that
pre-sale disclosure provides an adequate remedy. Yet franchisors argue
in favor of creating new federal "Sophisticated Investor Exemptions" and
against disclosure to prospective franchisees of lawsuits brought by
franchisors against current franchisees.°
To acknowledge the presence of sophisticated purchasers is to
acknowledge the presence of unsophisticated purchasers, and as this
paper shall show, some franchisors target those unsophisticated
purchasers. In such cases, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing should be applied as in a consumer contract, and may override
express provisions of the contract in certain instances-particularly
where the franchisor uses an integration clause to exclude evidence of
willful misrepresentation by agents of the franchisor. 1
The State of Illinois observed that franchisors may induce
purchasers to rely on a representation, "but only after meeting with a
lawyer does the franchisee realize that the representation was
meaningless because of the integration clause and contract law ... a
franchisor should be held to the written representations in its UFOC
[Uniform Franchise Offering Circular]. 12  The North American
Securities Administrators Association told the FTC that integration
clauses "have served as mechanisms for franchisors to avoid liability for
disclosure violations," and the majority of franchise agreements contain
such a clause.' 3  Proposals by the FTC to limit abuse of integration
regulation of the franchise relationship"); Philip F. Zeidman, Malaysia: Still a Mixed
Bag, FRANCHISE TIMES, Oct. 2000 at 56 (stating that Malaysian relationship law
"[interferes] in the parties' own capacity to strike a bargain").
10. Letter from Kenneth S. Kaplan, Asst. Gen. Counsel, AFC Enterprises, to Sec'y
FTC (Dec. 20, 1999), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/
franchise/comments/comment030.htm (AFC is a parent of Popeye's Chicken, Church's
Chicken, and Cinnabon). See also Letter from Eugene Stachowiak, VP Franchising,
McDonald's Corp., to Sec'y FTC (Dec. 20, 1999), available at
www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/mcdonalds.pdf (supporting
Sophisticated Investor Exemption). Triarc (Arby's, Pasta Connection, T.J. Cinnamons),
Wendy's, and Marriott were some of the other franchisors supporting the Sophisticated
Investor Exemptions. Id.
11. Contra, Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.,
889 P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he obligation of good faith is
'constructive' rather than 'implied' because the obligation is imposed by law and cannot
be disclaimed.").
12. Letter from Robert Tingler, Franchise Bureau Chief, to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y
FTC (Jan. 31, 2000), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/
comments/comment038.htm.
13. Letter from Dale E. Cantone, Stephen W. Maxey & Joseph J. Punturo, to Donald
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clauses by requiring the clause to exclude statements in the UFOC or its
exhibits have been met with resistance from the franchise industry.1
4
The fact that franchisors refuse to be bound by their written offering
circulars, let alone the verbal representations of franchisor salespeople, is
indicative of franchisor attitudes toward franchisees, courts, and
regulators. It is true that non-parties to the agreement, such as regulators,
are not parties to the contract, and hence not bound by the integration
clause. But as the story of franchise regulation unfolds in this paper, it
shall become apparent that regulators have not always been zealous
guardians of franchisee victims, and the courts tend to regard the
integration clause as sacrosanct.
The ability of American franchisors to use the Federal Arbitration
Act 15 and choice of forum/choice of law provisions would severely
constrain even the most ambitious state Attorney General. Franchisors
who do not wish to follow a specific state law have the ability to choose
the law of a friendlier forum, and can avoid American law altogether by
specifying an overseas forum.16 A growing body of case law recognizes
that the significant expense of arbitration may be used to prevent the
S. Clark, Sec'y FTC (Dec. 29, 1999), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/
rulemaking/franchise/comments/commentO I 7.htm.
14. Letter from Steven Goldman & Mark Forseth, Marriott International Inc., to
Sec'y FTC (Dec. 22, 1999), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/
rulemaking/franchise/comments/comment035.htm. The Marriott hotel franchisor called
the FTC proposal "a bit draconian." Id. One franchisor admits the problem: Tricon
recognized that integration clauses could be abused, and suggested stating that it is a
deceptive practice "to use integration clauses in a manner intended to deceive." Id. See
also Letter from Brian H. Cole, TRICON Global Restaurants, Inc., to Sec'y FTC (Jan.
11, 2000), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/
comment034.htm.
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2004).
16. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (preempting Puerto Rican law and ordering arbitration in Japan); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984) (preempting California Franchise Investment Law);
Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (preempting Montana law);
Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998) (preempting New
Jersey Franchise Protection Act and ordering arbitration in Connecticut); Alphagraphics
Franchising Inc. v. Whaler Graphics Inc., 840 F. Supp. 708 (D. Ariz. 1993) (preempting
Michigan Franchise Investment Law and ordering arbitration); KKW Enterprises Inc. v.
Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp, 184 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999)
(preempting Rhode Island Franchise Investment Act and ordering arbitration in Illinois);
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1970); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros
S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) (holding that U.S. citizen must arbitrate in
Japan). See also, Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State
Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process,
77 NEB. L. REV. 397 (1998). On history of choice of law in West, see William J.
Woodward, Jr., Symposium on Revised Article 1 & Proposed Revised Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of
Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 711-15 (2001).
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exercise of legal rights.' 7 Where expense renders franchisee remedies
illusory, local regulation of the franchise relationship can prevent
franchisors from retaining the fruits of opportunism. 18  Arbitration
presents ethical challenges not faced in the judicial process.'9
One of the difficulties in ascertaining the presence of (or lack of)
franchisor abuse is the lack of franchisee claims in judicial forums.
American Franchisee Association president, Susan Kezios, notes that due
to arbitration clauses, "decisions on resolving [abuse] issues are
occurring behind closed doors in private, and so we don't really know
what is going on."20  Reported franchise cases are the tip of the
proverbial iceberg, and only franchisors know the extent and nature of
discord in franchising. Franchisees themselves are reluctant to go public
for fear of loss of their franchise, the prospect of a franchisor hiring
private detectives to follow and photograph franchisees and their families
as they go about their personal lives, and the ability of the franchisor to
audit personal tax returns in order to prod the government into initiating
criminal charges against franchisees.
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer chides prospective
franchisees, saying "All too often, franchisees submit complaints to my
office regarding matters that would not have occurred if the investor had
thoroughly researched the franchise industry and the particular system of
which they became a part. 21  Spitzer claims that his goal is
"transparency. ' '22  However, under current law, little information is
provided to the franchisee; franchisors are not required to give complete
disclosure of litigation/arbitration against franchisees and gross/net
income data. If state regulators are serious about transparency, and if the
franchise industry is serious about providing prospects with maximum
information, there should be support for a change to the FTC's Franchise
17. But see, Stephen J. Wolfe, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the
Charge, CATO INSTITUTE, available at www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf (stating that
arbitration is cheaper than court, providing greater access to justice and respects
contractual freedom).
18. Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997,
1002 (1992) ("Contractual opportunism generally involves a party's attempt to capture a
greater share of the return on a contract. Sometimes this self-aggrandizement is
condemned because it reduces the joint return on a contract; other times, it is condemned
because it violates contract-based expectations.").
19. For example, "neutrals" are compromised by economic entanglements with one
of the parties, or arbitral bodies which are compromised by dependence on the
(corporate) drafter of the franchise agreement who selects the arbitral body which will be
used (and paid) in the event of a dispute.
20. Milford Prewitt, Encroachment 'Battlefield' Now More Peaceful, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Feb. 24, 2003 at 1, 43-44.
21. Elliot Spitzer, What to Consider Before Buying a Franchise, available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/franchise/beforebuyingfranchise brochure.html.
22. David J. Kaufmann, Spitzer Rules, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 2002 at 3.
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Rule to require disclosure of such information,23  and for the
dissemination of an Offering Circular prior to any sales pitch by the
franchisor, including at trade shows.
From a legal perspective, the franchise relationship is above all a
contractual relationship.24  Since the nature of the relationship is
contractual, implied terms and conditions may exist in franchise
agreements just as they do in any other agreement. Implied terms may
be mere "gap-fillers," but they may also be a reflection of the primacy of
norms other than freedom of contract. This paper will discuss recent
developments in economics and cognitive neuroscience, which highlight
the inadequacy of approaches to economic and political theory
epitomized in current franchise jurisprudence. 25 In less than a decade,
behavioral economics has progressed from birth to a respectful hearing
before the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and articles in popular
media; 26 its influence on the franchise industry has yet to be felt.
Of the implied contractual terms, perhaps the most controversial is
that of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith is a far less controversial
issue in civil law systems than in common law systems, and more
controversial in Great Britain than in the United States; the historical
reasons for this distinction shed some light on the current debate over the
use of the implied covenant in franchise agreements. Freedom of
Contract and Implied Terms in Contract are separate but related
concepts; Freedom of Contract in its purest form is incompatible with
certain implied terms, such as good faith, 27 and this observation has led
23. Proposed changes to the Franchise Rule were announced in 1999. See Franchise
Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57294 (proposed Oct. 22, 1999).
24. This does not mean that the terms of the contract are negotiated, as the IFA itself
admits. See Brief for the International Franchise Assn. and the Securities Industry Assn.,
as amici curiae, at 20, Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (No.
95-559), available at 1996 WL 78299 (for Westlaw) and 1995 U.S. Briefs 559 (for
Lexis) (Franchisors would face the "burdensome task of tailoring their contract
documents to meet the varying and often conflicting arbitration laws of 50 different
states.") Since the franchise industry balks at drafting different documents for each state,
it is unlikely to ever support true negotiation of franchise agreements.
25. The result of neurobiology has been a blurring of traditional distinctions between
"conservative" and "liberal" positions on government regulation. Steven Pinker of MIT,
a political conservative, notes, "Conservatives have always invoked limitations on human
reason to rein in the pretense that we can understand social behavior to redesign society.
But those limitations also undermine the assumption of rational self-interest that
underlies classical economics and secular conservatism." STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK
SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (Viking Penguin) (2002).
Moreover, to the extent that market failure occurs in the franchise industry, resultant
externalities may justify regulation purely on a cost-benefit basis.
26. Stephen J. Dubner, Calculating the Irrational in Economics, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2003, at B7.
27. Of course, this depends on ascertaining what good faith is; Judge Posner
observed, "[l]t is a chameleon." Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d
[Vol. 109:1
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to a retreat from the modem view of good faith enunciated in the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
substituting the textualist "gap-filler" analysis found a century ago.
Texaco, Inc. v. A.A. Gold, Inc.28 dismissed arguments that franchise
agreements are contracts of adhesion warranting exercise of equitable
remedies, and cited a hundred-year old English case, which said "that
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost
liberty of contracting." 29 Both society and the laws that regulate it have
changed in the last hundred years. In modem society, individual
purchasers of franchises are often unsophisticated consumers accustomed
to the substantial body of law which does restrict freedom of contract in
everything from conditions of employment to automobile purchases.
The public policy underlying such law (including franchise relationship
statutes) is that there are societal concepts of fair play to be upheld, as
well as a desire to minimize negative externalities created by oppressive
contractual terms in contracts of adhesion.
This paper holds that the current American view of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is too narrow, and franchisors
operating globally will have to comply with the substantial body of
international civil law that is both more receptive to good faith and
broader in the applications of the doctrine. Foreign regulation of
franchising is in its infancy, but it is worth noting that Korea has taken an
activist stance with respect not only to American-style disclosure, but
also to the franchise relationship. The general counsel to the American
franchise industry group (International Franchise Assn.) noted Korea's
"repetitive use of a standard of 'fairness,"' and commented that the
Korean franchise dispute resolution mechanism "is like nothing we have
ever seen in the world of franchising. Much the same can be said of
[Korean franchise] legislation in its entirety., 30  As noted below,
concerns about relationship issues are also seen in jurisdictions ranging
from Canada to Australia.
Reliance on judicial or arbitral application of equitable principles is
insufficient, and statutory mandates are required to make franchisors
responsible for the consequences of opportunistic behavior. Such
1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988). See also, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, UNFAIR CONTRACT
TERMS, BULL. No. 4 at 6. (last modified Dec. 23, 1997), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/rsearch/reports/oft202.htm (U.K. & E.U. law).
28. 357 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (stating lease gave franchisor right to
evict franchisee on 10 days notice).
29. Id. at 956 (quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Simpson, 19 Law
Rep. 462, 465 (1875)).
30. Philip F. Zeidman, The Pacific Rim Revisited, FRANCHISE TIMES, May 2003 at
59, 66 (noting that in 2001 there was little regulation in China, Korea, and Japan, but by
2003 that was changing).
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statutory mandates must take into account regulatory capture and the
nature of franchise contracts, which are inherently relational. 31 As the
name suggests, relational contracts are contracts between parties
anticipating continuation of a relationship following signing of the
contract.
American legislation regulating franchise relationships in the
petroleum industry 32 was spurred by the realization that the franchise
contract "may translate the original disparity of bargaining power into
continuing vulnerability of the franchisee . . . ,33 The practices leading
to regulation of auto and petroleum franchise relationships were ones
arising from the fact that franchise contracts are relational contracts in
which the franchisee's desire to protect the initial investment permits
franchisor overreaching during the course of the franchise relationship.
Passage of years or decades will necessarily introduce unforeseen
circumstances to which the parties must adapt. In franchising, the
franchisor normally exercises discretion as to how the parties shall adapt.
A 7-1 1 franchisee noted of acquiescence to franchisor demands, "You
must understand that when one is trying desperately to save one's
business, one's entire livelihood, you are willing to do almost
anything."
34
There is a difference between a discrete contract and a relational
contract, and franchise contracts are a distinct subset of relational
contracts. Application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is critical. Unlike a traditional contract, franchise contracts
establish a relationship where the stronger party can unilaterally alter the
fundamental nature of the obligations of the weaker party, and
"[U]nfettered discretion [in an Agreement that gives one party sole
discretion in a number of provisions] is precisely what the implied
covenant of good faith was designed to deal with in spite of its seemingly
unfettered discretion [the franchisor] must act in a commercially
reasonable manner.
' 35
Franchise attorney Andrew Selden coined the term "power
31. "Relational" was a term first used by Ian R. MacNeil. Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw U.L. REV. 854, 886 (1978). See also Charles F. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
32. Now codified as Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841
(2004).
33. S. REP. No. 95-731, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 876.
34. Letter from Teresa Maloney, National Coalition of Associations of 7-Eleven
Franchisees, to Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission, (April 27, 1997), available at
http://www.ftc.govv/bcp/franchise/comments/final38.htm (explaining the ability of
franchisors to force signing of general releases by franchisees).




franchising" to describe the traditional franchise model: "heavily one-
sided contracts that lock the franchisee into an unknown future
determined by the unilateral decisions of franchisor management., 36 By
use of Operations Manuals, compliance audits, 37 contract renewal, and
contractual collective action clauses (CACs), such as "agree to agree"
38
and "conform to current,"39 the franchisor can exercise nearly total
discretion over the franchisee. Multiple methods exist to alter the
obligations of the parties, but CACs are particularly troubling because
they render the franchise contract itself an ephemeral document drafted
on an Etch-a-Sketch.
CACs can be a powerful tool to unilaterally alter the current and
future obligations of franchisees who signed contracts decades in the
past; effectively, the "parties" to the original contract include unknown
future members to be admitted at the discretion of the contract drafter.
CACs are found in debt instruments, where ability of CACs to alter
contractual rights and obligations of the parties has been limited by state
and federal legislation; no such protection exists to protect franchisees
from CAC abuse. Franchisees who have never seen a CAC before are
not likely to understand its impact until it alters their franchise contract.
One franchisee association president confronted with unilateral
franchisor alterations pursuant to an "agree to agree" clause said to his
36. Andrew C. Selden, Organization Design for Successful Franchising, 20
FRANCHISE L.J. 1 (2000).
37. Compliance audits may include subjective criteria, such as the cheerfulness of
employees or cleanliness. Since the criteria are set by the franchisor and enforced by the
franchisor, prudent franchisees will avoid challenging franchisor policies or joining
franchisee organizations if they wish to minimize the risk of termination and the
concurrent loss of their franchise investment.
38. Such a clause states that, notwithstanding the language of the signed contract, the
franchisee "agrees to agree" to any change to the contract if a certain percentage of
franchisees "vote" to change the provision. The franchisor then puts the provision in the
contracts of franchisee applicants, who by purchase of the franchise are casting their
"vote" in favor of the franchisor. Note that the subsequent franchisees are initially under
the old provision and probably do not realize that they have "voted" until the new
provision affects them. Moreover, the initial franchisee may not even be aware of the
pending change unless the franchisee continually reads the new Uniform Franchise
Offering Circulars. In a fast-growing system, or one growing off of a numerically small
base, the franchisors' use of "agree to agree" clauses give the franchisor the ability to
drastically change existing contracts. Since franchisees have no comparable tool, the
franchise contract will shift in favor of the franchisor unless the franchisor chooses to
surrender benefits.
39. Such a clause states that when the holder of a current franchise(s) purchases an
expansion franchise or the franchise of a departing franchisee, all of the holder's
franchise agreements will be amended to conform to the most current contract.
Therefore, if a 50-unit franchisee buys another unit, not only will all 51 contracts have
the new obligations, but 51 "votes" have been cast to change the obligations of all
franchisees in the system subject to contractual alterations proposed pursuant to "agree to
agree" clauses.
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fellow franchisees, "All of it is legal; we've already checked that out!
But, it stinks." 40  Collective action is a one-sided affair; the same
franchise system prohibits class-action lawsuits by franchisees.
Wealth transferred to the franchisor includes not only the direct fees
paid by the franchisee, but the diminution of the value of the franchise
under the new contract. The nature of franchising itself is that the
franchisee is "buying" something that the franchisee can never sell,
specifically, the trademarked "name on the door" and such support as the
franchisor chooses to provide. Unsophisticated buyers of franchises fail
to realize the implications of the fact that they are licensing a trademark,
and are dependant on the good faith of the franchisor not merely during
the course of their affiliation with the franchisor, but in exiting the
system as well. 4  A franchise is a wasting asset, and as franchisees
approach the expiration of their term they are subject to franchisor
pressure to show a "sense of team work" as a condition of franchise
renewal.42  In short, "the franchise relationship provides ample
opportunity for a large corporate franchisor to take unfair advantage of a
small franchisee who is dependent on the franchisor for its business. 43
Even if franchisor discretion is not used to extract wealth from the
captive franchisee, the franchisor has sole control over new franchise
agreements, and in virtually all cases, the existing franchisee can only
sell to a new franchisee who has signed a new, more onerous franchise
agreement. Assuming the new franchisee to be an economically rational
actor, the franchise will have a reduced value due to the contract's more
onerous nature (higher royalties, 4 supra-competitive pricing of supplies,
40. Jim Hatfield (North American Association of Subway Franchisees), Reporting
Back: SAC News, I NAASF NEWSWIRE 4, at 1 (2002). CACs are particularly troubling in
franchise contracts; purchasers of a bond issue realize they are governed by a single trust
indenture, but purchasers of a franchise enter into individual contracts which are
subsequently altered to conform to the franchisor's ever-changing master template.
41. This is due to the fact that operation of the franchise necessarily involves use of
the franchisors marks. This applies not only to voluntary transfers but to bankruptcy
transfers as well. See Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 A.2d 207, 211 (Pa. 1976).
See generally Neil S. Hirshman, Michael G. Fatall, & Peter M. Spingola, Assignability of
Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, IPL NEWSL., Fall 2002, at 11, 13 (stating
that assignment without consent is not permitted since the trademark owner has duty to
maintain goodwill associated with mark). With less well-known trademarks, the primary
purchase motivation may indeed be the business know-how of the franchisor. However,
the top franchises, such as McDonalds, Subway, and 7-11, sell to individuals who are
paying for the mark which drives traffic; without the mark, franchisor "know-how" is of
little value.
42. Cf Zuckerman v. McDonald's Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D. Mass. 1999).
43. Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929, 938 (D. Mass. 1995).
44. Cf Timothy's Coffees of the World Inc. v. Switt, 94-CQ-050117, 1996 Ont. C.J.
LEXIS 2543 at *5 (Ont. Ct. General Div. 1996) (discussing royalty increase from 6% to
9% in the new (renewal) franchise agreement).
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expensive remodeling requirements, etcetera). Franchisee costs can be
significant; in September 2003, McDonald's announced a remodeling
program estimated to exceed $1 million per store. McDonald's-one of
the largest real estate owners in the world-also announced that
franchisees would no longer be permitted to own the building which
housed their restaurant. This prompted the chair of the franchisee
National Leadership Council to remark:
We do not believe that in the history of commercial real estate a
lessee has been responsible to pay for rebuilding and then pay more
to lease it [from the lessor] in the future. And we don't want to be
the first to set that precedent.
45
Franchisor discretion presents a mechanism for post-sale abuse, and
a distinction must be drawn between a prospect's lack of legal
sophistication and the operational sophistication a franchisee obtains by
being in daily contact with the retail consumers of the franchised
product. The assumption implicit in many judicial rulings is that the
franchisor knows best and is acting to maximize the value of the
franchised business. This assumption does not accord with the short-
term skew of modem compensation schemes. In many cases, it is the
franchisees who come to have a longer tenure than franchisor executives.
Industry consultant, Professor Komblau, remarked that franchisee
commitments may be for 20 years, but few franchisor executives will last
that long; "franchisees need and deserve commitments for a focus that is
beyond the bonus year., 46 The revolt of Shakey's franchisees in the late
1990's was due in part to franchisor mismanagement of the brand, with
45. Amy Garber, McD Operators Lovin 'New Image, Angry Over Rebuild, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003 at 1, 84.
46. Len Kornblau, Chains Must Create Marketing Plans That Benefit Franchisees
Over the Long Haul, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Oct. 7, 2002 at 24, 56. At one point,
Burger King franchisees even broached the idea of taking over the brand from
incompetent management under Diageo PLC. James Peters & Amy Zuber, BK
Franchisees Halt Growth Plans, Say Brand Must Beef Up, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS,
June 25, 2001 at 3, 207. See also Richard Behar, Why Subway Is "The Biggest Problem
in Franchising," FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 1998 at 126, 128 (explaining that Subway
development agents offered $1.5 billion to buy-out founder who they felt was
mismanaging the brand). In Quebec, 10 Dunkin' Donuts franchisees sued, alleging
losses due to franchisor mismanagement. Lori Lohmeyer, Allied Domecq Dunks
Corporate Staff in Restructuring, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 25, 2003 at 4, 85.
Royal Capital, the largest franchisee of beleaguered Church's Chicken, hired the
franchisor's CFO and reportedly is negotiating to buy the franchisor. Jack Hayes, Exit of
Church's CFO Fuels Speculation About Chain, AFC's Future, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003 at 1, 85. Franchisees bought Fantastic Sam's after the franchisor
went bankrupt after using Sam's revenue to pay for a failed acquisition strategy.
Franchisee Group Takes Over at Fantastic Sam's, FRANCHISE TIMES, Oct. 2003 at 24.
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Shakey's having "a revolving door to the executive office. 4 7 In contrast,
the president of Shakey's franchisee association began working in his
father's franchise at the age of 8, and noted that his hard work had left
him appreciating the small value of the hard assets.48 It is not franchisors
who bear the brunt of their own failure, as Congressman Coble (R-NC)
explained:
When speaking to this point of franchisor power and abuse, you don't
have to look any further than the horse's mouth. A major franchisor
indicated in a recent press release that 'to alleviate its debt load and
boost stagnant sales' the company would be shifting more burden
onto its franchisees. Did the franchisees have a say in this decision?
Probably not. Nonetheless, the franchisor has the unilateral ower
and right to dump or to transfer its burden onto the franchisees.
Finally, this paper addresses the current regulatory scheme in the
United States and pending proposals for reform. A brief overview may
assist readers unfamiliar with this issue: both state and federal
government agencies enforce regulations applicable to franchising,
although their efficacy is a matter of considerable debate within the
franchise community. At the federal level, there is a Franchise Rule
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 50 This governs
the pre-sale period and essentially requires the franchisor to deliver to
prospective purchasers a document known as a UFOC 51 containing
information about the franchise. The FTC proposed changes to the
Franchise Rule 52 governing pre-sale conduct at the same time that
Congress was proposing legislation known as the SBFA 53 which would
govern post-sale conduct. At times, the debate over FTC regulation
47. Amy Spector, Shakey's Franchisees Stirred Up Over Claims of Franchisor
Neglect, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001 at 4 (noting more than six different
franchisor owners in 47-year history of chain).
48. Id. at 4, 96. There is the McDonald's team which pursued a failed price war and
disastrous brand diversification strategy, but when pushed out by the Board was given a
generous severance package. Fortunately for franchisees, the new management is having
more success.
49. Franchising Relationship: Hearing Before the Subcom. On Commercial, &
Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. Serial No. 106-92 at
17 (1999), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju63852.000/hju63852_0.htm (hereinafter, Franchising Relationship) (prepared
statement of Hon. Howard Coble (R-NC)).
50. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (2004).
51. Uniform Franchise Offering Circular. This document resembles a stock
prospectus, only much longer.
52. See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/rulemkg.htm (notice, public comments,
and press releases).
53. SBFA stands for Small Business Franchise Act, which is also known as the




resembles kabuki theatre: things are not what they seem. Franchisors
point to the Franchise Rule in support of the proposition that there is
sufficient regulation of franchisors, when in fact most franchise disputes
arise in the post-sale period, which the FTC chooses not to regulate
despite the existence of Section 5 authority to do so.
Although the FTC debate is often a proxy for debating
Congressional legislation, the two are entirely separate issues, both as a
matter of law54 and in their effect55 on franchising. The FTC is an
agency of the executive, whereas Congress is part of the legislative arm
of the U.S. federal government. Lawyers sometimes get the branches of
government confused; when the FTC solicited comments on the
Franchise Rule, the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
submitted a lengthy brief56 on the proposed Congressional legislation.
This prompted the American Franchisee Association 57 (AFA) to submit a
rebuttal that began by noting the obvious conceptual (not to mention
legal) flaw in the lawyers' position.58 As this paper shall demonstrate,
the ABA brief is not the only example of franchise law discourse which
is sclerotic, 59 intellectually dishonest,60 and blind to the realities of the
54. SBFA is a federal law; the FTC Rule is accorded deference, but it is not a statute.
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2778 (1984)
55. SBFA would significantly alter the post-sale relationship; FTC's Franchise Rule
covers pre-sale delivery of a compliant UFOC.
56. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW ON
PROPOSED SMALL BUSINESS FRANCHISE ACT, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/comment025.htm. The ABA has historically
opposed federal franchise legislation. ABA Adopts Resolution Opposing Franchise Bill,
852 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-15 (Feb. 23, 1978).
57. http://www.franchisee.org.
58. Letter from Susan P. Kezios, AFA President, to Donald S. Clark, FTC Secretary
(January 31, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/
franchise/comments/comment037.htm.
59. Contract law principles in franchising harken back to turn-of-the century
decisions, such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in invoking the "freedom of
contract" mantra, and in the "classical" formalism applied to eliminate the obligation to
deal in good faith. Cf Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and
Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1223, 1231-1236 (1999) (stating that recent
retrograde "plain meaning" jurisprudence reflects view of good faith covenant at odds
with trend since adoption of UCC). Existing in the wider legal arena, these are
particularly acute issues in franchising.
60. Notwithstanding industry claims that UFOC disclosure is sufficient and that
franchisees are sophisticated businesspersons, many franchisors admit that franchisees
buy with their hearts, do not even read the UFOC, do not comprehend the scope of
franchisor discretion ex post, and are viewed by franchisors as ignorant children who
need a firm hand and are expendable in the event that they seek to attain any semblance
of bargaining power. One of the authors sat through a presentation in Philadelphia by a
franchisor of tobacco shops as the President deprecated his franchisees for almost an
hour, and discussed using the franchisees to funnel business to the franchisor internet site.
When asked about the impact of Drug Emporium (Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,966),
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franchise relationship: such can be seen in the areas of encroachment,
sourcing, good faith/fair dealing, and so-called "renewal" of the
franchise, to name just a few.
There are many instances of franchisees breaching the franchise
contract, failing to pay royalties due, 61 and damaging the trademark to
the detriment of their fellow franchisees, 2 as well as occasional
franchisee opportunism, 63 but this paper will focus primarily on instances
of franchisor opportunism. Although there are some franchisees with
power over their franchisors, 64 this is not normally the case, and
corporate franchisees and franchisors have the financial resources to
ensure a level playing field.65 Furthermore, American franchising law
(and the trend of global franchising law) favors the protection of
franchisor interests. There are also major law firms representing
franchisors with sections specializing in Franchise and Distribution Law.
However, those representing franchisees are far fewer in number, leading
to an imbalance in legal scholarship. 66  Additionally, franchisor-side
the franchisor pointed to two attorneys in the room and said neither law firm had
responded to his request for a means of "getting around" the decision. Turning to the
female attorney, he said "Maybe the two of you could wrestle to see who gets my
business."
61. Failure to pay royalties and other debts is often an indication of financial
difficulties, and ultimately will lead to termination. For this reason, franchisors
determined to get rid of a franchisee will often use economic pressure such as onerous
remodeling/maintenance demands or punitive encroachment, as this paper will discuss.
62. E.g., Spitzer Getting Inn-Volved, N.Y. POST, Aug. 6, 2002, at II (stating that
discrimination against Orthodox Jews by Days Inn franchisee in Catskill, New York
caused cancellations at unrelated Days Inn in Liberty, New York, and negative publicity,
including investigation by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer). A few days later,
the franchisee was terminated. See Kenneth Lovett, It's Checkout Time: Days Inn Boots
'Bias'Motel, N.Y. POST, Aug. 16, 2002 at 16.
63. Synergism Arithmetically Compounded, Inc. v. Parkwood Hills Foodland, Inc.,
8 C.P.R. (4th) 135, 2000 C.P.R. LEXIS 181, at *26 (Ontario Sup. Ct. of Justice 2000)
(finding franchisees took advantage of bankrupt franchisor, and attempted to renegotiate
agreements, and withhold royalties and ad fund monies).
64. See Alan J. Liddle, Unhappy Shakey's Franchisees Say Control of Chain at
Stake in Lawsuit, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 20, 2003 at 4.
65. Cf ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
122-125 (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (showing effect of wealth on outcome, repeat-player
effect, and ADR as "purchase" of justice). Corporate franchisees may be wealthy; in the
recent fight for corporate franchisee Quality Dining (NASDAQ: QD1N), the franchisee
spent one million dollars to fend off a takeover bid by a group of fellow Burger King
franchisees. Julie Bennett, Families Wage Battle for Quality Dining, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Sept. 2000 at 16.
66. A notable exception is the multi-volume FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND
REMEDIES, originally authored by the late Harold Brown, and currently edited by J.
Michael Dady, Jeffery Haff, and Ronald Gardner. The imbalance is also seen in legal
academia, with the exceptions of Professors Warren Grimes and Gillian Hadfield.




counsel represent their clients in franchise disputes in which the issues
vary little from case to case, while franchisees often use a local attorney
who may have never previously litigated a franchise case.67
Franchisors also have enormous monetary and legal resources.
McDonald's, criticized by two impoverished private citizens who refused
to apologize to the mighty franchisor, launched the longest-running
lawsuit in the history of Great Britain-at a cost of £ 10 million.68 In the
United States, both Burger King and Subway have fought franchisees all
the way to the Supreme Court; the franchisees lost.69 In one Subway
case, the franchisee lost his store and his loan collateral. In another case,
Subway prevailed against one franchised outlet and submitted a legal bill
of over $400,000-far more than the value of the franchise that was the
subject of the litigation. 70  Both Burger King and Subway have since
made significant steps toward a more amicable relationship with
franchisees. This does not change the history lesson for future
franchisors; a multibillion dollar corporation can be built with little
regard for the welfare of the thousands of individuals who invest their
life savings to build the franchisor's brand.
Franchisors have the resources to make an example of those who
would challenge their interests. By accessing the labor and capital
markets with a franchise business model, franchisors are able to achieve
freedom from statutes which would otherwise protect workers and
investors. Franchisees have far more to lose than hourly employees, and
it is not surprising that so many franchisees are reluctant to join
associations; the American Franchisee Association has an "Anonymous"
membership category for franchisees fearing retaliation. In contrast,
large franchisors such as Wendy's, McDonald's, Burger King, and Yum!
Brands have full-time government affairs staff to lobby legislators and
regulators.71  The International Franchise Association (IFA) is
67. The Australian Franchise Association attempted to provide a mechanism for the
information exchange of discovery documents among franchisees, similar to the ATLA
Exchange maintained by American tort lawyers. This was found to be a violation of
Australian law. Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v. AFA Facilitation Pty., No. QG 73 of
1996, 1997 Aust. FedCt LEXIS 4 at *12 (Fed. Ct. of Australia, Gen. Div.). The court
said, "we do not suggest that practices in the [U.S.] would necessarily, or even likely, be
viewed as desirable [in Australia]." Id. at * 19. It should be noted that the Association
followed some dubious practices which account for some of the tenor of the decision.
68. JoHN VIDAL, MCLIBEL 6 (1997). See also http://www.mcspotlight.org.
69. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Doctor's Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
70. Joe Dwyer, David Duree Fined $408,445, Barred in Kansas, ST. Louis BUs. J.,
June 14, 1996, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/stlouis/stories/
1996/06/17/story5.html. The saga of David Duree and the Subway sandwich franchise is
something akin to Ahab and the Whale, but regrettably beyond the scope of this paper.
71. Ellen Koteff, Joining Government-Affairs Parade Allows Operators to Beat
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headquartered in Washington, where it lobbies Congress to oppose
regulation of franchising;72 the IFA gave money to 33 candidates in the
2002 Congressional race.73 The IFA has spent more than $200,000 filing
more than a dozen amicus briefs in court cases.74 IFA lawyers told the
U.S. Supreme Court that amicus briefs are helpful since IFA is "a trade
association for the franchise industry [concerned with] the broad impact
which this Court's decision may have upon that industry.75 The IFA
believes that the franchise industry perspective and experience will be
helpful in assessing that impact." 76  However, when speaking with
lawmakers seeking to regulate the industry, IFA lawyers deny that
franchising is an industry.77
The "IFA works closely with the Federal Trade Commission,
Congress, state legislators and regulatory agencies to ensure that the laws
and regulations are conducive to the unique marketing concept of
franchising., 78  The president of the American Franchisee Association
(AFA) observed that "[t]he prior failure of [franchise] bills in the U.S.
Congress says little about the merits of such legislation, and more about
the financial and political clout" of those opposing the legislation.
79
Financial issues aside, franchisors can and do protect their interests
to an extent which is not possible for franchisees under current law. As
one Australian franchisee testified:
I came to realize that my future security and prospects in the
Their Drums, Save Money, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 2, 2002 at 28.
72. Robin Lee Allen, IFA Holds First Blitz on Capitol Hill: Franchisors,
Franchisees Lobby to Blunt New Regulatory Momentum, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS,
Nov. 1, 1999 at 1 ("[F]irst organized lobbying blitz" by IFA in attempt to stop proposed
fair franchising law).
73. Paul Frumkin, GOP Victory Seen as Win For Industry, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Nov. 18, 2002 at 1, 6.
74. Janet Sparks, "Best and Brightest" Discuss Issues at IFA Symposium,
FRANCHISE TIMES, June-July 2000 at 24 (quoting IFA government affairs director Betsy
Laird).
75. Brief of Amici Curiae International Franchise Association, Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), available at 1977 WL 189273 at * 1.
76. Id. at *3, See also Redevelopment Agency of the City of Concord v. Int'l.
House of Pancakes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 360 n.2 (1992) (amicus brief filed by IFA "the
national trade association of the franchising industry").
77. Amy Spector, Tricon Mounts Taco Bell Bailout: Store Buybacks, Debt Waivers
Eyed as 'Refranchising' Criticized, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001 at 1, 41
(quoting Matthew Shay, general counsel for IFA, opposing legislation on grounds that
"franchising is not an industry, it's a business concept used by industries"); see also
Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 93 (statement of Dennis E. Wieczorek, Esq.,
Partner, Rudnick & Wolfe).
78. Networking In, Participating In, Joining In... International Franchise
Association (Brochure, undated) (on file with author).
79. Susan P. Kezios, Small Business Franchise Act Eyes Protecting Franchisees,
Not Hindering Competition, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 14, 2000 at 32, 36.
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McDonald's System, being my [Aust.] $2 million plus investment in
my restaurants and my desire to expand, were ultimately in the hands
of a very subjective evaluation of my restaurants by one or two
people and the personal relationship [with] my Consultant.
80
Alexander Hamilton observed: "In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."'"
The nature of franchise contracts is such that there is necessarily
ambiguity, and the franchisors have the ability to unilaterally change the
obligations (and economic viability) of the franchise relationship over a
term that may last for 20 years. Discussing New Jersey's Franchise
Practices Act, the state Supreme Court noted the "community-of-
interest" in the franchise relationship which, coupled with an inequality
of bargaining power, is "critical in distinguishing franchises from other
types of businesses." 82 The court explained:
[O]nce a business has made substantial franchise-specific
investments it loses all or virtually all of its original bargaining power
regarding continuation of the franchise. Specifically, the franchise
cannot do anything that risks termination, because that would result
in a loss of much or all of the value of its franchise-related
investments.
83
A Canadian court took note of sunk costs as reason to limit post-sale
exercise of franchisor power:
From the franchisee's point of view, he must continue to provide a
useful function for the franchisor in the nature of those birds who
clean the teeth of crocodiles. On the other hand, most good
franchisors recognize that they are in a long-term relationship and
therefore do not immediately clamp their jaws down on a franchisee
who makes one or two errant pecks at the food. This of course is a
question of degree. However, in my mind, it appears that the
crocodile should become increasingly tolerant with the longevity of
the relationship and the amount of non-liquid assets that the bird has
at stake.
84
80. Far Horizons Pty Ltd. v. McDonald's Australia Ltd., 2257 of 1996 (Sup. Ct. of
Victoria, Commercial & Equity Division, Aug. 18, 2000) (LEXIS, Commonwealth Cases
Library, Victorian Unreported Judgments).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
82. Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 140
(N.J. 1992).
83. Id. at 141. Accord In the Matter of Headquarters Dodge, Inc., No. 92-1030,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *42 (D. N.J. Nov. 25, 1992) (Statute's "primary
objective-to prevent the unfair forfeiture of a franchisee's investment that historically
accompanied franchise termination.").
84. Head v. Inter Tan Canada Ltd., [1991] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 592, at *21 (Radio
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Courts wary of franchisor opportunism have used doctrines such as
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to attempt to achieve
an equitable solution to franchise litigation. However, as this paper shall
demonstrate, this current American doctrine permits franchisors to draft
contracts so as to eliminate the application of the implied covenant.
Notably, the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, "enacted in response to
industry-wide abuses,, 85 explicitly provides for remedies traditionally
deemed equitable. The PMPA has successfully withstood the withering
of the covenant of good faith and permitted the continued health of the
gas station franchisors. Unfortunately, only auto and gas franchisees
have such protection in all United States jurisdictions.
86
This paper proposes that federal regulation include termination
provisions; in states without franchise legislation, common law
principles apply. At common law, as one treatise notes, "effects of
termination were starkly simple-the franchisee would be ousted from
the franchise, essentially forfeiting his investment ... the franchisor
would then regain full control of the terminated business and would be
free to begin a relationship with a new franchisee.,
87
As added risk to the franchisees, default of one franchise agreement
may result not only in termination of the franchise at issue, but-due to
cross-default clauses-result in declaration that the franchisee is in
default of all the franchisee's agreements. To circumvent the protections
of the corporate form, franchisors require that the franchisee sign the
contract as a natural person. Even where the franchisor subsequently
assents to the assignment of rights to the franchisee's corporate entity,
the franchisee must remain personally liable, and the franchisor will
specify that as between the franchisor and franchisee the relationship is
with the franchisee as a natural person. 88 As a result, franchisees cannot
segregate their different franchises, nor can they segregate their personal
from their business assets. The franchisor remains protected by the
corporate form, and can set up separate entities.89 As a result, the
Shack franchisee).
85. Daras v. Star Enterprise, No. HAR 91-480, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17831, at *7-
8 (D. MD Nov. 12, 1992).
86. Cf Jan S. Gilbert, The FTC Rule and the PMPA: An Uncertain Alliance, 19
FRANCHISE L.J. 58 (1999) (FTC Franchise Rule does not provide relationship protection
as does PMPA).
87. 62B AMJUR2D Private Franchise Contracts § 548 (1999).
88. Andrew A. Caffey, Secondhand Store, ENTREPRENEUR, Dec. 2000 at 130, 132.
89. Franchisors using the corporate form can generally limit liability, with rare
exceptions. See generally Richard M. Asbill & W. Andrew Scott, Meineke Revisited:
The Specter of Individual Liability, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 6 (1999) (cases where franchisors
personally liable). Claims of intentional misrepresentation may give rise to claims
against individuals associated with the franchisor, particularly in the absence of "skillful
drafting" of the franchise agreement. Richard C. Duell III, Personal Liability: Are You at
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franchisor seeks to terminate the franchisee, it can arbitrate on its home
ground while seeking judicial eviction of the franchisee from the
franchise premises on grounds which relate to default under the franchise
agreement subject to an arbitration clause.90
II. Pre-Sale Issues
A. Fictive Kinship: The Franchise "Family"
Henry Ford told the U.S. Senate that a franchise relationship was
like a marriage. 91 Invoking fictive kinship to lower innate distrust of
92strangers goes back to the beginnings of recorded history. The theme
was taken up by franchisors in the 1960s and '70s: "The role I've got is
the Daddy, and the role you've got is the son."93  A more accurate
analogy is of the virginal bride (franchisee) and experienced groom
(franchisor).94 Marriage is a form of relational contract, and the analogy
is useful in understanding not only the franchise relationship, but also the
degree to which legal constraints (such as the SBFA) can limit
opportunism in the relationship. The analogy also suggests why non-
legal constraints cannot sufficiently regulate the franchise relationship.
Risk?, FRANCHISE TIMES, Aug. 2001 at 48. Limited liability first appeared at Florence in
1408. See J.M. ROBERTS, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 499 (1992).
90. The practical effect is that the franchisee must arbitrate in the franchisor's
chosen forum but the franchisor can either arbitrate and/or bring litigation. The Subway
franchisor has used separate corporations and forum selection clauses to maximum effect.
See Edward Wood Dunham, Enforcing Contract Terms Designed to Manage Franchisor
Risk, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 91 (2000) (Dunham is outside counsel for Subway).
91. THOMAS S. DICKE, FRANCHISING IN AMERICA 82 (1992).
92. ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 101 (2000)
(correspondence from third millennium B.C. between king of Ebla and king of Hamazi).
See also PINKER, supra note 25 at 245-47 (providing historical and literary examples;
citations to cognitive studies supporting theory).
93. Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 964 (1990) (quoting John Jay Hooker, The
Story of Minnie Pearl: A Case History of One New Company's Trials, Translations, and
Triumphs, in FRANCHISING TODAY: REPORT ON THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
CONFERENCE ON FRANCHISING 176 (1970) [hereinafter FRANCHISING TODAY]).
94. Id. (quoting Ken Coomer, Three Recurrent and Acute Major Problems in
Franchising, in FRANCHISING TODAY 184). As franchise operators, the authors have
heard such analogies. There is a reported case of a franchisee who testified the franchisor
spoke of plans to "f**k" the franchisee. See Far Horizons Pty Ltd. v. McDonald's
Australia Ltd., 2257 of 1996 (Sup. Ct. of Victoria, Commercial & Equity Division, Aug.
18, 2000). At least in the U.S., f**k has entered popular usage. See Alexandra Jacobs &
Maria Russo, It's a Four-Letter Summer, N.Y. OBSERVER, July 7-14, 2003, at 1, 8 (noting
first TV usage on BBC in 1965, uncensored on live TV on NBC in Jan. 2003, and recent
usage by President Bush and Senator Hillary Clinton). Indeed, "One man's vulgarity is
another man's lyric." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). See also Winslow
supra note 5 (describing franchisees being "screwed").
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Citing the example of the virginal franchisee bride, Professor Eric Posner
states that not only are such "fictive kinship" relationships difficult to
regulate judicially, but so are more discrete contractual relations.95 The
conclusion Posner draws is that "[m]uch contractual behavior depends on
reputation, ethnic and family connections, and other elements of nonlegal
regulation and not on detailed and carefully written contracts enforced by
disinterested courts." 96  A question unanswered by Posner is whether
franchisors lacking kinship with franchisees are constrained from
opportunistic behavior by any non-legal regulation. Indeed, law and
sociology have become intertwined for just this reason; as the "kinship
circle" both expands and becomes less personal, so the law expands to
recognize an obligation to that circle.
97
A large franchisor with hundreds or thousands of outlets is unlikely
to feel any ethnic or family connections.98 If we expect franchisors to
obey the mores embodied in other areas such as the securities
marketplace (which is emphatically not laissez-faire) then we must
codify that expectation in franchise relationship legislation. There are
only two segments of the American franchise industry which have
significant statutory protection: auto and petroleum franchises. Both
segments were the earliest to engage in national franchising, and many of
the automobile dealerships were owned by well-off leaders of the local
business community. And while the auto dealers were powerful enough
to spur Congressional action, the widespread franchisor abuse which
95. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 152-53 (2000).
96. Id. at 153; accord, Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1593 n.173 (2000).
97. An early example of this can be seen in the Roman Catholic Church, which
originally linked the sacred and the profane at law; an outgrowth of the Christian view of
the ecclesia. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). The thousand-year old severing of
ecclesiastical from secular law was both a product of and a contributor to the rise of
nation-states. However, by 1625 Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (The
Law of War & Peace) recognized that individual states-and by extension, individuals-
owed a legal obligation to others. The ineffectiveness of non-legal constraints in such a
world necessitated the birth of international law. The concept of an expanding circle of
kinship has received increasing study recently, particularly with the rise of multilateral
treaties and issues of global concern such as the environment, terrorism, and drug
trafficking. To say that we are all in the same boat is also to recognize that the "boat" has
grown from a 2-person canoe to a massive ocean liner. Posner is correct in his initial
analysis, but as he fails to see this expanding kinship circle, he fails to see the
jurisprudential implications. The expanding kinship argument was most notably made by
Peter Singer. See PETER A.D. SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE: THE ETHICS AND
SOCIOBIOLOGY (1981). See also, PINKER, supra note 25, at 165-69, and WRIGHT, supra
note 92.
98. However, the author Paul Steinberg notes that when co-author Gerald Lescatre
passed away suddenly, the personnel of Subway were both kind and of invaluable
assistance, for which he remains grateful.
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triggered the legislation indicates that franchisors are not too concerned
about damage to their reputations; even where the franchisors are few in
number and hence more readily identifiable in the public mind.
Regulation of petroleum-industry-franchisors came in the wake of the oil
crisis, when anti-oil sentiment reduced the efficacy of big oil lobbying
efforts. From that time until today, no further franchise relationship
legislation has passed in Congress.
Today there are thousands of politically active franchisors. At the
same time, many of the franchisees are immigrants unlikely to engender
much empathy in the local community or on Capitol Hill. The sheer
numbers make it less likely that bad behavior by franchisors will be
widely publicized. Constraints based on reputation are predicated on an
efficient market that provides ready access to reputation information.
Given that only those franchise disputes meeting specific criteria are
disclosed in a UFOC, 99 and that a search of public databases will not
disclose arbitrations,100 the written record available to a prospective
franchisee contradicts Posner's conclusion. Additionally, game theory
posits that bad behavior will affect ongoing dealings between the parties
in a tit-for-tat retaliation. The problem is that once the franchisee has
signed the franchise agreement, costs and growing inequality in
bargaining power precludes retaliation against the franchisor. Hence,
neither the intra-party nor the external impacts on reputation predicted by
classical game theory are effective in franchising.
Let us assume that the foregoing impacts did exist, or that a
franchisor believed them to exist. Such a franchisor might be thought to
be constrained by concerns about reputation, but as Posner should admit,
opportunistic behavior in such a situation may result in a sophisticated
franchisee imputing a high "discount rate" 10' to the franchisor. In theory,
the franchisor would have to make the franchise more economically
attractive to the franchisee. Alternatively, the franchisor might seek out
less sophisticated buyers who would be less likely to understand the
risk.10 2 Even if risk were perceived, less sophisticated buyers would
assign greater utility to the franchise opportunity due to their own lack of
99. BuSINESs FRANCHISE GUIDE 6237 (Commerce Clearing House). This
information disclosed in Item 3 of the UFOC. Under the 1999 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the FTC would expand the circumstances in which UFOC disclosure would
be required.
100. One partial source of arbitration decisions is the Business Franchise Guide,
published by Commerce Clearing House (CCH).
101. Where "discount rate" is an assessment of the reliability of the other party as a
partner in a relationship. See POSNER, supra note 95, at 17, 19.
102. See generally, PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF RISK (1996) (discussing risk-taking behavior).
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wealth.10 3 Further, even if some negative consequences to the franchisor
resulting from franchisor opportunism are assumed, society may be
willing to excuse actions viewed as violative of public policy provided
the offender has sufficient wealth. 0 4 Economic disparity between the
parties arguably makes the concept even more repugnant.'
0 5
Constraints by reputation operate both internally and externally. In
1937, Karen Homey's The Neurotic Personality of Our Time viewed the
tension between American economic values and American moral values
from a psychoanalytic perspective; today we might describe the tension
as cognitive dissonance. Much had changed by 2000 when Eric Posner
wrote Law and Social Norms. Posner views reputational constraints as
external, economic, events. From a Homey perspective, self-restraint
suggested by internal considerations ("I am a good person; therefore I do
not take advantage of my franchisees") may operate in a small system
such as the Car Wash Guys franchise. 0 6 The Johnny Carino's franchisor
placed a franchisee on its Board of Directors to provide input,' 0 7 and
Checkers Drive-In Restaurants selected as CEO a man who had been a
franchisee of KFC, Taco Bell, and Papa John's Pizza to turn the
company around and restore good relations with franchisees.'
0 8
At an IFA Legal Symposium, several counsel to small franchisors
indicated to the authors that they were not comfortable with the harsh
stance of the larger franchisor-members of the IFA and NFC, finding the
attitude counterproductive both in intra-system relations and in the
resultant legislative concern. However, large franchisors and franchisor
lobbyists have the money and access to legislators. Where internal
constraints are lacking, only the economic constraints suggested by
103. Id. (referring to the work of Daniel Bernoulli (1738); utility of increase in wealth
inversely proportional to wealth possessed).
104. In the famous words of Sir Henry Maine, the history of the law has been "From
Status To Contract." A byproduct of this has been an increasing unwillingness to permit
those with superior resources to be above the law. At one time, even murder was
permissible if one could pay the wergild. See Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the
Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century England, 19 LAW AND HIST. REV.,
1, 5 (2001). Wealthy franchisors have far more leverage than the average franchisee, and
it is for the legislative branch to determine as a matter of public policy whether statutory
curbs are needed. Such curbs would be in accord with the historical path of law in
protecting the interests of a weaker party.
105. Cf Ortwin Renn, The Social Arena Concept of Risk Debates, in SOCIAL
THEORIES OF RISK, 179-96 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (societal
norms underlying the principle of inconvertibility of differing resources such as money in
exchange for legal rights or legislation).
106. Winslow supra note 5.
107. Fired Up Inc. names franchisee to board, NATION'S REST. NEWS, Sept. 17, 2001,
at 108.
108. James Peters, Rebounding from checkered past, drive-in chain cuts debt,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 17, 2001 at 4.
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Posner are potentially available. Posner's analysis fails to explain
franchisor behavior because Posner fails to take into account the realities
of corporate behavior. Imperfect information exchange and targeting of
unsophisticated purchasers limits the reputational constraint anticipated
under traditional economic theory. Neuroeconomics suggests limits to
the application of the rational actor model even in a rigorous disclosure
regime.
Franchisees are impacted by decisions made thousands of miles
away. The constraining influence of non-judicial (e.g., reputational)
norms on behavior are inversely proportional to the degree of kinship.
This realization spurred the development of written law itself. 0 9
Geographic distance gives rise to an emotional distance, replacing
communal social norms with the artful drafting of franchisor attorneys.
Franchisors make decisions pursuant to corporate policies and
objectives, ° whereas many franchisees are sole proprietors who operate
their businesses as an extension of their personality. Posner's analysis,
rooted in sociobiology,"' does explain seemingly irrational behavior on
the part of individual franchisees. One commentator noted "[t]he
development of the norms, the existence of the behavior, and the
evolution of the brain are all intimately correlated." ' 1 2 There is evidence
that cooperative behavior activates two sections of the brain which
produce chemicals engendering pleasurable sensations.' 13 Reciprocal
altruism is an adaptive behavior, formerly crucial to species survival and
109. WRIGHT, supra note 92, at 98-100. Development of writing, legal statutes and
state-administration of judicial code in ancient Mesopotamia was response to "the
problem of trust" among members of society "now that daily life involved.., encounters
with people who were neither relatives nor acquaintances." Id.
110. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, and it is not practical for a large
franchisor to deal on a personal basis with hundreds or thousands of franchisees. But to
maintain the Posner/IFA fictive kinship model flies in the face of commercial reality, and
is hypocritical in light of post-contractual behavior of franchisors.
111. Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of Irrationality, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 289, 303
(2001). (noting "time-shifted rationality" as the "temporal mismatch of historically
adaptive behavior and modem environments"). See also Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral
Biology, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 1411 (2001). There is a certain irony in Judge Posner's son
inadvertently making the sociobiologist's case. To the extent that a purchaser discounts
the Offering Circular in favor of an intuitive judgment, there is another manifestation of
evolutionary history. Moreover, "there is a growing consensus that the unconscious [has]
cognitive capacities that rival and sometimes surpass that of conscious thought." Sharon
Begley, Follow Your Intuition: The Unconscious You May Be the Wiser Half, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 30, 2002, at B1.
112. Jones, supra note 111, at 304.
113. Natalie Angier, Why We're So Nice: We're Wired to Cooperate, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2002, at FI, F8 (M.R.I. scan of anteroventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex
showing dopamine production).
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
developed over millennia.1 14 Trust itself may be based not on conscious
thought but on neurobiology, most likely related to oxytocin production
in the brain.' 
15
In 2003, researchers at Emory University demonstrated that animals
recognized a sense of fair play and would not cooperate with those who
did not behave fairly; the scientists concluded that fair play appeared
early in evolutionary history.'1 6 It is not possible to simply rationalize
away such history, which is why concepts of fairness continue to
influence judges and arbitrators. Such influence is central to the
encroachment decisions favoring franchisees; notwithstanding an explicit
reservation of the right to encroach, some jurists (and many non-lawyers)
are offended by egregious unfairness of franchisors. [Cite]. Unfairness
is a violation of reciprocal altruism and is a concept understood from
childhood. The viability of reciprocal altruism as an adaptive behavior in
franchising is problematic where the legal environment is tolerant of
such practices as misstatements in pre-contractual dealings,
encroachment, and price-gouging after the contract is signed and the
investment made.
Cognizant of the negative image that the "Daddy/Son" analogy was
presenting, industry lobbyists cited the adaptability of franchising and
declared a "shift [that] moves the franchise relationship more in the
direction of partnerships and away from the parental attitudes that were
prevalent in the original business model." ' 1 7  Now franchisors tell
prospective purchasers to "Buy a franchise, join a family!"' 118 A
114. F. de Waal & L.M. Luttrell, Mechanisms of Social Reciprocity in Three Primate
Species: Symmetrical Relationship Characteristics or Cognition?, 9 ETHNOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 101-18, (1988) (finding that chimpanzees, the closest hominid species,
engage in cooperative behavior). The pattern exists in other species and anthropological
evidence is that it dates to the earliest humans. The topic is beyond the scope of this
paper; an excellent bibliography may be found in GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE
THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000). See also WRIGHT, supra note 92, at
324 (reciprocal altruism provides adaptive advantage, and spreads beyond family to ever-
widening social groups).
115. Ken Grimes, To trust is human, NEW SCIENTIST, May 10, 2003, at 32, 34-35.
This is a developing branch of economics known as neuroeconomics. Oxytocin
production occurs outside the large frontal cortex, implying that trust is a primitive and
instinctive human reaction. Id. at 35, (quoting Paul Zak of Claremont Graduate
University). Neuroeconomics contradicts classical theories such as the Nash equilibrium
which posits that the level of trust should be zero. Id. at 33. (Nash was the
mathematician whose life was chronicled in the movie A Beautiful Mind.).
116. James Randerson, Primates reveal a sense offair play, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 20,
2003, at 19. Brain scans of humans suggest that unfairness is a primitive concept and
may override higher-level brain functions. Id. (explaining why some angry franchisees
may attempt to "bring down the house" when they perceive unfair treatment).
117. Don DeBolt, Peace Prize: Franchisees, franchisors learn cooperation fiuels
prosperity of business, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 23, 2002, at 26.
118. Valpak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc., Buy a franchise, join a family!
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collective "Family" replaces the hierarchal "Parent":
"As one of our Franchisees, you'll feel like a valued member of a
family... entrepreneurs who receive the personal attention, training, and
support they need to succeed."" 9
B. Partnership
Franchising is presented to the prospective franchisee as a
partnership, and franchisor sales ads tout their "Passion for
Partnership"'120 and claim that "We're looking for A Few Good Partners
.... Find out if you could be a... Strategic Partner.' 121 One franchisor
website claims: "Franchising to Chem-Dry is all about being in a
partnership."' 22 A Buffalo wing franchisor says: "We're not just looking
to add stores, we want to add partners."'' 23 It is not simply innocent
franchisees who are deceived: Harvard Business School Professor
Jeffrey Bradach claims that the "Contractual Relationship" in a company
is that of an "Employee" while the "Contractual Relationship" of a
franchise is "Partner."' 124 Bradach adds: "different kinds of contracts
support different types of relationships--company employees are
subordinates of the chain operator, and franchisees are partners with the
chain operator ... the chain operator-franchisee relationship [is] a
partnership between owners."'
' 25
IFA's representative has testified before Congress about partnership
and family, but franchisors exhibit behavior which would not live up to
the standards of the most dysfunctional family. Judge Easterbrook
observes that "[p]arties to a contract are not each other's fiduciaries; they
are not bound to treat customers with the same consideration reserved for
their families.' 26 The problem with this analysis in the franchise context
(Advertisement), in FRANCHISE TIMES, April 2003, at 29.
119. Great Earth Vitamin Stores, We Are Family (Advertisement), in ENTREPRENEUR,
March 2001, at 120.
120. Country Kitchen, A Passion For Partnership (Advertisement), in NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 16, 2002, at 101 (quoting franchisee Zach Trupos: "they treat
you like a partner, not just a business associate.").
121. Max & Erma's, We're Looking for A Few Good Partners, (Advertisement), in
FRANCHISE TIMES, April 2003, at 29.
122. Q & A on ChemDry by FRANCHISE WORLD MAGAZINE available at
http://www.chemdry.co.uk/interview.html (last visited July 30, 2001).
123. Lori Lohmeyer, Mo-Joe's spreads wings with franchise plans, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 25, 2003, at 62.
124. JEFFREY L. BRADACH, FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS 32 (1998).
125. Id. at 33. The methodological flaws of Bradach's work stem from a naive view
of the franchise relationship and how both sides maneuver to advance their interests.
Bradach is not an accurate source, but is an (unintentionally) amusing one.
126. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990).
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is that there are gullible marks who believe they are joining, if not a
family, at least a partnership. One franchisor attorney noted that she
discouraged clients from speaking of the relationship as a "partnership"
precisely because such a term as a matter of law does not reflect the
franchisor-franchisee relationship. 27  The law imposes far more
responsibility on Partners than mere parties to a contract.128
Partners have obligations both legal and moral, as Judge Cardozo
famously noted:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior. 
129
A similar result has been reached in Australia. Hungry Jack's30 (a
Burger King case) contains a discussion of Australian law on partnership
and fiduciary relationships where courts held that:
If the joint venture takes the form of a partnership ... the joint
venturers will be under fiduciary duties to one another, including
fiduciary duties in relation to property the subject of the joint venture,
which are the ordinary incidents of the partnership relationship,
though those fiduciary duties will be moulded to the character of the
particular relationship (citation omitted).
131
127. Susan Grueneberg, Remarks at Understanding Franchising: Business & Legal
Issues, Practising Law Institute (June 12, 2001). Two authors distinguished the
relationship noting that, "[t]he business relationship must be one of a partnership (not a
legal partnership) where franchisees have input on those matters that are of concern to
them." See JUSTIS & VINCENT, supra note 6, at 323. But even as distinguished,
partnership is more than simply having input. Franchisors deliberately misrepresent this
to franchise prospects, and many prospects are foolish enough to believe them.
128. Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) § 21 (partner accountable as a fiduciary);
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) § 404 (partners owe duty of loyalty and duty
of care); RUPA § 405 cmt. 1 (partners can sue partners for violation of a duty to the
partnership). This analysis is particularly relevant in the area of encroachment: "A
partner may not compete with the partnership without the permission of the other
partners. [A] partner in... an automobile dealership cannot open a competing
automobile dealership without.., her partners' permission." HENRY R. CHEESEMAN,
BUSINESs LAW 572 (3d ed. 1998).
129. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
130. Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd v. Burger King Corp, 1999 NSW LEXIS 61 (Sup. Ct. of
New South Wales, Equity Division, Commercial List). In Hungry Jack's, the court found
that Burger King owed a fiduciary duty to the regional master franchisee. Id.
131. Id. at *285-86 (quoting United Dominions Corp. Ltd. v. Brian Pty Ltd & Ors,
157 CLR 1, 10-11 (1985)).
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Conversely, the Court cited the distributorship case of Hospital Products
stated that "the fact that the arrangement between the parties was of a
purely commercial kind, and that they had dealt at arm's length and on
an equal footing, had consistently been regarded by the High Court as
important, if not decisive, in indicating that no fiduciary duty arose. ' 32
The recurrent themes of "partnership" and "family" are misleading
and legally incorrect. Salesmen use kinship metaphors because they are
effective.133  Franchisees hear explicit representations of the
partnership/family canard, and are induced to rely on those
representations by franchise salespersons who know them to be false.
Franchisors make "family" representations with impunity, since such
statements are too vague to support a cause of action. 134 Franchisor
salespeople are told: "Get them to make a decision on the spot. Talk to
them like they're already owners. Trap them. Get them to say yeses.
Work the angles!' ' 135 A former President of the IFA illustrates how
"paternal" franchisors work the angles, as well as knowingly misstate the
law, in a story about a sales meeting he attended. The former IFA
President was in a meeting with his franchisor client and a prospective
franchisee who was reluctant to sign the check to purchase a franchise.
The franchisor spoke to the prospective franchisee "in an understanding,
almost paternal, fashion" and "[y]et, the check still lay unsigned."'' 36 The
former IFA President realized that he had to do something:
It was then that I remembered something.., explained to me many
years ago at an IFA convention. I wondered aloud, "What about
never closing the deal? Remember, you have to get the check every
month?"
[The franchisor] picked up on my comment. "That's right. With a
franchise, you never really sell anything. You don't close the deal
132. Hungry Jacks, 1999 NSW LEXIS 61 at *273-274 (quoting Hospital Products
Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 156 CLR 41, 70 (1984)). Accord, Ontario Ltd. v.
Bulk Barn Foods Ltd., 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1945, at *8 (Ontario Super. Ct. of
Justice, Divisional Court, 2000) (Courts should be slow to impose fiduciary duties where
"relationship is between commercial entities governed by the terms of a contract,"
quoting Scott v. Trophy Foods Inc., 123 D.L.R. (4th) 509, 528 (Nova Scotia Ct. of App.,
1995).
133. See PINKER, supra note 25, at 247 (citing G.R. JOHNSON, S.H. RATWICK & T.J.
SAWYER, The evocative significance of kin terms in patriotic speech, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM (V. Reynolds, V. Falger & I. Vine, eds., 1987).
134. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 837 (D. Minn. 1989).
135. Behar, supra note 46, at 130 (quoting Subway sales director Don Fertman).
Subway has since changed its sales approach and now encourages prospects to carefully
consider their decision before making a franchise purchase.
136. Jerry Wilkerson, True Confessions of a Franchise Sales Executive, FRANCHISE
RECRUITERS LTD. NEWSL. 2001, at 1,2.
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with this check," [the franchisor] stated, pointing to the [franchisee's
still-unsigned check]. "You simply start the relationship process.
Every month we have to get the check, earn the check, give you a
reason to send the check for your royalty payment. It is our
responsibility to keep you in business, profitable ... this is what
you're buying into, why you send us the monthly check .... 137
As a matter of law, the former IFA President is wrong, as the
franchisee will quickly discover should the franchisee ever decide-for
any reason-to stop sending the monthly check (in fact, the large
franchisors take royalties directly from the franchisee's bank account). 138
If the franchisor fails "to get the check every month," the franchisor will
promptly file suit at the courthouse down the road from franchisor
headquarters; the franchisee will have to travel whatever distance is
necessary to defend the action. The franchisee's recitation of the above-
mentioned conversation will not sway the judge, and franchisors
deprived of royalties are not noted for being understanding, let alone
paternal. If the franchisee dares to challenge the authority of the
"paternal" franchisor, the franchisee will be disowned (terminated) by
the "parent" and the franchise re-sold to another victim. If the franchisee
fails to remit the check one month in reliance on the former IFA
President's statement, the franchisor would simply point to the
contractual obligation to remit the monthly check, and exclude the
former IFA President's statement by pointing to the integration clause.
If the franchisee stops paying royalties the franchise will be
terminated. 139 The franchisee will be forced to pay the withheld royalties
and may even be sued for royalties which would have been due if the
franchise agreement had run its term; one franchise attorney refers to this
as "the pot of gold a franchisor may see at the end of the rainbow when it
terminates a franchise agreement., 140 In TCBY Systems, Inc. v. RSP Co.,
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Behar, supra note 46, at 132 (discussing franchisee threats to withhold
royalty monies, noting franchisor directly debits franchisee bank accounts).
139. Contrary to the former IFA President's assertion, not only do franchisors not
have to "earn" the royalty check, the franchisor can actively mismanage the brand and
push franchisees to bankruptcy without forfeiting the check. See Amy Zuber, Burger
King Gets $70M From Diageo, But Company, Franchisees Still Struggle, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, July 23, 2001, at 1 (franchisee attorney Robert Zarco claims inept
franchisor damaged brand and then terminated franchisees unable to pay royalties due to
resultant sales decline).
140. Rupert M. Barkoff, Damage Awards: 'Burger King v. Hinton'-A 'PIP' of a
Decision, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 2002 at 3, 15. (noting modification of historical contract law
principle that franchisor could recover present value of future revenue stream lost due to
franchisee cessation of operations). See also Dennis R. LaFiura & David S. Sager,
Liquidated Damages Provisions and the Case For Routine Enforcement, 20 FRANCHISE
L.J. 175, 177 (2001).
[Vol. 109:1
BEGUILING HERESY
Inc., 141 a frozen yogurt franchisee chose a location in central Minnesota.
The franchisor, which boasted of its expertise in site selection, approved
the site despite the fact that it did not meet the franchisor's own criteria
in multiple respects. 142 It refused to approve the franchisee's request to
add "cold weather" items, no small matter for a frozen yogurt store in
Minnesota, and the franchise failed, whereupon the franchisor attempted
to sue for lost royalties for both the contract term and the renewal
period. 143 Even where the franchisee is working for little or no money,
he must continue to work-and pay royalties to the franchisor--or risk a
judicial order, requiring payment of "lost" royalties and advertising fees
for the entire term of the agreement. In refusing to grant one franchisor's
demands, a California court noted:
[don't] do everything... the franchisor demands and the franchisee
risks declaration of a "material breach" backed up by the whip of a
giant "lost future profits" award. Such an award would leave the
franchisee enslaved for 5 or 10 or 20 years.144
If the franchise agreement contains a liquidated damages clause, the
franchisor can recover "lost profits," not suffer any deduction for
expenses not incurred, and then open up a new franchise in the area. If
the franchisee does not have an exclusive territory, the franchisor may
encroach at will, put the franchisee into a cash squeeze, and then claim
breach when the franchisee is unable to pay royalties. Termination
notices provide little or no time for a franchisee to sell his interest. 145 A
terminated franchisee will loose his entire investment, be sued for past
due and future royalties, and have to find a job not prohibited by the
noncompete clause, continuing to toil for the franchisor long after the
franchisor has located a new crop of franchisees. A savvy franchisor
such as Allied Domecq (Dunkin Donuts, Baskin Robbins, Togo's) will
show a franchisee a copy of the Encroachment Impact Policy to induce
the franchisee to waive legal rights by assuring the prospect that the
franchisor will not encroach on the franchisee. After the franchisee
complies with franchisor demands, the franchisor will site stores in
violation of its own Encroachment Policy (after directing the
"independent" analyst to rework numbers to show no impact) and then
hide behind the integration clause of the franchise agreement to saturate
141. 33 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 927.
143. Id. at 927-28. The Arkansas jury found for the franchisee and awarded $70,000
in damages. Id.
144. Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 375 (Ct. App. 1996).
145. Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Taseski, 47 F. Supp. 2d 867, 875 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(citing Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 495 A.2d 66, 72 (N.J.
1985); KFC Corp., v. Goldey, 714 F. Supp. 264, 266 (W.D. Ky. 1989)).
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the market, thereby driving the franchisee out of business and into such
penury that the franchisee cannot afford to pay an attorney. 146 Not only
will the court rule that the franchisor is not a partner, the court will
express doubt that the franchisor is bound by the word of the franchisor
salesman. 1
47
Allied Domecq is one of the most litigious franchisors. One news
report referred to the "Dunkin' lawsuit barrage... an extraordinary wave
of at least 350 lawsuits initiated by [Dunkin'] against its franchisees...
by comparison, McDonald's Corp. reportedly had sued only about a
dozen of its franchisees over the same period."'148 But Allied Domecq's
methods have been successful in court. Allied Domecq, lawsuit barrage
notwithstanding, remains a member in good standing of the IFA, with the
IFA opposing giving franchisees a private right of action on the grounds
that "court should be the last place to resolve disputes."'149 What the
franchise industry has been slow to recognize is that franchisor litigation
is frequently counterproductive. Dunkin's devotion to litigation takes
away time better spent addressing the competitive pressures of invasions
by Krispy Kreme from North Carolina and Tim Horton from Canada.
One franchisor lawyer noted that during the "Golden Age of Subway
Arbitration Cases" some franchisees "would certainly rather fight than
make sandwiches."' 50 Ultimately, Subway's parent company initiated a
number of changes designed to introduce more transparency, more
franchisee input, and less adversarial methods of dispute resolution; the
chain subsequently experienced record growth.' 51 Allied Domecq, which
has followed the Subway pattern in some respects, recently brought in a
new CEO who has indicated a desire to have a less litigious relationship
with franchisees. 152  But franchisees should not be forced to rely on
146. Harford Donuts, Inc. v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., No. CIV. L-98-3668, 2001 WL
403473, at *3-6 (D. Md. 2001).
147. Id. at *5 n.13.
148. Richard Martin, Franchisee Sentenced Amid Dunkin' Lawsuit Barrage,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 28, 2003 at 4.
149. Don J. DeBolt, If it Ain't Broke: Gov't Needs to Stop 'Fixing' Franchising,
Leave Existing Laws Alone, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 26, 2000, at 56.
150. Arthur Pressman, Arbitration under attack-Has the pendulum swung?,
FRANCHISE TIMES, May 2003, at 45. For a list of the Subway cases, see Dunham, supra
note 90, at 93, n.22.
151. Lori Doss, Sub standard no longer: Subway rolls unit design upgrade: New look
aimed at turning nation's biggest into stylish, fast-casual player, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, March 11, 2002 at 8 (noting that the recent growth rate was 7 times higher than
competitors, and that due to the "long history of skating on thin ice with franchisees"
Subway's creative director sought out franchisee input for store remodeling plan).
152. Lohmeyer, supra note 46, at 85 (positive franchisee comments on new CEO Jon
Luther). Steve Horn remains general counsel, and Luther denies that the litigation and
restructuring are related. See Jon Luther Allied Domecq CEO: lawsuits not related to
restructuring, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at 27.
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franchisor decisions (whether motivated by conscience or economics) to
refrain from abusive relationship practices.
Franchisors are aware of the combined effect of the lack of
regulatory vigor coupled with franchisors' vigorous enforcement of the
merger and integration clause. Although the integration clause is not
dispositive of a claim for fraud in the inducement, 53 it does provide a
significant shield which courts are reluctant to penetrate. 54  Courts
refuse to permit evidence of prior negotiations even after conceding that
contracts cannot be "isolated from the objective matrix of facts in which
they were set." 1 55  So franchisors are free to represent the franchise
relationship as a "partnership" in which the franchisee is "given a
reason" to send a royalty check to the "paternal" franchisor which must
constantly strive to "earn" that check.
Franchisors have long infantilized their franchisees; Hadfield's
examples from the 1970's are mirrored by franchisors today. As
illustrated by the story of the former IFA President, the process begins
with paternalism, and then proceeds to inducing the franchisee to enter
into a contract of adhesion in which the franchisee is committed to
ongoing royalty payments. In addition to royalty payments, the
franchisee often surrenders control of his or her future. Lease rights are
the property of the franchisor, customer lists are the property of the
franchisor, and telephone numbers 156 are the property of the franchisor.
The logo sign on the door, paid for by the franchisee, may only be
displayed with permission of the franchisor. Equipment used in the
franchise operation, emblazoned with the franchisor logo, may only be
displayed with the permission of the franchisor. The very ability of the
153. Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D. Md. 1989)
(citing Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 554 F.2d 623, 630 (4th Cir. 1977)).
154. Many jurisdictions follow a variant of the "New York Rule": Fraudulent
inducement claim barred by parol evidence rule where claim alleges: (1) Oral promise
not "collateral or extraneous" to contract, or (2) promise as to "future expectations", or
(3) oral promise within Statute of Frauds, Thomas J. Dougherty & Wystan M. Ackerman,
When Fraud Claims are Barred By the Parol Evidence Rule Under New York Law, N.Y.
Bus. L.J., Fall 2002, at 43.
155. Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 3 All E.R. 237, 239 (Lord Wilberforce).
156. On economic value of phone numbers, esp. toll-free alphanumeric, see In re
Dial-A-Matress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Dial-A-Mattress
Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding phone number 800-
MATTRES entitled to trademark protection); Zockoll Group Ltd. v. Telecom Eireann,
1995/9781 P (Transcript), (High Ct., Nov. 28, 1997) (discussing introduction of
alphanumeric in Ireland, noting that in the U.S. "Hopeless romantics may avail
themselves of the services of a florist by dialing 1-800 FLOWERS" and use of 800 #s in
franchising in U.S. and Ireland); see also In re Security Investment Properties, Inc., 559
F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1977) ("numbers constitute a unique property interest"); In re
Fountainbleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975) ("telephone numbers are
a valuable asset").
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franchisee to earn a living in the franchisee's chosen vocation depends
on the good graces of the franchisor by way of a non-compete clause,
which survives even if the franchisee does not. Even the spouse of the
franchisee may be controlled by the franchisor via spousal guarantees
and covenants. 1
57
Infantilization of franchisees serves several purposes in both pre and
post-sale periods. Pre-sale, the most common use is to persuade the
prospective franchisee to let down her guard; to trust the verbal
representations of "Father Franchisor" in the face of an integration
clause, which belies the illusory familial bliss of the franchisor's sales
pitch.' 58 Post-sale, infantilization is useful both as a "Father Knows
Best" defense to an arbitrator (or legislator) determined to rein in abuse
of franchisor discretion, and to reconcile the moral cognitive dissonance
caused by franchisor abuse. Artfully drafted franchise contracts may
provide an impregnable legal fortress, but the "because the contract says
I can" argument does not address the human need to feel that one is a
morally worthy person.
Parent-child relationships can take a counterintuitive cast where the
parent with the power believes all acts are justified: suttee has been
accepted practice in cultures where parents believed the practice to be
morally righteous.' 59 Driving a franchisee into financial ruin is not on a
par with suttee (although an Australian legislator said it had driven
franchisees to suicide), 60 but abusive practices will cause pangs of
conscience among at least a few members of the franchisor's staff. As a
business matter, moreover, a parent has a finite number of children while
a franchisor can replace franchisees, albeit at a potentially higher
discount rate. In a large, mobile society the ease with which franchisees
can be replaced greatly reduces any penalties for franchisor
overreaching.'16 Franchisees resisting franchisor opportunism and abuse
are often told to sell their franchise or be terminated and/or encroached:
as one McDonald's franchisee was told by McDonald's, "one of us has
157. Patrick L. Abramowich, Spousal guaranty Q&A for franchisors, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Apr. 2002, at 39 ("Courts routinely enforce spousal guarantees").
158. A rare example of a franchisor cognizant of this is the Midas executive who said
"life isn't about contracts, it's about trust." Brandon Copple, Life Is About Trust: when
you are in the franchising business, a little love and tenderness goes a long way. Just ask
those muffler shop owners, FORBES, Jan 11, 1999 available at 1999 WL 2046117
(quoting Midas CEO Wendell Province).
159. LUTHERAN CYCLOPEDIA 1020 (Erwin Lueker, ed.) (1954).
160. Philip F. Zeidman, Shattering the myths, FRANCHISE TIMES, Apr. 2002, at 27
(regarding Hannaford Seedmaster Services franchisor).
161. Cf LouISE BARRETT, ROBIN DUNBAR, & JOHN LYCETT, HUMAN EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY 254 (2002) ("Freeriders can stay one step ahead of discovery in large
populations because there are always new naive individuals to exploit.").
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to go and it sure isn't going to be US.
' 162
C. Franchise Success/Failure Rates
Franchising is ubiquitous in America and covers everything from
dating services' 6 3 to caskets 164 to yoga 16 5 to cattle semen. 166 McDonald's
paid to be included in the top-selling Sim City which allows players to
become "virtual franchisees,"' 67 and the latest fad is parents buying their
children "The Ultimate Graduation Gift: Your Very Own Franchise."'
168
In the 1984 comedy Ghostbusters, one of the characters takes out a
mortgage to get money to establish a business chasing ghosts. He is
reassured of success by the Bill Murray character, who tells the nervous
borrower: "The franchise rights alone will make us rich beyond our
wildest dreams.' ' 169 By 2001, one of the franchisors at the International
Franchise Expo was the Aura Shop, "which allows franchisees to scan
their customers' aura and then sell them products that can balance and
energize the body and soul.' 170 By 2003 Space Aliens Bar & Grill was
162. Far Horizons Pty Ltd. v. McDonald's Australia Ltd. (2000) V.S.C. 310;
BC200004860.
163. Singles start setting dates with destiny, FRANCHISE TIMES, Jan. 2002, at 11.
164. Mike Hendricks, Getting a discount on death, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 18,
2001, at B1.
165. Vanessa Grigoriadis, Controlled Breathing In the Extreme, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, at 9 (California yoga instructor took 26 of yoga's 84 positions, copyrighted the
program, and is now seeking to franchise the 2600 year-old discipline. The yogi has
threatened legal action against competitors, so apparently even yoga is not immune to the
adversarial nature of franchising.).
166. Dan Morse, Fast-Food Franchise Securitized Loans Lose Their Sizzle, WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2000, at B2 (describing cattle rancher planning to franchise ranching).
167. Matt Richtel, Product Placements Go Interactive in Video Games, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2002, at Cl. McDonald's paid Electronic Arts for placement in the popular
Sims Online game. Id. Since McDonald's paid for placement, it is unlikely that the
"franchisee" will suffer virtual encroachment or virtual termination. Id.
168. Jacob Bunge, The Ultimate Graduation Gift: Your Very Own Franchise,
FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept. 2002, at 16. The converse is children buying franchises for
parents: when Sharon Stone wanted to buy her mother an Auntie Anne's pretzel
franchise, she became angered when told that the franchisee, not the relative of the
franchisee, must personally buy the franchise. Stone angrily asked founder Anne Beiler
"do you know who I am?" Beiler, a conservative Mennonite, had never heard of the
actress and told Sharon Stone "no, I've never heard of you." See Julie Bennett, Don't try
this Alone: Amazing Acts of Daring and Denseness by Franchisees, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Aug. 2003, at 10, 42. Actor Jason Priestley (Beverly Hills 90210) and Chicago Bears
punter Brad Maynard were more successful in their efforts at becoming franchisees,
buying Roly Poly sandwich outlets. See Roly Poly Signs Celebs to Pact for Indianapolis,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 24, 2002 at 164. Akinola Olajuwon (brother of
basketball star Hakeem Olajuwon) was less successful, filing for Chapter 11 when his
Denny's restaurant holdings failed. See Dan Morse, supra note 166.
169. GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984).
170. IFE provides one-stop shopping for serious franchisees, FRANCHISE TIMES, Aug.
2001, at 9.
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pitching franchises.'
7 1
A survey found that 70% of Americans felt they knew enough about
franchising to explain it to others. 72  This attitude has enabled the
franchise industry to sell to unsophisticated purchasers, and led to a
perception which feeds into franchisor sales pitches presenting
franchising as a surefire road to entrepreneurial success. The president
of the International Franchise Association urges "those who received
pink slips" to buy a franchise:
[T]he odds of succeeding are favorable for two reasons. First,
franchises allow individuals to take charge of their careers, their
financial destinies, and their lives ... putting money into a franchised
small business offers more control over the return than a passive
investment in a volatile stock market can offer .... [Second],
consumer confidence [in franchised brands] makes a franchise
business a good investment and one that will be more stable than an
independent business in a sluggish economy. 73
Anyone who has ever been subject to the strictures of a franchisor
might dispute the notion that a franchisee controls her own destiny.
Consumer confidence in a brand makes for a wealthy franchisor; as
many a franchisee knows, that does not necessarily make for a wealthy
franchisee. The more successful the franchised brand, the less likely it is
that the consumer purchasing a franchise will question the outlet's
profitability. While the New York Attorney General may speak of
franchise ownership as the "American Dream," Subway founder Fred
DeLuca, a billionaire who has fought his franchisees all the way to the
U.S. Supreme Court, told a reporter that when his franchisees lose money
"I don't lose sleep over it[,] [t]his is America."'
' 74
Franchises sell based on perception of success, not reality. 175 A
prospect sees a franchise that has been in business for a few years and
does not realize that it has had multiple owners and the current owner is
there only because he has no option other than going bankrupt or selling
out at a major loss (which may ultimately result in bankruptcy). A
former franchise salesman noted: "[i]t becomes like the battered-wife
171. Nancy Weingartner, Mothership seeks Space Aliens, FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept.
2003, at 11.
172. Michael E. Cobo, How Potential Jurors View Franchising, 21 FRANCHISE L.J.
182 (2002) (analyzing nationwide sample of persons qualified to serve as jurors).
173. Don DeBolt, Layoffs, slower economy focus attention on franchised businesses
as career alternative, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, at 23.
174. Behar, supra note 46, at 128.
175. See Judith Evans, Take a Good Look Before You Leap, WASHINGTON POST, June




syndrome, where tomorrow will be a better day. And people refuse to
leave and accept the failure."'
17 6
The interplay between perception and behavior is complex, and the
motivating force of illusions may overcome the encyclopedic offering
circular. 77 The very form of the offering circular results in prospective
purchasers' resort to heuristics biased towards underestimation of
franchisor overreaching.178 Misperceptions as to the true nature of the
franchise relationship are enough to create an overconfidence bias. Such
bias is almost assured when prospective franchisees believe the Federal
Trade Commission has vetted and is a watchdog over the franchisors.
Recent statements by the New York Attorney General's Office
praising franchising as "a fabulous opportunity for those people"' 79 are
just the most recent of a series going back at least 15 years 18° which are
quoted by franchisor supporters in "How To" books targeted at
prospective franchisees:
Government research indicates that the success rate for franchise-
owned endeavors is significantly better than the rate for non-
franchised owned small businesses. These same findings also show
that 80% of all new small businesses fail, many within the first year.
By contrast less than 2% of new franchises are discontinued over a
three-year period.' 
81
A British visitor to the FranInfo website is told that "91% of franchisees
report profitability .... Past experience is generally not a pre-requisite
[to buying a franchise]." 8 2 In a "Dear Prospective Franchisee" letter, the
franchisor of Beverly Hills Weight Loss & Wellness Centers
(headquartered in New Hampshire) lists "success rates of franchised
176. Behar, supra note 46, at 132 (quoting Steve Sager, a former New Jersey-based
agent for Subway).
177. Cf, STANLEY H. TEITELBAUM, ILLUSION AND DISILLUSIONMENT: CORE ISSUES IN
PSYCHOTHERAPY 129 (1999); ANTHONY ROBBINS, UNLIMITED POWER 35-52 (Fireside ed.
1997) (1986) (stating that the perception of objective reality is the result of the mental
state of the observer, which in turn alters the objective reality.).
178. For example, brand familiarity, system size, FTC "disclaimer" notice and formal
language style in UFOC. Heuristics are the techniques used when confronted with the
need to make a decision based on complex data and avoid "cognitive gridlock." See
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer et. al. eds., 1999).
179. See Kaufmann, supra note 22.
180. Robert L. Purvin, Franchising: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, in
FRANCHISING 101: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO EVALUATING, BUYING, AND GROWING YOUR
FRANCHISE BUSINESS 3 (Ann Dugan, ed., 1998) (citing Int'l Franchise Assn.,
FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1991; Dept. of Commerce, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY
1984-1986).
181. Erwin J. Keup, FRANCHISE BIBLE: HOW TO BUY A FRANCHISE OR FRANCHISE
YOUR OWN BUSINESS 6 (4th ed., 2000).
182. Franchising in the UK, available at http://www.franinfo.co.uk/
franchisinginuk.lasso (last visited June 19, 2004).
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businesses" at "95.6% in the first year alone" without providing any
documentation for the claim.' 83  In India, despite franchisor scandals
including complaints against the NIT184 and Skumars.com' 85 chains,
criminal charges against a Mumbai (Bombay) franchisor, 186 and the
arrest of a New Delhi franchisor, I8 7 prospects are being told that
"Franchising enjoys an 85 percent success rate in India."'
' 88
Despite the fact that cellular phones did not even exist in 1971, an
American cellular franchisor founded in 1994 distributed a promotional
brochure in 2000 containing a bright red box with the statement: "Since
1971, less than 5% of all franchises have failed or were discontinued
each year. By contrast ... 65% of independent business start-ups fail
within the first five years, U.S. Department of Commerce."'' 89  The
statement is in quotes, so a prospective franchisee would assume that the
U.S. Government had made a recent statement supporting the superiority
of franchising based on 29 years of data. Below the claim, the franchisor
displays a prominent IFA logo and says "we are registered and listed"
with the Small Business Administration Franchise Registry "which
provides stream lined review and processing" for financing. In the
Blenheim Expositions case, it was the IFA itself in 1992 which released
the results of a Gallup poll used by Blenheim in promoting the
International Franchise Expo:
If you buy a Franchise Business, your chances of success are 94%!
THAT'S A FACT, according to a recent Gallup poll. Conversely,
it's estimated that only 35% of independent business start-ups survive
5 years.'90
183. Letter from the franchisor of Beverly Hills Weight Loss & Wellness Centers to
the author (Feb. 27, 2001) (on file with author).
184. NJIT's Franchisees Facing Shutdown, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 27, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 25386166. The franchisor of education centers kept 47% of net receipts, and
the head of the franchisees' association also attributed difficulties to franchisor
mismanagement. Id.
185. Saikat Chatterjee, Skumars.com Shelves VSA TPlan, to Focus on Fibre, TIMES OF
INDIA, Jan. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2265452. The franchisees were promised
refunds, but did not receive them, 1400 franchisees were affected. Id.
186. Makarand Gadgil, Franchisees Sue Bombay Bazaar, TIMES OF INDIA, Nov. 1,
2002, available at 2002 WL 102341904 (noting that franchisees were issued refunds, but
the checks bounced).
187. Zap Official gets Bail, Police Asked to File Reply by July 26, TIMES OF INDIA,
June. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 21136196.
188. Leading Edge/Deepanjali Bhas., Primary Healthcare is a Cottage Industr, TIMES
OF INDIA, Apr. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WL 19676657.
189. Brochure from, @WIRELESS, FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES: A COMPLETE TURN-KEY
RETAIL SOLUTION IN ONE OF TODAY'S HOTTEST MARKETS! (brochure on file with author,
undated, received May 2000).
190. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Franchise Show Promoter Agrees to
Settle FTC Charges of Misrepresenting Earnings and Success Rates of Franchises (Sept.
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The FTC found the statement to be false, and charged that even with a
skewed sample "the actual results of the Gallup poll do not support the
claims. ' ' 191 The FTC Director of Consumer Protection noted:
"Misinformation about the likelihood of success as a franchisee is of
particular concern given the sizable investments that are often required to
purchase a franchise."' 92 An FTC Commissioner told a gathering of
franchise attorneys that "it truly is in everyone's best interest not to tout
overly optimistic success claims."'
' 93
The imprimatur of the state Attorney General or the federal
government' 94 is particularly effective for unsophisticated purchasers
who are led to believe that franchising offers (depending on the "data"
cited) represent a 94% or 98% success rate after three years while being
told that starting their own business is a doomed endeavor. However, as
outlined in a Congressional staff memorandum, empirical data does not
support franchise industry claims. 195 A 1993 study by the American
Association of Franchisees and Dealers showed that only 31% of
franchisors themselves were still in business after five years. 96 If the
majority of franchisors are unable to stay in business, it is difficult to see
how franchisees can have a 98% success rate. Note that many franchises
are restaurant franchises,' 97 and a study of restaurants in Columbus, Ohio
revealed that the failure rates were 37% for chains and 38% for
independents. 98 Given the inability of many franchisors to stay in
business, it is no wonder that one of the largest franchisor-side law firms
opposes requiring disclosure to prospective franchisees of bankruptcy
27, 1995) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9509/bexpo.htm.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Commissioner Christine A. Varney, FTC Franchise Review, Address before the
ABA 1995 Forum on Franchising (Oct. 13, 1995), available at
http://www.fic.gov/speeches/varney/casdocx.htm (last visited June 19, 2004).
194. Even after success rates have been debunked, the government still announces
that there are opportunities in Arab nations because they "have recognized that in most
instances franchise operations are relatively safe and profitable." Export America
GLOBAL NEWS LINE at www.trade.gov/exportamerica/Volume%202/
ea dec htmllgnl 1201.html (last visited June 19, 2004) (discussing the UAE).
195. Staff Memorandum to John J. LaFalce on Franchise Industry Research & Data
including Franchise Success/Failure Rates (Jan. 1994), reprinted in ROBERT L. PURVIN
JR., THE FRANCHISE FRAUD 236-253 (1994).
196. Purvin, supra note 180, at 4.
197. Amy Spector, IFA Confab Weighs Legal Complexity of Online Franchise
Marketing, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Mar. 12, 2001, at 4, 98 (Frandata analysis of
IFA membership showed 18% Quick Service Restaurant and 9% casual dining).
198. Cities that Sizzle: Columbus, Ohio, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 2001 at
46, 48. (Study by OSU hospitality professors). However, the nationwide picture showed
the pressure of chains on the independents, though not distinguishing between franchised
and company chain outlets. Id.
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information on a franchisor's predecessors and affiliates.1 99
What franchisee prospects will not hear from regulators is that
academic studies such as those conducted by Scott Shane at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 200 and Dr. Timothy Bates of
Wayne State University paint a different picture. Bates testified before
Congress that notwithstanding higher capitalization of franchisees, they
failed at a higher rate than independent businesses; after four years
61.3% of franchisees were still in operation versus 73.1% of independent
start-ups. 20 Franchisor data at best under-report failure since franchisors
define failure from the franchisor's perspective. For example,
franchisors will say that an outlet is a success because it has been in
business for three years without accounting for the fact that it has
changed hands four times and none of the franchisees was able to eke out
more than a subsistence living at best. Or the franchisor will consider the
outlet a success even though the franchisee is saving money by not
paying workers statutory wages, overtime, and social security
payments. 202 Or the franchisee's family is working for negligible pay in
order to keep the business afloat. There is also a distinction between
large and small franchisees: a small Burger King operator may be
permitted to go under while the franchisor attempts to keep larger
operators from the same fate.
20 3
To speak of franchising as a fabulous opportunity is meaningless
since "franchising is a method of commercial cloning, and it is as easy to
199. E-Mail from John W. Fitzgerald, Gray Plant Mooty Mooty & Bennett P.A., to
the Federal Trade Commn. (Jan. 31, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/comment04O.htm (opposing proposed § 436.5(1)).
The e-mail notes that the author's law firm represents more than 50 franchisors. Id. The
firm also lobbys on behalf of franchisors. See Kristine McKenzie, Legislation Opponents
Gather for Town Meeting, FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept. 2000 at 6 (noting that the law firm
arranged a franchisor meeting with Congressman Ramstad (R-MN)).
200. Purvin, supra note 180 at 4 (citing Scott A. Shane, HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM GROWTH AND SURVIVAL: A STUDY
OF NEW FRANCHISORS (1995)). For a discussion of Shane's subsequent study, see Janet
Sparks, Franchise Consultant of a New Breed Conducts Scientific Survey: Non-
exclusivity May be Hazardous to Franchisor's Health, FRANCHISE TIMES, June/July 2003,
at 51.
201. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 88 (statement of Timothy Bates,
College of Urban, Labor & Metropolitan Affairs, Wayne State Univ.).
202. For a multi-unit franchisee, this can amount to a large amount. See Waffle House
Franchisee Hit with $2.9M OTRuling, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 3, 2001, at 3.
At 100-unit franchisee Treetop Enterprises, managers claimed they worked 80-100 hours
per week. Cowan v. Treetop Enters., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 930 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
203. Diageo PLC Said to Weigh $2.2B BK Buyout Offer; Chain to Broker Operator
Bailouts, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 7, 2002, at 1, 74. The Taco Bell franchisor
took accounting charges of $26M to assist 1,000 financially weak U.S. outlets. See
Richard L. Papiernik, Tricon Outlines Strategies to Boost U.S. Sales, Grow Abroad,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 9, 2001, at 4, 87.
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clone a poor concept as a successful one, perhaps even easier. ' 2°4 Just as
there is a difference between a speculative penny stock and a solid blue-
chip, so too there is a difference between franchisors. Franchising is
seen as a lifeline by companies with poor management and poor business
plans. In 2001, Wall Street Deli announced that they might go out of
business; part of their rescue plan was to franchise company stores or
close them if no franchisees would buy.20 5 A recent example of this
phenomenon is the Cosi sandwich chain. By the time of its initial public
offering (IPO), the chain had already accumulated losses of $1.4 million
per store, 206 a substantial amount for locations which sell primarily
sandwiches and coffee. Ten weeks after raising $38.9 million in the IPO,
the company blamed bad weather and tightwad consumers for ongoing
losses.20 7 According to industry analysts, however, Cosi's "problems are
more fundamental" than operations, Cosi had a "grand plan.. . [that]
failed to gel. 208  But Cosi's chief executive Jay Wainwright found a
solution, he decided to craft a franchising plan.20 9 No doubt Cosi will
trumpet its 97 locations, snazzy ddcor, and prime locations, and
franchisees will be seduced by a poor concept which has accumulated net
losses of $114 million, 210 and is now seeking franchisees to bail out bad
management.
Success rates are also presented in a manner designed to mislead
prospective franchisees. Recent studies have shown that panels of law
students and judges make different decisions based on statistical data
presented in terms of probability rather than frequency. 211 The results
suggest that a franchisee presented with the claim that "franchises have a
2% failure rate" is more likely to dismiss the prospect of failure than one
presented with the claim that "3,000 franchisees failed out of 150,000."
Franchisors further seek to confuse prospects by not discussing
failure rates directly, but rather by using sales brokers to make claims.
For example, the Franchise.corn website tells prospects that "[a]ccording
to the Small Business Administration, less than 5% of all franchise units
fail each year. This is compared to 30% to 35% of small businesses
204. Purvin, supra note 180, at 4.
205. Wall Street Deli Expects Loss, Eyes 'Strategic Alternatives,' NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, July 2, 2001, at 12.
206. Louise Kramer, Overambitious Cosi Eats Its Words, CRAIN's N.Y. BUSINESS,
March 3-9, 2003 at 1, 32.




211. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, & Gerd Gigerenzer, Communicating Statistical
DNA Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 157 (2003). The study was conducted in Berlin,
but the paper cites U.S. studies. See id. at 153 n.34.
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which fail within the first year of operation." 212 Recall that the Franchise
Bible claims government statistics of less than 2% franchise failure rate
over 3 years, the @Wireless franchisor claims less than 5% franchise
failure per year, and a 65% independent business failure rate over 5
years. Franchisors use un-cited "government statistics" to prove
whatever they think will close the sale. On a recent visit to the website,
adjacent to the Franchise.com claim were the logos of various
franchisors including one for an Internet company promising that the
prospective franchisee can be "In Business in Minutes." 213  The
Franchise.com broker also provides six reasons franchisees fail, all of
which relate to franchisee shortcomings such as lack of hard work or
undercapitalization; nowhere does the broker even suggest the possibility
of franchisor mismanagement.214
D. Earnings Claims
Understanding the difficulty with earnings claims also leads to a
better understanding of the imbalance in franchise law. Few people
would start a job without knowing what the salary was or what their
prospects for advancement at the company were. Few would invest in a
stock without some idea of the prospective earnings of the company and
the likelihood that the company was sound and would remain in
business. Few would invest in a franchise if clueless as to the profit
potential. The first thing a prospective investor asks the franchisor is
likely to be: "how much does the franchise cost, and how much can I
make?" Franchisors get around this conundrum in several ways. A
common approach of franchisors who want to avoid a direct answer is to
falsely state that the FTC prohibits making an earnings claim.21 5 Many
current franchisees are understandably reluctant to discuss their income,
and may be embarrassed to tell even close friends if the business is
failing.
In December 1994, the FTC brought three actions against franchise
promoters. Entrepreneur Media, Inc., parent of Entrepreneur
magazine 2 16 was cited for earnings claims violations 217 and assessed a
212. See Franchise.com available at http://www.franchise.com/fdc/template/
buyer/o2CResearchCenter.vma/z/display/78;jsessionld. =C37F72E I CF89F8CA677C9D
87B093FC91.jvml. The claim is not further attributed, making it impossible to
determine the accuracy of the claim, and the context of the purported assertion. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. "[The] Rule does not compel franchisors to disclose such [earnings] information,
it does require that franchisors who choose to make earnings claims must provide
substantiation." Varney, supra note 193.
216. Entrepreneur Media also publishes Mexican and Japanese versions of
Entrepreneur, and conducts seminars. See entrepreneurmag.com available at
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$25,000 civil penalty.218 Shulman Promotions (Own Your Own Business
Shows) was cited for a similar violation and given a $10,000 penalty.
21 9
Blenheim Expositions, which ran the IFA Expo, was also cited for
"misrepresentations about results of Gallup Poll on franchisee
success. '22° No penalty was assessed, but Blenheim was required to
print and distribute the FTC publication A Consumer's Guide to Buying
A Franchise.22 1 Implicit in the title of the publication is recognition that
the majority view in the United States that franchise purchases are non-
consumer transactions is not accurate. Tens of thousands of consumers
purchase franchises, and for these non-commercial purchasers, the
statements of a government agency are influential.
Several years ago, the authors were involved in the initial public
offering of an Eatontown, New Jersey-based bagel franchise, and several
franchisees became clients of the firm. Posing as prospective purchasers,
we inquired of franchisees as to the state of their business. With one
notable exception, all the franchisees that provided an opinion provided a
favorable opinion. In discussions about these opinions with the
franchisor's CFO, the CFO immediately named the dissatisfied
franchisee and explained that the franchisor conducted anonymous
surveys to find out what their franchisees were saying to "prospective
buyers." The CFO also observed that the franchisee's candor was
foolish: who would buy the franchise if the franchisee bad-mouthed the
franchise? The truth was that most of the franchisees quickly lost most if
not all of their investment. The franchisor subsequently went into
bankruptcy.
In a 2003 Fairfield Research survey of 10,800 franchisees, 53% of
franchisees did not consider their business a financial success. 222 A total
http://www.entrepreneurmag.com/Home/HM Static/1,4472,about-history,00.html.
Entrepreneur Media is, not surprisingly, opposed to tightening the Franchise Rule as it
applies to trade shows. See Letter from John M. Tifford, Esq., Rudnick, Wolfe, Epstein
& Zeidman to Federal Trade Commission, available at
http://www.ftc.govibcp/franchise/comments/95tiffor.htm.
217. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N ENFORCEMENT OF THE FRANCHISE RULE, at 57, U.S.
General Accounting Office, GAO-01-776, July 31, 2001 [hereinafter GAO 2001 Report].
218. Id. at 50.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 57. At issue was a claim commonly made by the IFA regarding the
likelihood of success and average profits. Id. This is one of the few times the FTC
disagreed with the IFA, however obliquely. See Varney, supra note 193.
221. GAO 2001 Report at 50.
222. Richard Martin, Poll: Franchisees' Low Grades for Franchisors Even Lower
Among Sandwich Shop Operators, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEws, Aug. 18, 2003, at 3, 8.
Johnson Franchise Consulting, which paid for the survey, is headed by a former
Schlotzsky's master franchisee now involved in litigation with Schlotzsky's. Id. at 8, 90.
The survey was taken in May 2003 and results were tabulated from 1,000 randomly
selected responses, no responses were received from McDonald's or Pizza Hut
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of 73% of all franchisees said their profits were "lower" (29%) or "much
lower" (44%) than forecast, with 88% of sandwich franchisees reporting
their profits were "much lower.
223
The CEO of Fairfield Research reported that in surveys of other
industries he never received so many calls from survey subjects
concerned about confidentiality: "You could tell [the franchisees]
wanted to respond... but many were relatively hesitant, verging on
paranoia. 224  There are valid reasons why a franchisee will not say
anything negative to a stranger inquiring about the franchisor or the
franchise opportunity. The discretionary power of franchisors is
enormous. Franchisors frequently conduct audits of franchised outlets,
often on a monthly basis. Such audits have a host of subjective criteria.
Failure to achieve a specified score on the audit may result in penalties to
the franchisee, including termination, meaning the loss of the
franchisee's investment. In addition to the Harford Donuts case, the
authors have heard from franchisees of Allied Domecq and other systems
who allege selective enforcement of system standards and/or punitive
encroachment. Franchisees who bad-mouth their system to prospects
may even find themselves the target of a lawsuit for defamation or
tortuous interference.
225
Fast food remains the largest franchise category, with an investment
requirement of $100,000-250,000.226 The authors are aware of one
restaurant franchisee who told prospects referred by the franchisor that
they could earn 30% on their investment just as he did. An anonymous
post in an Internet chat room also states that a particular restaurant
franchisor's outlets earned 18% after taxes. Actual pre-tax income
figures according to the National Restaurant Association are 6% for full
service and 5% for limited service restaurants. 227 Franchisors often tout
franchising as a "proven concept." In one such representation, the court
found that "What had been 'proven' was that the concept of franchising
was capable of returning large sums to the franchisor.,
228
franchisees. Id. at 8.
223. Id. at 3.
224. Janet Sparks, Debate Open Over Franchisee Survey Results, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Aug. 2003, at 60.
225. Cf Magnetic Marketing Ltd. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., [1991] 38 C.P.R.
(3d) 540, 568-569 (B.C.S.C.) (discussing franchisee bad-mouthing of the franchisor, the
court noted that "misery loves company" and dismissed that portion of the franchisor's
counterclaim).
226. Julie Flaherty, By the Book: Individuality vs. Franchising, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2001, at CI, C4.
227. The Restaurant Industry Dollar (table), FRANCHISE TIMES, April 2001 at 26
(providing NRA Rest. Ind. Rpt 2000).
228. Cf Bateman v. Slatyer (Feb. 25, 1987) No. NSW G351 of 1985, Slip Opinion, at
18 (N.SW., Australia). Franchisee husband was flight attendant with no retail
[Vol. 109:1
BEGUILING HERESY
Exhibitors at franchise Expos are disproportionately less well-
known franchisors. 229 For such franchisors, the general perception of
franchising as a statistically better bet than a non-franchised business is
particularly important. Prospective franchisees are most likely to pay
attention to the "empirical" industry-wide data presented by the Expo
where there is a lack of franchise-specific information to inform a
purchase decision. 23  People tend to rely on such data most heavily
precisely when it is most foolish to do so.
Entrepreneur is hardly a paragon of journalistic objectivity, and the
trade show is not the place to go for objective information, but to the
uninitiated a newsstand magazine or a trade show affiliated with an
association is perceived as a neutral source for information. Making
earnings claims to financial and trade media outlets can be a means to
circumvent FTC strictures, provided that the franchisor is careful not to
directly give press clippings to franchisees. 23' For the FTC to pretend
that purchasers of (for example) food franchises do not read the leading
trade publication is disingenuous in light of the raft of franchisor
advertisements in the back of Nation's Restaurant News (NRN) every
week. When celebrity chef Wolfgang Puck announced plans to
franchise, one of his directors was making claims of 36% profit margins
in NRN before the offering circular was even filed with state
regulators. 232 Another food franchisor, California-based Farmer Boys,
announced its franchising push in an NRN interview making claims that
franchisees had recouped their investment capital within two years and
233had experienced no franchise failures.
As the American Franchisee Association noted, consumers see the
newspaper first and then hear the franchisor say that the FTC prohibits
experience. Id. Wife had worked in franchisor shop for two years. Id. As franchisees,
wife worked 6 days/week and husband worked in shop on flight layovers. Id. They
never showed a profit. Id.
229. Mary Jo Larson, From Gumbusting to Geeky Guys: Expo Offers a Peek at
Newest Franchises, FRANCHISE TIMES, June-July 2000, at 4 (reporting that she "saw more
large companies exhibiting this year ... [b]ut, as with most IFE trade shows, there were
the very small and very different franchisors in attendance").
230. Cf, Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are
Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS 373, 396 (2002). "Individuating information reduces the
perceived relevance of base rates, whereas the absence of individuating information
focuses attention on available base rates". Id.
231. FTC Informal Staff Advisory Opinion No. 97-5 (July 31, 1997). See also David
J. Kaufmann, Practice Commentaries, McKINNEY'S CONS. NY LAW Art. 33, §§ 680-695
at 370 (noting that a Wall Street Journal interview making earnings claims was not in
violation of NY law).
232. Amy Spector, Puck Express Expands Through Franchising, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, June 11, 2001, at 4.
233. Amy Spector, Farmer's [sic] Boy Cultivates Franchisees for Expansion,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, July 28, 2003, at 122.
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earnings claims, the result is that franchisors sell with a set of publicized
earnings claims they are contractually not liable for.234 Professor Robert
Perry interviewed Blimpie's executives who told Perry that in 1993 the
average store gross was $239,000.235 Perry dutifully repeated this in his
book The 50 Best Low Investment, High Profit Franchises, and Blimpie's
area developer used the book to sell franchises in northern California.2 36
When one of the franchisees sued for disclosure violations, Perry
testified on the franchisee's behalf and the franchisee won at arbitration.
Given the costs of arbitration, most franchisees would give up; the
victorious Blimpie's franchisee noted that the airfare and cost for a one-
week arbitration in New York was $20,000.237
So if the franchisor will not make a claim in the UFOC, and the
FTC tells franchisor trade shows to not make claims, and current
franchisees are reticent to discuss their earnings, how is the prospect
induced to buy? The "cocktail napkin" is a colloquialism that describes a
meeting in which the salesman writes a number on a piece of paper and
shows it to the prospective franchisee with a remark such as: "would
you be happy if you made this much?" Of course, "[t]he strange thing
about the napkin is that the franchisor always ends up with it." 238 A 2003
study disclosed that 44% of franchisee respondents said that profits were
less than portrayed.239 The general counsel to the IFA responded that
only about 20% of franchisors make earnings claims, and "[i]f all these
people are making illegal earnings claims I don't know why there are not
hundreds of lawsuits that reflect that." 240 The answer is twofold: most
people do not run to the courthouse in response to every franchisor
action, and even if franchisees are aware that the earnings claim is
illegal, proving a case in court is another matter; particularly in the face
of an integration clause, which would render the "cocktail napkin"
inadmissible, even if the franchisor was caught red-handed.
A franchisee not aware of the significance of an integration clause
will mistakenly believe the franchisor is telling the truth and can be held
accountable for the lies of the franchisor sales force. The court will look
to the "well-drafted disclosure agreement," and the FTC will take no
action so long as the UFOC disavows Article 19 earnings claims.
Ultimately, the FTC has moved towards refusing to mandate the
234. Letter from Susan P. Kezios, Am. Franchisee Ass'n, to the Sec'y of the FTC
(Apr. 30, 1997) available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/kezios62.htm.
235. Meanwhile, Over at Blimpie 's, FRANCHISE TIMES, June/July 2002, at 17.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 19.
238. JUSTIS & VINCENT, supra note 6, at 25.




inclusion of earnings claims in the UFOC. The move was applauded by
the IFA, which nonsensically added that "the FTC is in a unique position
to 'prompt' franchisors to voluntarily make earnings disclosures. 2 4'
A cautious franchisor will be certain to avoid language which would
trigger FTC action, and will be sure to maintain possession of the
cocktail napkin, as well as insert a merger and integration clause in the
franchise agreement explicitly disavowing all prior statements and
representations of the franchisor and the franchisor's agents.242 A 2001
DecisionQuest survey of 600 persons found that 63% agreed with the
statement: "[o]wning a franchise is a great way to get into business
without taking a lot of risk., 2 4 3 The pollster observed:
Of course, franchisor sales forces sound variations on this theme
everyday, and opponents of new franchise legislation.., frequently
observe that franchising is healthy and needs no more government
supervision precisely because the chances of success are far higher
than in an independent business. However, this is not the thrust of
any well-drafted disclosure document or franchise agreement ....244
A recent GAO report found that the FTC fails to take action except
in limited circumstances. Generally, the FTC does not pursue cases
against major franchisors, and even refers bona fide franchisor violations
to a private association of the largest franchisors; the foxes are guarding
the hen house.245 Furthermore, although the FTC does not regulate the
franchise relationship,246 and therefore has no basis to make a judgment
on the subject, the FTC told the GAO that there was no need to conduct a
247more widespread investigation. From the perspective of the FTC,
there is no problem with the franchise relationship, and hence no need to
241. Letter from Matthew R. Shay, IFA Chief Counsel, to the Sec'y of the FTC (May
16, 1997) available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/fina182.htm.
242. Integration clauses do not always defeat claim of earnings claim
misrepresentation, see Sheskier v. Blimpie Int'l, Inc., Am. Arb. Ass'n Case 13 114 00309
00 (applying NY law), discussed in AFA BLAST FAX, Dec. 2001 available at
www.franchsiee.org/blast.htm.
243. Cobo, supra note 172, at 184 (analyzing nationwide sample of persons qualified
to serve as jurors).
244. Id. 183. Cobo notes that "the long-standing franchisor message about the
attributes of this business form has apparently registered-perhaps too well." Id. at 182.
245. GAO 2001 Report at 7 (discussing the Alternative Rule Enforcement Program
operated by the National Franchise Council (NFC)). See also NFC-FTC Alternative Rule
Enforcement Program, available at http://www.nationalfranchisecouncil.org/
about/ftc.htm. NFC was a trade group of 16 large franchisors which broke away from the
IFA and subsequently was reabsorbed into the IFA. Janet Sparks, IFA/NFC Merger Ends
Long Dispute, FRANCHISE TIMES, April 2003, at 50.
246. GAO 2001 Report at 8: "FTC staff told us [GAO] that the FTC generally lacks
the authority to intervene in private franchise contracts and related relationship issues."
247. Id. at 42-43.
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investigate or regulate, which means there is no record of problems.
Even in the face of evidence from outside groups such as the American
Franchisee Association, the FTC's pro-franchisor paradigm blinds it to
post-sale overreaching. Psychologist James Hillman observed: "[t]he
'objective' idea we find in the pattern of data is also the 'subjective' idea
by means of which we see the data., 248 The GAO report raises serious
questions about the possibility of regulatory capture affecting the FTC's
view of the data.
E. Targeting Prospective Franchisees
The franchising industry has taken note of regulatory slumber, and
the consequence is that the least attractive franchisors seek out those
members of the society who are least able to enforce what few rights are
afforded them under the franchisor-drafted adhesion contract.
Franchisors are advised to target those with little business experience
such as young people and retired military, as well as "the corporate
dropout '249 whose 401(k) is a ready source of cash. 250 In an advertorial,
the IFA notes that 75% of franchisees spent less than $250,000, 70%
paid an initial fee of $30,000 or less, with fast-food fees averaging
$20,000.25
1
When in court, IFA members claim that franchisees are
sophisticated businesspeople, but the IFA's own data shows that
franchisees usually start with small amounts of money. A rare example
of a franchisor addressing this issue is the Blimpie Subs franchisor. In
targeting poor neighborhoods, the Blimpie Urban Initiative for
Leadership Development (BUILD) program solicited urban minorities
248. JAMES HILLMAN, RE-VISIONING PSYCHOLOGY 126 (1975).
249. MARY E. TOMZACK, TIPS & TRAPS WHEN BUYING A FRANCHISE 33 (1999). See
also Franchise Bug Bites Techies: Rather than Pound the Pavement, Pros Start Fix-it
Shops for Home Computers, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Oct. 7, 2002, at 18; see also, Louis
Uchitelle, Pink Slip? Now, It's All in a Day's Work, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 2001, at BU 1,
BU3 (noting that fired employees think "it is an opportunity to go out on their own ....
get control of their lives ... that used to mean [consulting] or buying a franchise...
neither was an easy road to success"); Beth Mattson-Teig, Franchisees Buck Economic
Woes, FRANCHISE TIMES, June-July 2001, at 46 (the "growing potential for layoffs is a big
incentive for self-employment, and the ability to control one's own destiny becomes
increasingly desirable").
250. SDCooper Company, "Use your 401K or Rollover IRA to fund your new
franchise," (Advertisement) in FRANCHISE TIMES, June/July 2003, at 53, also available at
www.sdcooper.com.
251. More Modest Proposals, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, May 5, 2002, (Sponsored
Section page 23). IFA also notes that 250 franchises need investments of less than
$50,000. See IFA, Press Release, Opening a Franchise Not As Costly As You Might
Think (Aug. 7, 2001) available at www.franchise.org/news/pr/08072001 .asp.
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for franchise ownership, and waived the $18,000 franchise fee.252
Viewing BUILD as an opportunity to develop a long-term relationship,
Blimpie required candidates to pass a screening interview, attend a
business development course, write a business plan, and find at least 5
possible franchise sites in addition to attending the standard franchisor
training program.253 BUILD garnered media attention because it is not
the normal franchisor practice.
Some franchisees are publicly traded corporations with sufficient
legal and financial resources to assess the viability of a particular
opportunity. 5  However, franchisors normally target downsized
employees, 255 retirees,256 or immigrant 257 franchisees. Immigrants may
place their trust in a recognized brand franchise, which may be misplaced
as "some large franchisors target unsophisticated franchisees. '' 258  In
Sbarro Holding, Inc. v. Shien Tien Yuan, a New York court described the
relationship between the immigrant franchisees and the franchisor as
"awesome" for the reliance placed by the franchisee on the franchisor.259
A Canadian court also observed:
The fifty plaintiffs in this case are all [franchisees] who operate Pizza
Pizza stores in Ontario. Many of these people have come to Canada
as immigrants or refugees, worked hard and saved money
scrupulously, and then invested their life savings in the purchase of a
Pizza Pizza outlet. Having obtained a franchise, they then work long
hours, often in arduous conditions, in an attempt to earn a living from
252. Blimpie Helps Franchisees Build Successful Businesses, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 6.
253. See id.
254. See James Peters, S&P Downgrades Credit Ratings of Eight Struggling
Operators, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, July 23, 2001, at 1, 11, 149 (noting that
AmeriKing is the largest Burger King franchisee with 379 units).
255. Blimpie Int'l, Inc., "Up-Size Yourself," (Advertisement) in NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, July 9, 2001, at 79. The ad provides: "[c]orporate down-sizing got
you down? Pick yourself up and call BLIMPIE". Id.
256. Kiplinger's Money Power, Want a franchise? Here is Advice, DESERET NEWS,
July 22, 2001, at M04 (asking if persons have cash and are looking for "structure and
purpose" after retirement).
257. Kaufmann, supra note 22 at 7 (citing Eric Dinallo, N.Y. Aty. General's Office,
Chief of the Bureau of Investor Protection & Securities).
258. Dale E. Cantone (Deputy Securities Commissioner, Maryland Attorney
General's Office), State Review of Franchise Offering Circulars: A Continuing Cost-
Benefit Assessment, THE FRANCHISE LAWYER, Spring 2000, at 1, 2. Accord, LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK § 8.2c2iii (2000) (discussing advertising); see also Hadfield, supra note 93,
at 961-63. Of course, some franchisees become unsophisticated when advantageous: the
"[franchisee] is neither uneducated nor unsophisticated despite his attempts in the witness
box to appear so." Timothy's Coffees of the World Inc. v. Switt, 94-CQ-050117, 1996
Ont. C.J. LEXIS 2543 at *16 (Ont. Ct. General Div. 1996).
259. See Sbarro Holding, Inc. v. Shien Tien Yuan, 445 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (1981).
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their stores ... the operation of a Pizza Pizza franchise is difficult
and stressful work indeed.
260
A professor of Law and Economics observed that rationality implies
that the participants "know the nature of the environment in which they
operate" and while complete knowledge may be lacking, participants
"are aware of the extent to which they are ignorant." 26' The president of
the IFA claims that he personally went to Subway's headquarters in 2002
"to check out the rumors that Subway sells franchises to uneducated
immigrants," and pronounced that Subway founder Fred DeLuca had
received a "bad rap" and "a sad hatchet job" in the press during the
1990s. 262 During the 1980s and '90s, the IFA exhibited no such concern:
the IFA visited Subway after the bad publicity caused the franchisor to
change its policies, and there is no other reported occasion where the
president of the IFA has investigated franchisor overreaching.
Subway's attitude change is commendable, but it does not alter the
fact that abuses occurred for decades while Subway was in the process of
growing into the largest restaurant franchise in the United States. The
rise of Subway in the wake of such abuses indicates the need for
legislative action to prevent recurrence. In 1998, the head of franchisee
training for Subway said that 30% to 50% of his franchisees were
immigrants, and when Subway began testing for English and basic math
proficiency, 35% of applicants failed the tests.263 Noting that many were
"clueless" about their obligation to make weekly royalty payments and
other matters, the Subway executive continued: "[o]ne-third of the
students have no illusions. The rest have huge gaps in knowledge, don't
do their homework, or don't know what questions to ask. It's mind
boggling.264
Particularly for unsophisticated individuals of lower socioeconomic
status, ownership of a household-name franchise conveys a degree of
status and may result in a non-rational purchase decision.265 At a recent
meeting of franchise attorneys, this author asked a prominent franchisor
attorney from Richmond, Virginia what he would say to an immigrant
franchisee with a limited command of English who did not comprehend
260. Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Limited, No. 93-CQ-33541, B85/93, 1995 Ont. C.J.
LEXIS 968 at *2 (Ont. Ct. of Justice 1995).
261. Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer & Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 235 (1990).
262. Julie Bennett, A Wild Ride: Subway's Rise to Respectability, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Oct. 2003, at 14, 17.
263. Behar, supra note 46, at 130.
264. Id.
265. Cf PINKER, supra note 25, at 303 (citing work of economist Robert Frank,
acquisition of status items).
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the UFOC but relied on the representations and reputation of a
nationally-known franchisor, which then took post-contractual advantage
of the franchisee. The franchisor attorney responded: "[t]ough." If
empathy is "the unseen glue that holds civilization together,, 266 lack of
empathy tears the franchise relationship apart.
Unsophisticated franchisees may be susceptible to a "halo effect"
where the discount rate ascribed to the franchising as an industry is
distorted by application of the discount rate ascribed to franchised
products.267 A powerful franchise brand further distorts analysis of the
franchise investment. The halo effect becomes particularly pronounced
at the level of the specific brand. Trademark owners are acutely aware of
reputational risk as applied to the brand value of the retailed product,
268
but inefficient dissemination of reputational data with regard to the
wholesaled product (franchises) mean that franchisors can benefit from
an unsophisticated consumer's perception that if Dunkin' has quality
donuts and if Burger King is concerned about the humane treatment of
cattle, then the consumer's positive perceptions of the brand carry over to
the consumer's perception of the franchise. Regardless of whether this is
a rational heuristic; it is a process which must be considered in the
regulation of the franchise industry.
Franchise attorney Andrew Selden, who represents some of the
largest franchisee associations in the United States, notes that the
household-name franchises attract naive individuals who ignore the
litigation history only to discover post-sale that they are at the mercy of
"systems where the franchisors have megalomaniacal attitudes... try
and control everything, and.., take opportunistic advantage of their
franchisees., 269 A Canadian court noted that one founder:
266. Judy Foreman, I Feel Your Pain, NY DAILY NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, at 43, 44
(quoting psychologist Andrew Meltzoff of the University of Washington).
267. This kind of cognitive bias is a form of anchoring. See Mark Snyder et al.,
Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social
Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 656 (1977) (finding that new
information was fit into preexisting conclusion).
268. Cf Mug Shot: Coffee Companies Prepare for a Roasting, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21,
2002, at 63 (stating that companies have to "give in to... spurious cries [of unfairness to
growers], unless they want to gamble with 'reputational risk' i.e., having their names
tarnished in the media"). The concept of the trademark as more than mere indicia of
origin first appeared in F.I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L.REv. 813 (1927).
269. Janet Sparks, Is litigation in Franchising on the Decline?, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Nov./Dec. 2002, at 50. In their attitude towards the relationship between the dominant
franchisor and submissive franchisees, and denial of constraints imposed by moral norms,
franchisors are worthy heirs of Nietzsche. And as with their rejection of relationship
regulation on laissez-faire grounds, the franchisor philosophy of franchisee relations is
not in tune with the views held by the broader society in which the franchise industry
operates.
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viewed the franchise network much like a personal fiefdom over
which he was entitled to rule with absolute and unfettered authority.
The franchisees were expected to follow his directives and decisions
without question and certainly without opposition ... any franchisee
who had the temerity to question the decisions of the [franchisor]
could expect to have the full weight of the [franchisor] brought down
upon its head .... 270
Questioning franchisor decisions can be fatal to a franchisee. An
Australian court held that where a franchisee disagreed with a franchisor
remodeling program but subsequently assented to franchisor demands,
the franchisee could be terminated since mere "criticism of certain
aspects of the program" 27 by the franchisee led to a "loss of confidence
[that] would not necessarily be overcome by a change in attitude on the
part of [the franchisee]. 272 Some Rhode Island franchisees who drove to
their franchisor's headquarters to complain about encroachment claimed
that they were singled out after the visit; five years later one told a
reporter "I'm still afraid to talk to you.
273
Huge multinational franchisors have the financial, political, and
legal resources to look out for their interests, both pre and post-contract.
It is even more shameful that franchisors target those most vulnerable,
who are ignorant of American law and custom. Particularly in Asian
culture, personal honor is at stake in business relationships, and the
signed agreement is but one piece of evidence of the parties' desire to
form a relationship. 274 Many non-Western nations take a different view
of contractual ethics:
To Koreans, a contract represents the current understanding of a
"deal" and is the beginning of negotiations with a Korean partner, not
the end of discussions . . . . This has led many foreigners to believe
that Koreans do not place the same importance on a contract as
Westerners do.
Though Americans may regard a contract as legally binding, a
270. Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., [2000] O.J. No. 591 (C.J. (Gen.
Div.)), 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 2369 at *51-52.
271. Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd. v. Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd., (1999) FCA 903,
available at 1999 Aust Fedct LEXIS 495 at *24.
272. Id. at *25.
273. Behar, supra note 46, at 132.
274. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating International Business Transactions:
The Continuing Struggle of Life Against Form, 35 INT'L LAW. 1507, 1513-14 (2001)
(citing Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinkin'g the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West
Commercial Relations, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 427 (2001); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Ten Ways




Korean may regard the same contract as a "gentlemen's agreement"
which is subject to further negotiations dependent upon new
circumstances. Therefore, contract negotiations with Koreans should
be viewed as a process of extensive dialogue with the objectives of
(1) reaching a common understanding on the deal and of each party's
responsibilities; (2) putting that detailed understanding on paper; and
(3) being prepared to modify the meanings of the terms afterwards, as
conditions change.
275
Immigrants now comprise 1 in 10 Americans 276 and are a prime
target of franchisors. Traditionally, major cities such as New York were
the initial home of poor and unsophisticated arrivals. Even today 37% of
New York's population is foreign-born and 14% of households include at
least one undocumented person. 77 Air travel and changing patterns of
immigration have resulted in an immigrant population that is more
dispersed, 278 and wealthier2 79 than previous generations. If you stop at a
roadside hotel in Georgia, there is a 45% chance it is owned by an
immigrant from India. 280 Franchise journalist Janet Sparks observes that
"some franchise industries have already come to depend on different
ethnic/racial groups to run their businesses;" Sparks adds that the
economy hotel industry "survived" by getting Asian American
franchisees to pool family money and buy hotels, which provided jobs
and living quarters. 281 By 2003, the Asian American Hotel Owners
Association members accounted for more than 50% of economy
282
properties and nearly 37 % of all hotel properties in the United States.
Immigrants have traditionally suffered discrimination and been
275. U.S. FOREIGN AND COMMERCIAL SERVICE AND U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY
COMMERCIAL GUIDE (KOREA) (1998) available at www.buyusainfo.net/adsearch.cfm.
276. Labels in English Pose Risk in Multilingual Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001,
at A30 (citing the 2000 Census). A Franchisee's inability to read the tortured legalese of
a UFOC is another reason why franchisor targeting of immigrant groups is in the
franchisor's interest.
277. Susan Sachs, Mayor's New Immigrant Policy, Intended to Help, Raises Fears,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at 1.
278. Mark Bixler, Indians States Largest Asian Group; Entrepreneurial opportunity,
High-tech Jobs Fuel Boom, ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, May 27, 2001, at 6G
(noting populations of 46,000 Indians, 29,000 Vietnamese, 28,700 Koreans, and 27,500
Chinese in Georgia).
279. Susan Sachs, Welcome to America, and to Stock Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2001, at Al(stating that an "[i]ncreasing number of immigrants have arrived with
substantial savings to start their new lives").
280. Bixler, supra note 278 (quoting Mike Patel of the Asian-American Hotel Owners
Association).
281. Janet Sparks, Minority Programs: Hype or Help?, FRANCHISE TIMES, Aug. 2001,
at 12.
282. Janet Sparks, 7-Eleven Coalition Shocked by New Corporate Restrictions;
AAHOA Increases Membership, Toughens Position, FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept. 2003, at 50.
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targeted by schemes to quickly part them from their savings.: 8 Further,
immigrants coming from nations which have franchised businesses may
not be aware of significant differences in American franchise
regulations. 284 Although many immigrants come from English-speaking
nations such as India, many immigrants (including many from India)
285
are not fluent in conversational English, let alone the technical and legal
English found in franchise agreements. Lack of fluency in English
286
remains a barrier to integration in the workforce, and social norms
impose a responsibility on the more successful members of the extended
family to assist the group.287
Franchising can be an excellent avenue for entrepreneurial
immigrants to achieve success that would otherwise be difficult. It is a
risky avenue, however. Lacking the access to customary credit
resources, many immigrant families pool their savings to buy a
288franchise. While the extreme case is the immigrant in bankruptcy who
borrowed money from his brother-in-law to buy a franchise, 289 highly
leveraged purchases and intra-family lending, particularly among
immigrants, has been commonly observed by this author as a franchisee.
Limited financial resources may lead many to avoid the cost of a legal
review of the franchise contract. Furthermore, the FTC disclaimer may
have the opposite of the intended effect on a prospective purchaser. The
FTC disclaimer, a thick legal document stating that it has been filed with
283. Susan Sachs, Welcome to America, and to Stock Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2001, at Al (stating that "[w]hen it comes to separating immigrants from their money,
few techniques have gone untested").
284. In India, for example, there are regulations governing the maximum franchise
fee and royalty payments remitted to U.S. franchisor bank accounts, and these payments
must be approved by several agencies. See U.S. FOREIGN & COMMERCIAL SERVICE &
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE (INDIA) (1999) available at
http://infoservv2.ita.doc.gov/tcc/InternetCountry.nsf/baee3c88ac 11 f4628525653a0071 dl
06/.
285. Even where English is the lingua franca of business, it is often not the native
tongue of immigrants. In India, Hindi is the national language, and there are 24 total
languages spoken by a million or more persons. See THE WORLD FACTBOOK at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html.
286. This is a problem in the U.S., Labels in English Pose Risk in Multilingual
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001 at A30 (1990 Census showed 8.3% of households had
no person over age of 14 who spoke English well).
287. A wealthy immigrant doctor purchased a bagel franchise in Brooklyn Heights.
When the franchise incurred substantial ongoing losses, the author of this paper asked the
doctor why he did not sell. The doctor explained that as the "success" of his family, he
was responsible for their care and that charity would be demeaning. The doctor said he
was willing to incur modest losses, if it meant that the extended family would have jobs.
This may be an extreme case, but in the author's experience it is not unique.
288. See Bixler, supra note 278.
289. See Lee v. Hasty Market Inc., File No. 8536/84, 1993 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 49674
(Ont. Ct. of Justice 1993).
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the Federal Trade Commission, may lead to the assumption that there is
government oversight of the franchisor.29 0  Franchisors prey upon this
ignorance; many will say, for example, that they cannot provide an
earnings estimate because the FTC prohibits the practice. 29 1 Apart from
29the fact that such a statement is not true, 92 the prospective franchisee is
left with the impression that the franchise sales process is actively
regulated when in fact regulation, such as it is, consists primarily of the
disclosure requirement. FTC regulation does not address statements the
franchisor makes with the knowledge that the integration clause will
generally eliminate any recourse by an aggrieved franchisee, although a
proposed FTC rule would specifically outlaw the practice. Until then, as
a Canadian judge noted:
[w]hat would be the situation if [the franchisor] had instructed its
draftsman to prepare its standard form contract in such a way as to
give it the leeway that it claimed in this instance was present and the
draftsman had succeeded in doing so by employing skill and care? I
think it is helpful for franchisees that they would likely be facing the
parol evidence rule .... Not everyone is aware of the niceties of the
parol evidence rule. While there are exceptions to it, the careful
skilled draftsman can almost always avoid such exceptions with
enough fine print.
293
An attorney with two decades of experience observed: "this
longstanding rule of contract law is used knowingly in an effort to avoid
responsibility for franchise fraud and disclosure law violations. The




Freedom of contract in the United States reached its apogee in
290. How much oversight is exercised is a matter of debate and the subject of a recent
General Accounting Office (GAO) audit. See GAO 2001 Report supra note 217.
291. The author has attended sales seminars where this was done. In fairness, many
franchisor salespersons honestly believe this is the law and are surprised to find
otherwise. At a seminar in June 2001, an FTC employee told this author that the claim
by franchisors that the FTC prohibited earnings claims was such a frequent problem that
the FTC was considering issuing written guidance to stop the practice.
292. The only requirement is that if a franchisor chooses to make claims, they must
comport with Franchise Rule §§ 436.1(b-e). See Interpretive Guides to Franchising &
Business Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulation Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966 (Aug. 24,
1979).
293. Head v. Inter Tan Canada Ltd., [1991] 5 O.R.3d 210-11.
294. Letter from L. Seth Stadfeld to the Sec'y of the FTC (Dec. 21, 1999) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/comment023.htm.
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Lochner v. New York.295 Poor immigrant bakers were working 90 or
more hours per week in "bakeries" set up in the basements of tenement
buildings in lower Manhattan. Lacking adequate ventilation, the workers
suffered from oppressive temperatures and disease, many slept on sacks
of flour in the basements. Without money or negotiating power, the
workers were at the mercy of employers who took advantage of their
superior bargaining position. The government sought to stop this, but
was opposed by employers who claimed that if the conditions were
unacceptable, the workers were free to work elsewhere and the
government had no right to interfere with freedom of contract. One can
substitute "franchisees" for "workers" to hear the franchisor argument
against regulation. Reliance on the good faith of franchisors in the
absence of explicit legislation is likely to be less successful than reliance
on the good faith of the Lochner employers due to franchisees' large
sunk costs and noncompete covenants. Perceptions that unfettered
freedom for those powerful enough to dictate the terms of the contract
leads to results detrimental to the interests of society and causes changes
in jurisprudence.
As early as 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 96 recognized that
public policy concerns might limit freedom of contract. American law
also recognized that a powerful party could force a weaker party to
"agree" to a contract containing terms that were illegal.29 7 As the
Progressive movement took hold during the twentieth century,
restrictions on freedom of contract were a natural result.298 The Supreme
Court overruled Lochner in 1937.299
There is little doubt that Lochner would be decided differently
today; societal norms provide for limits on the employer's right to
freedom of contract. Congressman LaFalce compared proposed
franchise legislation to the Wagner Act, and noted that just as the
Wagner Act had brought fairness to the employment relationship in the
early days of big business, so too could the SBFA bring fairness to
franchising as the franchise industry becomes a major component of the
295. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also PAUL KENS, LOCI-NER V.
NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998).
296. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1.
297. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953)
(discussing tying arrangements, an issue in franchising agreements to this day). See also
Louis B. Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent (to the Attorney General's Nat'l Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws), 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 47 (1955) (describing power of
automobile franchisors to prevent entry of competitors by means of pressure on
franchisees).
298. See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
299. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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global economy.300 Franchisors claim franchising is not an industry and
hence cannot be regulated; but labor is not an "industry" and yet we have
labor laws applicable to every business in the country. Increasingly, the
traditional employer-employee relationship has evolved to alternatives
such as franchising, outsourcing, independent contractor arrangements,
and the like. With evolution has come a revival of century-old debates:
"franchising has been the subject of polarization reminiscent of the early
battles between management and organized labor," 30' and the ability of
franchisors to force franchisees to continue working at an unprofitable
franchise or risk facing huge awards is similar to indentured servitude
and was even compared to "enslavement" by the Sealy court.3 °2
Conversely, the ability of a franchisor to encroach upon a franchisee who
has built a successful business, or to force the franchisee to sell below
market, should be contrasted with recent trends in employment law
holding that employment-at-will contracts cannot be used as a means of
depriving an employee of benefits already earned.
30 3
Franchising is not only a non-traditional source of access to the
capital markets304 but to the labor markets as well. A leading franchisor
attorney tells his clients that "[f]ranchise investments are scrutinized and
evaluated against comparable business opportunities, competing
alternative employment options and robust returns in capital markets.,
30 5
Franchise sales boom in times of rising unemployment.30 6  Although
franchisor attorneys see "businesspeople who have decided to seize
entrepreneurial opportunities," 30 7 the franchise industry knows that many
300. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 10, 13 (statement of Hon. John J.
LaFalce (D-NY)).
301. Byron E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation: Solutions in Search of
Problems?, 20 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 241, 244 (1995).
302. See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). In that case, the franchisee fell delinquent in royalty payments. Id. In the
authors' experience, it is common for franchisees to toil for little money while paying
substantial royalties to franchisors.
303. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989) (quoting
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)).
304. Carolyn Walkup, Jimmy John's 'Delivers' on Growth, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, at 1, 6 (franchisor notes use of franchisee capital makes franchising
more attractive than company outlets).
305. Lane Fisher & Cheryl L. Mullin, Searching for Tomorrow's Franchisees,
available at www.franchise-law-firm.com/articles/articlel .html.
306. Jerry Wilkerson, Franchising Likely to Grow as Recently Jobless Seek to Mind
Their Businesses, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, May 26, 2003, at 27 (projecting 4-5%
annual growth "as the recently unemployed seek to establish their own businesses"). See
also Christopher Swan, UK Sees Slide in Growth as US Advances, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), June 26, 2001, Tuesday Surveys at 11 (noting that layoffs spur franchise
purchases).
307. Edward Wood Dunham, Flattery Will Get You Nowhere, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 103
(2001).
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franchisees are "buying a job. 3 °8 A recent New York Times article titled
"To Get a Job, Become a Boss: The Lure of Owning a Franchise" noted
that "many people opening new franchise outlets are also new to owning
a business." 30 9 An e-mail for the British Franchise Association exhibit
proclaims "[s]ack your boss!" and promotes franchising "as one of the
safest methods to start or even expand your own business.,
31 0
For new franchisees whose work experience is in a traditional
employment setting, a franchise is often looked at as a job from which
one cannot be laid off. Franchisees often use severance and 401(k)
monies to buy their franchise, leaving them in a precarious position in
the event of franchise failure. A recent session of the International Bar
Association reported that Venezuelans are buying franchises with their
unemployment checks, 31' and the U.S. Department of Commerce notes
that the growth of franchising in Argentina from 1993 to 1996 was
spurred by "massive job layoffs" as companies were privatized, as well
as an Argentine Supreme Court ruling that franchisors were not subject
to provisions of the Argentine Employment Agreements Act. 312  In
Germany, concerns that franchising was being used to have "employees
in disguise" (thereby circumventing Social Insurance payments) led to
passage of a law defining the terms under which the franchisor could
escape liability for payments on the franchisee's behalf.3" 3 Vertical
disintegration 31 4 of the labor market is a particularly sensitive issue in
countries which have greater employee protections than the United
States. But, labor market disintegration is also an issue in the U.S. as
rising statutory minimum and "living" wage requirements, FICA, and
308. Erika Friday, Desert Moon Looks to Grab Bigger Bite of Fast-casual Mexican
Niche, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, May 19, 2003, at 188, 189 (quoting Desert Moon
senior vice president of Operations on why he looked for multi-unit and not single unit
owners). The phrase multi-unit owner is common in the franchise industry, although
rarely in an attributed quote.
309. Sharon McDonnell, To Get a Job, Become a Boss: The Lure of Owning a
Franchise, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2003, at Section 10, page 1.
310. E-Mail from Fran News to FranMail list (Aug. 14, 2001, 5:46 a.m.) (on file with
author).
311. Philip F. Zeidman, An indespendable Way to Find out What's Happening in the
World of Franchising, FRANCHISE TIMES, Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 54.
312. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, INT'L. TRADE ADMINISTRATION, COMMERCIAL
SERVICE, NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, MARKET REPORTS, FRANCHISING IN ARGENTINA,
Jan. 16, 1996 (citing Rodriguez v. Argentine Bottling Co. & Pepsicola Arg., CSJN, No.
45,158, April 15, 1993, and noting applicability of § 30 of Argentine Employment
Agreements Act (LCT)).
313. FIELD FISHER WATERHOUSE, FRANCHISING UPDATE: FOCUS ON GERMANY
(Summer 2001) (on file with author) (noting 5-factor test).
314. Vertical disintegration is a term coined by Hugh Collins. See Hugh Collins,
Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment
Protection Laws, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1990).
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regulatory regimes such as the FLSA, the FMLA, and the ADA, raise the
economic cost of the traditional methods of labor procurement.
315
Non-traditional labor procurement enables corporations to maintain
control without the statutory and economic costs, as an Australian
professor noted, "arms-length" procurement such as franchising and
licensing is seen as an alternative to traditional investment in branches
and subsidiaries. 31 6 In addition, non-traditional labor is easier to control,
particularly where traditional labor (employees) would have statutory or
constitutional protections.31 7 Vertical disintegration of employment laws
is not simply an academic curiosity, it is franchise reality:
[I]n the view of many experts, the modem franchise agreement
severely stretches the legal requirements for an independent
contractor relationship. In some instances the Department of Labor,
the Small Business Administration, and the Federal Trade
Commission have denied franchisees recognition as small businesses
because the franchisor exercises total control over the business
enterprise.318
Professor Collins' observations regarding workers deemed "independent
contractors" is applicable to franchisees tightly controlled in all aspects
of work by the corporate franchisor:
[T]he underlying cause of the difficulty experienced by the courts in
policing the boundary between employment and independent
contractors springs from the vicious combination of the source of
315. Alan L. Fuchsberg, Temporary Employees Gaining Traditional Rights &
Remedies: Emerging Body of Law Addresses Use of Alternative Forms of Labor, N.Y.
L.J., March 10, 2003, at 7.
316. Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for
Standard Setting and Compliance, 37 INT. L. 69, 77 (2003).
317. A recent example can be seen where American municipalities outsource
functions and then attempt to control the free speech of the labor purchased on the
grounds that the relationship is that of an independent contractor and not employee-
employer. The Supreme Court disagreed in Bd. Of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518
U.S. 668, 684 (1996), but some courts have followed Umbehr narrowly. Franchisees are
graded by subjective evaluation criteria, and are in a more tenuous position than similarly
situated employees, private or municipal. For example, a franchisee attempting to form a
franchisee association has far less protection than an employee attempting to unionize.
318. Purvin, supra note 180, at 10. There are several tests to determine if a worker is
a true employee as opposed to an independent contractor. The Internal Revenue Service
factors are set forth in IRS Form SS-8, and the leading case on the issue is Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). Extensive control by the franchisor,
inherent in the very nature of franchising, risks the imposition of vicarious liability. See
Franchisor Liability, 39 POF 2d § 3. Franchisor attorneys have argued that courts should
distinguish between "controls implicit in the franchise relationship" and "operational
control." See Kevin M. Shelley & Susan H. Morton, "Control" in Franchising and the
Common Law, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 119, 120 (2000). In the author's personal franchise
experience, such a distinction is often difficult to make.
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legitimacy of the courts' decisions in deference to the parties' choice
and the employer's ultimate power to shape the terms of contracts
and determine the size of the organization. Armed only with
discourses framed in terms of respect for freedom of contract, the
courts cannot successfully impose employment protection rights, for
eve7 9test of employment becomes disfunctional [sic] in the long
run.
A measure of the high stakes involved in the labor debate is
evidenced by In the Matter of Francis,3 2 ° where a bathroom janitor in
rural New York claimed unemployment benefits. The amount of
benefits at issue was modest, but when the Commissioner of Labor, an
Administrative Law Judge, and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board all held that the "franchisee" was actually an employee, the IFA's
Washington, D.C. law firm filed an amicus brief, and the franchisor's
appeal was handled personally by the senior partner of the leading
franchise law firm in New York. The court found that although the
contract specified that Glenroy Francis was not an employee, the contract
was not dispositive; as a result, the court upheld the unemployment
Board's finding of an employee-employer relationship. 321  Cynthia
Feathers, Mr. Francis' attorney, noted that such claims involved only a
few thousand dollars and that in her years of practice this was the only
time she knew of an amicus brief in an unemployment claim case.
322
Four years after the New York case, a distributor for Mary Kay won
a Texas jury verdict of $11.25 million after the plaintiff showed that she
was subject to the control of Mary Kay and that her classification as an
independent contractor saved the company significant costs and enabled
Mary Kay to avoid compliance with California law.323 Hard facts
probably helped the plaintiff; after Claudine Woolf missed work due to a
debilitating form of breast cancer while pregnant, Mary Kay towed her
car and threatened termination.324
In a New Zealand case, where the employment tribunal and the trial
court accepted the vertical disintegration theory by holding an
independent contractor relationship to be subject to employment law; the
319. Collins, supra note 314, at 376-77.
320. 688 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (the "franchisor" was West Sanitation
Services, Inc.).
321. Id. at 56.
322. Telephone Interview with Cynthia Feathers, Esq. (Oct. 13, 2003).
323. Woolfv. Mary Kay, No. 00-5612-J (Sup. Ct. City of Dallas Nov. 21, 2002). See
also Reni Gertner, Saleswoman with Cancer Denied Leave, Awarded $11.25M,
LAW.WKLY. USA, Jan. 6, 2003, at 1, 18 (the suit alleged violation of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act).




Court of Appeal reversed but noted approvingly the lower court
comment that parties could contract as employer-employee or employer-
contractor and that from the employer's standpoint, the work got
performed either way.325 While the tribunal and lower court felt that this
justified looking to the purpose of the relationship rather than the
language of the contract, the Court of Appeal held that as long as the
contract was not a sham it was the province of the legislature to react to
changes in the procurement of labor.326 An Australian court facing
similar facts held that "the minutia of detail" in the agreement rendered
the worker an employee and not an independent contractor,327 and cited a
case involving the Weight Watchers franchisor, where the franchisee was
"tied hand and foot by the contract" in the manner in which the
franchisee performed work.328 More recently, in the Ekis case, Australia
moved away from the "control" factors and looked towards other factors
such as the investment of the franchisee cum employee; simultaneously
noting that the inquiry can be very fact-specific and noting, as did the
New York court in Francis that such matters are best left to the labor
authorities.329
The issue of franchisor control is more frequently raised by third
parties seeking to impose vicarious liability, and the factual bases for
such claims may be used as a foundation for finding the existence of a
quasi-employment relationship. A Brooklyn court found that Coldwell
Banker's degree of control over franchisees raised triable issues of fact
as to whether the franchisee was an agent of the franchisor, noting inter
alia "that the franchise must be operated in accordance with a
voluminous policy manual provided by [the franchisor]. 33 ° While courts
may continue to find the existence of a common law employer-employee
relationship on a case-by-case basis, these are not questions that courts
should routinely be called upon to resolve.
Legislative failure to recognize the economic and non-economic
325. TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd. v. Cunningham, [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 681 (Ct.
App. Wellington), quoting and rev'g [ 1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. 1030, 1035 (Employment Court)
and the employment tribunal decision repeated at [ 1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 956.
326. Id.
327. Vabu P/L. v. Comm'r of Taxation (1995) No. BC9504402 1995 NSW LEXIS
11223, at *21 (describing applicability of Superannuation Guarantee (Administration)
Act of 1992).
328. Id. at *15 (citing Narich P/L v. Comm'r. of Taxation (1983) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 587,
606).
329. Sec'y, Dept. of Social Security v. Ekis, (1998) 52 A.L.D. 246.
330. Friedler v. Palyomis, N.Y.L.J., July 16, 2003 at *21 (Kings Sup. 2003) (on file
with author). The court also noted the supervision and training provided by the
franchisor to the franchisee and franchisee employees, and the separate issue of whether a
customer of the franchise would believe that the franchisee was an agent of the
franchisor. Id.
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reasons which underlie the new methods in which labor is purchased
allow for abuse. Legislators need to initiate a debate on the new
economy and the degree to which opportunistic behavior permitted by
contract should be restrained by statute. Current regulatory views fail to
take into account the new labor purchasing paradigm. The New York
State Attorney General's Office issues a laissez-faire paean to
franchising as an avenue to the "American Dream" 331 while at the same
time the Attorney General notes that immigrant workers are "easy prey"
332who need the government to regulate their income.
The Attorney General notes that government regulation has
"managed to change the context" in which immigrant laborers work,333
and that is true. Today, a smart corporate purchaser of labor will
purchase labor by means of a franchise agreement and thereby capture
the "easy prey" without any interference from the government. This is
particularly true in low-skilled labor-intensive operations such as food
service. Burritoville was a non-franchised successful Mexican quick-
service restaurant (QSR) whose units averaged $800,000 annually, but
which failed to pay its (mostly Hispanic) workers overtime.334 Following
an investigation by the N.Y. Attorney General, the company was forced
to sell to franchisor TruFoods Corp., which agreed to assume $500,000
in liabilities to the workers.335 Given the labor economics of a QSR
under government scrutiny, the new owners of Buritoville have a
sensible plan, to franchise. 336  TruFoods, which also operates Arthur
Treacher's Fish & Chips and Pudgie's chicken outlets, hired a union
officer as director of labor relations in order to fight unionization efforts
at Burritoville.337
One of the authors was witness to a case where a worker went to
work "off the books" for a franchised QSR and filed an unemployment
claim against her previous employer. The previous employer called the
331. Kaufmann, supra note 22 (quoting Eric Dinallo, Chief of the Bureau of Investor
Protection and Securities, Office of the N.Y. Attorney General).
332. William Rainbolt, Attorney General's Success Shows Flaw in "Chicago School"
Theory, N.Y.S.B.A. NEWS, March/April 2003, at 34. Spitzer's official bio, in the fourth
sentence, boasts: "He reached landmark settlements with employers to protect the rights
of workers." See N.Y. RED BOOK 794 (96th ed. 2001). In one case, an Assistant A.G.
personally distributed checks in a bakery vestibule with media in tow. See Ronald
Drenger, Hudson Market Workers Win Back Wages, TRIBECA TRIB, Jan. 2002 at 6.
333. Rainbolt, supra note 332.
334. Lisa Fickenscher, Reheated Burritoville Set to Feed East Coast, CRAIN'S NEW
YORK BUSINESS, May 26, 2003, at 14.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Juan Gonzalez, Union Boss & Buster All in One, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 10,
2003, at 14 ("[b]y night he was a union leader, and by day he led Burritoville's efforts to
defeat his own union").
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QSR franchisor's corporate office to complain, and was referred to a
franchisor paralegal who began by disclaiming any responsibility for the
franchisee paying an employee "off the books" since the franchisee was
independent of the franchisor. When the employer stated that his
company would demand a hearing before the Unemployment
Compensation Board, the franchisor paralegal asked the employer:
"[c]an't [our franchisee] just pay you for the increase in your U1338
premium? You know, [our franchisees] operate on a small profit margin.
If they had to pay FICA 339 and that other stuff many of them would lose
money."
340
By franchising, the franchisor avoids unemployment insurance (UI),
worker's comp, and the employer's portion of FICA (in the authors'
experience, totaling about 13% to 16% of wages), while also avoiding
paying fringe benefits (which the AAMCO franchisor once estimated at
15%341), for a total savings of roughly 30% over a traditional employee
relationship. If the franchisee does not pay those costs, the resulting
externalities are borne by other purchasers of labor (through higher UI
and worker's comp premiums) and governments and hospitals which
must provide care to those lacking "fringe" benefits such as basic
medical insurance and a retirement pension. In addition, the franchisor
can avoid the labor laws which would protect an employee, most notably
the wage & hour laws. In the foodservice industry, the difficulty in
getting legal labor has led to the hiring of large numbers of illegal
immigrants. 342 Franchising can be an avenue for deriving revenue from
an operation staffed by illegal (and underpaid) labor while at the same
338. UI is unemployment insurance. In this case, claims paid affected the employer's
experience rating and affected the premium which was reset each calendar year.
339. FICA is the American old-age pension plan, referred to as Social Security. The
specifics are beyond the scope of this paper, but note that if FICA contributions are not
made, the worker will not be able to get a monthly check in retirement.
340. This particular franchisor tells franchisees that labor costs should equal 17% of
gross. Assuming 7.5% FICA, 3% Worker's comp insurance, and 4% U1, claiming that
statutory wages are the difference between profit and loss suggests a profit margin on the
franchise of 2.47% (17 x 0.145). These numbers are indicative of just how unprofitable
the franchise is for the franchisee. Implicit is the notion that profit is actually less where
at least a few employees are paid in accordance with law.
341. McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1227
(E.D. Mich. 1978). The franchisor was seeking damages from franchisees who left
AAMCO, for AAMCO's costs in reestablishing itself in the Detroit market. See id.
Given that medical insurance has increased more rapidly than wage expense, the costs of
fringe benefits today is likely much higher.
342. Pending Immigration Reform Step Toward Helping Foodservice Solve its Labor
Woes (Editorial), NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 29. See also NCCR in
Immigration Reform Push with Mexico, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 20, 2001, at
3 (meeting with Mexican foreign secretary, to discuss worker shortage in service
businesses).
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time disclaiming legal responsibility.
Several franchisors employing low-wage workers at company
outlets have recently paid large fines for viola'ion of labor laws.343
Corporate purchasers of labor are aware that the costs imposed by
regulation are less by purchasing labor from a worker classified as a
franchisee than as an employee. Additionally, opportunism ex post is
less likely to attract the concern of regulators if it occurs in the franchisee
relationship than in the employee relationship. Even one opponent of
franchise regulation admitted: "[T]axpayers are much less likely to
assent to paying large sums for fair franchising than they might for fair
employment. The latter is a larger social problem that will likely directly
touch the lives of many more voters. 344 Permitting purchasers of labor
to take exploitative advantage of their superior bargaining power touches
on the public interest; this is the essence of the Lochner debate.
Moreover, because failure to impose economic costs for labor abuse in
the franchise context makes it more attractive to purchase franchisee
labor in lieu of employee labor, the social problem will grow.
As Professor Collins of Oxford noted, lack of protection for workers
in non-traditional settings (such as franchisees) is a particular concern
where those affected are in a socioeconomic status which makes it
difficult for them to vindicate their rights.345 Business ownership may be
inversely related to socioeconomic status: in the U.S. blacks have a
household net worth of $15,500 compared to $71,700 for all
Americans,346 but blacks are 50% more likely to try starting their own
business.347
Although the etymology of "franchise" is from the Old French
"franchir," to free from slavery,348 in 1993 Congressman Kweisi Mfume
described the situation of minority franchisees as the "old master-slave
343. Dina Berta, Operators in Overdrive to Avoid Overtime Suits, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Nov. 25, 2002, at I (companies such as Starbucks, Taco Bell, Pizza
Hut, Einstein Bros. Bagels, Wendy's lost or settled suits). Settlements averaged $23,125
per worker at Wendy's and $2,903 at Taco Bell. See Alan J. Liddle, Taco Bell Shells out
$13M in OTSuit, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Mar. 19, 2001, at 1, 123. Pizza Hut paid
$10M to settle two class-action suits. See Alan J. Liddle, Workers' Winning Claims for
Back Overtime Shake Employers, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001 at 1. On
legal requirements, see generally, David J. Comeaux, Wage & Hour Update for the
Hospitality Industry, in HOSPITALITY LAW CONFERENCE (Jan. 24, 2003) (Conrad N.
Hilton College of Hotel & Restaurant Management, Univ. of Houston).
344. O'Hara, supra note 96, at 1596.
345. Collins, supra note 314.
346. Home Truths from the Barbershop, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 30 (citing a
BET study released Aug. 2002).
347. Id. (citing Kauffman Foundation report released Sept. 24, 2002).
348. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 727 (2nd ed. 1983).
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relationship all over again." 349 In 1996, Burger King's president Robert
Lowes and African-American franchisee La-Van Hawkins were feted at
a White House ceremony attended by President Clinton and Vice-
President Gore. 350 But by 2001 Hawkins left Burger King amid lawsuits
alleging racism at Burger King and testimony from now ex-president
Lowes that he had been unable to stop Burger King from impeding
fulfillment of the agreement made with Hawkins.
351
The next franchise industry poster boy was Calvin Johnson, the first
African-American to open Athlete's Foot franchises in inner
Washington, D.C. In 2001, Johnson was featured in the IFA newsletter
as a minority entrepreneur who had "realize[d] the American dream" of
operating a business.35 2 By 2002, when Johnson decided to sell his
failing store:
[Athlete's Foot] brokered a deal, but I never heard back from their
buyer. Ironically, when the time came to close down, my landlord
offered to take $4,000 off of what I owed him in exchange for my
benches and cash register. A few weeks later I walked by and saw
the same guy (who was also the missing buyer) had opened up an
Athlete's Foot in my old store. If the deal had gone through earlier,
he would have had to pay me $45,000. I got zero out and he saved
the $100,000 I paid to build the place out. He was even using my
$10,000 sign.
353
As has been discussed and will be further elaborated, franchisors
today target immigrants just as the Lochner employers targeted
immigrants. At least one franchisor negotiated a franchise sale with an
immigrant who was in bankruptcy at the time and who borrowed the
entire purchase price.354 The franchisee testified that he opened for
349. Minority Franchising: Is Discrimination a Factor? Hearings Before the House
Comm. On Small Business, 103d Cong. 9 (1993).
350. Milford Prewitt, Hawkins Departs BK Chain in Settlement After Court Defeats,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 22, 2001, at 1, 49.
351. Id.
352. Opportunities, FRANCHISING WORKS (undated, ©2001) at 2 (on file with author).
353. Julie Bennett, The Burning, Stinging Feeling of Athlete's Foot, FRANCHISE
TIMES, June/July 2002, at 16, 17.
354. Lee v. Hasty Market Inc., File No. 8536/84, 1993 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 49674 at
*2-3 (Ont. Ct. of Justice 1993). The debtor's wife was the nominal franchisee, but the
franchisor's founder had the sales discussions with the debtor, a Korean resident in
Canada for 13 years. Id. at *2. The same franchisor also sold a franchise to a husband
and wife who "had only two years experience in the business world and were largely
uneducated" although possessed of "not only common sense but, also, good business
sense." See Idriss Family Enterprises Ltd. v. Hasty Market Inc., 15614/86, 1991
A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 36013 at *15-16 (Ont. Ct. of Justice 1991). The Idriss' testified that
they worked from 7 a.m. to midnight. Id. at * 10. The Idriss' borrowed half the purchase
price and sold their home and business to raise the other half. Id. at *7.
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business at 8 a.m. and closed at midnight,355 hours longer than some of
the Lochner bakers. Franchisors frequently mandate arbitration in distant
fora, thereby rendering franchisee remedies economically unfeasible, a
result which is not the case in most traditional employment relationships.
Franchisor attorneys make many of the same legal arguments heard in
the Lochner era.
In some respects, franchisees today are in an even more precarious
position than the Lochner bakers, due to substantial sunk costs and the
ability of franchisors to restrict franchisee revenue or even terminate the
franchisee if the franchisee joins an association or testifies before
Congress. Terminated franchisees may find themselves unable to earn a
living in their chosen field due to non-compete covenants. The purpose
of vertical disintegration is to confer an economic benefit upon the
purchaser of labor. Many statutory restrictions attempt to deal with the
ability of parties to externalize the effects of their behavior. By
purchasing labor through a franchise business model, however, the
franchisor is able to shift costs to the franchisee. In turn, many
franchisees, already operating on narrow margins (or losses) are tempted
to externalize costs as well. Externalities in such a case are more
problematic because by the time of discovery, the franchisee may be out
of business or lack the ability to compensate the social insurance scheme
or private party which bears the cost by default.
Canadian courts have begun to recognize the vertical disintegration
principle. In the case of Brian Head, a Radio Shack "joint venture
manager" who worked for Radio Shack since graduating from high
school, an Ontario court noted: "In the more complex conditions of
modem industry, more complicated tests have to be applied., 356 When
Radio Shack was the subject of a tax assessment appeal, it claimed that
the store was under the control of Head, notwithstanding that Radio
Shack was responsible for the property expenses. 357 By misleading the
tax assessor, Radio Shack received more advantageous tax treatment. 358
Radio Shack also benefited from classifying Head as independent to
avoid the notice provisions of the Employment Standards Act.359 The
court found that the plaintiff "had little influence as a franchisee. He
certainly was much like a company store manager who was on a
355. Lee, 1993 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS at *4.
356. Head v. Inter Tan Can. Ltd., [1991] 5 O.R.3d 192, 214 (citing Montreal v.
Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd., [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161, 169). Brian Head joined Radio
Shack as a high school graduate and worked for Radio Shack as an employee, and later as
a "joint venture" partner for 13 years before termination. Id. at 195.
357. Head, 5 O.R.3d 197.
358. Id.
359. See id. at 197.
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somewhat different profit sharing arrangement. 3 60  The indicia of
employee status led the court to agree that Radio Shack had the same
right to terminate as if the individual were a regular store manager.
36'
In a Nova Scotia case, Imperial Oil had Esso gas outlets across
Canada run by a wholly-owned subsidiary, Atlas Supply. When an Atlas
site in Nova Scotia experienced a sharp decline in sales and increasing
competition from Canadian Tire franchisees, Atlas decided to franchise
the site362 to a man who had a high school equivalency diploma and
extensive business experience.363 Atlas estimates of profits ranged from
$11,000 (franchisor projection not disclosed to franchisee) to $33,000
(the projection disclosed to franchisee).364 The franchisee testified that
he believed the $33,000 figure because it came from a representative of
Esso. 365 On cross-examination, the franchisor salesman admitted that the
projections were based on the franchisee working for free:
Q: In fact, in any of these documents that we see were provided by
Atlas, we do not see the state of the assumption that the owner is
expected to donate his time for nothing, do we?
A: That is correct.
Q: Nor was that discussed with [the franchisee], that he was
expected to donate his time for nothing, correct?
A: Mr. Murphy was aware that the franchise program was designed
for the franchisee to assume full time responsibility at the franchise
location.
Q: Oh no doubt about that, since he's the owner, but there's a great
deal of difference between him being one of the employees and him
being the owner isn't there?
A: Yes.
Q: ... I believe you knew in your own mind that it took at least
three people to run the franchise operation in Yarmouth, not two. But
you say your assumption was he was expected to be the third of them?
A: I believe that he was aware of that as well.
Q: Oh, did you tell him that?
A: I think we discussed it yes.
Q: In your discovery, however, you haven't mentioned anything
360. Id. at 210.
361. See id. at 212-14. The Court noted the Operations Manual, purchase
requirements, franchisor ownership of the premises, franchisor inspections, and need for
the franchisee to work long hours which precluded any other business. Id.
362. Atlas Supply Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Yarmouth Equipment Ltd., [1991] 103
N.S.R.2d 1,3.
363. See id. at 4.
364. See id. at 5-6.
365. See id. at 6 (quoting from trial transcript page 387).
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about that discussion have you, even after I asked you to relate all of
your discussions with [the franchisee]? You don't recall ever having
said that before, do you?
A: I guess this is the first time.
366
The franchisor admitted that franchisee profit potential "was
marginal, $33,000 for the investment plus the effort and responsibility, it
was a marginal type operation., 367 Franchisors pitch their product using
the N.Y. Attorney General's approach to sell the "American dream," and
talk about franchising as a "fabulous opportunity: '368 "When owning a
franchise, you are in business for yourself, but not by yourself... Enjoy
your American Dream., 369 Franchisors don't disclose the true nature of
the relationship and the monetary realities. One of the authors attended a
CLE seminar "Fundamentals of Franchising" where a franchisor attorney
admitted that her clients did not make an Item 19 (Earnings Claims)
disclosure since "why would a mid-level executive at Texaco want to
quit his job to make 35K as a franchisee?" Additionally, a former
Subway salesman noted that buying a single unit meant "you bought
yourself a middle-paying job., 370 One husband-and-wife team operating
two franchised units reported $45,000 annual income after 10 years of
70-hour weeks.37' Most American franchisees are single unit owners.
FRAN data reports that of 271,431 franchisees, only 30,000 are multi-
unit owners (many of the multi-unit owners are large corporations).372
One hapless McDonald's franchisee in Australia did not even make
minimum wage. Worse, after working for a year at McDonalds, he was
denied a franchise on the basis of harassment allegations and he brought
suit against the franchisor.373 The court trying his case, in dicta, found
that the allegations "have not been proved, and in a number of respects
they have been revealed as untruthful., 374 The court then turned to the
McDonald's claim:
Counsel for McDonald's submits that it accepted no contractual
366. Id.
367. Id. at 5.
368. Kaufmann, supra note 22 (quoting Eric Dinallo, N.Y. Attorney General's
office).
369. Franchising 101, available at http://www.carwashguys.com/franchiseI01.shtml.
370. Behar, supra note 46, at 128.
371. Id. at 132. Recently per-store sales, and presumably, profitability, are much
higher in the wake of a successful ad campaign stressing the health benefits of the
product.
372. Julie Bennett, Turn-ons and Turn-offs of Multi-unit Franchisees, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Sept. 2003, at 10.
373. Carr v. McDonald's Australia Ltd., 1994 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 1058.
374. Id. at *82.
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obligation when it induced Mr. Carr to set aside six days a week for a
year, without receiving any kind of wage, to engage in a mix of
studies and work, part of which was done on behalf of McDonald's
itself, and all of which was directed by McDonald's, presumably with
a view to its commercial purposes, and was intended to lead to a
grant of a franchise by it to him. It seems to me that, in the
circumstances of this case, the submission only needs to be stated to
be rejected.
375
The Australian court ruled in favor of Mr. Carr, so he fared better than
the New Yorkers who worked for McDonalds. As welfare recipients,
New York workers were forced to work without pay at a McDonald's
outlet alongside paid workers, without even the prospect of a minimum-
wage paycheck, let alone a franchise.376
Foreigners in the United States are particularly vulnerable. In
Boston, the Finagle a Bagel chain brought a group of management
applicants from Sri Lanka for an 18-month "training," and the trainees
alleged that they were forced to work 75 hours per week, not paid the
minimum wage, and fired when they complained.3 77 The exernalities
created by abuse of labor by franchisors occur in both company-owned
and franchised outlets, and both in the United States and abroad.
McDonald's shuttered a Canadian outlet (on which it continued to pay
$17,000 per year in real estate tax) when the workers scheduled a union
vote and when the message didn't get through McDonald's closed a
second location in downtown Montreal, reportedly with 4 years of rent
payments remaining, to prove the point.378  For reasons grounded in
economics as well as social policy, franchisors should be held to a
standard of commercial morality, and the most certain and predictable
means of imposing such standards is legislatively. Absent legislation,
courts will often use the equitable principle of good faith.
375. Id. at *25-26. The court noted the franchisee worked "[J]ust as Jacob, to secure
the hand of Rachel, worked for Laban for the seven years, that 'seemed unto him but a
few days."' Id. at *19. Some former franchisees have put McDonald's training to use
elsewhere. One of the largest pornographic movie companies was founded by a
(McDonald's) Hamburger U. grad who said "I learned about inventory, buying the proper
insurance, doing everything by the book, not taking shortcuts." Frank Rich, Naked
Capitalists, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., May 20, 2001, at 51, 53.
376. Frankie Edozien, City Served Tasty Treat to McD's: Free Labor, N.Y. POST,
Sept 22, 2002, at 8.
377. Visa Holders Sue Bagel Chain over Training Flap, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, at 3. The franchisor denied the charges in the lawsuit. Id.
378. McDonald's Orchestre la Non-Rentabilit de ses Restos Syndiqu~s, Selon la
CSN, LA PRESSE CANADIENNE, July 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24687457.
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III. Post-Sale Relationship Issues
A. Sourcing Requirements: Fiduciary & Antitrust Issues
Franchisees are generally not on equal footing with franchisors,
although told that they will be partners with the franchisor. Under those
conditions, it is not unreasonable to hold franchisors to the fiduciary
duties which they assume by virtue of their partnership representation.
The Supreme Court of Canada established a three-pronged standard for
finding the existence of a fiduciary relationship: (1) exercise of
discretionary power (2) that can be exercised unilaterally so as to effect
the beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and (3) "a peculiarly [sic]
vulnerability to the exercise of that discretion or power." 379 A broader
definition is enunciated by an American regulator: "[a] fiduciary
relationship arises when one person is under a duty to give advice for the
benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship and
the advisor occupies a dominant position over the other., 380 Franchisors
would contend that the franchisor is not giving the franchisee advice for
the benefit of the franchisee but rather giving orders for the benefit of the
franchisor, and that a properly drafted franchise agreement reflects this
cold reality. This is why franchisors claim to be "partners" with their
franchisees when advertising and when lobbying Congress, but not
before a court of law.
Although good faith exists in both fiduciary and non-fiduciary
relationships, both the meaning of good faith and the burden of proof
differ. As one who has control of assets belonging to a second party, the
fiduciary must act with "utmost good faith, 38' fiduciary duty being "the
highest standard of duty implied by law., 382  Although prospective
franchisees may think that the franchise relationship imposes fiduciary
obligations on the franchisor, even if the franchisee does not express that
in such legal terms, 383  courts have generally held that "a
franchisor/franchisee relationship is not fiduciary or confidential in
nature., 384 Yet, an American court stated that a fiduciary relationship
379. Ontario Ltd. v. Bulk Barn Foods Ltd, [1999] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 789, at *15,
(citing LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574,
577-78).
380. In re Lazard Freres & Co. LLC, Securities act of 1933 Release No. 33-7671,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 33-41318 (Apr. 21, 1999) (applying New
Jersey law).
381. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 410 (6th ed, 1990).
382. Id.
383. PURVIN, supra note 195, at 191-92.
384. Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D. Md. 1989).
Accord Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir.
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could be found where the franchisor "has a duty independent of the
contract to act for the franchisee's benefit.
38 5
The proposed SBFA set forth certain instances in which the
franchise relationship would be a fiduciary relationship.38 6 The record
shows that many franchisees are unsophisticated parties. Even a pro-
franchisor commentator noted that since such parties may not distinguish
"fair" from "unfair," franchisors' fiduciary standards would protect
unsophisticated purchasers and also benefit those franchisors which
already treat their franchisees fairly.
387
A Canadian judge noted the Jirna v. Mr. Donu?88 holding that the
franchise relationship was not fiduciary, but also took note of the Arthur
Wishart Act's imposition of a duty of fair dealing in every franchise
agreement:
[I]t is evident to me that the relationship between a franchisor and
franchisee is something more than a pure commercial relationship
between arm's length parties who can look only to their own selves
for the protection of their respective interests. I tend to agree with
counsel for the plaintiff that the franchisor/franchisee relationship is
more akin to that of a partnership. It is certainly, in my view, a
relationship to which the duty of utmost good faith should app19 in
terms of the dealings between the franchisor and the franchisees.
3 9
Failure to see the franchisor as a fiduciary has significant economic
effect on the franchisee. "Rebates" are a common practice in the
foodservice industry,390 and can amount to millions of dollars for a single
1984); Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Burger
King v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1020-21 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of
Tex. v. Del Monte Corp., No. 18748 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *15 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
(applying California law); Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp.
858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980). See also Country Style Food Services Inc. v. Roupen
Hotoyan, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1581, at *26, citing Jima Ltd. v. Mr. Donut of
Canada Ltd., 22 D.L.R. 3d 639, 647 (1971) (applying Canadian law). Contra Amott v.
The American Oil Company (Amoco), 609 F.2d 873, 881-84 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting
"further indication of the fiduciary nature of a franchise relationship is found in the recent
surge of general franchise legislation," finding fiduciary duty under South Dakota law,
but noting state law split).
385. Norwood v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F. Supp. 1459, 1468 (D. Ore. 1991).
386. See H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. § 5(c) (1999).
387. George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers & Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57
Bus. LAW. 55, 78 (2001).
388. Jima Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., [1979] 40 D.L.R.3d 303, affg 22
D.L.R.3d 639, rev'g 13 D.L.R.3d 645.
389. Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., [2000] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS
2369 at *19, citing Perfect Portions Holding Co. v. New Futures Ltd., [1995] O.J. No.
2113 (Gen. Div.) at para. 14. The Shelanu court stated that it would have found a duty of
good faith even absent the Wishart Act. Shelanu, 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. at *20-21.
390. Mark Smith, Many Happy Returns: Automated Contract Management can Pay
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franchisor. The first franchise case in Canadian history, Jirna v. Mr.
Donut, involved secret rebates that the franchisor was receiving on
products it required the franchisees to purchase, and also involved the
degree to which a franchisor was or was not a fiduciary of the
franchisee. Franchisees may maintain that the franchisor is a
Purchasing Agent of the franchisee, and hence in a fiduciary relationship,
therefore prohibiting super-competitive pricing by direct or indirect
means.
3 92
Tying is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product,
or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier. 3 93  In order to maintain quality standards, franchisors
customarily require the purchase of raw materials from an authorized
supplier. In some cases, the franchisor simply specifies the supplier and
collects a "rebate" directly from the supplier, which the franchisor is able
to do because of its power over its franchisees. 394  In other cases, a
franchisor subsidiary which is designated as the franchisee supplier buys
the supplies and then resells them to the franchisees at a markup. The
Franchise Rule provides for disclosure of "any revenue or other
consideration to be received by the franchisor or persons affiliated with
the franchisor, ' '395 but the "affiliated persons" are narrowly defined, and
the Interpretive Guides to the Rule begin by noting that "[d]isclosure is
limited to situations in which ... indicating the narrow nature of the
disclosure qualifications.
Many franchisees do not inquire into sourcing requirements and
"rebates" until there is a crisis which causes examination of the contracts.
In the McDonald's system, in the wake of the rigged sweepstakes
scandal, it was alleged that franchisees were not even allowed to ask
about the ownership of vendors mandated for purchase of paper goods
Off with Top Rebates, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 30, 2003, at 34 ("from an
operator's perspective, the ultimate price of an item is its landed cost less the rebate").
391. Jima Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., [1970] 13 D.L.R.3d 645, rev'd 22
D.L.R.3d 639, aff'd40 D.L.R.3d 303,
392. Ontario Ltd. v. Bulk Barn Foods Ltd., [2000] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1945 at *5.
393. Northern Pacific Railway v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1959). Note that the FTC
may act against such arrangements under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994). More commonly,
action is taken pursuant to the Sherman Act, or Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14
(1994).
394. Cf FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 224 (1968). The maker of 7-Up alleged
that PepsiCo, former owner of the brands spun-off as Tricon, violated antitrust laws
causing the number of Tricon restaurants carrying 7-Up to fall from 5,000 to 2,000 in less
than 2 years. Lawsuit Alleges PepsiCo Antitrust Violations, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, at 48.




("Perseco") and technology ("E-Mac Digital").397 The Jack in the Box
burger chain suffered a fatal food poisoning outbreak in 1993 and a
resultant decline in sales triggered examination of vendor "rebates" to the
franchisor. By 1996, franchisees uncovered Coca Cola rebates and filed
suit against the franchisor. The resultant decline in the relationship,
according to franchisees, led to the franchisor's failure to attend the
franchisee's 2002 convention.
398
Photovest Corporation v. Fotomat Corporation, one of the earliest
U.S. franchise cases involved the Fotomat photo processing franchisor,
which obtained hidden rebates ranging from 2% to 10%, 399 even as it
promised franchisees that the franchisor's "buying power" would be
"passed along" to franchisees. 400  The amounts involved can be huge.
Queen City Pizza involved the Domino's franchisor, which sold almost
half a billion dollars per year4 1 to franchisees at markups that the
franchisees alleged were up to 40% above the free market price and cost
$3,000 to $10,000 per year per store above the free market price.40 2
Although Queen City was sanguine about the large markups, in
Photovest the franchisor's ability to charge large markups was seen as
indicative of the presence of a submarket.4 °3 An excellent primer on the
topic is Regents v. Subaru,40 4 in which the court held that while a single
brand parts market could be established, a "market" must evidence cross-
elasticity of supply and cross-elasticity of demand. Although the court
applied Australian law, it discussed the economic underpinnings of the
concept and foreign cases, including Kodak. Regents is a persuasive and
cogent intellectual argument against the applicability of market power
theory in franchise cases, and the court ruled against the franchisee, but
the practical issue of franchisor hold-up remains.
397. Letter from Richard Adams, Franchise Equity Group, to Editor, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21.
398. John Hamburger, Jack in the Box Franchisees Meet in Hawaii, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Jan. 2002, at 8. The franchisor stated that a general belief that there would be
sparse franchisee attendance as well as "scheduling conflicts on the part of our executive
management" were the reasons for nonattendance. Id.
399. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *69 (S.D.
Ind. 1977). As is evident in the Fotomat case, rebates are often hidden even from
franchisor employees. This author is aware of one franchisor employee who discovered
vendor invoices showing a 1% discount. When the employee asked what became of the
1%, the invoices were quickly taken away, and when the employee was given copies a
few weeks later, the 1% was no longer disclosed.
400. Id. at *35.
401. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 433 (3rd Cir. 1997)
("worth $450 million per year, form[ing] a significant part of Domino's Pizza, Inc.'s
profits").
402. Id. at 434.
403. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 1979).
404. Regents Pty. Ltd. v. Subaru (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., [1998] 84 FCR 218.
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Antitrust arguments may be tenuous, but conceptually, the fiduciary
argument is persuasive. Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to find
a fiduciary relationship, despite the nature of the franchise relationship.
In Bulk Barn Foods, the franchisor purchased materials and then resold
them to franchisees.4 °5 The court held there was no third party, hence, no
fiduciary relationship when the franchisor purchased from the suppliers,
and the franchisor "in no way [bound] franchisees to that purchase, 40 6 as
the relationship "was one of vendor-purchaser., 407  The court cited a
Nova Scotia distributorship case 40 8 and reasoned that since the franchisor
(agent) did not bind the franchisee (principal), there was no fiduciary
duty.
The reality is that the franchisee must purchase the product at
whatever price the franchisor demands in order to purchase or retain the
franchise. In other words, one product, the franchise, is tied to a second
product, aftermarket supplies.40 9 To assert that this is disclosed to the
prospective purchaser ignores the ability of the franchisor to take
advantage of franchisee sunk costs by means of ex post alterations to
sourcing requirements. For example, the retail gasoline market is highly
competitive and every penny makes a difference. In Wilson v. Amerada
Hess Corporation, a jury awarded $2.6 million to the franchisees who
alleged that the petroleum franchisor had charged supracompetitive
prices in order to drive the franchisees out of business and capture the
sites for company-owned outlets. 410 Also, the 7-Eleven franchisor has
"total control of the gasoline" purchases, and franchisees report that they
411lose business to competitors who get a lower wholesale price.
Ironically, the only reported case of a franchisee overbilling the
franchisor and getting a vendor kickback is a 7-Eleven case.
4 12
In Eastman Kodak Company. v. Image Technical Services4 13 the
United States Supreme Court found that tying the aftermarket purchase
of supplies to the initial purchase of a xerographic copier could give rise
to an antitrust claim. Although Kodak is a controversial decision,4 14 the
405. Ontario Ltd. v. Bulk Barn Foods Ltd., [2000] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1945 at *6.
406. Id. at *7.
407. Id. at *8.
408. Id., citing Scott v. Trophy Foods Inc., [1995] 123 D.L.R. 4th 509.
409. See Warren S. Grimes, GTE Sylvania and the Future of Vertical Restraints Law,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 27, 29 (noting potential for exploitation by franchisor, as well
as franchisee difficulty with Sherman Act Section 1 claims for vertical price maintenance
and tying).
410. See Nora Lockwood Tooher, Hess Oil Company Slammed For Overcharging
Gas Stations, LAWYER'S WEEKLY USA, July 21, 2003, at 22 (discussing the case).
411. Sparks, supra note 282.
412. Hksar v. Yip Yiu Wing, [2001] HKEC 123 (Criminal Court, Hong Kong).
413. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
414. See Benjamin Klein, The Law of Vertical Restraints in Franchise Cases and
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Kodak analysis is on point in the franchise context, as Professor Grimes
observed:
[I]n some franchising relationships, the franchisor has power over
franchisees that, because of non-recoverable or sunk investments, are
locked into the franchise relationship. Franchisees can be exploited
by a relatively powerful franchisor in a number of ways, including
the setting of low maximum resale prices or tie-ins that force the
franchisee to pay supracompetitive prices for the tied product.
415
The ability of a franchisor to charge supracompetitive markups,
particularly on materials it merely buys on the open market and resells to
captive franchisees, should be prima facie evidence of a unique
submarket. Even the franchisor trade association, the IFA, tells
prospective franchisees that "[r]estrictions on the suppliers from which
franchisees may buy goods and services used in the establishment and
operation of their business is comprehensively regulated under federal
and state antitrust and trade regulation laws. 4 16
In court, franchisors sing a different tune. In analyzing the post-
Kodak world, one attorney observed that while "Kodak rescued franchise
tying claims from the dustbin of history ... it is unlikely to yield a
harvest of franchise victories on the merits,' '417 a view which is borne out
by recent court decisions 418 that revert back to the pre-Kodak "incident of
the contract" argument for franchisor exemption from antitrust laws in
supply sourcing. Such holdings mean that discretionary post-sale
franchisor sourcing requirements are not "comprehensively regulated"
under antitrust laws, unless the franchisor has an incredibly incompetent
Summary Adjudication: Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak:
Applying Post-Contract Hold-up Analysis to Vertical Relationships, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
283 (1999). The Kodak result has been hotly debated by Benjamin Klein and Warren
Grimes. See id. at 284. Antitrust law is strongly linked to prevailing political winds.
Klein's view that post-contract "hold-up" of franchisees is not an antitrust problem, but
rather a "contract problem" had some success prior to Kodak. See Tominaga v.
Shepherd, 682 F. Supp. 1489, 1494-95 (C.D. Cal. 1988). Kodak presents a difficult
precedent for franchisors, who would maintain the "contract problem" argument today.
But see Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 435 (3rd Cir. 1997).
See also Ajir v. Exxon Corp., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11046 at *16-17 (9th Cir. 1999)
(court fails to mention Kodak but cites a pre-Kodak 9th Circuit decision in finding that
the franchisor did not possess market power since the franchisee could "surrender one
franchise and acquire another" and the franchisor power is not relevant to a tying analysis
since "this power is related to the franchise method of doing business").
415. Grimes, supra note 409, at 29.
416. International Franchise Association Code of Principles and Standards of Conduct
§ V.8 ("Supply Sources") available in FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES GUIDE 17, 20
(Fall/Winter 2000).
417. Allan P. Hillman, Franchise Tying Claims: Revolution or Just a "Kodak
Moment?," FRANCHISE L.J., Summer 2001, at 1, 46.
418. Id. at 39 ("The Post-Kodak Scorecard").
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attorney drafting the franchise agreement. If the position taken by the
IFA in its Code of Principles is to mean anything, then the Supreme
Court holding in Kodak must trump the Third Circuit holding in Queen
City. More importantly, if binding authority in the common law is to
mean anything, Kodak must trump Queen City. Some courts have
avoided application of Kodak by stating that if the corporation does not
have market power in the tying product, and announces in advance that
there is a tied product, there can be no tying claim; 419 this is the old
"incident of the contract" argument.
Allowing the exemption of franchisors from the antitrust laws
because the post-contractual holdup is an incident of the franchise
relationship is predicated on a belief that the prospective purchasers are
able to quantify the economic rapacity of a franchisor possessing
contractual discretion. Markets are imperfect, which "can create
sufficient market power to justify possible antitrust liability [,],42° this is
the lesson of Kodak.
Contrary to the notions of the New York Attorney General, this is
another example of the differences between the franchise marketplace
and the securities marketplace. While it is true that the securities
marketplace is exempt from much antitrust law,421 and Queen City
opined that a similar result should occur in the franchise marketplace,422
Queen City is wrong. The securities marketplace exemption is based on
the doctrine of implied repeal of the Sherman Act resulting from
Congressional passage of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.423
The 1934 Act regulates the period after the issuance of shares by a public
company. There is no analogous federal regulation of franchises. The
closest equivalence is between the Securities Act of 1933424 and the
Franchise Rule,425 a regulation promulgated by an agency. Because there
is no preemptive statute, post-contractual holdups cabined only by
franchisor discretion are not impliedly preempted with respect to
antitrust claims. Even in cases applying implied preemption, exemption
from antitrust laws is only allowed to the extent necessary to implement
419. Metzler v. Bear Automotive Serv. Equip. Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1364-65
(S.D. Fla. 1998).
420. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 447 n.4. (3rd Cir.
1997) (Lay, J., dissenting).
421. Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Securities Laws Trump Antitrust Laws Again,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 2003 at 3.
422. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 441. (3rd Cir.
1997).
423. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 421 (the 1934 Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78).
424. 15 U.S.C. § 78.
425. 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1979). The Franchise Rule may be accorded deference. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
But implied preemption would violate the Constitution.
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the law passed by Congress.426 Unconstrained by principles of antitrust
or agency, franchisors are free to take opportunistic advantage of
franchisees, and there is no way for the franchisee ex ante to make an
informed decision. As the Queen City dissent noted, "it would be
illogical for the franchisees to expect that the franchisor's [discretionary
contract right] coupled with its approval power in the franchise
agreement, included for the very legitimate purpose of franchise quality
control, would be applied in such an odd and predatory [manner]. 'A 7
Indeed, a franchisor may require substitution of an inferior product at an
above-market price, and require purchase quantities in amounts which
cause spoilage and waste.428 Although there are numerous examples of
franchisor opportunism, given the debate over the existence of a tying
relationship 429 and the franchisor representations of partnership;
constraining sourcing opportunism would be most easily accomplished
by a legislatively-crafted fiduciary standard. This would also avoid the
economic and political shifts which create employment for hordes of
antitrust lawyers.
B. Encroachment
No issue in franchising is more contentious than encroachment, and
no issue better illustrates the difficulties in regulating the franchise
relationship. Encroachment occurs where a franchisor establishes a
second outlet that takes profits430 that would otherwise belong to the
existing (first) outlet.431 Encroachment may occur by means of a new
432 rbto
"bricks and mortar" location, a "virtual" location, a new distribution
426. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
427. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 448-49 (3rd Cir.
1997) (Lay, J., dissenting).
428. A&K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd. v. Cordiv Enterprises Ltd., [1981] 56
C.P.R.2d I at 17 (noting that spices were 2 times more cost, and chicken packaging of
franchisor-supplied products were inferior to outside sources).
429. See, Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust
Remedies for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 141 (1996).
430. Carvel Corporation required franchisees to pay royalties on 10,000 gallons/year
even though the average use per store declined from 7,330 gals in 1987 to 6,120 gals in
1992. See Carvel Corp. v. Baker, 79 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56-57 (D. Conn. 1997). Not only
was the true royalty 40% higher than quoted, the franchisor actually benefited from
franchisee losses since it obtained the same royalty for selling less product and suffered
no loss by establishing a second distribution outlet of supermarkets to compete with
franchisees. See id.
431. Defining encroachment is more art than science, but this definition takes into
account not merely a present decline in sales but a permanent diminution in sales growth.
By looking at lost profits rather than lost sales, one can account for the erosion of
marginal profit rate (the percentage of profit on the last dollar of gross sales).
432. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc. of Shreveport v. Drug Emporium Inc., Bus.
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 11,966 (Amer. Arb. Assn., Dallas, Tx., filed Sept. 2, 2000)
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channel, such as a supemarket,433 within the territory, or franchisor
capture of a franchisee's customer, pre-sale, 434  or post-sale.
Encroachment may be a result of action by a franchisor both
deliberate, 435 or inadvertent 436, or a merger between franchises, 437 or
encroachment by one franchisee selling into another franchisee's
territory,438 or by a shrinkage of the product's market due to population
shifts or reduction in demand for the product itself.439 In some cases, a
franchisor may even establish a second franchise under a different name
to compete head-on with its existing franchisees.
440
A more recent issue has been "co-branding." For example, Taco
Bell, KFC, and Pizza Hut are owned by the franchisor Tricon, which has
(internet site advertised as "virtual drugstore").
433. Both Hdagen-Dasz, and Carvel have practiced this form of encroachment. See
Carvel Corp. v. Baker, 79 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.Conn. 1997).
434. This author was informed by a franchisee of high-ticket dry goods, and that a
customer inquiry to a franchisor's toll-free line resulted in the customer being instructed
to view the product at a local (franchised) location and then call back the toll-free line or
order online at the (franchisor) website to get a better price.
435. See Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d
1396, 1401 (11th Cir. 1998) (Sheraton purchased Hyatt location & converted to
company-owned). Encroachment may be punitive, retaliating for a franchisee's criticism
of a franchisor or attempting to form a franchisee association, or to upgrade or open new
outlets, or otherwise failing to accede to franchisor wishes.
436. This may occur where the franchisor provides Internet ordering and a customer
does not enter the location of the local franchise showroom where he viewed the product.
437. Cf St. Charles Foods. Inc. v. Am.'s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 817
(1 th Cir., 1999) (Popeye's acquired Church's Chicken). The issue was franchisee right
of first refusal for new outlets of the formerly competing chain, where both chains
retained separate names under same franchisor parent. Id.
438. Cf Bronx Auto Mall, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Honda arbitrarily set a figure of 600 Acura dealers, resulting in dealers
in unsuitable markets. Id. at 598. The Bronx dealer had to compete on price to lure
customers from the suburban dealers' trade area. Id. at 602. Nationwide, the number of
Acura dealers losing money rose to 60% by 1993 before falling back to 40-50%. Id. at
601.
439. A franchisor attorney remarked that one of the problems with Carvel was that
cultural shifts meant that parents were not taking their children out to ice cream parlors
anymore, but were buying supermarket ice cream instead; the Carvel franchisor had to
establish a supermarket presence as a matter of brand survival. David J. Kaufmann,
remarks at Understanding Franchising: Business & Legal Issues (Practising Law
Institute seminar June 12, 2001). The burger franchises (McDonald's, Wendy's &
Burger King) saw rapid expansion push retail prices down, David Leonhardt, A Sinking
Feeling At the Register: Lower Prices are Disrupting Many Industries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2003 at BU1, BU10 (33% increase in outlets from 1994-2001), at the same time that
consumer tastes changed, Lenore Skenazy, Golden Arches Are Falling, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2003 at 41 ("McDonald's still treats us like kids. . . the classic, clueless
1950's parent"). And that may be a permanent shift. Shirley Leung, Fleeing From Fast
Food, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2002, at BI (young consumers are seeking healthier foods;
franchisors are forced to diversify brands to meet changing tastes).




now begun selling pizzas in the taco and chicken outlets. 441 Co-branding
can create a ubiquity which dilutes the value of the brand to the
franchisee, while creating additional royalty revenue for the franchisor. 42
Co-branding may result in both encroachment to the neighboring
franchisees and lower profits and longer work hours to the franchisee
pressured to co-brand.
Franchisors commonly argue that they would never do anything,
such as encroachment, which would harm the profitability of their
franchisees, since their interests are aligned. The evidence shows
otherwise. Recently Yum Brands (KFC, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut) disclosed
that margins of co-branded units were actually below those of single
brand units.443 An editorial in an industry paper noted that an Allied
Domecq (Dunkin' Donuts, Baskin Robbins, Togo's) franchisee claimed
that a Dunkin' lawsuit ostensibly for sanitary failure was actually
punishment for the franchisee's failure to assent to co-branding. The
editorial continued:
Such suspicions ... are hardly surprising given that franchisors...
stand to gain more royalties and initial fees when franchisees deploy
more than one of their concepts. If multibranding doesn't always
translate into higher margins, as Yum has indicated, it is not
surprising that some franchisees might question the motives of
franchisors pushing the development of multiconcept stores.
4 4 4
Threats of encroachment may be used to obtain franchisee
acquiescence to franchisor demands. A chicken franchisor seeking
franchisee assent to a rewritten franchise agreement "did exert pressure
upon the [franchisee] defendants by threatening to construct a competing
outlet across the street., 445 In systems such as Domino's Pizza where
franchisor buy-out price is set as a multiple of cash flow, encroachment
may be used "to lower the cash flow of the units [that] may be coveted
by the franchisor or owned by a 'troublesome' franchisee. 4 46  Once
441. Amy Zuber, To Market, to Market: Chains Find Strength in Numbers, use Co-
branding as Growth Vehicle, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at 45, 46. See
also Prewitt, supra note 20, at 46 (franchisee attorney J. Michael Dady noting "new era"
of encroachment thru multibranded outlets, Internet, and supermarket distribution).
442. Ellen Shubart, When Franchises Become a Candy Bar, FRANCHISE TIMES, Feb.
2000, at 47.
443. Editorial, Blissful Union? Long-term Benefits of Co-branding Remain to be Seen,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003, at 27 (also noting Arby's franchisor
abandoning co-branding due to difficulties with the concept).
444. Id. at 30.
445. A&K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd. v. Cordiv Enter. Ltd., [1981] 56 C.P.R.2d 1,
1981 C.P.R. LEXIS 409 at *5.
446. Letter from John Rachide, Chairman of the (Domino's Pizza) International
Franchisee Advisory Council, to Federal Trade Comm'n. (Apr. 30, 1997) available at
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again, we see that the franchise marketplace is not like the securities
marketplace: in an analogous securities market transaction where "a
majority stockholder wishes to involuntarily squeeze-out the minority, it
must share the value of the enterprise with the minority on a pro rata
basis."447 In the franchise marketplace, the franchisor may be able to
encroach or punitively enforce subjective "standards" to squeeze all the
value out of the enterprise and leave the franchisee with nothing.
Encroachment may be motivated by personal animus. In one case,
the franchisee was carrying on an affair with the Chairman of the Board
of the franchisor, a married man 30 years her senior.448 Shortly after the
affair ended,449 the franchisor embarked on a course of action which
included opening a competing restaurant less than a mile and a half away
from the franchisee and undercutting the franchisee with lower prices
and promotional coupons, resulting in a 35% sales decline at the
franchisee's restaurant.450
At the outset, it should be noted that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing does not preclude the most savage encroachment.
In Carlock,45' the court dismissed the franchisees claims of
encroachment by the Hdagen-Dazs franchisor, citing a Dunkin' Donuts
case452 in which a store was sited less than a mile away, and a
convenience store franchise case where the franchisor opened a
competing site four blocks away, thereby driving the franchisee out of
453business. In Los Angeles, Burger King signed a contract with a
franchisee without informing him that Burger King was simultaneously
negotiating to open a competing restaurant five blocks away.454 In those
cases, the courts failed to apply the covenant of good faith to restrict the
franchisors contractual right to open new locations at the franchisor's
discretion. As another court explained:
If the Court were to hold that the instant contracts contain an implied
restriction on competition, it would be placed in the unenviable
http://www. ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/rachid32.htm.
447. Agranoffv. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 888 (Del. Ch. 2001).
448. Vylene Enterprises, Inc. v. Naugles, Inc., 105 B.R. 42, 45-46 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1989).
449. Id. at 45.
450. Id. at 46. For an analysis by a franchisor's outside counsel, see Jeffrey C.
Selman, Applying the Business Judgment Rule to the Franchise Relationship, 19
FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 114-115 (2000).
451. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F.Supp. 791, 812 (D. Minn. 1989) (applying New
York law).
452. Id. (citing Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (111.
1986)).
453. Id. (citing Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721,
723 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)).
454. Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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position of having to delineate for the parties the boundaries of "fair"
competition, that which guarantees to [franchisees] the fruits of their
contracts, and "unfair" competition, that which deprives [franchisees]
of the fruits of their contracts.
455
A franchisor told one of the authors when opposing statutory restrictions
on encroachment that if under the proposed SBFA a franchise opened in
Los Angeles a New York franchisee suffering a drop in business could
claim encroachment. In response, the author noted that the majority of
case law holds that under a properly drafted franchise agreement, the
franchisor could site a competing outlet twenty feet away in a strip mall
and the franchisee would have no remedy. The franchisor attorney
scoffed "[n]o, they couldn't do that." He was wrong, as was the District
Court which had "difficulty foreseeing a situation where a franchisor
might develop a new store next to an existing franchise. 4 56
Tina Perazzini of Subway stated her employer's policy on
encroachment during the 1990's: "We put them up any f***ing place we
could., 457 The 2003 Fairfield Research survey showed that 24% of
franchisees had been "threatened, encroached upon or coerced into
unwanted expansion by their franchisor." Among sandwich franchisees
the figure rose to 58%.
458
Where a brand has strong identity, a franchisee's most threatening
competitors, may well be his own franchisor and fellow franchisees. The
authors operated a Subway sandwich franchise in lower Manhattan. One
day during lunch, a man wearing a Subway uniform began distributing
flyers in front of the store. Oddly, customers speaking with the Subway
coupon man would turn and walk away from the store. It turned out that
the man was giving coupons advertising the "[b]uy one, get one free"
special at the Subway up the street owned by another franchisee.
In September 2001, a store employee gestured at the still-burning
World Trade Center site four blocks away459 and taunted passing New
York City police officers that the mighty United States could not catch
Osama Bin-Laden. The ensuing verbal exchange would have made Tina
Perazzini blush, and the employee was given an unpaid leave of absence
as punishment. Unfazed, the employee promptly walked to the
neighboring Subway and immediately began working, he didn't even
need to take off his uniform. Another employee quit, claiming that a
455. Metro Communications Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, 788 F. Supp.
1424, 1433 n.16 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
456. Davis v. McDonald's Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d 1251, 1259 n.9 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
457. Behar, supra note 46, at 130.
458. Martin, supra note 222, at 8.
459. On conditions at the time, see generally Paul Steinberg, The New York Small
Business Market After 9/11, 30 N.Y. REAL PROP. L.J. 3 (2002).
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nearby franchisee had offered to pay her "off-the-books" in order that
she could avoid taxes and collect welfare. At a franchisor training
session, another franchisee sent his manager to work the room soliciting
other franchisees' key employees to quit their current store and work for
him instead. Sometimes, franchisees are their own worst enemy.
The Hobin v. Coldwell Banker case involved franchises 300 feet
apart.46° In Hobin, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not prevent
encroachment. Cognizant of the conflict between "two apparently
inconsistent principles, '461 the implied covenant and the doctrine that
express terms cannot be overridden by the covenant, the court
distinguished between cases where good faith could be applied to restrain
franchisor discretion where "necessary to protect an agreement which
[would] otherwise be rendered illusory" and circumstances where there
was no restraint because "regardless of how such [discretionary] power
[is] exercised, the agreement [is] supported by adequate
,,462consideration. What constitutes adequate consideration? A
peppercorn does. 463 Peppercorns are the stuff of first-year law school
courses on Contracts. In the real world of franchise agreements, the
court's ruling means that where the express provisions provide that the
franchisor has discretion, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing does not exist. For obvious reasons the court could never
provide a real-world instance where the covenant would apply. This
begs the question, why the court did not simply state (as other courts do)
that where the franchise agreement expressly reserved discretion, the
covenant does not apply. From reading the decision, it would appear that
the court was uncomfortable with declaring the death of good faith and
fair dealing. To the extent the implied covenant survives, it is because
franchisors are reluctant to harm franchise sales by telling prospects
about the consequences of the franchisor's express right to open stores
(company-owned or franchised) in competition with the franchisee.
This was the basis for Scheck, there is a difference between "you
don't have an exclusive territory" and "we can open company-owned or
franchised outlets next to you in direct competition for your customers."
Most courts do not find a distinction as a matter of law, but there is a
distinction to a prospective franchisee. That being said, many people
would buy the franchise anyway, believing along with the franchisor
460. Hobin v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 744 A.2d 1134, 1136
(N.H. 2000).
461. Id. at 1137.
462. Id. at 1138 (quoting Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 752-




attorney and court cited above that such a thing would never happen in
the real world, even though contractually permitted.
Rarely has a decision so roundly criticized been kept alive as long
as Scheck v. Burger King.464 The case is central to a discussion of
franchise encroachment, one lawyer referred to "Encroachment: The
Nine Lives of Scheck."465  Scheck was a Burger King franchisee, and
Burger King converted a Howard Johnson's two miles from Scheck's
franchise into a competing Burger King. The issue in Scheck was the
extent to which the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
would restrict franchisor encroachment where the contract did not
explicitly reserve the right of the franchisor to site competing outlets
nearby. Scheck's contract merely noted that Scheck did not have an
exclusive territory. 466 There are two issues in Scheck-type cases. First,
where the franchisor explicitly states that the franchisee will not have an
exclusive territory, does the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing operate as a restriction on the franchisor? Second, if the
covenant does restrict the franchisor, does a violation give rise to an
independent cause of action where there has been no express contractual
violation? In the U.S., the answers to these questions depend on state
law, and the states are split. Sometimes, as with Scheck and Weaver,
cases involving the same franchisor and choice of law can result in
opposite conclusions.
Legislation such as the SBFA is necessary to prevent abuse of hard-
working individuals who put their life savings into a franchise by being
left in penury, with nary a peppercorn to call their own. There is no
encroachment continuum, as courts have repeatedly ruled in Dunkin'
Donuts cases.467 The Dunkin' agreement provides that:
DUNKIN' DONUTS, in its sole discretion, has the right to operate or
franchise other DUNKIN' DONUTS SHOPS under, and to grant
other licenses in, and to, any or all of the PROPRIETARY MARKS,
in each case and on such terms and conditions as DUNKIN'
464. Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991), reh'g denied,
798 F. Supp. 692 (1992).
465. Rupert M. Barkoff, Encroachment: The Nine Lives of 'Scheck', N.Y.L.J., July
27, 2000 at 3. Even courts not following Scheck have noted "the rationale of Scheck is
compelling." See Chang v. McDonald's Corp., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33288, at *5-6
(9th Cir. 1996).
466. Scheck, 756 F. Supp. at 549.
467. Tolstoy observed in ANNA KARENINA: "Happy families are all alike. Every
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Unhappy franchise systems share this trait;
just as Carvel and Haagen-Dazs set the standard for alternate distribution channels, and
Subway for arbitration as a means of denying franchisee remedies, so Dunkin' Donuts
has replaced Burger King as the standard-setter for physical site encroachment. Dunkin'
has taken the process one step further, telling franchisees that it has a policy to review
encroaching sites but then ignoring the findings of the review.
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DONUTS deems acceptable.
468
When a franchisee claimed an encroaching site violated the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, the court held that "the agreement authorizes
,,469[Dunkin's] unrestricted competition.
Market saturation is not necessarily bad, as franchisor attorney
David Kaufmann explains:
Saturating the marketplace with as many points of distribution as
possible to maximize retail opportunities; make procuring a
company's products or services as easy, convenient and swift as
possible; and, to heighten a company's name recognition and
consumer awareness is a retail concept hardly restricted to
franchising.
470
True enough. As one franchisor attorney has noted, Starbucks
471
saturates a market, why shouldn't a franchisor do the same?472 The
distinction is that when Starbucks errs, it harms only itself. When a
franchisor encroaches upon a franchisee, the franchisor is better off and
the franchisee is worse off. The encroachment equation is expressed as
Marginal Revenue Product. Marginal Factor Cost (MRP. MFC). 4 73 To
understand why market saturation benefits the franchisor long after it has
become counterproductive for the franchisee, it is first necessary to
address Kaufmann's assertion in terms of expansion of demand, cross
elasticity474 of demand, and product substitution.
As discussed previously, a trademark should add value in the mind
468. Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159 (111. App. 1986).
469. Id. at 1161.
470. DAVID J. KAUFMANN, Network Expansion/ Dual Distribution! Encroachment, in
UNDERSTANDING FRANCHISING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES 503, 507 (Practising Law
Institute, 2001). Kaufmann is a prolific writer and lecturer on franchising, and authored
the New York State franchise law. He now exclusively represents franchisors.
471. Starbucks is not a franchise, although 80% of consumers believe it is a franchise.
See Cobo, supra note 172, at 183. See also International Franchising (Sponsored section
in Intl. Herald Tribune, May 18, 2001) (on file with author) (claim that Starbucks is a
"publicly traded franchise").
472. Posting of Byron E. Fox, byronfox@worldnet.att.net, to
Franchising@mail.abanet.org (Aug. 26, 2002) (hardcopy on file with author) (listserv is
run by the ABA Forum on Franchising).
473. Where the increase in revenue (franchise fees, royalties, ad fees, rebates,
financing charges, etc.) due to the addition of a franchised outlet is expressed as MRP
(Marginal Revenue Product) and the cost of servicing that franchised outlet (headquarters
support, compliance audits, etc.) is expressed as MFC (Marginal Factor Cost), then the
franchisor should encroach where MRP. MFC. Note that economies of scale will operate
to reduce MFC as the system expands.
474. "Products that are similar to each other, that are substitutes for each other,
display positive cross-elasticity. That is, if the price of A remains constant, an increase in
the price of B will generate more sales of A as buyers switch to it." Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 713 n.12 (7th Cir. 1979).
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of the consumer. The more ubiquitous a trademark is, the more
frequently a trademark registers in the mind of the consumer and the
consumer will perceive the brand to represent quality; after all, if
Starbucks is on every street comer, it must be great coffee, right? And
when you think of going out for coffee, what store comes to mind? That
is what marketers call "top of mind awareness," and franchisors
commission studies to ensure that their advertising agencies are
increasing top-of-mind awareness. Kaufmann is correct that market
saturation will increase gross market share both due to increased
convenience and increased awareness.
Kaufmann's writings intertwine concepts of brand substitution and
cross elasticity of demand. Brand substitution occurs when a consumer
perceives a relative difference in convenience, quality or price. Cross
elasticity of demand is a formula475  measuring the variable
responsiveness of the quantity demanded to a change in the price of
another good, and is the economic rationale for the recent 99-cent burger
wars among the major franchisors. Kaufmann is correct insofar as the
"price" of a good includes the consumer "cost" (driving time and
gasoline) to obtain the product. Increasing franchise density reduces the
"price" the consumer must pay to obtain the good, and therefore leads to
a rise in demand for the (franchisee-retailed) good.4 76
Kaufmann's flaw is his failure to consider that franchising is a
peculiar subset of retailing, and marketing and economic paradigms need
adjustment accordingly. Cross elasticity of demand is not conventionally
thought of as part of an intra-brand profitability analysis, but it should be
in franchising. 477  Kaufmann fails to account for intra-brand cross
475. Elasticity is customarily represented as a Cartesian coordinate graph with
quantity plotted on the x-axis and price on the y-axis. See WALTER J. WESSELS,
ECONOMics 293-309 (3d ed. 2000). Slope is rise divided by run. Most products have a
negative slope, since the higher the price the less output is demanded. However, some
luxury goods such as high-end cars, college tuition, and real estate can have a positive
slope where consumers perceive a correlation between high quality and high price. Cf
Louise Kramer, Restaurateurs put Eateries Under the Knife, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUSINESS,
Sept. 16, 2002 at 4 (quoting owner: "[i]n this business, it used to be better to be thought
of as expensive.., if it cost more, people would think it was better"), accord Alex
Kuczynski, Lifestyles Of the Rich And Red-faced, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept 22, 2002, Section 9 at
1, 8 (noting that decorator clients "don't enjoy the purchase unless they know they have
spent a lot of money for it.").
476. Theoretically at least, a franchisee could increase the retail price to the consumer
to capture some of the reduction in cost to the consumer of obtaining the product. But
this would be quickly offset by increased intra-brand competition, whose decline in
profits (both nominal total and marginal rate) would be borne primarily if not exclusively
by the franchisee.
477. The substituted product is another outlet of the same franchisor. The probable
reason that franchisors don't use cross elasticity of demand is that it would necessarily
involve admitting publicly that the interests of the franchisor and franchisee are at odds,
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elasticity of demand, where demand is unitary elastic 478 and hence a post-
sale constraint on franchisee pricing latitude not disclosed in any UFOC
this author has ever seen. To some extent, a franchisee can attempt to get
around this by intra-franchise differentiation. 479 However, the flaw in
Kaufmann's logic is laid bare when one considers that intra-brand
differentiation (which is the result of intra-franchisee differentiation)
negates a primary premise of franchising.
The whole point of franchising is uniformity, and in a well-run
franchise the customer can compare the price of apples to apples. The
raison d'etre of franchising is fungibility. 480 This creates an anomalous
situation in cases of franchisor encroachment: unit price falls and
franchisor output rises on increased profitability; simultaneously
franchisee output declines on reduced profitability. The economically
rational courses of franchisor and franchisee are diametrically opposed.
Example: Franchisee A located on First Street is grossing
$20,000/week. Franchisee B on Eleventh Street is grossing $10,000.
Franchisor feels that Franchisee B is substandard and wishes to push
B out of the system. Franchisor sites Franchisee C on Ninth Street.
The Ninth Street outlet captures $5,000 from Franchisee A and
$5,000 from Franchisee B (because it is closer to B) and creates new
demand of $5,000. The franchisor already services Franchisee A and
B, so the addition of Franchisee C does not impact MFC but MRP
increases by the royalties on an additional $5.2 million over a 20-year
franchise agreement. Even discounted to present value, that's
respectable MRP. In addition, the franchisor gets a franchise fee,
ongoing advertising fees, a real estate surcharge on the sublease,
royalties from the sale of the logoed products which Franchisee C
must purchase to outfit the new location, etc. In addition, the
advertising fees contributed by A, B, and C can be used at the
periphery of the trade area, or even on national placements, which
will further franchisor expansion and provide little or no benefit to A,
and that franchisees are competitors among themselves, and the franchisor benefits from
internecine competition so long as pricing is systemically optimal.
478. Demand is elastic where a price change causes a greater change in demand;
inelastic where a given price change causes a smaller change in demand; demand is
unitary where there is a 1:1 correlation between price and demand changes. Most
products have a combination of elastic, inelastic and unitary features depending on the
specific price/quantity coordinates being compared.
479. For example, product line, visual merchandising, customer service, etc.
480. W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION L. & PRACTICE § 2:3 at 3
(1990) (noting that essential concept of franchise is uniformity of product or service).
There are occasional exceptions. See Linda Lee, Times Square, With Ketchup, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002 at B1 ("McDonald's corporation, once the enforcer of a clonelike
1950's uniformity, now takes a do-your-own-thing attitude about decoration.").
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B, and C whose dollars pay for the advertising.
481
The tautology that output is a function of input can be seen in the
example above. Input is comprised of capital and labor, and is the MFC
of the encroachment equation. In the example, the inputs are provided
almost exclusively by Franchisees A, B, and C. More importantly, the
franchisor has near zero input cost on Franchise C, but the input of
Franchisee C results in an increase in output (MRP) captured by both
franchisor and Franchisee C. However, since MFC is so low for the
franchisor,482 the incentive to encroach is great, particularly where
longer-term costs (such as legal expenses, systemic declines in franchisee
profitability, and increased reputational costs) can be managed through
artful drafting of the franchise agreement.
Encroachment impacts more than gross sales. Gross sales impact
can be significant and lasting, and is the most easily quantified
damage.483 But the more subtle impacts of encroachment can be more
damaging, and may go unnoticed by an unsophisticated franchisee. Most
franchisors make their money based in some form on the gross sales of
an outlet, whereas franchisees make money based on net income.
Franchisor encroachment is particularly effective with products having
high price elasticity, since franchisees must charge sub-optimal unit price
to avoid customer defections to the nearby competing franchisee. In the
example above, for example, Franchisee A may have invested his life
savings on a business plan predicated on a 40% Cost of Goods Sold
(COGS). But in order to keep customers who would otherwise defect to
B or C, Franchisee A lowers the selling price. The franchisor and
vendors are still charging the same wholesale price, so the percent COGS
now rises, eroding or even eliminating profitability. It is a valid
481. This is a respected expansion strategy in marketing. For example, Target and
Kohl's department stores have recently done extensive television and outdoor media prior
to entering the New York City market; brand awareness is likewise a precursor to
franchisor expansion into virgin territory.
482. The Print Three franchisor was able to set up an entire competing franchisor
named Le Print Express without adding staff. See Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three
Franchising Corp., [2000] 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 2369 at *26-27. Tricon (Taco
Bell, Pizza Hut, KFC) collected $830M in franchise fees in 2001 and noted that cost of
collection was low. See Papiemik, supra note 203. And AFC Enterprises (Popeye's,
Church's Chicken, Cinnabons) told financial analysts that 70-90% of franchise revenue
collected by the franchisor was profit. See James Peters, AFC A Ringing Success in First
Year as Public Company Despite Soft Economy, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Mar. 11,
2002 at 4, 61.
483. For example, as a franchisee, this author experienced an immediate 25% sales
decline following the opening of a competing franchise less than four blocks away, and
the decline remained more than a year later. In fairness, the franchisor had taken steps to
minimize the impact by limiting operating hours of the new location and was surprised by
the magnitude and duration of the impact.
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complaint of franchisors that franchisees are more prone to supra-optimal
pricing, franchisees are ill-advised to exceed the franchisor's suggested
retail price both for reasons of franchise uniformity484 and long-term
profit maximization. 485 Although maximum price maintenance may be
permissible,486  franchisors can avoid antitrust concerns by pitting
franchisees against each other to increase gross sales. The incremental
cost of the increased revenue to the franchisor is likely to be
insignificant. Hence, the increased revenue to the franchisor will provide
the highest margins, particularly in a less mature system where the
franchisor has excess capacity to service new outlets.487 Whether this is
true for the franchisee depends on factors related to elasticity and
variable operating costs. In any event, where the franchisor is well
managed, encroachment is an economically rational act where the goal is
488profit maximization. Moreover, if the franchisee is pushed to abandon
the franchise (rather than being terminated), the franchisor has a stronger
claim for loss of future royalties.489 In that instance, the franchisor gets a
newly-built outlet paid for by the new franchisee, increased sales, and
double royalties 490 by virtue of a claim against the old franchisee.
Courts, however, have begun to look with skepticism at lost future
royalty claims.4 9'
484. Customers are aware of prices, and expect relative uniformity on prices within
the same market area. This conclusion is supported not only by internal franchisor
research reviewed by this author, but by this author's own experience as a franchisee.
485. Although a small franchisee probably doesn't know the price elasticity of the
product, a large franchisor probably does have some idea. A franchisor has a greater
amount of market sales data, and presumably is better equipped to determine the optimal
retail price. Of course, that optimal price may be different for franchisor and franchisee,
and the question becomes whether the franchisor will balance the interests in setting a
suggested retail price. When McDonald's promoted a $1 burger, franchisees complained
that they were losing money. See Amy Zuber, Discounting not a Quick Fix for Fast
Feeders, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Nov. 25, 2002 at 1, 54 (franchisee says
McDonald's must cut rent, give money to operators, or raise the prices).
486. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 258, at §§ 6.7a, 6.7b (2000).
487. In a mature system, the excess capacity issue is less significant since economies
of scale have likely driven marginal factor cost to a low level anyway.
488. 1 refer to immediate profit maximization. To analyze the long term
consequences, it is necessary to discount to present value costs such as increased
litigation and reputational damage. While those factors are discussed elsewhere in this
paper, it suffices to say that those costs have not acted as a deterrent to any franchisor of
which this author is aware.
489. Barkoff, supra note 140, at 3 ("recovery of loss of future revenue seems to
depend on who blinks first"). A franchisee terminated for failure to pay royalties may
escape payment of lost future royalties. See Burger King Corp. v. Hinton, Inc., 203 F.
Supp. 2d 1357, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
490. The franchisee could seek to show that the new outlet, which may effectively be
a relocation insofar as it draws from an almost identical trade area, reduces any claim for
lost royalties since any computations are speculative.
491. Rupert M. Barkoff, Recent Precedents say Recoveries for Lost Future Royalties
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The example above shows how encroachment makes economic
sense in the short term for the franchisor. Franchisors maintain that this
wouldn't happen since it would kill the golden goose by driving
franchisees into bankruptcy, and ending the royalty stream. A
commentator in the IFA publication Franchising World criticized those
who complain of encroachment: "A franchisor doesn't deliberately try to
take business from his franchisee, that decreases royalty. Royalty is his
income.,
492
This statement is incorrect, for several reasons. First, a reduction in
profitability for the encroached franchisee does not mean a reduction in
franchisor royalties; as shown above there is often an inverse
relationship. Second, reduction in franchisee profitability logically
results in a diminution in resale value of the franchise. Franchisee
recognition of that diminution upon sale may trigger the need for cash
contribution to cover collateralized loans; sunk costs and prospective exit
costs keep the franchisee in the system despite the reduction in
franchisee income. Third, a franchisor has the ability to make it difficult
493for a franchisee to exit the system, so a franchisee may remain even
when barely eking out a living. Fourth, the franchisor has conditioned
the franchisee to think of himself as an "owner" of the business, and
admitting defeat may be psychologically difficult, particularly when the
franchisee's loss results in no loss to the "partner" franchisor, who
merely inserts a new franchisee serf in his place. Fifth, at least in the
short run, the franchisor may be able to convince franchisees that market
saturation will ultimately result in increased sales. The franchisor may
even give financing (collateralized and with a healthy down payment) to
encourage franchisee overexpansion, and the franchisor's regional
developer may be required to over-saturate the region in order to keep
regional development rights.494
aren 't Likely, FRANCHISE TIMES, May 2003, at 46 (citing the Sealy and Hinton cases;
noting that Sealy was a California "Left Coast" decision but Hinton was from the same
court that in Weaver rendered a pro-franchisor decision reversing Scheck).
492. Tom Murphy, Federal Legislation Could be Demise of Franchising,
FRANCHISING WORLD, Apr. 2001, at 50, 51.
493.
494. Cf In the Matter of Doctor's Associates, Inc. and Tom O'Neill and Scott
Linkletter, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 12,098 (Resolutions LLC, filed June 1, 2001).
Per written contract, local Subway agent must open more stores than any competitor or
face termination, the loss of everything the local agent had struggled to build would
revert to the franchisor. Id. This clause is present in most Subway contracts with
regional agents, but is not disclosed to prospective franchisees in the UFOC. Prudent
franchisors avoid creating privity between the regional agent and the franchisee, but this
does not obviate the need for disclosure of relevant information to the franchisee. See
Rupert M. Barkoff, Three-Level Systems: Problems Facing the 'Cheese' in the
'Sandwich', N.Y.L.J., July 24, 2003 at 3 (noting legal issues regarding "middleman"
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Because most courts hold that a franchisor may encroach at will if
the franchise agreement is artfully drafted, the franchisee may be
confronted with a Hobson's choice: build the new location or someone
else will. Psychology and sunk costs may impel the franchisee to build
the new site. For the franchisee, such a situation is lose-lose. But the
franchisor who bears little risk is in a win-win position. In fact artful use
of "agree to agree" and "conform to current" contract clauses mean that
the franchisor will capture the goodwill created in the past by the local
franchisee and also that the franchisor will capture an increased future
revenue stream from the original franchise.
Franchisors may also have an economic motivation to reduce
franchisee profitability through encroachment. The Fotomat franchisor
maintained a policy of encroaching in order to limit gross sales to
$70,000 per kiosk.495 The court noted that the effect was to prevent the
franchisee from attaining the 3-year projection that the franchisor had
discussed in the sales literature. In order to quickly expand nationwide,
the franchisor decided to expand through franchising. In the early years
496it derived more income from franchise sales than from operations.
When Fotomat decided to recapture the Indianapolis market from the
franchisees, it deliberately encroached in order to buy out franchisees at
497the lowest possible price.
Some franchisors such as Cingular498 and Haagen-Dasz view their
franchisees as "Beacons on the Street ' 499 to raise the profile of the brand
in order to funnel customers to distribution outlets more profitable to the
franchisor. Conversely, the Subway sandwich chain has 20,000
franchised outlets and only one company-owned test store. Franchise
legislation should distinguish between a "Hdiagen-Dasz" and a "Subway"
encroachment; the former is much more prone to franchisor bad faith
than the latter, because MRP is much greater and the potential for abuse
of franchisees greater as well. Moreover, reputational damage is more
likely to be a curb on "Subway" encroachment than "H~iagen-Dasz"
encroachment. This is particularly true where the franchisor has built
trademark value on the backs of the franchisees and now desires to
eliminate or reduce the franchisees to a "tactical marketing tool.
An additional factor where franchisors encroach with company-
between franchisor and franchisee).
495. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., No. IP 74-705-C 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15832 at *62 (S.D. Ind. May 18, 1977).
496. Id. at *21.
497. Id. at *93.
498.
499. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 791 F. Supp. 719, 818 (D. Minn. 1989).
500. Id. at 818.
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owned outlets is franchisor access to the franchisees' financial and
market data. In 1992, a Sheraton Atlanta airport franchisee ceased
receiving bookings through the Sheraton reservation system. Sheraton
Reservations claimed computer error but refused to compensate the
franchisee.0 1 Sheraton Reservations also overbilled the franchisee and
demanded that the franchisee pay the charges and pursue a refund.502
Around the same time, Hyatt offered to sell Sheraton an Atlanta airport
property at a low price.50 3 The Sheraton employee in charge of the
acquisition felt that two Atlanta franchisees needed to be terminated from
the Sheraton system, and prepared internal documents to that effect.50 4
By May 1993, Sheraton had purchased the Hyatt property and
converted it to a Sheraton company-owned hotel.50 5 Tom Faust, formerly
the Sheraton Reservations manager, was made manager of the company-
owned hotel. Faust used "confidential, competitively sensitive
information from the Reservation system concerning the franchisees" to
support his argument to the franchisor employer that the franchisees
should be "ejected" from Sheraton.50 6 Faust had detailed data on the
rates, occupancy, discount policy, marketing plan, and operating
expenses of the franchisee. 50 7 The franchisee presented evidence that
Faust may have used the data to take customers away from the
franchisee.50 8  Sheraton Reservations claimed that it was not
discriminating in favor of the company-owned property managed by
former Sheraton Reservations manager Faust, but the franchisees
claimed otherwise based on their own 300 test calls to Sheraton
Reservations. 0 9
In applying a Scheck analysis, the court noted that while Sheraton
had put the franchisee on notice that Sheraton reserved the right to place
competingfranchises anywhere the franchisee did not have notice that he
would be competing with afranchisor-owned outlet.5 10 The court noted
that if Sheraton had placed the franchisee on notice, the franchisee would
501. Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396,
1401 (11 th Cir. 1998).
502. Id. The errors were due to the SABRE reservations system. See id. When the
reason was discovered, Sheraton Reservations credited some money back, but, the
franchisee claimed, still overbilled $1800. Id. at 1407.
503. Id. at 1401.
504. Id.
505. Id. The Hotel was owned by wholly-owned subsidiary of franchisor. See id.
506. Id. at 1402. Sheraton admitted this, but claimed it did not act on Faust's
recommendation. Id. at 1406.
507. Id. at 1410 (discussing Georgia Trade Secrets Act).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 1402, 1406.
510. Id. at 1404.
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have no recourse.511 In contrast to the controversy which greeted Scheck,
six years later Camp Creek was quietly received within the franchise
industry, which realized that "artful drafting" could enable
encroachment, just as the Scheck court had tried to explain.51 2
Many franchisees fail to understand that they are entering into a
Faustian bargain with their franchisor. Franchisors often claim that they
don't have sufficient data to provide prospects with revenue and profit
numbers, but then use the same data to surgically cannibalize their
franchisees. Data can be used when determining which locations to
defranchise, refranchise, and encroach with company outlets. Sometimes
this is part of a public strategy by the franchisor. The Merrill Lynch
analyst following Krispy Kreme noted the discrepancy between 20.9%
comps 513 at company-owned outlets, 11.8% at older franchises and 1%
for newer franchises.51 4 The analyst stated that Krispy Kreme admitted
some cannibalization but said it was part of a strategy for the franchise to
515achieve "critical mass" in a few years.
Franchisors tell their "partner" franchisees that there are written
guidelines followed by the franchisor and imply that the franchisor acts
in good faith in determining where to site new outlets. Franchisors are
not liable for fraudulent misrepresentation where they promise a
prospective franchisee that the franchisor will not encroach the
franchisee, since failure "to make good subsequent conditions which
have been assured" or otherwise fulfill "an agreement to do something at
a future time" is breach of contract, not fraud.516 Moreover, a properly
drafted integration clause will result in summary judgment in favor of the
franchisor on a claim for breach.517 If the franchisor does not place the
encroachment policy within the franchise agreement, an integration
511. Id. at 1405 n.12.
512. See Robert Zarco & Lawrence V. Ashe, The Sounds of Silence in the Franchise
Agreement, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 1 (1999) (analyzing the two cases).
513. Same-store comparable sales relative to prior year for stores open at least one
year.
514. Richard Papiernik, Analysts say Future may Tarnish Krispy Kreme Glaze,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Mar. 26, 2001, at 11, 69.
515. Id. Within two years, the effects were as predicted. James Peters, Krispy
Paradox? Weekly, Same-store Rates at Odds, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 29,
2003, at 1.
516. Cook v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 400, 410 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
The rationale is that "fraud must relate to facts then existing or which have previously
existed." Id.
517. See Whalen v. Connelly, 545 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1996) (discussing fraudulent
inducement claims). Some inducement claims may also be barred by the economic loss
rule, notwithstanding the rise of the "contort" many courts sharply distinguish between
contract and tort. See Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So. 2d 74, 77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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clause will likely preclude a franchisee cause of action.5 18
Even where the policy is incorporated in the franchise agreement
the policy may be illusory. Dunkin' Donuts has such a mechanism for
franchisees to dispute prospective encroachment. As seen, however, in
Harford Donuts v. Dunkin' Donuts,51 9 Dunkin' Donuts simply ignores
analyses which show cannibalization and opens the new location. In
Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts, the appellate court dismissed franchisee
evidence that the Dunkin'-approved grievance committee found that the
new site would "significantly encroach" by observing that Dunkin' was
not "contractually bound" by the committee finding.5 20 In Kirkwood Kin
v. Dunkin' Donuts, the franchisees alleged violation of the covenant of
good faith on the grounds, inter alia, that Dunkin' had violated the
covenant by failing to consult with the franchisees prior to opening two
competing outlets. In holding for Dunkin', the court observed that if the
franchisee lacks veto power, "what good would prior consultation do,
other than perhaps assuage any fears the existing franchisee might
have?.., parental 'hand holding' [is not] a requirement of the
covenant.,521 But the next year, a Dunkin' franchisee who failed to seek
the parental hand holding on the grounds that "no one.., has gotten
anywhere with those programs" was told by the court that his claim was
"flawed because he failed to avail himself' of Dunkin's encroachment
procedure. The rulings demonstrate the lack of mutuality in the
franchise relationship. A franchisee must give the franchisor an
opportunity to discuss encroachment on the off chance that the policy
will not always be a sham. However, a franchisor does not have to
submit to the encroachment dispute resolution procedure where the
franchisor has a contractual right to encroach, and knows that it will
ignore the results of any study not in the franchisor's favor.
Many franchisors have encroachment dispute resolution policies
similar to Dunkin' Donuts, and franchisees are induced to rely on the
policies. Indeed, franchisor salespeople proudly point to such policies to
show that the franchisor is concerned about expanding in manner which
will not harm the prospective purchaser's investment. In December
1990, when the Chief Executive Officer of Carvel was asked by
franchisees about rumors that Carvel would enter into the supermarket
distribution market, he denied the rumor, adding that that strategy had
518. Davis v. McDonald's Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
519. Harford Donuts, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., No. Civ. L-98-3668, 2001 WL
403473 (D. Md., Apr. 10, 2001).
520. Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts, 496 N.E. 2d 1159, 1161 (111. App. 1986).
521. Kirkwood Kin Corp. v. Dunkin' Donuts, C.A. No. 94c-03-189-WTQ, 1997 Del.
Super. LEXIS 30 at *51 (Del. Super. Ct., Jan. 27, 1997).
522. Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Panagakos, 5 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 n.20 (D. Mass. 1998).
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11 1 523"ruined" Haigen-Dazs' shops. By the fall of 1992, Carvel was
"testing" a supermarket program and by April 1993 there was a full
524
rollout of the program over franchisee objections.
Where a franchisor has a history of such behavior, regulators must
ask whether an Offering Circular which enunciates the encroachment
policy is fraudulent, given the illusory nature of the policy. Franchisees
should be explicitly and prominently informed in the disclosure
documents that the franchisor can and does ignore its own policy, and
will site encroaching outlets even if it results in the existing franchisee
going out of business.
Encroachment may take place for both economic and punitive
reasons. While a factual inquiry into franchisor motivation is more
complex than a bright-line standard, good faith may be applied at the
second stage of an encroachment analysis. Where the franchise
agreement provides explicit and prominent notice that the franchisor may
site a location adjacent to an existing location, the burden would shift to
the franchisee to demonstrate that the franchisor had encroached for the
purpose of forcing the franchisee to surrender possession or be forced
into economic ruin. 52 5 One of a franchisee's obligations is to pay certain
sums to the franchisor for the term of the agreement, and good faith
includes "an implied undertaking on the part of each party that he will
not intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent the other party
from carrying out the agreement." 526 Where an encroaching franchisor
bankrupts a franchisee, the franchisee has not only been denied the fruits
of his contract, he is prevented from fulfilling the franchise agreement.
C. Franchise Inspections & Audits
As then-Chief Judge of the First Circuit, now-Justice Breyer
observed that where compliance with a rule is inordinately difficult, the
resulting ability of the rulemaker "to pick and choose when and where to
enforce the rule ... destroys in practice the very hope of rationally
,527cabining [the rulemaker's] discretion." The subjective nature of
franchisor inspections gives rise to selective enforcement designed to
keep franchisees in line.528
523. Carvel Corp. v. Baker, 79 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D. Conn. 1997).
524. Id.
525. See Far Horizons, supra note 80, at n 6. The court found that McDonald's did
not act in bad faith and so did not pursue the desirability of such a test. See id.
526. Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt. Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir.
1991).
527. U.S. v. Data Translation Inc., 984 F.2d 1256, 1262-63 (1st Cir. 1993).
528. Cf SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 258 at § 8.2b. 1 (citing the Mobil and
Southland cases). Even under the PMPA, franchisor motives for termination are
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Franchisors can choose the optimal time to make a punitive
inspection. A Canadian Radio Shack franchisee was named Manager of
the Month in December and then sent a warning letter in January based
on the store inspection conducted right after Christmas; the franchisee
pointed out that he had been working 85-90 hours per week and that both
he and the staff were exhausted and in any event the retail customers
would not see the disorganized backroom and office.529 McDonald's
instituted a grading system which some franchisees viewed as a means to
force small franchisees to sell out to larger operators. One of the more
contentious points was the degree of restroom cleaning during lunch.
The criteria made it easy for McDonald's to get the grade it wanted to
give: a franchisee attorney noted that during lunch rush "it is inevitable
that some towels will end up on the floor unless someone is standing
guard., 530  Conversely, although the franchisor-mandated "Made For
You" program created many customer service problems, an industry
consultant said that McDonald's inspections focused on "dust on
windowsills and cigarette butts in the landscaping... [o]ne of the
reasons that inspectors don't focus on service is that they have no
solutions to the problems created by Made For You."
53'
The authors have spoken with a donut franchisee active in
organizing a franchisee association. The franchisor knew when the shop
would receive its weekly supply delivery and inspected the shop just
after delivery. Among other items, the franchisor noted that the delivery
which had just been unloaded was not completely put away, despite the
franchisor observing an employee putting the delivery away during the
inspection. The franchisor graded the store as "89" and then denied the
franchisee's pending bid for an expansion site since the franchisee
needed to score "90" to expand.532
irrelevant where the franchisor bases termination on an act or omission of the franchisee.
See Glenside West Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1109-1110 (D. N.J.
1991). Franchisor counsel tell clients that "several courts have concluded that franchisors
are free to treat individual franchisees differently without facing any legal consequence."
Gordon W. Schmidt & John R. Gotaskie, Jr., Enforcement of System Standards: What's a
franchisor to do?, FRANCHISE TIMES, Oct. 2000 at 44, 45. The authors are lawyers with
Doepken, Keevican & Weiss P.C. See id.
529. Head v. Inter Tan Canada Ltd., [1991] 1991 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 513 at *4, *15,
"18.
530. Amy Zuber, Slow Economy Feeds Fast-food Fight: Industry Observers say
Franchisees Hard Pressed to meet Franchisor Expectations, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Jan. 21, 2002 at 28, 29.
531. Amy Garber, McD Smiles at Sales rise; Reaction Cautious, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, July 28, 2003 at 5,167 (quoting Dick Adams of Franchise Equity
Group). Sixty-five point five percent of customer complaints were related to service. Id.
(quoting a Smith Barney analyst's report).
532. Similar allegations of retaliation for franchisee organizing activities were made
against the Popeye's chicken franchisor; in declining to grant summary judgment the
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Franchisor inspections can also be used to provide a pretext to
prevent franchisee growth, permit franchisor cannibalization of existing
franchisees, provide leverage to gain franchisee acquiescence to
franchisor demands, and punish franchisees resisting those demands. In
early 1982, Dunkin' Donuts wanted franchisees to sign a modification to
the advertising policy. 5 33  Shortly after Katherine Apostoleres, a
franchisee since 1976, refused to sign both her stores were audited. 534 In
reviewing the jury verdict in favor of Apostoleres, the appellate court
affirmed the magistrate judge's finding that sufficient evidence existed
for a jury to conclude that the 1982 audits were "substantially motivated
by Mrs. Apostoleres' refusal" to sign the new Dunkin' agreement and
"the terminations were not based on good cause because there was no
intentional underreporting."
535
A Taco Bell franchisee "who had regularly received C's, B's, and
A's on [franchisor evaluation] scores, began to get F's"536 the month
after signing a letter releasing Taco Bell from claims resulting from Taco
Bell's opening of corporate-owned restaurants in competition with the
franchisee. Adding insult to injury, the corporate locations were
originally found by the franchisee, who was denied permission to open at
the sites ostensibly because the restaurants did not meet Taco Bell
criteria for store sites. 537 In quashing Taco Bell's subpoenas for "highly
personal and sensitive financial data" of the franchisee plaintiff and his
wife Iris, the magistrate judge found "the manner in which [Taco Bell]
proceeds ... is indeed heavy-handed and quite apparently designed to
harass and embarrass both the plaintiffs and [non-party] Iris Cohn."
538
Taco Bell, which successfully overcame an independent franchisee
association in the early 1990's in part by allegedly refusing to permit
expansion, 539 now has a more docile association which opposes renegade
court found that the franchisees had raised a genuine issue as to whether Popeye's refused
to approve a prospective purchaser based on the purchaser's activities in the Franchisee
Association, as well as the purchaser's ethnic origin. Popeye's, Inc., v. Yuzo M. Tokita;
Fima & Assocs. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co. (Consolidated Cases), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13295, *30-31 (E.D. La. 1993).
533. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Minerva, Inc., 956 F.2d 1566, 1568 (1lth
Cir. 1992).
534. The audits took place in August 1982; Dunkin' claimed the audit had been
scheduled prior to Apostoleres' refusal to sign. Id. at 1570. Another audit of both stores
took place in Sept. 1985, and a termination letter was sent in June 1986 based on
allegations of underreporting at one of the two stores. Id. at 1568.
535. Id. at 1570.
536. Richard L. Cohn & RLC Enterprises, Inc. v. Taco Bell Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 165 *4 (ND. I1. 1993) (adopting order of Feb. 12, 1993, reprinted at 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1732).
537. Id. at *2-3.
538. Id.at*12-13.
539. Dunafon v. Taco Bell Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22026 at *5 (W.D. Md.
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operators and forwards media inquiries to the franchisor.5 40
Franchisors have leverage in internal franchisee association politics;
AAMCO franchisees alleged that the franchisor gave a choice site to a
franchisee who ousted two association board members that had won a
lawsuit against the franchisor on behalf of the association. 541 Despite the
risks of forming associations, franchisees have been prodded by
franchisor action to organize, and the number of franchisee associations
grew from less than 30 in 1992 to 250 by 2001.542
Underreporting is a problem for franchisors, particularly in a cash
business. The authors have listened as franchisors and their attorneys
waxed in high dudgeon, believing franchisees to be the fountainhead of
this heinous offense. But in matters of cash handling, franchising is no
different from any other non-franchised business. Indeed, it is no
different from the problem faced by a franchisee faced with cash
shortages due to theft, or the retail industry phenomenon euphemistically
known as "inventory shrinkage." In the authors' experience as an auditor
of cash businesses 543 and later as a franchisee auditing the cash drawer
each day, the human compulsion to filch a few dollars from the till
appears more prevalent than not. And we would concede that many
business owners, including franchisee-owners, keep duplicate sets of
books.544 For this reason, audit controls are put in place. These may be
cash controls, inventory controls, random audits, "secret shoppers" and
1996) (Franchisee alleged that in Feb. 1993 Taco Bell President stated that leaders of Intl.
Assn. of T.B. Franchisees [IATBF] not permitted to expand. Count dismissed on choice-
of-law rationale. Id. at *9-13.). IATBF gave media interviews, "Taco Bell did not
appreciate the media attention, referring to IATBF leaders as 'renegades and scum,"'
Dunafon v. Taco Bell Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22468 at *2 (W.D. Mo. 1997). See
also, Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 66. (statement of Darrell Dunafon,
Dunafon Real Estate Development, Sandella's Franchise, Former Taco Bell Franchisee).
540. Amy Spector, Tricon mounts Taco Bell bailout: Store Buybacks, Debt Waivers
Eyed as 'Refranchising' Criticized, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEws, Feb. 26, 2001, at 1, 44
(quoting franchisee association President John Antonaccio and Antonaccio message
opposing group seeking to form non-franchisor sanctioned association).
541. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Graham, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5037 at *4-5
(E.D. Pa. 1990).
542. Mary Jo Larson, Associations: Evolving and Here to Stay, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Sept. 2001, at 19 (quoting Joe Schumacher of Fisher Schumacher & Zucher).
543. From 1985-1987, one of the authors was assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps
Nonappropriated Fund Audit Service in Jacksonville, N.C. and audited military clubs,
chapels, and recreational activities.
544. We would quickly note for the benefit of the audit department of our former
franchisor that to "concede" tax cheating by cash businesses should not lead to the
conclusion that we kept such books ourselves as franchisees, but rather that we are a
"knowledgeable" "source of information on the industry," e.g., Rubin v. U.S. News &
World Report, Inc., 271 F.3d 1305 at 1306-08 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (falsified books in jewelry
industry).
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the like-"Trust, but verify.,
545
Agency theory posits that where a person has his or her own money
at stake, they will be more attentive. This is borne out in practice in
large retail stores where even managers are loathe to "rat out" a thieving
co-worker as opposed to managers of franchises whose income is tied to
indices such as profitability and shortage control: those managers are
more prone to fire an employee whose theft has an immediate impact on
the manager's compensation. Internal control calculus is different for
franchisees who are always at their business in contrast to franchisees
who rely on managers to operate the business for all or a portion of the
time during which the franchise is transacting revenue-generating
business. This is because a franchisee not continuously on site will
impose controls in order that the franchisee is able to deter and detect
theft. Those same controls will often tend to operate to the benefit of the
franchisor and the governmental tax authorities, since proper controls
will create a paper trail and ensure that cash arrives at the depository
which will retain an independent record of deposits. Where gross
revenue is accurately recorded, the franchisee has an incentive to record
all costs in order to minimize net (taxable) income. Purchases of raw
materials are often governed by franchisor-mandated specifications as to
approved vendors, providing yet another independent source from which
Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) may be obtained. COGS and other
expenditures expressed as a percentage of gross sales are then compared
to franchisor national and regional comparable numbers in order to detect
variances.546
There is a slope of diminishing returns when the cost of internal
control and audit is placed against the revenue from internal control and
audit. This slope is not only comprised of "hard" costs in dollars, but the
"soft" costs of increased mistrust: franchisor lack of trust can induce
545. Kate O'Sullivan, Trust, but verify, INC. MAG., Apr. 1, 2001, available at
http://www.inc.com/articles/hr/manageemp/motivate emp/22312.html (last visited May
18, 2003) (secret shoppers used for quality control at noodle shop chain). The phrase was
popularized in the 1980's by President Ronald Reagan in his dealings with the Soviet
Union and is taken from the Russian proverb "Doveryay, no proveryay." Gartner
research, Letter From the Editor, Apr. 30, 2002 available at:
http://www4.gartner.com/pages/story.php.id.2401.s.8.jsp. McDonalds makes significant
use of secret shoppers and in April 2002 it was reported that the franchisor had already
conducted 22,000 visits that year. Amy Zuber, McD to Post 6th Quarterly Decline,
Concedes Service Woes, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. I, 2002, at 1.
546. Variances indicate not only royalty underreporting, but quality control problems.
For example, a low COGS may indicate that the franchisee is skimping on raw materials,
and selling the customer a product which is not up to franchisor standards. A low labor
cost or high productivity number may be indicative of long customer wait times or
employees rushing to assemble products of inferior workmanship.
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untrustworthy behavior on the part of the franchisee.5 47 Because of this,
non-confrontational audit methods are favored by many franchisors-
COGS, labor, and other expense data can be obtained independently, as
can much revenue data such as units sold, credit card, and banking
information. Point of Sale (POS) systems are set to capture and
download this data to the franchisor via modem. In this paradigm,
confrontation with the franchisee is disfavored; rather like Schridinger's
cat, all things exist in harmony until one peers inside the box.
But sometimes it is the franchisee who opens the box, and the
franchisor response reveals much about how the franchisor views the
relationship. Economist Ernest Fehr has shown that if a party refrains
from exercising a valid right to fine a non-cooperating party, cooperation
is enhanced in the future.54 8 In a recent case known to this author, a
franchisee derived significant revenue from sales to a major music
television network. One time the network's accounting department
accidentally sent a $2,500 check to the franchisor's corporate accounting
department, which ascertained that the franchisee had not reported that
sale and previous sales. The franchisor sent notice to all franchisees in
the same county that it would be conducting a series of detailed random
audits of surrounding franchisees. Although the franchisor did not
explain the reason, franchisees quickly discovered the reason and the
issue of underreporting and the consequences to all franchisees were
widely, albeit quietly, discussed. Adopting the Fehr approach, the
franchisor permitted the franchisee to restate revenues and warned that if
any future underreporting occurred, a dozen franchisees in the offending
county, chosen at random, would have a three-year audit with expense of
the audit being charged to the franchisees. A representative of the
franchisor explained to the authors that after review, the franchisor (one
of the top 5 franchisors in the U.S.) deliberately chose to refrain from
exercising maximum legal remedies in order to signal to franchisees that
the franchisor was being more than fair to franchisees, and expected
fairness and honesty in return. In the two years following the incident,
the franchisor experienced rapid expansion in the county, rising numbers
of multi-unit owners, and no litigation/arbitration claims from
franchisees within the county.
Contrasting with the Fehr approach, the Dunkin' Donuts approach is
one of publicly stated mistrust of and surveillance of franchisees. At a
547. See, Ken Grimes, To Trust is Human, NEW SCIENTIST, May 10, 2003, at 32, 36
(citing work of and quoting Ernst Fehr of the University of Zurich stating that subject is
more likely to show trustworthiness when trusted by the other party).
548. Play Fair, Why Don't You?, NEW SCIENTIST, May 17, 2003, at 36, citing 422
NATURE 137 (2003), studies of Ernest Fehr, Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics, Zurich.
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meeting of the ABA Forum on Franchising in New Orleans, Stephen
Horn, general counsel for Allied Domecq QSR (the parent of Dunkin'
Donuts) discussed how Dunkin' spies on franchisees at their homes and
work. In his written materials, Horn discusses "franchisee lifestyle ....
Everyone knows which franchisee just built a beach house and which
one drives a late model Mercedes., 549  To Horn, every franchisee is
suspect: "[T]he franchisee who is happy and wants to expand. Has
anyone checked to see how much he claims to earn from the
business? ... Of course, poor attitude may also bespeak a problem. 55°
How to dig up the dirt? Horn's written materials are circumspect
compared to his oral presentation, but instructive:
One of the best ways to gather evidence. . . is to conduct surveillance
of the franchise .... Investigators are fairly ingenious at figuring out
ways to get the job done. Some are known to use small video
cameras that can fit inside a briefcase ... an investigator posing as a
customer can shoot footage while eating on line or sitting at a
table... an investigator can pose as a potential buyer if the
franchisee has the business on the market.551
Horn's conclusion:
The best use of surveillance is not necessarily to generate evidence
for court, but to confirm that a franchisor's suspicions are correct and
provide some ammunition for a confrontation meeting with the
franchisee. If the case goes to court, the franchisor can always use
subpoenas to gather all the evidence, of which surveillance will
provide but a snapshot.
55 2
At the conclusion of his presentation, Horn turned on a slide projector.
He then regaled the assembled attorneys with photographs not of
Dunkin' stores, not of Dunkin' franchisee deliveries, not of surveillance
inside stores-rather, Horn showed photographs of the personal homes,
boats, and cars of Dunkin' franchisees. Horn then made explicit to the
attorneys what he meant by "ammunition for a confrontation meeting":
the franchisee would be confronted with photos that the private
investigator had taken while lurking around the family home. Dunkin'
attorneys would point out that there was an "obey all laws" clause; the
549. Stephen Horn and Jeffery S. Haff, Franchisee Nonpayment of Fees:
Underreporting, "Royalty Strikes" and Related Issues, in FRANCHISING WITHOUT
BORDERS at Tab W9 at 3(2000 ABA Forum on Franchising).
550. Id.
551. Id. at 4. One Massachusetts attorney told this author that his client suspected
that one of Dunkin's undercover spies was even dressed in military uniform.
552. Id. Footnote noted attorney Jeff Haff s comment that such behavior adversely
affects franchisee morale and trust in their franchisor.
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family appeared to be living beyond its means, and what would happen if
the IRS got these photos? Under such circumstances, Horn stated, the
franchisee would normally pay the Dunkin' demand.553 Franchisees who
fight Dunkin' risk exposure of their private lives, as Horn's slide show
indicated; one franchisee subsequently said that Dunkin' even makes
inquiries into franchisee's "romantic relations" 554 The threat of forfeiting
a $500,000 investment and having one's "romantic relations" exposed
provide a powerful weapon to ensure franchisee submission to franchisor
demands.
After the panel finished presenting, several attendees gathered
around the two presenters. Several asked Horn about his recent novel,
and one for an autograph. None asked about the ethics of Dunkin's
strategy. When this author asked if Dunkin's practices did not amount to
extortion, Horn hastily said that he had been misunderstood. Some while
later, this author had communication with three attorneys about Horn's
presentation; two of the attorneys had attended the meeting. One of
those who attended noted that his clients had told him about the Dunkin'
surveillance, but that he was surprised that Dunkin' was so public about
discussing such practices, as well as surprised at the lack of reaction
from the attendees. One attorney who had not attended the presentation
defended Dunkin' practice and said it was ethically permissible. That is
debatable: an attorney who retired after working for a disciplinary
committee in a major east coast state told the authors that the issue was
clear-cut: threatening criminal prosecution (tax fraud) in order to gain
advantage in a civil matter. The issue was not, she explained, how
artfully the franchisor attorney skirted the letter of any ethics regulation:
"he knows precisely what he is doing, why he is doing it, and he knows
what the response of the other party will be. It's not even a close call in
my mind. It's shocking to get up and boast; it makes you wonder what
else they're up to."
Robert Zarco, one of the world's foremost franchisee attorneys,555
takes up the Dunkin' story from this point. In 2002, Zarco says,
Dunkin's suit for underreporting by Pittsburgh franchisee Chris
Romanias was dismissed because the court did not find Dunkin's
accounting methodology to be credible. 556 At the same time, Zarco's
553. Horn regarded the slide show as the pinnacle of his presentation, repeatedly
noting how effective such photos were. When the projector initially did not work, a hotel
employee was dispatched to fix the equipment and Horn noted how glad he was that the
attendees had been able to see his slides.
554. Martin, supra note 148, at Ill (citing fall 2002 interview in BLOOMBERG
MARKETS magazine).
555. Zarco won the Scheck case (U.S.) and Hungry Jack's (Australia). See
www.zarcolaw.com.
556. Martin, supra note 148, at I11.
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firm was representing Miami franchisee Omar Martinez in a similar
suit.557 After the Pittsburgh case, claims Zarco, the Dunkin' attorneys
realized that they could not show any underreporting by Martinez, and
indeed on January 3, 2003 Dunkin' dropped its underreporting claim
against Martinez. 558 What remained was a claim for violation of the tax
and employment laws.559 The strategy outlined by Hom in New Orleans
in 2000 had become the litigation strategy in Miami in 2003. The
"violations" were not ones which damaged the franchisor; they were
violations of federal law. Dunkin' did not allege that Dunkin' had lost
any money, Dunkin' alleged that Martinez had cheated the IRS and had
not always filled out the 1-9 form of the Immigration & Naturalization
service when he hired new employees.56°
Large franchisors can legally avoid taxes on much of their income,
and have multimillion-dollar lobbying efforts to ensure, for example, that
states do not tax franchisor royalty revenue.561 There is nothing illegal
with franchisors getting the best tax code money can buy, 562 but
franchisors have also violated the law when doing so enabled them to
take advantage of the most vulnerable. Recall that many of the largest
corporations in the country, including major franchisors such as Taco
Bell and Wendy's, have been found guilty of violating employment laws
and paying less than the legal wage.563 The franchisor corporations paid
fines, but did not forfeit their business as an additional penalty.
Employees received back pay awards, but none of them wound up
getting the company given to them. It should also be noted that an
arbitrator who pleads guilty to a criminal tax charge may still render an
award, since tax fraud has no effect on the integrity of the award.564 One
557. Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Omar Martinez, 2003 WL 685875 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
558. Id. at n.2.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 2.
561. Jerry Wilkerson, Franchising Likely To Grow as Recently Jobless Seek To Mind
Their Businesses. NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, May 26, 2003, at 27 (efforts by states to
tax royalties deemed "a government obsession for dollars"). Companies can also do
avoidance strategies such as placing their trademarks in a tax-free or low-tax jurisdiction
and "charging" the parent company royalties, thus making income tax-free.
562. Like everyone else, franchisors don't like to pay taxes and have fought against
paying taxes on income from franchisee royalties, AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 600 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1979) (IFA amicus brief for franchisor),
and lobbied against the estate tax, FISHER SCHUMACHER & ZUCKER, FRANCHISE ALERT,
February 2001 (We have.., lobbied.., in support of repealing federal estate taxes). On
IFA position, see, Paul Frumkin, Industry Supports Federal Tax Cut Plans, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, May 26, 2003, at 1, 96 (quoting Don DeBolt on corporate dividends
tax cut).
563. Supra note 329.
564. United Transportation Union v. Gateway Western Railway Co., 284 F.3d 710,
712 (7th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 109:1
BEGUILING HERESY
franchisor even requires that franchisees commingle business and
personal tax items, 565 and the dependence of the foodservice industry and
the rest of the U.S. economy on the 11 million undocumented workers
has been the impetus behind efforts to legalize this essential economic
force;566 just a month before the World Trade Center attack changed
views on immigration, the restaurant industry was supporting President
Bush's efforts to legalize Mexican immigrants. 567  There is a bit of
hypocrisy in the franchisor stance in Martinez.
In the case of Omar Martinez, tax evasion charges were brought not
by the government, but by Dunkin' Donuts, after Dunkin' "subpoenaed
numerous third-party financial institutions, the Social Security
Administration, Defendants' accountant" and conducted various
depositions. 568 The court found that Dunkin' had proven that Martinez
"failed to comply with applicable tax laws" for 1999, 2000, and 2001 .569
Since this was not a tax fraud case, and since the I.R.S. was not the party
565. For example, Subway sandwich franchisees are required to purchase supplies
through the Independent Purchasing Cooperative (IPC), an organization ostensibly
independent of the franchisor. For liability reasons, franchisees often assign their
operating rights to a corporate entity. Expenses and revenues are netted out and taxes
paid (commonly but not always as an S corporation). The IPC sends an annual check for
each store representing vendor rebates on business purchases. Disregarding the corporate
form, the check is payable not to the corporate entity which purchased the items, but to a
natural person. Hence, the franchise is making purchases which are deductible as
business expenses on the business tax return and a portion of the expenditure is sent back
(as income) to a natural person, the franchisee. This practice also places the franchisee at
risk of those seeking to pierce the corporate veil. Subway franchisees are also required to
keep available on-site 3 years of tax returns (business & personal) for perusal by
franchisor representatives. Doctor's Associates, Inc. Franchise Agreement, available in
SUBWAY FRANCHISE OFFERING CIRCULAR at Exhibit "A," p. 5 (1st ed. 2002).
566. Milford Prewitt, Many Borders To Cross: Immigration Reform on Rocky Road,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, July 7, 2003 at 1, 49 (food industry workers
overwhelmingly Latino), at 50 (Pakistani deli owners in Brooklyn), at 52 (rule rather than
exception that undocumented workers staff high-end restaurants), also, John Moreno
Gonzales, Turning Blind Eyes: Illegals essential to work force, employers say, NEWSDAY
(Queens Edition), July 23, 2003 at A 18, A36 (Government "fully aware" of illegals and
that "the only way to retain this work force is to allow the new immigrants to work
without papers"). The role of undocumented workers is widespread in the U.S., and in
Freeport, N.Y. the village paid to set up a job hiring site to match workers with
employers. Elissa Gootman, Battling on 2 Fronts on L.I. Over Immigrant Job Centers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at B5.
567. Milford Prewitt, Operators, Lobbyists Laud 'Alien' Amnesty, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 1.
568. Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Omar Martinez, 2003 WL 685875 (S.D.Fla.), Feb. 21,
2003 at *1-2. The result may have been different if the subject franchise had been a gas
station; the PMPA permits termination for "fraud or criminal misconduct by the
franchisee relevant to the operation of the marketing premises." 15 U.S.C. § 2802(c)(1).
Martinez' activities related to personal expenses deducted on a tax return, not to
operation of the Dunkin' franchise itself.
569. Martinez at *5.
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bringing the suit, the court did not assess any penalties to be paid to the
I.R.S. or direct the payment of the taxes (presumably Dunkin' will
forward the papers to the I.R.S. since Dunkin' conducted the tax
audit). 570  The court rewarded Dunkin's assistance to the I.R.S. by
forfeiting Omar Martinez' store to the franchisor on the grounds that the
false statements Martinez made to the I.R.S. constituted a "material
breach" of the franchise contract.571 In support of its position, the court
cited an additional three cases that Dunkin' had brought to terminate
franchisees under the "obey all laws" clause.572 The court gave short
shrift to Omar Martinez' argument that he had neither been charged with
nor admitted to tax fraud, holding that a franchisor "need only prove
Defendants' violation of the law in order to enforce their contractual
right to terminate.
' 573
Dunkin' Donuts and Baskin Robbins are part of the Allied Domecq
conglomerate.574 Omar Martinez was "charged" by Allied Domecq with
a handful of violations of federal law during the period 1999-2001, and
Allied Domecq argued that Martinez should forfeit his business because
of that. Conversely, Allied Domecq violated federal law 20,870 times
during 1994-1997, which violations enabled Allied Domecq to add net
sales of $1,040,905.575 And unlike Martinez, Allied Domecq's violations
were directly related to business activity-indeed, the illegal activity was
Domecq's business. Moreover, when the Treasury Department
attempted to investigate Allied Domecq's violations of law, the records
had disappeared: as one commentator noted, such action "implies
evasion to conceal the involvement. '" 576 Allied Domecq paid the U.S.
Government $260,000 as a fine for not obeying the law-less than the
value of franchises forfeited to it under the "obey all laws" clauses. The
publicly available records redact the mitigating circumstances paragraph,
so it is not known whether Allied Domecq agreed to assist other Treasury
Department investigations, but Allied Domecq subsequently "cooperated
fully" with the I.R.S. in getting seven franchisees charged in the Boston
570. Id. at*12-13.
571. Id. at *9.
572. Id.
573. Id. at *10.
574. James Peters, Dunkin '-Baskin-Togo's Parent Allied Domecq Lists Shares on
NYSE, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 19, 2002, at 4 (noting that only 10% of 2001
revenues of $4.2 billion came from restaurant division).
575. Memorandum of Betsy Sue Scott (Chief, Civil Penalties, U.S. Department of the
Treasury) dated Oct. 3, 2001, available at www.ustreas.gov/foia/reading-room/docs/ofac-
index.html (June 25, 2002 production, Image 2) (multiple violations of Cuban trade
embargo, travel to Cuba, failure to retain records).
576. Christopher H. Johnson, U.S. Foreign Trade Sanctions and the Multinational




area alone.577 In short: if a franchisee breaks federal law he loses his
business, if a franchisor corporation breaks federal law it pays a
(relatively) miniscule fine. The distinction here is that Martinez made
improper deductions on his tax return, apparently a far more serious
offense than Allied Domecq making a million dollars by doing business
with a repressive dictatorship in violation of federal law.
Assuming that an individual or corporation violates federal law, that
is a matter for the government. If Allied Domecq was auditing its
franchisees out of some perceived civic duty to enforce the Internal
Revenue Code, that would be odd but not illegal or unethical. And given
Domecq's inability to uncover one of their own executive's theft and
transfer of $15 million to tax-free offshore bank accounts,578 their
concern for a few off-the-books jelly doughnuts is arguably misplaced
and Pittsburgh court was correct in questioning Domecq's auditing
acumen. However, given the written and oral representations of
Dunkin's counsel at an ABA seminar coupled with the circumstances of
Martinez, serious questions are raised about the legality of Dunkin'
tactics and the legal ethics of Dunkin' counsel. Even if Dunkin' now
institutes a policy of mandating reporting to the I.R.S. of all Dunkin'
compliance audits, Dunkin' can still accomplish its goals at the
"confrontation meeting" by threatening to exercise Dunkin's contractual
rights to have Dunkin's phalanx of tax auditors pore over the franchisee
tax returns. Unless the franchisee is prepared to take the risk that there is
nothing in all of the franchisee's business and personal tax returns that is
open to question, and no embarrassing "romantic relations," it is not
worth the risk of a spurned Dunkin' "cooperat[ing] fully" with the I.R.S.
(not to mention a wrathful spouse). The issues raised by Dunkin's tactics
go beyond the scope of this paper, but do illustrate the ability of
franchisors to bring the resources of a multibillion-dollar conglomerate
to bear in an ethically questionable manner in order to seize without
payment the business of a franchisee.
IV. Post-Relationship Issues
A. Selling the Franchise
A franchisor can make life intolerable for a franchisee and push the
577. Martin, supra note 148.
578. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Executive of Domecq Importers
Inc. Charged With Conspiracy and Money Laundering (Mar. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/152at.htm. Three Domecq execs were
implicated in the scheme uncovered during an antitrust investigation of Domecq and
other companies.
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franchisee to do as the franchisor demands or sell to a more malleable
franchisee. This would not be a problem if the franchisee could sell the
franchise freely. There is a bit of a Scheck-type debate among the courts
on this issue: In Taylor Equipment, the Eighth Circuit (applying South
Dakota law) declined to follow the Larese case out of the Tenth Circuit
(applying Colorado law):
[Larese] held that the implied covenant required that the franchisor
not unreasonably withhold consent ... [opining that] "the franchisor
must bargain for a provision expressly granting the right to withhold
consent unreasonably, to insure that the franchisee is put on notice."
We disagree ... we decline to follow Larese because it would impose
an unrealistic drafting burden on parties who intend to create an
unrestricted approval clause whose exercise will not be supplanted by
a jury's notion of reasonableness. 
579
The Eighth Circuit missed the point of Larese, which is that a single
line in the UFOC-similar to post-Scheck UFOC language regarding
encroachment-would obviate juror notions of reasonableness. In any
event, the franchisor must approve any prospective purchaser, and may
retain right of first refusal, and is the primary source of prospect leads.
In fact, since the franchisor controls the use of the franchise trademark,
the franchisee may even be prohibited from placing a "For Sale" notice
in the newspaper which advertises the name of the business for sale and
the franchisee prohibited from placing "For Sale" signs on the premises
of the franchised location itself. If the franchisee markets the franchise
directly or through a business broker, the franchisor must still approve
the purchaser. This means that the franchisor salesperson will have an
opportunity to dissuade the prospective purchaser, and any tortuous
interference claim will be difficult for the franchisee to prove if the
salesman is subtle. The pool of prospective purchasers may be further
limited in systems such as McDonald's 580 or Domino's Pizza 581 where
the prospect must first be an employee for a year.
The franchisor both controls purchaser leads and grants/withholds
franchise approval. The franchisor will have the opportunity to influence
the prospective purchaser's offering price and choice of which franchise
to purchase. In a less mature system, the franchisor can steer the
franchisee to a new location. If the franchisor has embarked on a
579. Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996),
(citing Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 767 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir. 1985)). Taylor
was followed by the Fourth Circuit in Enfield Equipment Co., Inc. v. John Deere Co.,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17424 at *10 (4th Cir. 2000).
580. See supra note 356.
581. Rachide, supra note 446. Rachide notes he started as a 19 year old, "working
my way up through the ranks ... long before I ever heard of a UFOC."
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582program of re-franchising, it may steer the prospect to a company
owned store. Hence, a departing franchisee who spends money to
advertise his business in the classifieds may be simply generating sales
leads for the franchisor. A system in the throes of refranchising may put
pressure on the sales staff to quickly dispose of company units; even
franchisors concede that refranchising is a sign of economic uncertainty
and a need to expand to compensate for stagnant sales.583
A franchise purchase consists of both intrinsic value and time value.
A franchise is a wasting asset due to the finite term; unless the franchisor
chooses to contractually obligate itself it is under no obligation to renew
584the franchise. Most franchisees never consider an exit strategy when
they enter the franchise system, and if they have not been franchisees,
most will never realize that their exit price is greatly controlled by the
franchisor. Given a choice between influencing the price in favor of the
departing or arriving franchisee, it is logical for the franchisor to favor
the arriving franchisee. As a condition of approving the transfer, a
franchisor may even require a prospective purchaser to spend significant
sums to remodel the site; an economically rational purchaser will reduce
the price paid the franchisee by a corresponding amount.
585
582. Joel Holsinger, Does Refranchising Make Sense?, FRANCHISE TIMES, Aug. 2002,
at 43 (in QSR segment alone, over last 7 years 7,600 units refranchised, raising $4.5
billion for franchisors). See also, Amy Spector, Tricon Mounts Taco Bell Bailout: Store
Buybacks, Debt Waivers Wyed as 'Refranchising' Criticized, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001, at 1 (Taco Bell raised $3.1 billion, reduced corporate outlets from
47% in 1994 to 20% in 2001. Franchisees paid excessively high prices; one lender
reportedly took $350M write-down. Id. at 4. Also notes refranchising at Hardees, Carl
Jr's, Coco's, Checker's, Church's Chicken, Popeye's, Cinnabon, Captain D's Seafood).
Id. at 1-2. See also, New World Bids To Buy Bankrupt Einstein/Noah Bagel for $181M,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 4, 2001, at 12 (New World refranchising to shift
toward higher-margin manufacturing). See generally, Larry Simmons, Achieving a
Successful Refranchising Program, FRANCHISE TIMES, June-July 200 1, at 44-5.
583. Lori Doss, Ground Round To Refranchise from 112-Unit Holdings, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Nov. 12, 2001, at 8 (quoting IFA President Don DeBolt). When
PepsiCo spun off Tricon, the franchisor had S4.5B in debt; refranchising brought in $213.
Diageo: 915 International Units Would Go To BK Corp. To Trim Debt Costs if it Does
IPO, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 6, 2001, at 6. A short while later, many of
Tricon's refranchised stores verged on bankruptcy. In the Ranch I Chicken chain, stores
were sold off to franchisees to pay down debt after top executives of the franchisor were
linked to a stock fraud involving organized crime (the company itself was not
implicated). Fowl Play for Cash, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., June 18, 2001, at 6.
584. Zuckerman v. McDonald's Corp., 35 F.Supp. 2d 135, 143 (D. Mass. 1999).
585. The authors are informed by one franchisee that after purchasing from a retiring
franchisee, the new franchisee was told during his monthly compliance review that he
would be required to perform remodeling and upgrades estimated at $20,000. The
retiring franchisee was friends with the area master franchise developer. Normally, the
franchisor would inform the incoming franchisee of the immanent expenditures, resulting
in a reduced price. See id. at 146 (McDonald's intended to require purchaser to remodel,
Seller reduced price).
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The net effect of franchisor power, one commentator has noted, is
that "the franchisor may force the price below market value, thus easing
the task of marketing the franchise at the expense of the departing
franchlisee. 586 In addition, the departing franchisee will not tell the truth
to the incoming franchisee-at least, not if the departing franchisee
wishes to consummate the sale. If the new franchisee seeks to bring suit,
the franchisor can point to the integration clause and the interest of the
new franchisee in maintaining good relations with the franchisor.
Moreover, the franchisor has likely relied on the exiting franchisee to
make explicit representations as to the strength and profitability of the
outlet and the system in general; the franchisor then protects itself by
having the incoming franchisee attest that the franchisee has not received
such representations from the franchisor.
Although the franchisee's sale of the business to a new owner is
contingent upon franchisor approval, the converse is not true. A
franchisor may sell the company to another purchaser who may have
radically different ideas for the brand. Baskin Robbins was a respected
franchisor prior to its purchase by Allied Domecq. Franchisee Jerry
Merrill observed that the managers at Domecq "don't care one iota about
the people who devoted their lives to building this [Baskin Robbins]
brand., 587 Allied Domecq announced that it deemed 140 locations as
"non-strategic" locations which would not have their franchise
agreements renewed. Even worse, franchisees had a non-compete clause
in their agreement, and Domecq's spokeswoman warned that Allied
Domecq "does not condone the actions of franchises who [sic] have left
the system before the completion of their franchise agreements and
opened under another brand., 588 Jerry Merrill wanted to rebrand his first
outlet when the contract expired and Domecq refused to renew. But
Domecq refused to waive the non-compete clause because, Merrill noted,
they still held the lease on the franchisee's second outlet and wanted to
extract the maximum value from the outlet prior to the second contract's
expiration.8 9
586. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 258, at § 8.2c2ii. Again, this is in distinction to
an analogous situation in the securites marketplace, where a majority stockholder owes
fiduciary duties to the minority stockholder in a transaction which pushes out the
minority holder, In re Pure Res., Inc., Shareholders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch.
2002).
587. Julie Bennett, 'Non-Strategic' Franchisees Form New Brand, FRANCHISE TIMES,
June/July 2002 at 18.
588. Id. at 19.
589. Id., quoting Jerry Merrill. Ultimately, the terminations involved about 200
agreements, and a group of former Baskin franchisees reorganized as the KaleidoScoops
cooperative, Carolyn Walkup, Frozen-out franchisees regroup with KaleidoScoops,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, July 7, 2003 at 8. Initially sales declined 20% but




The franchisor may perceive a benefit to recruiting franchisees with
unrealistically high expectations. The type of cognitive dissonance
known as disconfirmed expectancies suggests that a franchisee entering
the relationship with unrealistically high expectations of ability to
succeed will work harder when confronted with the low pay and long
hours common to franchising.5 90  The franchisee may continue to
experience negative cash flow for an extended period,591 depleting his
resources for the benefit of the franchisor:
[D]uring the first years of their agreement, most franchisees think
things are going great. The realization that they are trapped does not
occur until they are forced to sign the renewal contract. Many
franchisees are shocked to learn that the assets of their business are
barely worth enough to pay off the liabilities. At least by signing the
[renewal] agreement they are able to keep their job.
592
A distinction between Bolter and Casarotto raises another problem found
in franchise contracts. The arbitration clause in Casarotto was in the
initial agreement, in Bolter the clause at issue was in a subsequent
agreement. Franchise agreements are for a term of years, and:
[A] franchise agreement is subject to the vicissitudes of the market.
Advances in the art or in technology, competition of other processes,
[and] consumer preferences, all place practical limitations on the
duration of most franchises.
593
What franchisees may not expect is that the franchisor may make
changes not to respond to market conditions but to take opportunistic
advantage of the franchisee's sunk costs. Dale Cantone of the Maryland
Attorney General's office observes that "regulators have no jurisdiction
over renewals and often that's worse than the original [contract]. You've
already got a lot invested in the system, so there's usually less room for
590. Judith Evans, Take a Good Look Before You Leap, WASHINGTON POST, June 27,
1999, at H8. When reprinted in the CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, this article bore the more
accurate title: Do Your Homework When Buying A Franchise: Long hours, modest pay
may await, Sunday July 18, 1999 available at www.enquirer.com/editions/1997/07/18/
fin dojvourhomework.html visited 1/24/01. Cf Elliot Aronson and J. Merrill
Carlsmith, Performance Expectancy as a Determinant of Actual Performance, 65
JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 178 (1962). Of course, the response
makes sense in that (1) the perceived reward is larger than actually the case and (2) self-
perception attributes failure as a personal and not a systemic shortcoming.
591. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 33 (1999) (AFA survey showed only
41% of franchisees break-even first year, 19.8% of those surveyed never broke even).
592. Rachide, supra note 446.
593. Lichnovsky v. Ziebart International Corp., 324 NW 2d 732 (Mich. 1982).
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negotiations. 5 94
At the expiration of the term, the franchisee who is unwilling or
unable to continue the franchise may find that all the years of hard work
become the property of the franchisor and the franchisee is prohibited
from working in the same type of business; a prohibition which the
franchisor may interpret broadly.595  Sunk costs and non-compete
provisions may leave the franchisee little choice but to "renew" the
franchise agreement: "the veteran franchisee who has spent 15 or 20
years building a business ... either accept[s] these new terms or goes out
of business. 59 6 Franchisors will assure prospects that they have the right
to renew the franchise, and assure legislators that there is no problem:
"Empirically, renewal is the norm ... 93% [of 12999 agreements in
sample] were renewed., 597 The truth of that statement depends on what
the meaning of "renew" is.
A standard dictionary defines "renew":
(1) To make new or as if new again; restore. (2) To take up again;
resume. (3) To repeat so as to reaffirm: renew a promise. (4) To
arrange for the extension of: renew a contract. [italics in
original].
598
A legal dictionary defines "renewal":
(1) The act of restoring or reestablishing. (2) The re-creation of a
legal relationship or the replacement of an old contract with a new
contract, as opposed to the mere extension of a previous relationship
or contract. [emphasis added].
59 9
Franchise prospects are rarely lexicographers or attorneys. It is unlikely
that Florence Bolter or any franchisee is aware of the fact that "renewal"
in legalese means the opposite of what "renewal" means to a non-lawyer.
When the FTC broached the issue of whether "renewal" was the most
594. Nancy Weingartner, AAFD celebrates 10 years in style, FRANCHISE TIMES, Aug.
2002 at 7, 8.
595. Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie, [1990], 1990 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 415 (Pizza
franchisor maintained that exec who left to found chicken franchisor was in violation of
noncompete, also in violation for use of "30-minute or free" delivery program. Court
held for exec, noted that while he may have "developed his know-how" once he left pizza
company "it had become personal to him as part of his intellectual make-up." Id. at
*39.).
596. Letter of Malcolm Lindy, Popeye's Chicken franchisee, to Editor, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, July 24, 2000 at 53.
597. Francine Lafontaine & Darrell L. Williams, Issues in the Economics of
Franchising 5 (March 30, 2001) (presented at the ABA Antitrust Section Spring
Meeting).
598. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 698 (3rd ed. 1994).
599. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (Pocket ed. 1996).
[Vol. 109:1
BEGUILING HERESY
accurate term, one franchisor responded: "This term "renewal" is
synonymous with franchising and we cannot ever recall when it was
perceived as a misleading term., 600 Another group responded that while
the term "seldom reflects what actually happens ... [renewal] is an
accepted term of art in franchising. 6 0 ' Tortured parsing, where plain
English words are reversed to become legal terms of art, provides
courtroom cover but tarnishes both franchising and the legal profession.
Franchisor sales agents should be prohibited from using the word
"renewal" when they actually mean, "sign a new contract which may be
completely different and take away rights you currently have as well as
increase your obligations to us and diminish the value of your business."
Chem-Dry (the franchisor in Bolter) tells prospective franchisees that it
bases the franchise relationship on the question: "This may be legal, but
is it ethical?" 60 2 Franchisor ethics are significantly different pre-contract
than post, and franchisees should know that the law dictionary does not
contain a definition for "disingenuous": that definition is found in the
layman's dictionary on the same page as "dishonorable." Declining to
renew a franchise can be a mechanism for a franchisor to capture the
603goodwill built up by the franchisee. With a few exceptions, this is
permissible. Only Hawaii takes note of the transfer of goodwill from
franchisee to the non-renewing franchisor. 60 4 Failure to renew can bring
wealth to the franchisor, but not to the franchisee:
McDonald's Corporation began a de-franchise process as we were
approaching the end of our 20 year lease. After working for
ourselves for the better part of our lives, at the ages of 52 and 53 we
were suddenly looking for employment. We sacrificed a big portion
of our lives, so we could have something when we retired. Our
current financial condition is that we will have to continue working in




600. Letter of NaturaLawn of America to Federal Trade Comm'n. (Dec. 22, 1999)
available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/comment026.htm.
601. Letter of John R.F. Baer, Robert T. Joseph & Alan H. Silberman to Sec'y, FTC
(Dec. 21, 1999) available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/
comments/commentO11 .htm.
602. ChemDry, supra note 122.
603. California (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 20025) and Minnesota (Minn. Stat. § 80C
14 subd. 4).
604. Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 482E-6(3)) requires compensation, including for
goodwill.
605. Letter of Joan Fiore to FTC (Undated), available at
www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/final61 .htm.
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C. Goodwill
One court noted that a franchise fee may be, in effect, a payment for
goodwill. 60 6 The reality is that many franchises are simply a limited right
to use a trademark607 and a transfer of wealth from franchisee to
franchisor. 60 8 Unlike a typical business whose goodwill increases the
wealth of the owner, a franchised business develops goodwill that
increases the wealth of thefranchisor. An example of this is the Swinton
Insurance franchisor in Great Britain. Founded in 1957, Swinton began
franchising in 1984, and by the early 1990s it had 142 franchisees
serving 1.5 million customers and Sun Alliance Group had purchased
Swinton for about £ 250 million.60 9 A Swinton brochure told prospects:
"As your business increases, the value of your Swinton franchise will
also increase .... When you retire or for any reason wish to sell, then
you will reap the benefits of the equity you have built." 6 10 A Swinton
analysis showed that the company could profit by over £ 4 million in five
years by refusing to renew franchises, and at the 1997 franchisee
conference, Swinton told franchisees that it would not renew their
franchise agreements. 6'1 In asking the court to order renewal, the
franchisees noted that while the franchisor was "acquiring a valuable
asset from the franchisee," the franchisee faced "difficulty ... in starting
up his own business because the goodwill which [he] built up is not [his]
own goodwill but that associated with the [franchisor] name."
612
A franchisor entering a new market can use the resources of the
franchisee to create the goodwill and then take away the right to use the
trademarks once they have acquired value in the expansion market:
606. Re: Floan and Copperart Pty Ltd, (Fed. Ct. New South Wales Dist., Slip Opinion
at 56, Aug. 9, 1990), available at, LEXIS, Commonwealth & Irish Cases Combined
File.
607. See, Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 A.2d 207, 211 (Pa. 1976) ("In its
simplest terms, a franchise is a license from the owner of a trademark or trade name
permitting another to sell a product or service under the name or mark."). Trademark
rights may continue indefinitely. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir.
1993).
608. In theory, the franchisor's knowledge of the ability to maximize the wealth
transfer by opportunism during the franchise relationship should increase the value of the
contract to the franchisor. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:
An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1267 (1980). A franchisor
can set a low initial entry fee and target less-qualified prospects, with the knowledge that
the contract's true value lies in the franchise relationship as it will become, not as the
franchise relationship is at the time of contract.
609. Paperlight Ltd and others v. Swinton Group Ltd, Queen's Bench Division






[I]t matters little to the franchisor whether a particular franchisee
remains in business, as there will always be another franchisee
available to take that place .... Once a franchisee has succeeded,
through the expenditure of his own efforts and capital, to establish a
local reputation for the franchise name, his franchise is vulnerable to
termination.613
When Burger King Corp. (BKC) decided to establish a presence in
Australia, it entered into a franchise agreement with a local company.
After 20 years, BKC decided to take control of the market. The plan was
described by the judge as "one of sinister simplicity" 614 in which "BKC's
wholly discreditable conduct" 615  included the "commercially
reprehensible" 61 6 practice of secretly obtaining information from the
franchisee's employee which Burger King used "to formulate its strategy
against [the franchisee] ... in gross dereliction of the fiduciary duties I
am satisfied BKC owed [the franchisee]. 6 17 The court found that "very
senior officials of BKC" communicated with the franchisee "in terms
which lacked frankness and veracity. '618 Burger King officials dissuaded
the franchisee from dealing with Mobil on the basis of ongoing
discussions with Shell for the establishment of Burger King outlets at gas
stations, but lied to the franchisee about Burger King's true plans (to cut
out the franchisee), a practice the judge found "further evidence of the
commercially disgraceful way in which, in my opinion, BKC was
conducting itself in relation to [the franchisee]., 61 9 Burger King also
followed practices known to many franchisees: using punitive reviews
and preventing the franchisee from meeting development targets and
curing alleged breaches of the franchise agreement. In awarding $A
69,329,800 to the franchisee, the judge ruled "the overwhelming
evidence is that BKC did not act with good faith .... It was determined
to create a situation which would enable it to terminate [the
franchisee] .,620
Goodwill in the franchise relationship is a particularly controversial
topic in France, where the right to receive the goodwill (fonds de
commerce) of a franchise operation can have significant tax and real
613. General Motors Corp. v. Gallo GMC Truck Sales, 711 F.Supp. 810, 814 (D.N.J.
1989).
614. Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd v. Burger King Corp, NSWSC 1029 (1999), 1999 NSW
LEXIS 61 (Sup. Ct. of New South Wales, Equity Division, Commercial List) at *271.
615. Id. at *248.
616. Id. at *243.
617. Id. at *244.
618. Id. at *248.
619. Id. at*241.
620. Id. at *489.
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estate consequences.621 American franchisees would be surprised to
learn that a French franchisee/lessee of the business location has a right
to automatic lease renewal if the franchisee is deemed the legal owner of
the goodwill. 622 In California, a franchisor claimed to be the "owner" of
the business and hence entitled to payment for goodwill under the state's
Eminent Domain law; the court rejected the claim. 623 The link between
locational (geographic) goodwill and lease renewal is not unique to
France: Franchisee sub lessee protection was formerly granted under
Brazilian law, but franchisors have succeeded in eliminating that
624 honprotection, with one franchise attorney making the incredible
statement that:
In view of the nature of franchising, the usual protection afforded by
ordinary leases may not be appropriate ....
In franchising, both parties are working with the common aim of
making the franchise succeed, and there is no value in regulating their
relationship under the Leasehold Law.
625
Shortly after that statement was made, the Associated Press reported that
McDonalds franchisees in Brazil are suing McDonalds, alleging, inter
alia, that McDonalds pays 5% of sales as gross rent to the landlord but
charges the franchisee 21% of sales, in violation of law-perhaps there is
626a value in regulating the relationship. Just as franchisors claim
exemption from the laws applicable to everyone else in testimony before
American legislators, so too have franchisors in Brazil claimed-
successfully-that they merit an exception to the law.
"Success" in the franchise context depends on perspective:
franchisors normally take a percentage of the gross; 6 2 7 franchisees' profit
621. Rdmi Delforge, New Trends in French Case Law: The Growing Recognition of
the Independence of Franchisees, 2 INT'L J. OF FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L. 37, 42-
43 (2000). Also, franchisors are exempt from compliance with Article 85(3) of the EU
Treaty "to the extent necessary to protect the identity and goodwill of a franchise chain,"
Phillippe Xavier-Bender, European and French Law on Distributing Products, 10-AUT
INT'L L. PRACTICUM 61, 63 (1997) (NY State Bar Assn.).
622. Id. at 42 (citing Decree of September 30, 1953).
623. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Concord v. Int'l House of Pancakes, Inc.,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
624. Cdndida Ribeiro Caff, Recent Developments of [sic] Franchising in Brazil, 2
INT'L J. OF FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L. 159, 164 (2000).
625. Id. at 164.
626. CCH, BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE No. 266, ISSUE No. 269, Dec. 21, 2001 at 12,
citing Associated Press story of Dec. 10, 2001 (this section of the BFG is a pamphlet
enclosed with the monthly update).
627. This can be direct, as in a stated percentage of gross revenues. It can be indirect,
as in mandatory purchase of raw materials from the franchisor, on which the franchisor
makes a profit. In either event, the practical effect is the same.
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is the net. Perhaps franchisors behave differently in Brazil than in the
United States. In the United States, a "successful" franchisee is often not
even the lessee of his business premises628 but a sub lessee 629 at the
mercy of both the franchisor lessee and the landlord.630 The importance
of this provision cannot be overstated: it permits de facto unilateral
termination of the franchisee, even if the franchisor deliberately acts in
bad faith to seek termination of the lease in order to get rid of the
franchisee. One court held, in refusing to permit such behavior, that a
franchisee:
[K]nows that his good service will in many instances produce regular
customers. He also realizes, however, that much of his trade will be
attracted because [the location] offers the products, services, and
promotions of the well-established and well-displayed name [of the
franchisor]. Unlike a tenant pursuing his own interests while
occupying a landlord's property, a franchisee ... builds the goodwill
of both his own business and [the franchisor].
In exchange, [the franchisee] can justifiably expect that his time,
effort, and other investments promoting the goodwill of [the
franchisor] will not be destroyed as a result of [the franchisor's]
arbitrary decision to terminate their franchise relationship.
628. See generally, Rick Kalisher, To sign or not to sign, that's the franchisor's
question, FRANCHISE TIMES, Oct. 2001 at 55 (pros and cons of subleasing vs. direct lease
between landlord & franchisee).
629. Franchise statutes generally do not apply to the relationship with a landlord,
absent "an extraordinary situation." Bsales v. Texaco, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 655, 661 (DC
NJ 1981) 1980-1983 BFG 7717. (Franchisees alleged franchisor and landlord colluded
to not renew lease, resulting in termination of franchise agreement, thereby violating
statutory protection of PMPA). See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(c)(4) (1997) (nonrenewal of gas
station lease as grounds for franchise termination). On a more mundane note, as
observed by this author, the lack of privity between franchisee and landlord gives the
franchisor-lessee great control over even minor matters: the franchisee may require the
intervention of the franchisor to fix a leaky roof.
630. Alignment of interests between franchisor and landlord may operate to the
detriment of the franchisee, particularly where the landlord and franchisor have existing
or potential contractual relationships to which the sub lessee (franchisee) is not a party.
Bsales, note 7 at 663 (franchisee sub lessee had no rights in negotiations between
landlord and franchisor master lessee). Franchisors may even take affirmative steps to
prevent automatic renewal of the lease, thereby triggering franchisee termination.
Veracka v. Shell Oil Co., 655 F.2d 445, 448 (lst Cir. 1981) 1980-1983 BFG 7576 (DC
Mass), 7681 (aff'd). Another example is a situation where a landlord owned multiple
properties suitable for franchise locations: the franchisor could negotiate a
supracompetitive price on a franchisee-operated site in exchange for a below-market rate
on a franchisor-operated site. There may also be the potential for kickbacks to the
franchisor from the landlord or real estate agent with concomitant supracompetitive lease
pricing to the franchisee. The cases cited were decided under the Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1997), which provides more protection than
given to franchisees not covered by the PMPA or Auto Dealers Day in Court Act.
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Consistent with these reasonable expectations, and [franchisor's]
obligation to deal with its franchisees in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner [citation omitted] [franchisor]
cannot arbitrarily sever its franchise relationship . . . . A contrary
conclusion would allow [franchisor] to reap the benefits of its
franchisees' efforts in promoting the goodwill of its name without
regard for the franchisees' interests.
63 1
It is true that a franchisor is normally in a better financial position
than a franchisee, and a landlord may consent to a sublease in
circumstances where a lease assignment would be refused due to the
franchisee's more precarious financial position. 632 However, a franchisee
might reasonably assume that if the master lease contained an automatic
renewal option, the franchisor would exercise the option at the
franchisee's demand, thereby preserving the franchisee's investment.
The franchisee would find out that: (1) most courts disagree,633 and
(2) franchisor abuse of the lease relationship made it necessary for
Congress to pass an amendment634 to the PMPA to overrule case law and
require petroleum franchisors to grant franchisees a right of first refusal
on lease renewal options. Although this reduced the risk for petroleum
651636yewhrfranchisees,63 5 it does not help non-petroleum franchisees. Even where
the franchise agreement is for a term of years, and theoretically the
franchisee could relocate to another site, build-out expense 637 may be
economically impractical or even impossible. As a practical matter, a
franchisee in such circumstances could lose more than his entire
investment 638 and not even reap the tax benefits of the unused
depreciation. Alternatively, a franchisee who perceives the need to
631. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa. 1978). It must be
stressed that courts and the law are more protective of franchisees who own gas stations
than would be the case for franchisees who own, say, a doughnut shop.
632. E.g., Ponderosa Int'l. Development Inc. v. Pengap Secs. (Bristol) Ltd, 277 EG
1252, 1 EGLR 66 (Chancery Div. 1986) (Landlord's refusal to permit assignment to
restaurant franchisee while permitting sublease to franchisee was not unreasonable; both
parties' experts testified that investors would view assignment as impacting value of
building.).
633. 39 A.L.R. 4th 824 § 3 (courts in agreement that sub lessee normally cannot force
exercise of renewal option).
634. PL 103-371 (1994 HR 1520), codifiedat 15 U.S.C. 2802(c)(4).
635. Hazara Enters., Inc. v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D.
Fla 2000) BFG 12,037.
636. Even for franchisees covered by PMPA, there is still room for franchisor action,
PDV Midwest Refining LLC v. Armada Oil and Gas Co. Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 835, 847-
848 (Franchisor's voluntary "loss" of trademark could constitute grounds for franchisee
termination under PMPA notwithstanding 1994 amendments to PMPA.).
637. Franchisor estimates of buildout costs are in Item 7 of the UFOC.




relocate may need the permission of the franchisor, and in a mature
franchise system, relocation may raise encroachment claims by
franchisees in the impacted (relocation) area. The legislative history of
the PMPA finds that:
the franchise relationship in the petroleum industry is unusual, in fact
perhaps unique, in that the franchisor commonly not only grants a
trademark license but often controls, and leases to the franchisee, the
real estate premises used by the franchisee. In addition the franchisor
almost always is the primary, even exclusive, supplier of the
franchisee's principal sale item . . . this relationship is ... often
complex and characterized by at times competing interests.
639
The arrangement described, however, is no longer unique. Many
franchisors are the master lessee and sublease the franchise site to the
franchisee. 640 As a result, they are able to require the franchisee to
arbitrate any disputes in private arbitration thousands of miles from the
franchisee while suing on the lease in local court. In Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Stuart, Subway franchisees alleged that the franchisor
falsely claimed that arbitration was a condition precedent to legal action
by either the franchisor or the franchisees. 64' The franchisor had a
wholly-owned subsidiary which leased the store and then subleased to
the franchisees.642  The Subway store lease did not contain any
arbitration provision.643  In upholding the right of the franchisor to
terminate the sublease due to a breach of the franchise agreement
notwithstanding the alleged representations, the court was not bothered
by the claimed franchisor fraud since the franchisees had notice of the
provisions. 644 As one attorney observed: "It may be that the drafting
gambit at issue in the case is familiar to counsel who frequently work in
the franchise area, but I suspect that many transactional lawyers,
including those with significant experience, would not spot the
implications of those provisions. 645
The goodwill "disposition of a pleased customer to return to the
place where he has been well treated ' 646 (locational goodwill) is created
639. S. REP. No. 95-731 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A. 873 at 875.
640. For example, the franchisor of the 17,000 unit Subway sandwich chain.
McDonald's derives an estimated $1.5 billion from real estate operations. See Amy
Zuber, McD Layoffs 'likely' as fast-food giant slows expansion, focuses on rollouts,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Nov. 4, 2002 at 4, 79.
641. Doctor's Assocs, Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1996).
642. Id. at 978.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 980.
645. Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist Transaction Cost
Engineer, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 31, 68 (2000).
646. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly Co., 205 F.2d 788, 797 (5th
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entirely by the franchisee and is captured by the franchisor when the
franchisee exits the system. 647  At the expiration of the franchise
agreement, the franchisor can capture two decades or more of goodwill.
Joan Fiore, a McDonald's franchisee from New York, stated that when
the twenty year contracts expired, McDonald's forced the Fiores to sell
their stores at reduced prices to "new, younger franchisee[s]" and
observed: "Had we spent twenty years as a [sic] janitor with a pension,
we should have found ourselves in a far better financial position." 648 In
one of the rare cases where a terminated franchisee was permitted to
retain the leased premises, a Canadian court ruled:
Given the failings of [the franchisor] and the hard work of [the
franchisees] to become associated with [the] location, it would
constitute unjust enrichment for [the franchisor] to regain control of
those premises, cause the eviction of [the franchisees] and obtain for
itself whatever locational goodwill may have been built up over the
years .... The landlord ... is content to have [the franchisees] as its
tenant. Accordingly, there will be a declaration of constructive
trust.
64 9
Some franchisors such as Dunkin' Donuts reduce risk by
demanding that the franchisee lease the premises but contractually agree
to turn over the lease to the franchisor upon termination, on the grounds
that "an inability to preserve the goodwill already accumulated at the
location" will irreparably harm the franchisor.650 Even if the franchisee
is the lessee or owner of the property where the franchise is located, non-
compete covenants will prevent the franchisee from retaining the
Cir, 1953) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). The classic definition of locational goodwill is:
"nothing more than the probability, that the old customers will resort to the same place."
Cruttwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (1810).
647. But see Hutchens v. Eli Roberts Oil Co., 838 F.2d 1138, 1142 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
1987-1989 BFG 9085 (dicta suggesting that if franchisor had attempted to terminate
franchisee to capture franchisee's goodwill court would have ruled in favor of franchisee
under PMPA). Also note: The Southland (7-Eleven) franchisee leases everything from
the franchisor. A buyer pays (1) a purchase price classified as goodwill the old
franchisee and (2) a fee to Southland, discussion of the structure in Southland Corp. v.
Froelich, 41 F.Supp. 2d 227, 241 (1999).
648. Letter from Joan Fiore to Secretary, Fed. Trade Commn., available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/final61.htm. Phone comment of Joan Fiore
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/fiori66.htm, case at BFG
10,963, 10,876 (D.C.N.Y. 1996).
649. Magnetic Mktg. Ltd. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., 38 C.P.R. (3d) 540, 565
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 1991).
650. Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Taseski, 47 F. Supp.2d 867, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1999),
citing, inter alia, Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Dowco, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4526
(N.D.N.Y. 1998). A non-compete covenant survives the termination and even the
bankruptcy of the franchisee: not only does the franchisee lose the goodwill at a
particular site, but within the specified market radius as well.
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goodwill the franchisee has built. The "Lick-a-Chick" franchisor
provided that the franchise agreement was in perpetuity. 65' The
agreement provided that if a franchisee-owner of the land and building
where the franchise was conducted ever left the system, the franchisor
had the right to purchase at original cost less depreciation.652
The unscrupulous franchisor has an incentive to capture the
goodwill directly (by pushing the franchisee out or refusing to renew the
franchise agreement) or indirectly (by encroachment or company-owned
alternate channels of distribution). Accepting the IFA's testimony in
Congress that franchising is a "partnership, ' '653 we are reminded of Judge
Cardozo's observation:
To say that a partner is free without restriction to buy in the reversion
of the property where the business is conducted is to say in effect that
he may strip the good will of its chief element of value, since good
will is largely dependent upon continuity of possession.
654
Geographic goodwill can extend into cyberspace. The Internet,
Federal Express, and dry ice have combined to make virtually any
product 655 eligible for worldwide delivery by the franchisor (who has
superior rights to the franchise domain name656) at the expense of local
"brick and mortar" franchisees: the franchisees may become a
showroom network funneling business to the franchisor web site. In
such a case, the franchisor benefits from patronage by customers who
would not shop on an Internet site but for the presence of the local
franchisee.
Even without Internet distribution, the corporate franchisor can
capture the goodwill of the small business who got the customer in the
first place. The nature of a franchise/dealership agreement is such that
the upfront costs of acquiring the customer may be borne by the small
651. A&K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd. v. Cordiv Enters. Ltd., [1981] 56 C.P.R.2d I.
652. Id. The court found the agreement terminable on reasonable notice and refused
to enforce the sale of premises to the franchisor, dismissing franchisor arguments that the
contract was entered into voluntarily and that the franchisee had chosen not to seek legal
advice.
653. Testimony of Adler, infra note 993. As a matter of law, franchising is not a
partnership. Since IFA counsel Matthew Shay was deeply involved in the above
testimony, this fact is presumably known to the IFA.
654. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 467 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) citing Matter of
Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 7 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
655. See, Pooja Bhatia & Edward Felsenthal, When Pigs Fly, WALL ST. J., August 3,
2001, at W1 (estimate 10 million pounds of barbeque-by-mail in 2001, more than double
volume of three years ago).
656. Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 15 U.S.C. § 1129,
addressing "problems faced by owners of famous marks when dealing with the issue of
domain names." H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5.
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business, but the gains accrue to the corporate giant. A Cingular
Wireless dealer brought suit after one of his customers brought him a
taped message in which Cingular told the customer of a special free
phone promotion.657 Cingular specifically told the customer not to go
into the dealer's store, the promotion was only available from Cingular;
and when customers switched the dealer's residuals were terminated.6 5s
The dealer also alleged that Cingular induced him to only deal Cingular
products with the assurance that the dealer would have access to the
same promotions and pricing, but Cingular's own stores and direct
telemarketers then undercut the dealer.659 Hdiagen-Dasz referred to their
franchised shops as a "tactical marketing tool [which] should be used as
such (Beacons on the Street). 66 °
The goodwill of the brand itself 66 1 (reputational goodwill) is also at
issue in the franchise contract. Such brand goodwill is that "element of
value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of
customers, arising from an established and well-known and well-
conducted business .... Particularly with a trade name commanding
high levels of customer recognition, brand goodwill may have been a
significant factor in the decision to purchase the franchise. 663 In such a
case, the franchisee pays a premium to "rent" the goodwill for the period
of the franchise agreement. However, the franchisee also makes an
ongoing investment in building the value (goodwill) of the trademark.
657. Ben Silverman, Wireless dealer has Cingular's no., N.Y. POST, Sept. 16, 2002,
at 26.
658. Id.
659. Id. The practice is apparently not limited to Cingular. Shortly after one of the
authors subscribed at a New York City dealer for AT&T Wireless, he received an e-mail
offer similar to the offer described in the Cingular case. The other author had a similar
experience with T-Mobile. The amounts involved are significant; the Cingular dealer
claimed he was generating $350,000 per month in revenue for Cingular. Most cellular
dealers are small businesses; in New York City, most are immigrants and their families.
It is rare that the dealer has the resources to defend his legal rights, even if he is aware
that he may have legal rights.
660. Carlock v. Pillsbury, 719 F.Supp. 791, 818 (D. Minn. 1989). The exhibit was
attached to a plaintiffs attorney affidavit and the court noted that it appeared to be a
March 1985 handout for an internal franchisor marketing meeting. Due to plaintiff's
attempt to circumvent court restrictions on pages filed, the plaintiffs submitted attorney
affidavits; the court reprimanded the attorneys but did not reject the affidavits since they
were necessary to rule on the summary judgment motion. Id. at 799.
661. See infra, note 663 and accompanying discussion. See also, Gorenstein Enters.
Inc. v. Quality Care-USAAA Inc., 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989) (Trademark identifies
product and owner of mark has duty to ensure quality control of good or service provided
under trademark.).
662. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915).
663. CfJ. THOMAS MCCARTIRY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 18:2, 18-5 (1999)
("Good will and its trademark symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot
be separated without death to both.").
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That nontransferable goodwill can be wrested from the franchisee, and
courts will often rely upon the express provisions of the franchisor-
drafted contract to permit what an objective observer might view as a
legal but inequitable result.
664
D. Good Faith and Goodwill: Hartford Electric v. Allen-Bradley
665
A recent case involving both geographic and reputational goodwill
indicates that some courts are willing to exercise equitable remedies to
preserve the goodwill created by franchisees, viewing goodwill as fruits
of the contract. The Hartford Electric court prevented the franchisor
666
from terminating a franchisee without good cause, notwithstanding
explicit language in the franchise agreement.667 Hartford Electric
(HESCO) is a distributor of devices used in industrial equipment. The
company operated on a year-to-year agreement 668 with Allen-Bradley (A-
B), a large Milwaukee-based manufacturer. The agreement provided for
termination by either party "at any time, with cause or without any
cause" on 90 days notice.669
Connecticut General Statutes § 42-133f (a) provides that a
franchisor must renew a franchise "except for good cause which shall
include, but not be limited to the franchisee's refusal or failure to comply
substantially with any material and reasonable obligation of the franchise
agreement."
670
The early 1990's were a time of national recession, and the
Connecticut economy was particularly affected. In February 1992, after
two years of sluggish sales, A-B placed HESCO on the "Distributor
664. Beitzell & Co., Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp, 1988 WL 66194 (D.C. 1988).
665. Hartford Electric Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., CV 96562061S, 1997 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1411, aff'd, 736 A.2d 824 (1999), 1998-2000 BFG 11,685. On appeal,
separate amicus briefs were filed by the Manufacturing Alliance of Connecticut and the
Connecticut Beer Wholesalers Association.
666. Id. The franchisor disputed that it was a franchisor, but the court applied
Connecticut law to find a franchise relationship, and cited a case applying New Jersey
franchise law finding the same result. Id.
667. A similar holding was reached under Illinois law in Flynn Beverage Inc. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 815 F.Supp. 1174 (C.D. I11. 1993) (also barring application of
NY choice of law provision, finding conflict with antiwaiver provisions of Illinois
franchise act). But see, Tulsa Trailer & Body Inc. v. Trailmobile (N.D. Okla. 1986)
1986-1987 BFG 8615 (applying Illinois law: if express provision allows termination
without cause, no breach of implied covenant).
668. An issue not reached by the court is that Connecticut General Statute § 42-133f
(d) provides that franchise renewals be for three years or more on agreements entered into
or renewed after Oct. 1973.
669. Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., CV 96562061S, 1997 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1411 at *3. The facts of the case presented here have been taken from *1-
*8 of the trial court opinion.
670. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133(f) (West 2000).
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Concern Program" (Concern Program), requiring HESCO to prepare a
business plan and work with A-B to address problem areas. At the time,
the DePasquale family, which controlled HESCO, was embroiled in a
struggle between the father and son for control. In 1994, litigation
culminated in DePasquale buying out his father's interest in HESCO.
DePasquale then hired a Director of Sales (Dan Fadden) and a Director
of Operations (Roy Lusk). HESCO purchases from A-B surged 20.6%
in 1994 and 22.5% in 1995. In April 1995, following a meeting in
Milwaukee, HESCO was taken off the Concern Program.
However, all was not well at HESCO. In October 1995, Fadden and
Lusk met secretly with an A-B branch manager in Enfield, Connecticut
and criticized DePasquale's management and ethics. In November,
Fadden met secretly with an A-B district manager in Boston and repeated
the criticism of DePasaquale. The trial court found that "after those
meetings the relationship between A-B and HESCO declined., 671 Sales
were down since the Milwaukee meeting in April, and in December Lusk
left DePasquale's employ. A few weeks later, in January 1996, A-B
placed HESCO back on the Concern Program. As justification, A-B
cited inadequate staffing and training, the departure of Lusk and internal
conflicts within HESCO. The following month saw the departure of
Fadden and "A-B continued extensive monitoring [of] all aspects of
HESCO's operations to the point that Mr. DePasquale, in a letter of April
26, 1996, protested in anger at A-B's harassment., 672 Less than a month
after DePasquale's letter, A-B's Enfield and Boston managers
recommended to their superior that DePasquale be terminated. Shortly
thereafter, A-B gave notice of termination to DePasquale in accordance
with the terms of their contract.
In assessing the potential damage if HESCO was terminated, the
trial court noted that as a practical matter termination would put HESCO
out of business, since it sold $10 million worth of A-B products and $10
million worth of other products which were sold in conjunction with the
sale of A-B products. In applying the Connecticut Franchise Act (CFA),
the court ruled:
The public policy sought to be implemented by CFA is to protect
franchisees from arbitrary and unjustified terminations. The
legislative history reveals a substantial number of Connecticut
businesses operate under franchises granted by national concerns.
They hire many Connecticut citizens and contribute substantially to
the Connecticut economy. Those Connecticut businesses invest
heavily to develop a market for franchisors' products. Termination
671. Hartford Elec. Supply Co., 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1411, at *5-*6.
672. Id. at *6.
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of such franchises without good cause can create great financial
losses to franchisees and to the Connecticut economy generally.
Thus, this court concludes that A-B's violation of CFA by terminating
HESCO without good cause so violates an important state public
policy as to amount to a breach of an established concept of
fairness.
673
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut showed little
sympathy for A-B's strict construction of the termination clause. The
court noted that HESCO had been an A-B distributor for fifty years, and
Connecticut customers viewed HESCO and A-B as "one and the
same" 674 identity. Public perception of the HESCO/A-B relationship and
nontransferable goodwill were cited by the Supreme Court in (1) finding
the existence of a franchise relationship, 675 and (2) finding a degree of
dependence by HESCO warranting the imposition of a good cause
requirement on the contractual termination clause.676
677Certainly, there was a statute on point in Hartford Electric.
However, neither the trial court nor the Connecticut Supreme Court
limited the holding to a matter of statutory construction; both courts
explicitly noted their concern with fair dealing. Both courts also took
note of the relational nature of a franchise/distributorship contract. Over
the course of time, the dependent party in a relational contract may grow
to expect that the relationship will continue when in fact a relationship of
years or even decades (50 years in Hartford Electric) may be terminated
on a few weeks' notice due to no fault of the terminated party. The
economic damage can be in the tens of millions of dollars.67 8 One of the
673. Id. at *38-*39 (emphasis added). Connecticut cases note the state Franchise Act
is for protection of the weaker party, and whether franchisee is protected may turn on
how much of the franchisee's sales are of the franchisor's product. Danby's Rental &
Leasing, Inc. v. U-Haul of Conn., 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 970 at *7-8 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 23, 1993) (citing Grand Light & Supply Co., v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672,
677-78 (2d Cir. 1985)).
674. Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 736 A.2d 824, 839 (1999)
(quoting Cooper Distributing Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 271 (3d Cir.
1995)). See also 1992-1993 BFG T 10,094, 1995-1996 BFG 10,743, and 1998-2000
BFG 11,650 (litigation between Cooper and Amana).
675. Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 736 A.2d 824, 839 (1999)
(citing Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 950, 961 (D.C. Coon. 1988)). See also 1989-
1990 BFG 9 9360, 9361.
676. Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Company, 736 A.2d 824, 839 (1999)
(quoting Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 677 (2d Cir.
1985)). See also 1983-1985 BFG T 8428.
677. Assuming, of course, the court properly found the relationship to be a franchise
relationship as a matter of Connecticut law.
678. Cooper Distrib. Co., v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 180 F.3d 542, 544-45 (3d Cir.
1999) (Cooper, distributor for 30 years, terminated on 10 day's notice, sold $20 million
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more egregious cases occurred with distributors of Thomas' English
Muffins, who were terminated (one after 24 years) from their "old"
routes but then offered the opportunity to buy their "new" routes back
from the company. 619 Such actions create economic and social damage
in the local community. It is for this reason that several states have
imposed franchise laws, but the absence of a federal statute leaves many
franchisees and distributors unprotected.
V. Issues During and After the Relationship
A. Good Faith and Relational Contracts: Fruits of the Contract
The Connecticut Supreme Court took a broad view of the "fruits" of
a relational contract. If we use "fruit" in the sense of a mere
consequence of an action, then the N.Y. Court of Appeals statement in
Kirk La Shelle is irrelevant. If a contract results in a benefit, one of the
parties is entitled to that consequence. Analyzed as property, the benefit
legally belongs to one party or the other. If that benefit is blocked from
reaching its rightful owner, the aggrieved party's action is for breach of
contract or tortuous interference. Conversely, if no benefit flows from
the contract, no benefit exists and therefore there is no benefit to be
interfered with. Of what use is good faith and fair dealing in either case?
The standard set out by the court in Kirk La Shelle v. Armstrong is broad
and seemingly protective of wrongly injured parties. However, the court
speaks only of the "fruits of the contract," a position presumably
excluding pre-contractual acts or omissions. "Fruits of the contract" is
not a model of clarity: there can be debate over what constitutes the
contract,680 let alone the "fruits" thereof: two of the most controversial
decisions in franchise law involve whether franchisor encroachment
"destroy[ed] the right of the franchisee to enjoy the fruits of the
contract., 68 ' To understand the potential for opportunistic abuse under
the current statutory scheme, it is necessary to ascertain what the "fruits"
of the franchise contract consist of.682 The relational nature of franchise
annually of Amana products accounting for 80% of Cooper's business).
679. Smith v. CPC Baking Dist. Co., 177 F.3d 110, 113 (2nd Cir. 1999).
680. Rupert M. Barkoff, J. Michael Dady, & Alan H. Silberman, Are Franchise
Agreements Without Written Borders? Oral Evidence of Contract Terms and the Concept
of "Integrated Contracts, " in FRANCHISING WITHOUT BORDERS at Tab LB 1 (2000 ABA
Forum on Franchising). Accord George I. Wallach, The Declining 'Sanctity' of Written
Contracts: Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo.
L. REV. 651 (1979).
681. Vylene Enterprises, Inc. v. Naugles, Inc., 90 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F.Supp. 543, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
682. Also relevant in determination of remedies. Heller v. Equity Marketing, Inc.,
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contracts-which can change considerably over a term lasting for as
much as twenty years-make Kirk La Shelle difficult to reconcile with
the classical view that "[a] contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do
with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.', 683 In practice the
law often does recognize that the intent of the parties matters, even
between sophisticated parties. 684  The fluid nature of the franchise
relationship (created in large part by the extraordinary scope of
franchisor discretion) should make the intent of the parties a critical
inquiry in dispute resolution. Franchisors are justifiably concerned that
government regulation of the post-sale relationship will limit franchisor
ability to respond to changing conditions over the years and thereby
impede franchisor receipt of the fruits of the contract. In accepting this
argument, legislators should demand that good faith and fair dealing be
exercised in order that franchisees may also enjoy the fruits of the
contract.
Franchisees may reasonably believe that fruits of the contract
include turnkey operation and ongoing operational support.
685
Franchisors will even have departments with titles such as "Store
Design" and "Store Construction" 686 which would lead the franchisees to
believe that the franchisor will actually be responsible for the design and
construction of the store; in fact, the franchisor is concerned with
Lanham Act687 (trade dress) issues.688 The risk is particularly acute for a
259 A.D.2d 275 (N.Y. App.Div. 1st Dept 1999) (specific performance available for
breach of contract but not quantum meruit).
683. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Learned
Hand, J.).
684. E.g., Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000).
685. A refreshingly direct application of this is the International House of Pancakes
(IHOP) turnkey program, which opens 90% of its stores and "makes them profitable
before selling them to franchisees." James Peters, Growth strategy hot on griddle as
IHOP, Stewart prepare for future, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 17, 2001, at 8,
122; see also Wendy Webb, IHOP head takes different approach to franchising,
FRANCHISE TIMES, Feb. 2000 at 20. In 2003 IHOP abandoned the program after 45 years.
Lori Lohmeyer, IHOP to cut 15% of staff regroup with franchisee operations team,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003, at 1. Turnkey programs can present risks
for franchisors. Beth Mattson-Teig, The pros and cons of turnkey programs, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Sept. 2002 at 34.
686. See The HQ Development Departments, SUBWAY TO SUBWAY (Doctor's
Associates, Inc., Milford, Conn.), June 15, 2001, at 7 (citing Store Design & Construction
as "departments that can help you"). See also DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC., THE WAY
YOUR FRANCHISE SHOULD BE (Doctor's Associates, Inc.) 1998. ("Real Estate, Store
Design ... Construction ... are just some of 25 departments at our headquarters that
support our franchisees.").
687. 15 U.S.C. 1051 (2002).
688. As a franchisee, this author utilized the franchisor-provided departments and
franchisor-recommended contractors to build a national franchise. Upon discovery of
illegal and dangerous electrical wiring, multiple electrical failures and fires, shelving
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franchisee developing a new site or purchasing a troubled outlet from an
exiting franchisee; the expertise required to navigate the permit
process 689 and adequately supervise a team of architects, contractors, and
subcontractors is likely to be underestimated by a first-time franchisee.
The franchisees may reasonably believe that the "fruits of the
contract" include advertising and marketing support and may reasonably
believe that the advertising monies will be spent in a manner benefiting
the franchisees who contribute the advertising dollars. However,
franchisors may target spending to benefit markets with a heavy
concentration of company-owned sites.
The franchisees may reasonably believe that they will own their
own business and reap the benefits of the goodwill-reputational and
which fell apart within a month, and a failure to provide adequate oven ventilation-
which caused the restaurant temperature to rise to 130°F-the franchisor acknowledged
that no electrical schematic had been produced and disclaimed responsibility to ensure
that the equipment would actually operate in the store as "designed" in the blueprints on
file with the franchisor. Although the franchisee brochure stated the franchisor would
provide stores designed, inter alia, to "[f]acilitat[e] easy maintenance" and "[c]onserv[e]
energy, both economically and physically" based on "questionnaires that address code
and design ... requirements," the franchise agreement contained an integration clause.
DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC., A BUSINESS You CAN BE PROUD To OWN 7 (1996). The
franchisor's world headquarters disclaimed responsibility for the resulting monetary
damages and directed the franchisee to "sell your store if you don't like it." This is a
common franchisor response, (similar remark also present in the Far Horizons case of
McDonald's Australia, during the same conversation about "when do we fP**k [the
franchisee]") and one American franchisor actually trains franchise reps to use this
response when a problem arises. As the franchisor is well aware, the franchisee has
substantially greater investments of time, money, and emotional capital invested in the
business than any of the employees of the franchisor. "Sell your store if you don't like it"
is an intentionally provocative response designed to elicit feelings of powerlessness in the
franchisee. In the author's experience, this statement is remembered by franchisees long
after the original issue is resolved. The passive-aggressive franchisor "conflict
resolution" training thus may permanently poison the franchise relationship. This is not
of concern to the franchisor, since as indicated by the statement, the franchisor always
has the ultimate control over the business life (and frequently, life savings) of the
franchisee. As Professor Hadfield observed, franchisor behavior post-contract may be
quite logically based on opportunistic exploitation of the franchisee's sunk costs.
Franchisor behavior can also be explained in light of the legal latitude granted by a
proper integration clause. In fairness, the franchisor discussed above (Doctor's
Associates) has since made radical changes to become more franchisee-friendly and the
experience described above might not recur today.
689. For example, in New York City the permit process is sufficiently difficult that
there are companies whose business is shepherding permits through the bureaucracy.
Expediters, in BELL ATLANTIC MANHATTAN YELLOW PAGES 521 (1999). See also
Michael Brick, Some Suburban Restaurant Chains Are Learning About Life in the City,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002 at C9 (problems in New York City include "lack of
contiguous space, security deposits, union wages, delivery costs and permit expeditors");
Benjamin Smith, Bloomberg to Overhaul Buildings Department, N.Y. SUN, July 24, 2002
at 3 ("the department is so impenetrable by the common person that it has bred an entire
industry of 'expediters .... ').
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locational-created by the franchisees' hard work. The founder of
Dunkin' Donuts noted: "Franchising gives people a sense of
ownership., 690 That the "ownership" is illusory is irrelevant: The very
survival of franchising is dependent upon conveying a sense of
ownership without the attributes of ownership; the sense of contractual
obligations without the mutual obligations contracts traditionally entail.
The franchise "contract" is not a conventional contract. The obligations
of the parties are set forth in the contract, and those obligations include
adherence to the Operations Manual 69' and franchisor directives with
respect to sourcing, upgrades, and compliance reviews. The franchisee
cannot alter the contract, but the franchisor can direct the franchisee to
follow policies not in effect at the time of contracting; notwithstanding
that those policies may erode or eliminate the profitability of the
franchise. Franchisors posit that maintaining the goodwill of the brand
requires the use of suppliers selected by the franchisor; 692 one court noted
that Domino's Pizza mandating the purchase of 90% of supplies from the
franchisor/supplier ensures consistency such that "individual franchisees
need not build up their own goodwill., 693 The franchisor then either
supplies (or determines the exclusive suppliers of) the franchisee's raw
materials. The franchisor retains cash "rebates," "marketing allowances"
694and "signing bonuses" from the designated suppliers, a practice so
widespread within franchising that when one franchisor was charged
with the practice, it asked the judge to look at the franchisor's acts in
light of industry practice.695
Bankruptcy may provide no relief. Although the franchise contract
is generally executory and U.S. bankruptcy law provides for the
assignability of executory contracts,696 and franchisors have generally
690. Rosenberg to Receive NRN Innovator Award, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS,
Sept. 10, 2001, at 4.
691. E.g., Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 803 (D. Minn. 1989) (Hdagen-
Dazs operations manual incorporated by reference into franchise agreement).
692. See 909787 Ontario Ltd. v. Bulk Barn Foods Ltd., 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS
1945 (2000) at *2-3 (Franchise agreement: "goodwill of the Company... based upon ...
sale of high quality products ... [franchisee shall] use all and only such supplies, as
are.., approved in writing by the Company.").
693. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 433 (3rd Cir.
1997).
694. E.g., Synergism Arithmetically Compounded Inc. v. Parkwood Hills Foodland
Inc., 8 C.P.R. (4th) 135 (2000); 2000 C.P.R. LEXIS 181 at *11 (2000) (Fat Alberts &
Ralph's Sports Bar franchisor).
695. 887574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd., 93-CQ-33541, B85/93, 1995 Ont. Sup.
C.J. LEXIS 968 at *29 (Ont. Ct. of Justice 1995) (Judge noted that both sides cited
passages from the testimony of the same expert.).
696. The Bankruptcy Code (II U.S.C. § 101) does not define "executory," which is
where both parties have obligations remaining, the breach of which would be material.
Mitchell v. Streets (In Re Streets & Beard Farm P'ship), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir.
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been unsuccessful in asserting a § 365(c)(1) (personal services
contract) 697 defense-the very nature of a franchise agreement suggests
that there is "no special knowledge, skill or talent" that is the essence of
a personal services contract 698 -the franchisor may still avail itself of
other laws to disapprove the assignment.699 Moreover, the franchise
agreement and the franchisee's lease, although separate contracts, may
be deemed so interrelated as to prevent the estate from assuming the
lease while rejecting the franchise.700 Adding insult to injury, although
there is no special skill, knowledge, or talent involved in running a
franchise, the franchisee may remain bound post-bankruptcy by the non-
compete covenant-the courts are split on the issue.
70'
If we use "fruit" in the Latin sense of fructus, 702 we are looking at a
process-a contractual relationship involving a series of actions resulting
in a series of consequences. The benefit is not from the contract per se
but rather from the actions taken by the parties in the relationship seeking
to fulfill their mutual ongoing expectations. Unlike a discrete
transaction, in a contractual relationship that extends over an extended
period of time, parties to the contract may reasonably expect that both
parties may have to be flexible and not seek to opportunistically exploit
unforeseen events. Indeed, the success of a relationship may hinge on
1989). Executory contracts are assignable (subject to adequate assurance of future
performance) even when the contract does not permit assignment. Worthington v.
General Motors Corp. (In Re Claremont Acquisition Corp.), 113 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th
Cir. 1997).
697. See In re Sunrise Rests., Inc., 135 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)
(stating that "Section 365(c)(1) was designed only to prevent a Debtor-In-Possession
from assigning unexpired executory contracts including personal service contracts, which
are ordinarily not assignable by law").
698. In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991); accord In re Sunrise Rests., Inc., 135 B.R. 149 at 149.
699. See In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984) (demonstrating
Rhode Island law); see also Beverages Int'l, Ltd. v. Schenley Affiliated Brands Corp., 61
B.R. 966 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (demonstrating Massachusetts law). But see In re
Coors of North Mississippi, Inc., 27 B.R. 918 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (holding that assignment
was permitted with cure period of 3 years to pay franchisor creditor). State laws
regarding franchise transfers may be found in FRANCHISE DESK BOOK: SELECTED STATE
LAWS, COMMENTARY & ANNOTATIONS (W. Michael Garner, ed. 2001). UCC 9-408
permits the creation of a security interest in a franchise notwithstanding franchise
agreements to the contrary. However, the trustee may not use the contract right against a
franchisor with an otherwise enforceable right. Additionally, the contractual right of first
refusal may be void under the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Headquarters Dodge, Inc. 13
F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 1993).
700. Cottman Transmissions, Inc. v. Holland Enters., Inc. (In re Holland Enters., Inc.)
25 B.R. 301 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1982).
701. Craig R. Tractenberg, What the Franchise Lawyer Needs to Know About
Bankruptcy, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 6 (2000).
702. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1989). Fructus is a more expansive view in that
it involves use and enjoyment, an ongoing process and not simply a discrete result.
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the ability of the parties to go beyond the strict language of the contract.
An early example is Edgington v. Fitzmaurice.70 3 Directors of a fish
wholesaler on the verge of insolvency invested additional funds to keep
the company afloat, even though not contractually obligated to do so.
This action, said the Chancellor, "shewed bona fides on their part.,
70 4
This is a view not only of the product of a contract but the process of a
relationship contract, and good faith is a logical component of such a
contract. Franchising contracts are best viewed in this manner: the
ongoing nature of a franchise agreement requires such a viewpoint if the
franchise relationship is to make economic sense. This is beyond the
"mutuality" that the New York Court of Appeals disfavors: 70 5 a better
view would be that of a bilateral contract 70 6 requiring "contractual
solidarity": "Longer in focus than mutuality, [contractual solidarity] is a
belief in the future interdependence of the parties, which fosters a desire
to maintain the relationship. 70 7
The concept of contractual solidarity is particularly useful in the
analysis of franchise relationships. The view that "a contract is a
contract" and that there is no difference between discrete and relational
contracts is a legal fiction that is not borne out by common experience.70 8
A New Zealand court explained:
[T]he Court's inquiry is not limited to the intention expressed in any
written contract but can be deduced from all the circumstances and an
examination of the history of the contract in operation because, as it
is important to recognise, the Court is dealing not with a contract
governing a single transaction but with a contract governing a
703. 1885 29 Ch. D. 459 (Eng. C.A.). Probably the earliest reported case specifically
addressing good faith in commercial relationships.
704. Id. at 468 (emphasis added). However, the court found the subsequent
shareholder prospectus deceptive and held the directors liable, prior bona fides
notwithstanding.
705. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 ( N.Y. 1982). New York has
taken the traditional view of contracts, viewing anything beyond the four comers as a
slippery slope the court should avoid. A minority view is that courts should inquire "into
the circumstances surrounding a contract even where no ambiguity as to finality or
intended meaning is apparent on the face of the document." See Tigg Corp. v. Dow
Coming Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 363 (3d Cir. 1987).
706. Although the distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts is often
abandoned as archaic, it is useful in the analysis of franchise agreements. See generally I
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §3.4 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the
meaning ot "bilateral" and "unilateral" and the abandonment of these terms).
707. Mark T. Spriggs & John R. Nevin, The Relational Contracting Model and
Franchising Research: Empirical Issues, in FRANCHISING: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND
RESEARCH, 141, 145 (Patrick J. Kaufman & Rajiv P. Dant eds., 1995).
708. See Hadfield, supra note 93 (demonstrating unique nature of franchise
agreements and resultant franchisor opportunism in the post-contractual phase). But see
supra note 94 (criticizing Hadfield's analysis).
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continuing contractual relationship. It is a living thing and it is not
possible to freeze-frame it at any particular moment such as the
moment of signature of the contract and say that the picture so
produced rep9resents for all time and for all purposes the intention of
the parties.
Franchise contracts are living things because, inter alia, they
incorporate Operations Manuals and franchisor directives which permit
unilateral alteration ex post of the rights and obligations under the
contract. Franchise attorney J. Michael Dady noted: "There is a
difference between a writing to buy a horse and a writing to enter into a
20-year agreement., 710 Dady was speaking of the role of an integration
clause, but the principle applies in the area of good faith as well. If good
faith is viewed not as an absolute standard but as a standard that is
contextual and is applied in light of the totality of the circumstances, the
standard of good faith in a franchise relationship can be higher than the
standard of good faith imposed in a discrete contract. Indeed, good faith
is most useful when evaluating relationship contracts whose attendant
discretion is the cause of much mischief. When the Carvel ice cream
franchisor allegedly refused to allow alterations to blueprints required by
the Maryland Health Department, and took other steps to frustrate the
ability of a sub-franchisor to perform under the contract, the trial court
refused a jury instruction that Carvel had a duty of good faith. 711 On
appeal, the court held that "even if it acted within the bounds of its
discretion, Carvel would be in breach [of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing] if it acted unreasonably. '1 2
B. Good Faith
Contract formation is a universal human trait and contractual
fairness is notable for its fundamental role in contract.7 13 The idea of
good faith (bonafides) in modern commercial law is of Roman origin
7 14
709. TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd. v. Cunningham, [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. 1030,
1033 (Employment Court), rev'd, [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 681 (C.A. Wellington).
710. J. Michael Dady, Address at ABA Forum on Franchising, (Oct. 19, 2000).
Accord CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 73 (1997) ("penumbra" of involvement
greater for seller of machinery to factory over several years versus seller of single item).
711. Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt. Group, 930 F.2d 228, 230-231 (2d Cir. 1991).
712. Id. at 232.
713. Cf EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 186-187
(1998) (detection of cheating by party to contract, citing Leda Cosmides & John Tooby,
Cognitive adaptations for social exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND 163-228 (Jerome H.
Barkow et al., eds. 1992)).
714. See generally Martin Josef Schermaier, Bona Fides in Roman contract law, in
GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 63-92 (2000). See also, Nicola W. Palmieri,
Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL
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and recognized by many legal systems as an essential element of the
contractual relationship. 71 5 What precisely is being recognized is another
matter: not only do national systems differ, but the growth of
international trade led the drafters of the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts to postulate a definition of good
faith and fair dealing "construed in the light of the special conditions of
international trade." 716  The Principles also make good faith non-
waivable: 717 "The parties' duty to act in accordance with good faith and
fair dealing is of such a fundamental nature that the parties may not
contractually exclude or limit it."
718
The American approach to contractual good faith is set forth in the
Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 205: "Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement." 7'9  The Comment to § 205 further notes the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) definition of "honesty in fact ' 720 and injects a
moral note by stating that good faith excludes actions "involving 'bad
faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness, or
reasonableness., 721 This circuitous definition is seen in the case law, and
is the result of a practical difficulty: "Good faith" is a more amorphous
concept than its opposite, "bad faith." Like obscenity, "bad faith" may
be difficult to define in an intelligible manner, but we "know it when we
see it."'722 In the leading Australian case adopting the implied covenant
of good faith, the court noted, with approval, that American judges had
used "good faith" to exclude bad faith and "do justice according to
law.,
723
L. REV. 70, 80 (1993) (describing historical development of good faith).
715. E.g., CIVIL CODE art. 3(1)(2) (Switz.) (providing when bonafides is presumed
and that one must exercise "degree of care" to plead bonafides).
716. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, art 1.7(a), cmt . 2 (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES].
717. UNIDROITPRINCIPLESart. 1.7(2).
718. Id. at cmt. 3.
719. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
720. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2001).
721. RESTATEMENT, supra note 719, at Cmt. (a).
722. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Potter
Stewart's famous observation illustrates the common sense which courts use every day to
define the parameters of acceptable behavior. Indeed, some attorneys maintain that this
approach is increasingly followed by courts in the resolution of franchise disputes.
Professor Robert Summers followed this approach of defining good faith by excluding
bad faith, and noted six examples of bad faith, of which one (evading the spirit of the
deal), is often in franchising a result of two other examples of bad faith: abuse of power
to specify terms and abuse of power to determine compliance. Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 232-43 (1968).
723. Renard Constructions (ME) Pty. Ltd. v. Minister for Public Works (1992) 26
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Apart from defining good faith as not being bad faith and remaining
silent on the issue of whether the parties can contract around § 205,724 the
Comment's moral tenor causes further difficulties. American contract
law is not alone in this predicament; German law declares: "a
transaction in violation of good morals is void., 725 Italian law declares:
"the causa [of contract] is unlawful when it is contrary to ... morals.,
726
Such laws imply more than holding void a contract entered into for an
illegal purpose: immorality is different from illegality. Immorality is not
necessarily a religious concept, and the use of law as an expression of
moral standards is not necessarily an expression of religious belief,
perhaps we have mistaken the cause for the effect. Such error leads to
the absurdities of extreme laissez-faire and the hollow jurisprudence of
Oliver Wendell Holmes.72 7 A growing number of sociologists and
cognitive neuroscientists postulate that moral behavior (and the moral
tenor of the law) is a manifestation of an adaptive mechanism which is
partly innate and partly learned.12 8  To the extent that this adaptive
mechanism lowers transactional costs among ever-widening circles of
individuals, there is a sound economic basis for ensuring the
maintenance of sanctions against opportunistic actors. Whatever
conceptual basis is used, good faith is woven through Western contract
law.
The Swiss Civil Code places the requirement of good faith at the
beginning of the Code itself-a principle of general applicability in
Swiss law. 72 9 Although many civil code nations have moved towards a
more laissez-faire approach in recent years, there is still a markedly more
receptive attitude towards contractual good faith concepts in the civil
systems of France,73 ° Germany, 73' Italy,732 and Israel 733 than in the
N.S.W.L.R. 234, 266-68. The history of good faith in Australia is discussed by the Court
of Appeals of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, in Burger King Corp. v. Hungry
Jack's Pty. Ltd. (2001) N.S.W.L.R. 187.
724. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) provides that good faith is an obligation that may not be
disclaimed. In reality, good faith in American franchise agreements is more notable by
its absence.
725. BURGERLICHES GESETZ BUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] § 138 (F.R.G.).
726. CODICE CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1343 (Italy).
727. Holmes' cynical abnegation of the moral underpinnings of the law was in
response to the horrors he witnessed during the Civil War, which began for many as a
moral crusade. See Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 23-69 (2001).
728. PINKER, supra note 25, at 186-194.
729. See C.C. art. 2 (Switz.), supra note 715.
730. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1134 (3) (Fr.). Refers to execution of contract in
good faith (bonnefoi).
731. BGB § 157, and most famously, § 242 (F.R.G.). Contracts interpreted as
requiring good faith and credit (Treu und Glauben). German translation of UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES art. 1.7 (good faith and fair dealing) is Guter Glaube und redliches
Verhalten. See generally, NORBERT HORN, HEIN KOTZ, & HANS LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE
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systems descended from English common law. In fact, it was at the time
of Israel's adoption of a civil code in 1973 that the duty of good faith
was introduced into contract law, not only in contractual performance,
but in the negotiation and drafting of the contract as well.734 The cool
detachment of Justice Holmes is not shared by judicial systems abroad,
nor has it been shared through history.
Fair play has long been a concern of jurists and lawyers. Judge
Rosenblatt of the New York Court of Appeals noted that "It]he
development of the law involves elements of philosophy, religion,
governance, morality, and human emotions . . .. , As one historian
noted, even Canon lawyers of the Middle Ages struggled with the
"amorphous concepts" of contractual good faith and equity. They found
it difficult to reconcile Christian dictates with contractual realities,73 6 an
issue that resurfaced recently for one franchisor claiming to operate
according to "Christian principles., 737 This difficulty was not new to the
Middle Ages; Western commercial contract law may have originated in
an attempt to circumvent Biblical law.738 The origins of franchising may
be in the Middle Ages, 739 but the problems of franchising are not
confined to the Middle Ages. A Canadian judge compared one franchise
system to a "fiefdom ' 740  and the leading American franchisee
organization noted:
AND COMMERCIAL LAW, 134-145 (1982) (writing on contractual good fait in Germany).
In 1999 there were 32,899 franchised outlets in Germany, and U.S. franchisors had a
9.6% market share. When In Germany (table), FRANCHISE TIMES, May 2001 at 10.
732. C.C. art. 1366 (Italy) (providing that a contract shall be interpreted according to
good faith. Note also art. 1362 which provides that the "common intent of the parties,
not limited to the literal words of the contract, shall be sought in interpreting the
contract.").
733. Nili Cohen, The Effect of the Duty of Good Faith on a Previously Common Law
System: The Experience of Israeli Law, in GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND
CONTEXT 189-212 (Roger Brownsword, Norma Hird, Geraint Howells, eds. 1999); see
also Nili Cohen, Pre-Contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate,
in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann, GOOD FAITH & FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 25 at 42,
n.70 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1997).
734. COHEN, supra note 733 at 189.
735. Albert M. Rosenblatt, The 55th Annual Cardozo Memorial Lecture: The Law's
Evolution: Long Night's Journey Into Day, 24 CARDOzO L. R. 2119, 2120 (2003).
736. James Gordley, Good faith in contract law in the medieval ius commune, in
GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 93, 95 (2000).
737. ChemDry, supra note 122.
738. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 556 (1933).
Prosbul was a contract to avoid Deuteronomy 15:1-9, which released debtors from
obligations on a seven-year cycle akin to bankruptcy discharge. Interestingly, the dictate
did not apply to foreigners--one of the earliest examples of a distinction between
"domestic" and "international" law.
739. PURvN, supra note 180, at 39-42 (origins traced to medieval Church).
740. Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 3002,
at *51-52 (Ont. Sup. C.J., 2000).
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[U]nscrupulous franchisors ... deny their franchisees the realization
of goodwill and value they may have invested many years and their
life savings to develop.
In this respect, franchising today most resembles indentured
servitude. In the Middle Ages, people would "freely" choose to bind
themselves to the land, work it for a number of years and pay a large
portion of the profits to the landowner . . .. When the indenture
period was up, you were faced with a choice, re-pledge yourself to
the feudal lord, even if he demanded twice his prior share, or simply
walk away from the home you built and the crops you developed.
The feudal analogy is unfair to medieval jurisprudence. In fact, when the
feudal system dissolved one of the legal questions was to what extent the
nascent laissez-faire system should replace the obligations owed to the
weaker party: unlike franchising, feudal privilege conferred
responsibilities as well as benefits in an amalgam of written, unwritten,
secular, and ecclesiastic mores.
742
Baron Thurlow observed "Did you ever expect a corporation to
have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be
kicked?, 743 Subway founder Fred DeLuca told the Janotta court that he
did not have any responsibility to tell landlords that they were leasing to
a shell company controlled by DeLuca since "It's not a requirement
under the law." 744 Justice Holmes observed: "The law is the witness and
741. Letter from Susan P. Kezios, AFA President, to Donald S. Clark, FTC Secretary
(January 31, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/
comments/comment037.htm. In one case, franchisees made a claim for unpaid labor, and
an Australian court agreed: "The necessity of working, without any financial reward,
much longer each week than one had intended or desired ... is in our opinion, such a
prejudice or disadvantage as the law will treat as compensable in damages, and therefore,
properly included as part of the consequential loss sustained by [franchisee purchasers]."
Cut Price Deli Pty. Ltd. v. Jacques, (1994) 49 F.C.R. 397 at 404, cited in Carlton v. Pix
Print Pry. Ltd., [2000] F.C.A. 337, QG 30 of 1997, Fed. Ct. of Australia, Queensland
District Registry (Mar. 22, 2000). Carlton held that "something is allowable to [the
franchisee] in respect of loss of opportunity to earn ordinary income .... It is only the
effort additional to that which the purchaser could have expected to have to put into the
business purchased that can be the subject of a damages award where the purchase was
wrongly induced."
742. See ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 690-691 (1846 repeal of English "Corn Laws");
see also id. at 708 (1789 abolition of feudal dues in France also abolished peasants'
communal rights).
743. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (3d ed. 1979) (quoting Edward, First
Baron Thurlow).
744. Behar, supra note 46, at 134. DeLuca has since changed his mind, and now
encloses in his leases a lengthy rider in bold-faced type discussing this point. Both the
landlord and the Subway agent must specially initial that specific paragraph of the rider.
Much as DeLuca epitomized the abusive franchisor in the past, he is now a model for
other franchisors wishing to operate a more fair and balanced franchise relationship.
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external deposit of our moral life. 745 Franchisor counsel, however, may
disagree. According to the former controller for the Subway franchisor,
general counsel Leonard "Lenny the Ax" Axelrod said: "If you're
looking for morality, leave it outside the door.,
74 6
American law may be uncomfortable with the blending of morality
and contract, but as an equitable doctrine, good faith and fair dealing is a
reflection of societal mores. In Hungry Jack's, the Australian court
found that Burger King's actions "constituted a failure to conform with
basic commercial morality. 747 A Nova Scotia court observed that an
overbearing franchisor evidenced a "marked departure from normal
business ethics or morality," 748 and Ontario now requires franchisors and
franchisees "to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards." 749 In the U.S., recent changes to Article 1 of the
Uniform Commercial Code include amending the definition of good faith
from "honesty in fact" to add "observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing.,
750
Moral values appear to have an innate biological basis: concepts of
moral awareness are observed in infants. 75  The developing science of
neuroeconomics suggests that innate emotions confer an adaptive
advantage in the marketplace, 752 but this view is not widely held in the
legal community. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit espouses the
majority view that the basis is not biological, but theological:
The moral and mental baggage of the law is connected to the fact that
the basis of most legal principles is tradition, and the tradition,
heavily Judeo-Christian, is saturated with moral concepts that
745. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1879).
This is a bit incongruous coming from a man whose recent biographer (Prof. Alschuler of
the University of Chicago) titled his work: "Law Without Values: The Life, Work, &
Legacy of Justice Holmes."
746. Behar, supra note 46, at 134. Axelrod denies making the statement. Id.
747. Hungry Jack's Pty. Ltd. v. Burger King Corp, 1999 N.S.W. LEXIS 61 at *236
(Sup. Ct. of New South Wales, Equity Division, Commercial List 1999). See also Janet
Sparks, Australian court hits BK with $45M judgment, FRANCHISE TIMES, Feb. 2000 at
41.
748. A&K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd. v. Cordiv Enters. Ltd., 56 C.P.R. (2d)l, 4
(C.P.R. 1981).
749. Arthur Wishart Act § 3(3) (2000) (dealing with "Franchise Disclosure").
750. A.L.I., Actions Taken on 2001 Annual Meeting Drafts, available at
www.ali.org/ali/AL1200 lActionsTKN.htm; see also U.C.C. § 1-201 (b)(20) (2001).
751. PINKER,supra note 25.
752. Human Nature: Who do we think we are?, NEW SCIENTIST, May 17, 2003 at 34.
See also sidebar, Play Fair, Why Don 't You?, id. at 36 (Antonio Damasio's study of man
with prefrontal cortex damage who made shortsighted economic decisions leading to
long-term loss, failed to show galvanic skin response of "normal people," indicating no
emotional arousal on the part of the unsuccessful player).
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
emphasize state of mind.
753
The Seventh Circuit has been quick to disabuse litigants of any such
moral concepts: "contract law does not require the parties to behave
altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on the philosophy
that I am my brother's keeper., 754 As the judicial wellspring of the Law
& Economics ("Chicago School") movement, the Seventh Circuit's
hostility to good faith springs from the belief that imposition "would
reduce commercial certainty and breed costly litigation. '755 The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing reflects a sense of fair play, and
most non-lawyers would agree with the New York Court of Appeals'
decision in Kirk La Shelle Company v. Paul Armstrong Company,
finding that all contracts contain:
an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will
have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract
there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
756
From the language of LaShelle, it would appear that good faith and
fair dealing is a principle of general applicability in contract law similar
to civil code nations and similar to the UNIDROIT Principles. There is
probably no case of a court holding that good faith is not required in
contractual performance,7 57 but American law looks to the expressed
intent as controlling; a party may contract with the actual intent to
operate in bad faith while remaining within the four comers of the
contract. 758 Judicial adherence to the "four comers" approach effectively
753. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 208
(1999).
754. Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd.,
970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992). The reference is to the story of Cain & Abel, Genesis
4:9. On Greek and Roman concepts of commercial good faith. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15
U.S. 178, n.C (1817) but note that the Franchise Rule and securities laws have imposed
an obligation to disclose.
755. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.). See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit:
Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991).
756. Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1933). New York does not recognize breach of implied covenant of good faith as an
independent cause of action for franchisees. McGowan v. Pillsbury Co., 723 F. Supp 530
(W.D. Wash. 1989).
757. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith: Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982) (citing 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS
490 (1970)).
758. See Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1992) (Cenac is a case worth
reading for descriptions of Murry's behavior, which included placing a dead cat on the
property line and banging on his chest like a gorilla while shirtless and bellowing "ho ho
ho." Such conduct necessarily dissuaded customers from patronizing Cenac's store.); see
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permits bad faith behavior, as Congressman LaFalce observed:
franchisees confront a tremendous imbalance in franchise contracts
that bind them to accept virtually all actions and decisions of their
franchisor no matter how arbitrary or abusive .... And franchisors
have vigorously enforced these contracts with the help of courts that
have most often refused to consider anything beyond the strict terms
of the contract.
759
Then-D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia (now a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice) maintained in Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell that artful drafting may
eviscerate the implied covenant: "It is possible to draw a contract as to
leave decisions absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the
parties and in such a case the issue of good faith is irrelevant.
'" 760
Another court stated that "a party cannot maintain a claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where the party
cannot claim a breach of any express contractual provision. ' '76 1 This
accords with the prevailing view that the implied covenant of good faith
does not provide for an independent cause of action.762  In an
unpublished opinion, however, the Third Circuit held in a distributor
termination case that breach of the implied covenant could be the basis
for a claim even absent breach of an express provision.763 At the far end
also 17A AM.JUR. 2D Contracts § 352 (1999). But see Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta
Corp., 903 F.2d 1414 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that good faith doctrine applied to prevent
de facto breach of terms where performance maintained de jure). Also, In many
countries, the reverse is true; for example, Australian courts hold that good faith is
implied based not on the intention of the parties "but as a legal incident of the
relationship," Garry Rogers Motors (Aust.) Pry. Ltd. v. Subaru (Aust.) Pry. Ltd., FCA
903, V 342 of 1999, 1999 Aust. FEDCT LEXIS 495 at *18 (citing recent cases).
759. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 14 (Prepared Statement of Hon. John
J. LaFalce (D-NY).
760. Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.)
(quoting MacDougald Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 188 S.E. 2d 405, 407 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972)). Judge Posner suggests that courts could even dispense with the entire
doctrine of good faith. Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir.
1991).
761. Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1440 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Some
courts have recognized the implied covenant as an independent cause of action. Burger
King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1013 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (Florida law, citing
Scheck v. Burger King Corp. 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992)). Particularly in states
which do not recognize the implied covenant as an independent cause of action.
McGowan v. Pillsbury Co., 723 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Wash. 1989), 1989-1990 BFG
9409 (New York law); Alan's of Atlanta Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414 (11 th Cir.
1990), 1989-1990 BFG 9636. Artful drafting and unilateral alteration of contracts can
cause a wronged franchisee to suffer summary judgment as a plaintiff while being
mulcted in damages as a defendant.
762. The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code holds this
position in Commentary No. 10 (Feb. 10, 1994).
763. Unidrug, S.A.R.L. v. E.T. Browne Drug Co., Inc., Bus. Franch. Guide 11,415
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of the spectrum, one court held that an implied covenant can never be
found in a fully integrated agreement.764
A more balanced approach is Justice Cardozo's view that:
Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary
businessman when making an ordinary business contract. It is his
intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that counts.
765
A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held
that "contractual relations which involve a special element of reliance,"
such as franchise agreements, contain an implied covenant of good
faith.766 In that Nevada case, a distributorship agreement was terminated
after 16 years. The manufacturer had an option-but not an obligation-
to repurchase the $30,000 of inventory (now worthless to the distributor)
and refused to do so. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of
Nevada stated that the parties could not take "arbitrary action"
disadvantaging the other party, and remanded with a finding that the
manufacturer be directed to repurchase the inventory. 67
Ontario has codified a good faith requirement in franchise
contracts.768 This was in keeping with Canadian jurisprudence, which
had previously recognized that the "standard is breached when a party
acts in a bad faith manner in the performance of its rights and obligations
under the contract. 769 Contrary to the U.S., a party can be within the
four corners of the contract and still unlawfully act in bad faith, which
Canada defines as "conduct that is contrary to community standards of
,,770honesty, reasonableness or fairness.
Franchisors argue that they can exempt themselves from the implied
covenant of good faith by a contractual provision stating that implied
covenants do not apply. In Amoco Oil Company v. Ervin, the jury
awarded damages after hearing testimony that Amoco's rent charged to
franchisees double-charged certain items.77 ' The appellate court
affirmed, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Colorado the primary
(3d Cir. 1998).
764. Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (applying Iowa law to a case of first impression in the franchise context and citing
Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Iowa 1978)).
The franchise agreement in Tri-County contained a standard "Entire Agreement" clause).
765. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 120 N.E. 86, 87 (N.Y. 1918).
766. Overhead Door Co. of Reno, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 734 P.2d 1233, 1235
(Nev. 1987).
767. Id.
768. Arthur Wishart Act § 3 (2000).
769. Gateway Realty Ltd. v. Arton Holdings Ltd. and LaHave (No. 3), [1991] 106
N.S.R.2d 180, 191-192.
770. Id.
771. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 497 (Colo. 1995).
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issue was whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
could override express provisions of the contract. Amoco claimed that
since the contract gave Amoco the right to set the rent formula and
explicitly stated that there were no implied covenants in the integrated
contract, the jury and the appellate court were wrong. 7 2 A divided Court
held that the dealers had left Amoco with the discretion to modify the
rental terms, and since the contract terms required the dealers to rely on
Amoco's good faith, the issue of whether Amoco had acted in good faith
was properly one for the jury.773 The dissent cited Scalia's Tymshare
opinion in supporting Amoco's right to double-charge, without concern
for good faith and fair dealing: "the reason may be purely a whim or
caprice., 774 The dissent claimed that "although good faith is generally
applicable to all contract provisions," Amoco had drafted a contract
which permitted unfettered discretion in the setting of franchisee
rentals. 775 The Amoco dissent reverses the traditional view of good faith:
"[C]ourts rely on the implied good faith covenant '[w]here a party to a
contract makes the manner of its performance a matter of its own
discretion.' 776 As one of the McDonald's cases explained:
The doctrine of good faith performance imposes a limitation on the
exercise of discretion vested in one of the parties to a contract ... a
party vested with contractual discretion must exercise that discretion
reasonably and with proper motive, and may not do so arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
777
Amoco v. Ervin illustrates the reason why franchisors find jury trials to
be "a scary thing."778  Jurors-and unsophisticated franchisees-see
franchisor discretion as limited by standards of commercial morality.779
772. Id.
773. Id. at 499. The court also distinguished between disparity of bargaining power
and disparity of power due to the ability of the franchisor to exercise discretion: "the
dependent party is then left to the good faith of the party in control." Id. The concept of
"dependent party" was developed by Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract & the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L.REv. 369 (1980), and Steven
J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984).
774. Amoco, 908 P.2d at 506.
775. Id.
776. Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Burkhardt v. City Nat'l. Bank, 226 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)).
777. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
778. Edward Wood Dunham, A Rare But Scary Thing: More on Franchise Jury
Trials, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 179 (2002).
779. Cf Mary S. Diemer, Whom Do You Trust?, LITIG. NEWS, May 2001 at 8 (75% of
those surveyed believe executives of big companies cover up bad behavior, 30% say high
damage awards are necessary to teach lesson).
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But courts have held that franchisors may site competing outlets near
existing franchisees7 80 and use franchisees as chum to garner customers
for the franchisor's alternate distribution channels.781  Some judges will
find no violations of the covenant of good faith if the contract permits
franchisor discretion. Limiting the scope of the franchisor's obligations
and expanding the scope of the franchisee's obligations-frequently by
unilateral post-contractual alterations by the franchisor 782-reduces the
likelihood that the franchisee can claim breach of contract. However, it
raises to a near-certainty the ability of the franchisor to claim breach on a
violation-even a violation based on the subjective view of the
franchisor.
C. Franchise Litigation
One way a franchisee attempts to reduce dissonance is to ignore or
downplay the franchisor's litigation history, an Item 3 disclosure often
buried deep within the UFOC as an Exhibit at the end of the offering
circular. Another alternative may be for the franchisor's agent to tell the
prospect that there is no need to worry since those are all disgruntled lazy
franchisees-and of course, the prospective franchisee isn't one of those,
right? Franchisors can appeal to anti-lawyer sentiment to overcome the
plain language of the document their own counsel has drafted;
salespersons telling prospects who question the UFOC: "Oh, our
lawyers make us say that ... don't worry, we don't sue good franchisees,
we're in a partnership together and if you lose we lose"-blaming the
franchisee victim reduces dissonance caused by the litigation history,
because if bad things happen to bad people, then we are safe.783 Worse
still, the UFOC is misleading since it fails to disclose cases where a
franchisee was coerced into taking an action or coerced into selling his
franchise by the mere threat of franchisor action. A franchisor can send
certified letters by the thousands with a click of a mouse and debit the
franchisees' bank accounts for the privilege.784
An Australian Member of Parliament stated that one franchisor used
court proceedings to drive franchisees "to the wall" and that one
780. Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (111. 1986).
781. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 818 (D. Minn. 1989).
782. Accomplished by modifications to the Operations Manual, forcing the franchisee
to sign a new agreement and selective enforcement of system standards.
783. A comprehensive discussion of this and related heuristics is discussed in
ATLA's annual "Overcoming Juror Bias" seminars, which offer insight into the
decisionmaking processes of adults in the United States. See, e.g.,
www.atla.org/clecon/03041 ojbtr.aspsx (offering "overcoming juror bias college").
784. Since no figures are published, the extent of this practice is difficult to quantify.




franchisor had driven five franchisees to suicide.7 85 A Canadian court
advised:
Franchisees should recognize that they require a degree of
sophistication including a willingness to read the fine print of a
standard form contract, and the stamina to do so notwithstanding the
franchisor's representative suggesting strongly that the prospective
franchisee need not bother with all the legal jargon. There is the
frequent suggestion that the franchisor is not going to rely on it given
the mutual desire of the franchisor and the franchisee to make lots of
786money.
A legal affairs officer for Hardee's claimed that:
[W]e can end up without a royalty... if we kick [the franchisee] out.
On top of that, it is by no means clear who would win in litigation.
The big company picking on the small entrepreneur does not usually
play well in front ofjuries.
787
The Hardee's claim ignores franchising realities. The franchisor
can simply replace the franchisee with a new one, or run the Hardee's as
a company store. Of course, given that Hardee's had to increase its
allowance for franchisee doubtful accounts receivable from 38% to 54%
and refranchise company stores in the wake of large increases in
workers' comp and healthcare costs, it is unlikely that Hardee's would
788want to convert any outlet to a company store. Hardee's can also sue a
terminated franchisee for breach of contract and lost profits. 789 The lack
of franchise statutes and powerful trademark laws make it pretty clear
who would likely win in litigation: according to the IFA franchisors win
98% of the time, 79° a courtroom record which would be the envy of the
785. Philip F. Zeidman, Shattering the myths, FRANCHISE TIMES, Apr. 2002 at 27.
The interplay between morality and law is again raised by the M.P.'s characterization of
the franchisor as "evil." Id. Interestingly, this has roots in Western jurisprudence: in
Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle said that when "an injury is done from choice, the doer is
unjust and wicked." ARISTOTLE, BOOK FivE OF NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS sec. 8 (David
Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). The Supreme Court noted that the purpose of
antitrust laws is to limit "rights which may be pushed to evil consequences, and therefore
restrained." Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912) (the
same argument can also be made for franchise relationship laws).
786. Head v. Inter Tan Can. Ltd., 1991 O.R.3d. 192 (1991).
787. Hardee's assistant director of legal affairs Dave Gordon quoted in BRADACH,
supra note 124, at 34-35.
788. Milford Prewitt, CKE's 2Q-Loss Grows, but Hardee's Wins Slight Gain;
Turnaround Forseen, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, at 4, 74.
789. See, Barkoff, supra note 140.
790. Amy Garber, Franchisee's $16.5M Legal Win Over McD Sparks Furor:
Judgment Could Fuel more Litigation, Regulation, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 9,
2003, at 1 (quoting Mitchell Shapiro of Jenkens & Gilchrist, speaking on behalf of the
IFA).
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Star Chamber. 9
It is by no means certain that a jury in the franchisor's hometown
would favor a franchisee from another part of the country. Moreover, the
only reason why the jury would hear the case in the first place is if the
franchisor's legal affairs officer chose not to put an arbitration clause in
the franchise agreement; franchise jury trials, one franchisor lawyer
noted, are "a rare but scary thing., 792 Even if the franchisor's case is
devoid of legal merit and the franchisee's case is meritorious, the
franchisee must incur expensive legal fees to vindicate his rights.
Prospective franchisees too often rely on the friendly franchisor
salesman. And ignore the economic import of forum selection. One
Minnesota franchisee investing $70,000 in a yogurt franchise (and
producing evidence of a total loss of $177,000) was awarded $70,000 by
an Arkansas jury.793 The trial court awarded $95,363 in attorneys' fees
based not on Minnesota attorney rates but the lower Arkansas rates. 9
On appeal, the court upheld the Arkansas rates but remanded the award
of $3990 in costs: the franchisee had incurred in excess of $25,000 due
primarily to the expense of litigating in a distant forum. 795 Even
franchisors with huge amounts of disclosed litigation are able to sell
franchises.796 The disclosure document may not even be an accurate
picture of litigation involving the parties that the franchisee will be
dealing with: Actions brought by the franchisor against franchisees do
not have to be disclosed, and actions brought by entities allegedly not
parties to the agreement do not have to be disclosed. If a suit involves a
791. Contrary to popular belief, prior to the Civil War, the Star Chamber was not
always harsh. See CLAYTON & DAVID ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND: PRE-HISTORY
TO 1714, at 230-31, 356 (1980).
792. Dunham, supra note 778. Dunham notes that the prospect of facing juries has
affected franchise contracts, and that arbitration clauses are "one explanation for the
paucity of jury trials," as in the period 1990-2000 Dunham could only locate 105 jury
verdicts. Id. at 180. Dunham is the outside counsel for Subway Sandwiches' franchisor,
Doctor's Associates Inc. When Subway franchisees obtained an arbitral ruling that the
franchisor had attempted to prevent the election of certain franchisees to the Ad Fund
board and were awarded costs, punitive damages, attorney fees and the costs of the
arbitration, several commentators noted the irony of the franchisor who had championed
arbitration as a shield losing in arbitration. See, e.g., Legal Updates, FRANCHISE TIMES,
April 2001, at 41.
793. TCBY Sys., Inc. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 1994).
794. Id. at 928, 931.
795. Id. at 931.
796. One of the more improbable claims made by a franchisor consultant is that
franchisors with much litigation against franchisees will present that as a "positive
attribute" to purchasers "and, as a result, many franchisees may hear about franchisor
initiated lawsuits even if said litigation is not disclosed in the UFOC." Letter from Carl
C. Jeffers, President, Intel Marketing System, to Federal Trade Commission (undated),




real estate or leasing corporation legally distinct but the defacto alter ego
of the franchisor, that suit should be disclosed. If a franchisee is placed
on "probation" or "pre-arbitration" and monetary sanctions attend to
such status, that should be a UFOC disclosure as well.
Franchisees should remember that the marginal cost of a legal
action is far less for the franchisor, which pays attorneys and paralegals
who need only cut-and-paste from the lawsuit/arbitration papers they
have on file. Indeed, franchisors may benefit from bringing demands for
arbitration or initiating a lawsuit: First by charging the franchisee a cost-
plus-overhead fee and second by making it clear to the franchisee that
there is no option other than selling the franchise to a buyer of the
franchisor's choice. In one case, a court found that "litigation itself has
been used by [franchisor] as an instrument to drain [franchisee] for
purposes of ultimately buying [franchisee stores] at an inadequate
price."
797
Franchisors and regulators trumpet "transparency," 798 while at the
same time resisting requirements that franchisors disclose all disputes
with franchisees. The presence of mandatory arbitration clauses
requiring franchisees to travel to distant forums result, in franchisees not
pursuing valid claims and counterclaims against franchisors. Franchisors
can therefore bring action against vast numbers of franchisees and only
disclose those that result in a franchisee counterclaim. One franchisor
attorney noted:
To the extent that franchisees sued by their franchisors feel that they
have somehow been aggrieved, they will assert counterclaims which
will be subject to UFOC Item 3 disclosure in any event. To the
extent such franchisees do not feel aggrieved and thus do not
interpose counterclaims, we respectfully submit that disclosing
franchisor-initiated litigation would furnish no useful information to
prospective franchisees but would prejudice franchisors in the
manner indicated above.
7 99
Disclosing all arbitration actions brought and threats of litigation or
termination is important because franchisor coercion is nearly impossible
to discern from a UFOC, and franchisees seeking to exit the system are
not likely to tell the prospect: "This is an abusive franchise system.
How about buying my franchise so I can get out?" Unless the franchisee
797. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *95 (S.D.
Ind. May 18, 1977).
798. Kaufmann, supra note 22 (quoting New York State Attorney General Spitzer).
799. Letter from David J. Kaufmann, attorney, to Federal Trade Commission (May
11, 1997), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/kaufma33.htm (last visited
March, 2003).
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files a counterclaim, the arbitration will remain undisclosed and not
detectable by a search of litigation records. Threats of
litigation/arbitration are not disclosed, although they are of major
importance to a prospective franchise purchaser. In 1998, Congress
passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA), permitting
courts to require litigants to undergo mediation.800 ADRA does not
permit courts to compel arbitration, but many franchisors avoid courts
altogether by use of a pre-dispute arbitration clause in the franchise
contract.
D. Arbitration Clauses Can Encourage Abuse
An employee in the legal department of one franchisor was
particularly proud of the rise in arbitration claims her system is bringing
against franchisees, grinning while she said: "[M]y boss doesn't
negotiate with franchisees anymore. It's just like hey there's a problem,
file an arbitration., 80 ' Franchisors that have fought franchisees all the
way to the Supreme Court (Burger King in 1985802 and Subway in
1996803) did so over the right to compel the franchisee to resolve the
dispute in a distant forum. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
forum selection clauses in commercial contracts are prima facie valid.80 4
For franchisees, justice can be limited to those who can afford to
travel across the country and hire teams of lawyers in multiple states.
The U.S. Supreme Court,0 5 the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 8° 6 and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice have all ruled
that a franchisee may be compelled to resolve franchise disputes in a
foreign nation. Conducted in secret and not bound by stare decisis,
800. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2001).
801. See generally, Arbitration In Franchising: A Symposium, 22 FRANCHISE L.J.
(2002).
802. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
803. Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). (Subway sought to
compel Montana franchisee to arbitrate before the American Arbitration Association in
Bridgeport, Connecticut). Subway has a history of litigation to enforce arbitration in
Bridgeport, Connecticut. See Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir.
1997); Doctor's Assoc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998); Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v.
Stuart, 85 F. 3d. 975 (2d Cir. 1996); Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp.
77 (D. Conn 1996).
804. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
805. See Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
806. Benincasa v. Dentalkit Sri, EU Case C-269/95, 1997 WL 1704753, at 52 (Eur.
Ct. Just. Feb. 20, 1997) (inferior position of franchisee not relevant to determination of
validity of forum selection clause). The franchisee unsuccessfully argued that since he
never did business as a franchisee, he should be given the protection of consumer law.
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arbitration raises significant policy concerns, as one judge noted: "There
is no verdict, no appeal, no precedent., 80 7  Franchisors may take
advantage of an entire class of franchisees without fear of being called to
account for their actions or even to face the reputational damage that a
suit would bring, as a franchisor attorney explained:
[T]he franchisor with an arbitration clause should be able to require
each franchisee in the potential class to pursue individual claims in
separate arbitration. Since many (and perhaps most) of the putative
class members may never do that, and because arbitrators typically
do not issue runaway awards, strict enforcement of an arbitration
clause should enable the franchisor to dramatically reduce its808
aggregate exposure.
Filing arbitration claims (with fees charged to the franchisee) has
become a franchisor management tool-management by threat. The
franchisee may not even understand what is going on: the authors met
one franchisee who had been subject to an "arbitration by mail" in which
the franchisor filed a claim and debited the franchisee's bank account.
The franchisee did not file a response, and lost the arbitration.
Meanwhile, the franchisee had complied with the frapchisor demand.
But the franchisee did not even understand that there had been an
arbitration, and asked the franchisor to please reverse the arbitration fee
since he had fixed the problem. The franchisor contact said she had to
get permission to reverse any charge. The charge was never reversed,
and the franchisor never explained to the franchisee what had happened.
A lawyer without franchise experience may find it incredible that
someone could fail to appreciate the consequences, let alone the
existence, of a legal proceeding. In a judicial proceeding, there are strict
rules of procedure requiring the service of rather intimidating legal
documents on the defendant. The format and presentation of the
documents are calculated to impress upon even an illiterate that
something important is going to happen. 80 9 Moreover, the defendant may
807. Hope Viner Sambom, The Vanishing Trial, ABA. J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 26
(quoting E.D. La. District Judge Sarah S. Vance).
808. Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (1997). Cf., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 920-21 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (arbitration clause's "principal purpose was to put sufficient obstacles in the path
of litigants to effectively deter" consumer claims). Ting also concemed with the secrecy
of arbitral process. Id. at 932. For critique of Dunham's position on arbitration, see Jean
R. Sternlight, Protecting Franchisees from Abusive Arbitration Clauses, 20 FRANCHISE
L.J. 45 (2000). This trend is spreading to other areas of the law, see Scott S. Megregian
& Todd Babbitz, The Use of Mandatory Arbitration to Defeat Antitrust Class Actions,
ANTITRUST, Summer 1999, at 63.
809. Many franchisees are immigrants who may not understand the import even of
some legal documents. This author is aware of one franchisee who received a court
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also get a letter or postcard from the Clerk of Court notifying the
defendant to appear. Even the size of type and exact language of the
documents may be mandated by statute.810  This is a reflection of the
strong public policy that one whose rights are at stake should be
adequately informed as to the seriousness of the proceeding. Public
policy unfortunately is virtually never grounds for overturning an
arbitrator.8 "' A franchisee may simply receive a letter by certified mail
from the franchisor on the franchisor's letterhead, followed by a letter
from the arbitral body. Blue-backs, red-lined paper and process servers
are frightening to the uninitiated, but they get the point across that
something serious is at stake. This author is aware of franchisor
representatives who have conducted formal training for their franchisees
on what to do when the franchisee receives arbitration demands; the
representatives were concerned that franchisees were failing to
appreciate that they could lose their entire investment if they didn't
properly respond to the franchisor letter. This is particularly true in the
case of new franchisees who got the thick UFOC and were told by the
franchisor salesperson that the UFOC was a bunch of legal mumbo-
jumbo that the FTC and the company lawyers made the salesperson give
out.
The authors have met many franchisees who believe that in order
for the company to take their business from them, a lawsuit would be
necessary. They are surprised to learn that a private company chosen by
the franchisor can hold a meeting in the franchisor's hometown and take
away the property which they paid for. They protest that if the franchisor
ever tried this, a court would stop the franchisor, and do not comprehend
the finality of an arbitration. The authors have experience in the
summons which properly comported with Article 18-A of the New York City Civil Court
Act. In that case, the immigrant franchisee referred to the summons as a "letter" and
believed the Plaintiff (a vendor) who said the matter was fixed and there was no need to
go to court. The Plaintiff then went to court and obtained judgment after a perfunctory
inquest at which the franchisee did not appear. It turned out that the judgment was for
work performed at a different business which was not owned by the franchisee and not in
any way the franchisee's responsibility.
810. Cf N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 81.07(c) (order to show cause must have on
its face specific language in 12 point type or larger bold face type).
811. N.Y. Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Ass'n. v. State, 704 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914
(1999) (arbitration award could not be vacated on public policy grounds since this would
invade province of arbitrator and be inconsistent with choice of forum; award must
violate "well-defined constitutional, statutory, or common law of this state"). In a more
notorious case, the Court refused to overrule an arbitrator's decision to permit a truck
driver to continue to drive large trucks on public highways after twice being caught on a
random drug test. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531
U.S. 57, 62 (2000). The court dismissed the employer's public policy argument: in order
to invalidate an arbitral award, the public policy must be "explicit, well-defined and
dominant." Id. This will be small comfort if the pot-smoking driver ever kills someone.
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franchise industry and the financial services industry, both of which use
pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a risk management tool. 812 On multiple
occasions in both industries, the signer of the arbitration clause did not
understand that they were waiving their right to bring suit. One of the
authors attended a CLE course at which attorneys in the audience used
the terms "arbitration" and "mediation" interchangeably, when queried
one responded that she used the term "binding arbitration" to distinguish
from "arbitration"; the lawyer explained that only the latter could be
appealed for a trial on the merits. In another instance known to the
authors, a Professor of Business at a major state university was not aware
of the exceedingly limited grounds for overturning an arbitral decision
nor of the differences in discovery. In Civil Court of New York County,
commercial disputes are sent to a process referred to as "arbitration"
from which a party can appeal for a trial de novo-the court does not
properly distinguish between the terms "arbitration" and "mediation."
The head of the American Association of Franchisees & Dealers supports
the National Franchise Mediation Program, but notes that many
franchisees confuse mediation and arbitration.
81 3
Franchisees are not alone in misunderstanding the seriousness of
arbitration and its qualitative deficiencies. 814 It would be difficult to
conceive of a high court decision that a judge could be improvident or
silly, yet the Supreme Court has said that the arbitrator may be
"improvident, even silly."815  "[F]actual errors" are not grounds for
judicial review of the arbitrator's decision.81 6 Even "the fact that 'a court
is convinced [the arbitrator] committed serious error' does not suffice to
812. A major difference is that while a franchise arbitration generally requires the
weaker party to travel to the forum mandated by the stronger party, the NASDR sets the
forum near the investor's residence and the brokerage firm is required to travel to the
arbitration.
813. Mediation: Is everyone on the same page?, FRANCHISE TIMES, May 2001, at 56,
57.
814. On deficiencies of arbitral process, see State high courts skeptical of mandatory
arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2002, at 30. This article discusses consumer
arbitration cases from West Virginia, Virginia, California, and Montana, but also notes a
Georgia commercial case wherein the court stated that because "manifest disregard of the
law" is not a statutory ground for overturning an award, the award must stand. See
Progressive Data Sys. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp., 2002 WL1517841 (Ga.). Arguments
on both sides of the debate were made at a Duke Law School symposium. See The
Coming Crisis in Mandatory Arbitration: New Perspectives and Possibilities, at
www.roscoepound.org/new/symposiumschedule.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
815. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 1015, 509 (2001)
(citing Paperworkers v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)). One commentator observed that
we are witnessing the "transformation of arbitration into arbitrariness." Robert E.
Shapiro, Efficient Injustice, LITIG. 59, 61 (Fall 2001).
816. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 36).
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
overturn his decision," 8 1 7 nor does the arbitrator pleading guilty to
criminal tax fraud invalidate the decision.81s
An October 2001 trilogy in the San Francisco Chronicle81 9 is
credited with prompting the Judicial Council of California to issue
Ethical Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration.
8 20
California's temerity brought lawsuits from the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.82" ' When
the American Bar Association's Section of Dispute Resolution solicited
comments on the California standards from three Section members, all
acknowledged the abuses in consumer arbitrations.122 Ticknor v. Choice
Hotels International Inc.8 23 found that a franchise contract agreement to
arbitrate was unconscionable under the same state law principles as
applied to consumer disputes, but most courts are more willing to uphold
arbitration provisions in franchise contracts of adhesion as opposed to
consumer contracts of adhesion. As arbitration has spread to the
consumer sector, the inherent flaws of the arbitral process have led
proponents of arbitration to seek to distinguish "consumer" from
''commercial" protections:
Current efforts in California to deal with the issue of 'repeat player'
and inappropriate relationships between providers and those who
regularly use arbitration in the employment, consumer and health
care context have resulted in legislation that is extraordinarily
detailed and onerous. It is important that steps be taken to protect all
forms of commercial, construction and other forms of negotiated
arbitration agreements between parties of equal bargaining power
from adverse attempts to resolve consumer protection issues.
If a party does not give up rights by agreeing to resolve disputes in
an arbitral forum, a party by definition does not give up a right to a
817. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62
(2000) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
818. See United Transp. Union v. Gateway W. Ry. Co., 284 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir.
2002).
819. Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Millions Are Losing Their Rights, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001 at Al; Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Can Public Count on
Fair Arbitration?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8 at A15; Reynolds Holding, Judges' Action Cast
Shadow on Court's Integrity, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9 at A 13.
820. See Task Force Report, available at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/
documents/adrreprot.pdf (last visited Dec. 2003).
821. NASD Dispute Resololution, Inc., v. Judicial Council of Cal., No. C-02-3486-
SC, (Cal. Nov. 12, 2002) (dismissing suit as barred by 11 th amendment).
822. Frame of Reference, JUST RESOL., Oct. 2002, at 13.
823. 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Montana law).
824. Frame of Reference, supra note 822 (quoting Richard Chernick of Los Angeles).
See also Richard Chernick, Imposed-Arbitration Reforms Threaten to Stifle Strengths of
Commercial Arbitration, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 16.
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hearing by an impartial neutral in an impartial forum. Given that even
proponents of arbitration are now forced to admit what franchisees have
known for years, it is reasonable to mandate that UFOCs and franchise
agreements contain disclosure as to the disadvantages that a franchisee
has in the arbitral process. Most citizens assume that a judge will not
have financial involvement with one of the parties to a case; most
citizens assume that a judge will not depend on the grace of one of the
parties to remain employed; most citizens assume that judges will be
rational and not silly. The fact that none of these assumptions are
warranted in arbitration should be disclosed in contracts mandating the
use of arbitration, and it should not matter whether the contract is drafted
by a corporate HMO or a corporate franchisor.
The law of the United States may be enforced (or not enforced) by a
private "judge" working for a private company which may depend for its
revenue on the continued patronage of a party opponent. 825  In Via
826Fone, a Kansas dealer of cellular phone service believed that the
distributor was violating federal antitrust law and went to federal court
seeking enforcement of federal law. The court dismissed the case due to
language in the dealer agreement that all "claims ... and disputes
between Dealer and Company, shall be resolved by submission to
binding arbitration." 827 The history of the last two decades has been one
of increasing receptiveness to privatizing the enforcement of disputes,
including the enforcement of alleged violations of federal law. Apart
from the philosophical question as to whether laws of the United States
should be enforced by private citizens sitting in private judgment, the
attitude of the Supreme Court that: "Arbitration agreements allow
parties to avoid the costs of litigation"828 presupposes that (1) the
825. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (securities law and
RICO claims arbitrable by securities industry Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO)).
Concern over a "dual justice system" was an impetus behind the 2002 California rules for
arbitrators. See Hearings on SB 475 Before the Assembly Judiciary Committee, Aug. 21,
2001, at 3, at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb 0451-0500/
sb_475_cfa_20010820_095918 asm comm. html (last visited Dec. 2003). The earliest
case upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (now codified
at 9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) was Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
However, courts remained uncomfortable with, if not hostile toward, the FAA until the
mid-1980s. Courts will occasionally refuse to enforce an arbitration clause on grounds of
procedural unconscionability, particularly in the employment context. See Murray v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l. Union, 289 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2002)
(employer picked arbitrator pool and could disregard result); Hooters of Am. Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting rules "so one-sided that their only
possible purpose [was] to undermine the proceeding").
826. Via Fone, Inc. v. W. Wireless Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d. 1147 (D. Kan. 2000).
827. Id. at 1149.
828. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
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wronged party can afford to seek justice in a distant forum and
(2) arbitration is less costly than litigation. Both suppositions are
questionable.829  Arbitration can be, well, arbitrary: there is no
requirement for a reasoned decision, and the expense can effectively
eliminate remedy for an aggrieved but impoverished party. For many
franchisees faced with such a cost-benefit analysis, pursuing remedies
against their franchisor would not be economically feasible. Such use of
arbitration clauses has significance far beyond franchising and raises
issues transcending the wealth of the party: "it is just as much an
obstacle to the wealthiest member of society as it is to the pauper."
8 30
Moreover, the franchisor may bring action which the franchisee is
unable to afford to defend. In a recent construction arbitration, the
respondent claimed financial inability to pay the arbitration fees, which
were $7,250 per day.8 3 1 The American Arbitration Association panel
learned of this after conducting five days of hearings, and ruled that only
the petitioner could present evidence thenceforth, and the arbitrators
832would only consider petitioner's evidence in rendering a decision.
Subsequently, a court overturned the award when the petitioner sought
judicial confirmation, noting that the denial of respondents rights "was
grounded in misconduct" since it was a reaction to respondent's
nonpayment of AAA fees, "a matter in which [the arbitrators] had a
direct financial interest. 8 33 The financial interest of arbitral bodies in
keeping corporate clients happy has been dealt with elsewhere; suffice it
to say that a leaked AAA memo sent to arbitrators in January 2000 asked
the arbitrators to assist the AAA "marketing effort for 2000" by
soliciting corporations, even to the extent of making a joint phone call
(arbitrator and AAA salesman) to the target corporation.
834
Expensive arbitration as a shield from accountability has been a
traditional tactic of franchisors, and is spreading throughout the private
sector with troubling results, as one attorney noted: "My last arbitration
[involved] a mid-level executive, and it cost us $20,000 for five days of
hearings and the filing fee. The court filing fee is $150, and the judge
doesn't cost you anything., 835  A recent eight-day JAMS arbitration
829. Public Citizen, Cost of Arbitration: Executive Summary, available at
www.lawmemo.com/arb/res.cost.htm (last visited June, 2003).
830. Leonard v. Terminix Int'l. Co., 854 So.2d 529, 537 (Ala. 2002).
831. Coty, Inc. v. Anchor Constr. Inc., 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 50013(u), (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 8, 2003).
832. Id.
833. Id. at 23.
834. Cliff Palefsky, Only a Start: ADR Provider Ethics Principles Don't Go Far
Enough, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 18, 21.
835. John Gibeaut, Detoured to ADR, 87 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (Oct. 2001). Some analysts
disagree. See www.arbitration-forum.com/articles/html/delikat-01.asp (last visited Feb.
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brought by a Merrill Lynch client cost $80,000 for each side.836 Outside
of the United States, however, arbitration can result in a significant
savings in legal fees due to the high cost of lawyers in some countries.837
Even the arbitration-amenable Supreme Court acknowledges, "existence
of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from effectively
vindicating her federal rights in the arbitral forum., 838 The arbitral body
also derives revenue due to the franchisor's choice to specify the arbitral
body as the sole forum for dispute resolution. The franchisor may then
enforce the arbitral award in the courts of the franchisee's home state.
839
In addition, the franchisor remains able to obtain the benefits of
being a "repeat player" since the arbitral forum is generally the
franchisor's hometown and the arbitral body is one selected by the
franchisor. Even the co-chair of JAMS' Committee on Professional
Standards & Public Policy acknowledged that:
Unless a system is established to provide equal information to all
parties, the institutional litigant may be more familiar with the
particular process and available neutrals. Moreover, the provider
organization and the neutral may anticipate receiving more
assignments from the institutional party.
840
The Supreme Court has held that a franchisor may require
arbitration in a distant forum-even an overseas forum84' operating
under foreign rules-and will enforce a foreign arbitration against
18, 2004) (noting individuals fare better in arbitration than federal court).
836. See Sylvia Hsieh, Merrill Lynch Liable For $7.7 Million For Not Protecting
Family's Investments, LAW. WKLY. USA, Oct. 14, 2002, at 20.
837. See Martha Neil, Small World Big Business: International Arbitration Has
Become a Lucrative Field After Decades of Disfavor, 88 A.B.A. J. 28 (Sept. 2002)
(Chicago litigator Hugh R. McCombs, Jr. says his fees less than British barristers, and
that arbitration can be handled by one lawyer rather than hiring a barrister and solicitor.).
838. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000). See
also Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555 (4th Cir. 2001)
("[1]nquiry necessarily turns in part upon ... whether the forum fees in a particular case
are so prohibitively expensive as to deter arbitration." Of course, this does not address
the ancillary costs (travel, local counsel, etc.) or the informational imbalance between the
repeat-player franchisor and the novice franchisee.).
839. But see Artrip v. Samons Constr., Inc., 54 S.W.3d 169, 171 (Ky. App. 2001)
(Ky. App. 8/17/2001) (Kentucky law says courts may confirm arb award only when
agreement provides "for the arbitration itself to be in the Commonwealth.").
840. Michael D. Young, The Right Balance: Provider Principles Mitigate the
Potential Dangers of Mandatory Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 18, 19.
841. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 638-39. With the exception of
Mitsubishi, most early cases dealing with mandatory arbitration involved stockbrokers.
The earliest franchisor to aggressively use arbitration in a distant forum as a weapon
against franchisees was Doctor's Associates Inc. (DAI), the Subway sandwich franchisor.
Cf Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). Not coincidentally, a joint
amicus brief was submitted by the franchisors (IFA) and securities firms (SIA) in
Casarotto. Id. at 688.
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domestic assets of the losing party. 8 42 Arbitration can be particularly
useful to franchisors wishing to enforce judgments overseas, since more
than 100 nations will recognize foreign arbitral awards. 843  That
recognition is not found when seeking to enforce court judgments. For
example, Turkey is a signatory to the New York Convention (and
recognizes arbitral awards) while requiring reconsideration of foreign
court judgments. 844 In the U.S., the winning party in a foreign arbitration
may be able to enforce the arbitration under the New York Convention,
or convert the arbitral award to a money judgment and proceed in the
U.S. under the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition
Act; the latter choice may enable a monetary recovery even where
defects in arbitral proceeding itself may preclude enforcement in the U.S.
under the New York Convention.845
Contractual unconscionability in the U.S. is judged by the position
of the parties at the time of contract signing.846 The result of current case
law is that an individual with little or no business experience may sign a
franchise contract eliminating the franchisee's right to seek judicial
redress locally. If the franchisor has managed to extract the maximum
amount of wealth from the franchisee, the franchisee may lack the
resources to arbitrate. This is disturbing enough when the dispute is
contractual. Moreover, when the allegation is of a violation of law, to
effectively shut off recourse to justice enables the franchisor to violate
the law with impunity. Despite evidence to the contrary, the U.S.
Supreme Court holds that:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute, it only submits to their
842. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2003) (enacting United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T.
2517 (June 10, 1958). Pursuant to the Convention, the winner may attach assets in any
signatory nation. See id.
843. See Martha Neil, Small World Big Business: International Arbitration Has
Become a Lucrative Field After Decades of Disfavor, 88 A.B.A. J. 28 (Sept. 2002) (treaty
as reason for increase in preference for arbitration).
844. E.g., U.S. FOREIGN & COMMERCIAL SERV. & U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
TURKEYCOUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE (1999), available at
http://infoservv2.ita.doc.gov/tcc/InternetCountry.nsf/baee3c88ac 11 f4628525653a0071 dl
06/ (last visisted March, 2003).
845. Ocean Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals & Alloys, Inc., 157 F.Supp. 2d 245
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying N.Y. C.P.L.R. 53 (McKinney 2001)). The court noted that
such a result would not be obtained where lex loci provided that the arbitral award was a
self-executing money judgment, such as provided under Japanese law. But see
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 519 (C.A.N.Y. 1975).
846. This makes sense since the alternative would enable a party to escape a contract
which proved to be a bad bargain.
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resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.
8 4 7
The truth of that statement depends on what the meaning of "forgo"
is. Accepting the dictionary definition of "to relinquish," one must
accept that in at least some franchise disputes, a party possessing
statutory rights will-due to cost and time constraints-forgo rights
which would have been exercised if those rights could be vindicated in
the local courthouse. Individual franchisees may be unable to "close up
shop" and travel for hearings before an arbitrator in the franchisor's
hometown. Furthermore, even a party entering into contract with a full
understanding of the costs and disadvantages to arbitration may have no
idea that they will forgo their day in court if the franchisor violates
federal antitrust or racketeering law. Congressman Jay Dickey, an
attorney and former Taco Bell franchisee, explains:
Now here I was, the sole practitioner in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, trying
to run a business, and if I had any dispute at all, that I was giving up
venue and jurisdiction to California .... And, thank goodness, we
didn't have any disputes .... I was thinking, well, all they have to
do is-we would just have referred this to a court in California, and I
am-it is over. It is over for me ... it put me back on my heels. It
would put other people back on their heels. And remember, I was a
lawyer at the time.
8 4
Resolving disputes in a distant forum can be even worse in
arbitration than litigation. The Supreme Court would have aggrieved
parties believe the choice between arbitration and litigation is a
distinction without a difference. There is a difference, which explains
the recent development of clauses giving one of the parties an option to
litigate or arbitrate while binding the weaker party to mandatory
arbitration. 849  The reality recognized by the Bolter court is that
arbitration may result in a party unprotected by statutory rights. A
Supreme Court that would allow private persons to interpret and enforce
antitrust and discrimination statutes is a Court that would allow
847. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (employee
alleged violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)). This involved the
employee of a stockbrokerage. The securities industry compelled employee arbitration as
a matter of course long before such clauses became common in the general workforce.
Note that in Wilko, the Court held that the agreement to arbitrate was a waiver of
substantive law and hence not permitted under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1933). See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
848. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 6 (Statement of Hon. Jay Dickey).
849. Courts have split on whether such clauses are lacking in mutuality or otherwise
unconscionable and hence unenforceable. See Adam M. Nahmias, The Enforceability of
Contract Clauses Giving One Party the Unilateral Right to Chose Between Arbitration &
Litigation, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Summer 2001, at 36.
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franchisors to de facto contract around federal franchise legislation. A
"race to the bottom" could ensue,850 with franchisors arbitrating in the
forum most amenable to franchisor overreaching. The difficulties of
private "justice" go far beyond forum selection. For example, although
punitive damages and statutes of limitation may be contractually limited
in litigation, judicial decisions are widely published and contractual
abuse is a matter of record, which the legislature can address. Such is
not the case with private "justice" meted out behind closed doors with no
requirement for a reasoned opinion, let alone a published opinion. If
franchisors truly favor full disclosure, they should favor publication of
all arbitration decisions; in 2003 a bill was introduced in Texas which
would make arbitration awards a matter of public record.851 The vast
majority of franchise disputes are resolved through arbitration.852 As
853courts reject the notion of implicit confidentiality in arbitration,
franchisors may seek to alter franchise agreements to ensure that
franchisees and legislators remain unable to see the extent of franchisor
actions against franchisees. Mandating UFOC disclosure and publication
would reduce the informational disparity between franchisee and
franchisor counsel while still preserving the other advantages franchisor
counsel possess.
The flexibility and opacity of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
can be a source of strength, particularly where the parties wish to mend
the relationship.854 However, many franchisees are not sophisticated
businesspeople; most franchisor sales pitches are based on this premise.
Therefore, a more appropriate paradigm might be the evolving
jurisprudence of ADR in employee/consumer contracts. A minority of
courts have begun to rethink mandatory pre-dispute
850. In response to new California standards for arbitrators, the American Arbitration
Association warned that it may discontinue holding consumer arbitrations in the state.
Reynolds Holding, Arbitration Bills on Davis' Desk, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2002, at 1.
851. Mark Boyko, State LegislaturesSsee Flood of ADR Bills in First Quarter of
2003, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2003, at 29, 30 (referring to Texas S.B. 997).
852. Dunham, supra note 808, at 180. On procedures for franchise arbitrations
generally, see FORUM ON FRANCHISING, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 10-12, 2001).
853. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd. v. A.I. Trade Fin. Inc., Case No. T 1881-99
(Oct. 27, 2000), (Supreme Ct. of Sweden) (overturning lower court), in 13 WORLD TRADE
& ARB. MATERIALS 147 (2001). For a discussion of the lower court decision, see 14
MEALEY'S INT'L. ARB. REP. 11 (1999).
854. Cf, Peter B. Hutt II et al., Techniques for Resolving False Claims Act Cases
Through Mediation, PROCUREMENT LAWYER, Spring 2002, at 1, 20 ("Both the party and
the mediator will typically engage in more candid discussions ... in the absence of an
adverse party... mediator can provide.., frank assessments ... through ex parte
communications .. "). In addition, the arbitrator has broad remedial powers. See
Millicom Int'l. V N.V. v. Motorola, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.




employment/consumer arbitration clauses,8 55 but it is by no means certain
that their unease will carry over to franchise agreements. Since most
franchise arbitrations are subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, current
Supreme Court solicitude of abusive arbitration clauses presents high
barriers to franchisees seeking justice; state courts cannot protect their
own citizens. 856 Franchisees proceed at their own risk: "A properly run
arbitration system can produce good results, but many arbitration
systems are not fair, and there is almost no law that says they have to be
fair.
,857
The strongest legislation ever enacted to protect franchisees was
passed by the Iowa legislature, 858 primarily due to legislative disapproval
of the franchisor practice of requiring Iowa citizens to travel to a distant
forum to seek redress. 859  Franchisor ability to force arbitration or
litigation in a forum far from the franchisee can place the franchisee at a
disadvantage for many reasons other than home court bias.860  As one
scholar observed: "Who's going to hire a lawyer in some city halfway
855. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffrey, 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros. Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997); Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus.
Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1996). Increasing incidence of arbitration has
led to Congressional interest according to the American Arbitration Association, which
noted that nineteen ADR-related bills were recently introduced. See Summary of ADR-
Related Legislation Introduced during 106th Congress, Disp. RESOL. TIMES, Oct-Dec
2000, at 3. See also, Boyko, supra note 851, at 29 (noting 325 proposed bills, and only
South Dakota did not see any proposals).
856. This does not keep state courts from trying, particularly in Alabama, Montana,
and California. In the recent case of Bolter v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 4th 900, 901
(4 th Dist. 2001) the franchisee prevailed. Most recent decisions striking down arbitration
clauses are consumer cases. See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont.
2002); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 671 (Ct. App. 2002). One
commentator noted that Alabama's reluctance to enforce arbitration stemmed from a
desire "to inflict 'home-cooked justice' on those without power in Alabama courts."
Stephen J. Ware, The Alabama Story: The State 's Experience with Arbitration Shows the
Connection of Law to Politics and Culture, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2001, at 24, 27.
857. David G. Savage, Justice in Job Disputes, 87 A.B.A. J. 30 (May 2001) (quoting
Lewis Maltby, counsel for National Work Rights Institute).
858. See FRANCHISE DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 295-321.
859. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 45.
860. Charles Hynes, District Attorney for Kings County (Brooklyn) tells of the client
who traveled out of state with his lawyer. Upon leaving the courthouse at the end of a
losing trial, the client asked his attorney to translate the Latin inscription on the facade.
Replied the attorney: "It says: Retain Local Counsel." Two construction industry
attorneys noted that owners and contractors include forum selection clauses in an
"attempt to alter the risk equation by relying on the lower-tier entities' reluctance to
travel substantial distances to pursue a lawsuit in a potentially hostile jurisdiction." V.
Frederic Lyon & Douglas W. Ackerman, Controlling Disputes by Controlling the Forum:
Forum Selection Clauses in Construction Contracts, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2002, at
15. Forum shopping as a litigation tactic to increase the opponent's cost and obtain a
home court advantage first became widespread in the early days of tort suits against the
railroads. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 260 (2002).
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across the country and fly out there for hearings? ' 861 The first thing an
aggrieved franchisee may learn is that it will be necessary to hire
multiple attorneys, thereby substantially increasing the cost of obtaining
redress. 862  Although European attorneys are free to cross national
borders to represent clients, 863 an American attorney does not have
similar flexibility to cross state borders within the United States.
864
Although an attorney may seek pro hac vice 865 admission (denial is
strictly within the discretion of the state and is not reviewable),866 the
procedure increases costs. Some states also require the attorney to be
assisted by local counsel.867 For a national franchisor represented by one
of the mega-firms, this is a significant advantage over a franchisee
represented by local counsel.
E. State Law Waiver
If a franchisee is fortunate enough to have enough money left to hire
861. Sylvia Hsieh, Plaintiffs Are Finding New Ways to Challenge Mandatory
Arbitration, LAW.WKLY. U.S.A., Feb. 7, 2000, at 1, 21 (quoting Prof. David Schwartz of
University of Wisconsin Law School).
862. As franchisors expand globally, one non-franchise case illustrates how complex
litigation may become. United Mex. States v. Metalclad Corp., 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359
(Supreme Court of British Columbia 2001) involved a dispute between a U.S. corporation
and the Mexican government over the operation of a landfill. The Vancouver, Canada
court had to decide which of two provincial laws of British Columbia were to apply in
reviewing Mexican adherence to a multilateral treaty affecting the U.S. company. See id.
863. Roger J. Goebel, Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the European
Union: Lessons for the United States, 34 INT'L LAW. 307 (2000) (citing relevant
European Community Treaty provisions and case law).
864. American Bar Association, Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, Public
Hearings (Feb. 16-17, 2001), available at www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-trans-discuss.html
(last visited March, 2003). See also, Charles Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal
Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S.
TEX. L. REV. 665 (1995); Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Franc P.C. v. Superior
Court, 930 P.2d 339 (1997) (court ruled that out-of-state attorneys could not participate in
arbitrations in California. The legislature overturned this decision); Assembly Bill 915,
1998 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 915 (Cal. 1998). A fifty state plus D.C. listing of
unauthorized practice statutes is available from the American Bar Association's website.
See American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility (Mar. 10-11,
2000), available at www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-uplrules.html (last visited March, 2003).
865. Samuel Brakel & Wallace Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50
WASH. L. REV. 699, 700-01 (1975). Proposed revisions to ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct would loosen the restrictions. See Mark Hansen, Smooth Sailing:
House Approves Proposals to Ease MJP Rules with Minimal Debate, 88 A.B.A. J. 69
(Oct. 2002). Some states have begun to allow temporary practice by out-of-state counsel
without a pro hac order. Theresa Osterman Stevenson, States Address
Multiurisdictional Practice, LITIG. NEWS, May 2003, at 12.
866. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (no federal right to practice in state unless
state bar admission requirements met).




legal counsel and travel to a distant forum, the franchise agreement may
place the franchisee in a legal no-man's land, bereft of state statutory
protection. This is particularly important since there is no private right
of action for violation of the FTC's Franchise Rule.868 In drafting the
franchise agreement, franchisors normally incorporate a choice of law
provision. A franchisee living in State A, operating a store in State B,
and litigating under the laws of State C may find that although all three
states have franchise laws, none of those laws will protect the
franchisee.869
In Burger King v. Austin, 87 the franchise agreement provided for
the application of Florida law. The Atlanta-based franchisee filed a
counterclaim alleging, inter alia, violation of the Florida Franchise
Act.871 The response of Burger King was that the franchisee could not
claim the protection of Florida law; notwithstanding that Burger King
itself had required the application of Florida law as a condition of
granting the franchise. Burger King had no problem with applying
Florida law to protect the franchisor, but claimed the law that protected
the franchisee was only to protect "persons ... doing business in
Florida." 872 Since James and Loretta Austin were not doing business in
Florida, the Florida statute could not apply; since only Florida law
applied, Georgia law could not apply. Since there is no applicable
federal franchise legislation, the Burger King position was that there was
no franchise statute protecting the franchisee.
The court held that James and Loretta Austin had standing under the
Florida Franchise Act. Although noting that the franchise agreement
demonstrated that both parties "intended that they be regarded as doing
business in Florida. Any other decision would be unjust . ,873 The
Court added:
868. See Brill v. Catfish Shaks of America, 727 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (E.D. La. 1989)
(noting criticism that this effectively imposes upon the franchisee a burden of proof on
claims involving FTC violations which had to be brought under Louisiana's Unfair Trade
Practices Act).
869. See e.g., Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Texas v. Del Monte Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18748 at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (California choice of law did not confer
protection of California franchise act where franchisee was Texas domiciliary not doing
business in California). While not exactly analogous to U.S. states, European
Community members are prohibited from statutorily discriminating against other E.C.
nationals; an Austin-type situation would be a violation of article 12 (renumbered article
7) of the Treaty of Rome. See Phil Collins v. lmtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 3
C.M.L.R. 773 (Court of Justice 1993). As a practical matter, E.C. franchise laws-and
contract law generally--could not be tailored to favor the "home team" as some U.S.
states have done.
870. Burger King, 805 F. Supp. at 1007.
871. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.416 (West 2004).
872. Burger King Corp., 805 F. Supp. at 1022.
873. Id. at 1023.
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If the Florida legislature had included a phrase that specifically
limited the Florida Franchise Act's application to Florida residents or
domiciliaries, the Court would not have determined that the Act was
applicable to this contract, i.e. the parties' intent in including a choice
of law provision in a contract cannot be used to override the clear
intention of the legislature.
874
Many legislatures have done just that: Burger King cited cases
limiting extraterritorial application of state franchise laws of
Wisconsin, 875 Connecticut, 876 California, 7 7 and Illinois.8 78  The court
cited case law holding that the Burger King franchise agreement resulted
in depriving some Burger King franchisees of protection under the laws
of the franchisees' domicile. 879  The outcome would be that the
franchisee would not be protected by any franchise statute: Burger King
"would then be obtaining an unfair advantage solely by virtue of a choice
of law provision that benefits [Burger King] by ensuring uniform
enforcement of its franchise agreements. " 880 Federal legislation would
alleviate both concerns: the franchisor would have uniform enforcement
within the United States, and the franchisee would have some limited
protection even if the franchisor managed to strip away all protection
afforded by state law. Additionally, states should pass legislation
prohibiting the waiver of local franchise acts:
A franchisor, through its superior bargaining power, should not be
permitted to force the franchisee to waive the legislatively provided
protection, whether directly through waiver provisions or indirectly
through choice of law.
881
874. Id.
875. Hoff Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 750 F. Supp. 176 (M.D. Pa. 1990)
(Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law).
876. Power Draulics-Nielsen, Inc. v. Libbey Owens-Ford Co., 1988 WL 31880
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Connecticut Franchise Act).
877. Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431, 1439 (E.D.
Cal. 1986) (California Franchise Relations Act).
878. Highway Equip. Co. v. Caterpillar Inc., 908 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1990) (Illinois
Franchise Disclosure Act).
879. Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F.Supp. 543, 550 (S.D. Fla. 1991), on
rehearing, 798 F.Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act
not applicable to Massachusetts franchisee using Florida choice of law); Burger King
Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F. Supp. 684, 690 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (Montana Unfair Trade
Practices Act inapplicable). See also Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310 (1 th
Cir.), cert dismissed, 528 U.S. 948 (1999).
880. Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp 1007, 1023 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
881. Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 1990)
(upholding Indiana statute). Ricoh was also cited by Flynn Beverage Inc. v. Jos. E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (C.D. Il1. 1993) ("Illinois has a strong
public policy in overriding the choice of law provision provided for in the agreement.");
accord, Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 666, 671-72
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Ultimately, however federal legislation is necessary, since courts
ignore the anti-waiver provisions. In Carlock, Minnesota Haagen-Dazs
franchisees with a New York choice-of-law clause sought the protection
of the Minnesota Franchise Act. 882  The Act rendered void any
"condition, stipulation or provision" which took away the franchisee's
statutory protection.883 The New York Franchise Act did not apply to
out-of-state franchisees: as Carlock observed, this lack of protection is
the norm.884  Leaving the Hdiagen-Dazs franchisees out in the cold
without the protection of any franchise law was not repugnant to the
public policy of Minnesota: "The franchisee protections embodied in the
Franchise Act were offset by the 'powerful countervailing policy' of
enforcing the parties' choice of law., 885 In the wake of Carlock, the
Minnesota legislature amended the Franchise Act to expressly invalidate
contractual choice of law provisions which operated to waive statutory
compliance, but courts ignore the legislative intent. 886 It is tautological
that the purpose of a non-waiver provision in a statute is so that the
statute cannot be waived, but franchisees who merely read the statute
will find themselves without Franchise Act protection. Waiver of
Franchise Acts is distinguished from waiver of Unfair Trade Practices
Acts: while the latter statutes arguably may be waived by commercial
parties, 887 Franchise Acts-including their non-waiver provisions-are
designed to protect a narrowly-drawn class of commercial parties, i.e.,
franchisees. Courts should not permit waiver of Franchise Act non-
waiver provisions. At minimum, franchisors stripping franchisees of
statutory protection should be required to explicitly disclose this fact in
the Offering Circular.
The Austin court's language is reminiscent of Hartford Electric. In
both cases, the court ultimately hangs its decision on a statutory peg, but
(App. Div. 1986) (non-waiver "preserve[s] the fundamental public policy of the
franchisee's home state where its statutes afford greater protection").
882. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp.791, 809-10 (D. Minn. 1989).
883. Id. at 810, citing MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (West 2004).
884. Id., discussing N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 680. As proud as the New York Attorney
General is of his efforts to protect franchisees, those efforts do not extend to out-of-state
litigants in New York courts. Compare Schwartz v. Pillsbury, Inc., 969 F.2d 840, 847
(9th Cir. 1992) (Illustrating the importance of careful drafting, Schwartz noted that New
York Franchise Act applies to contracts made in New York, and since the Hdiagen-Dazs
agreements stated they "shall be deemed to have been made in the State of New York,
County of Bronx" the New York Act applied even though the franchisees, franchised
location, and contract signing all took place in California.) (emphasis omitted).
885. Carlock, 719 F. Supp. at 810 (quoting Modem Computer Sys. v. Modem
Banking Sys., 871 F.2d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 1989)).
886. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 408 n.57 (1964).
887. First Mut. Inc. v. Rive Gauche Apparel Distrib., Ltd., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17547, at *8-10 (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A §§ 2, 11 could be waived by commercial
parties).
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in so doing suggests that the franchisor/distributor was acting in an
"unfair" manner; indicating discomfort with traditional ("not override
express provisions") contractual jurisprudence. Presumably, Burger
King had the advice of counsel when drafting the franchise agreement,
and was aware of the ramifications-positive and negative--of the
choice of law provision. In fact, Burger King's position was that
application of that very choice of law provision would effectively
deprive the majority of franchisees of statutory protection. Choice of
Law was an express provision of the contract, and it resulted in
franchisees treated in an unfair but legal manner: reconciling Austin's
dicta with traditional contract law we see hints of Lord Hoffman's
"beguiling heresy."
Assume that the State of Tufflove has a law that requires contract
breach to be witnessed by a busload of tourists from Topeka as a
condition precedent to suit and another law that provides that if the
tourists from Topeka do claim to witness a breach such testimony will be
dispositive. The drafter of a contract specifying Tufflove choice of law
will have to weigh the likelihood of an opposing party locating said
busload of tourists from Topeka. The non-drafting signatory of a
contract with a Tufflove choice of law provision will be aware of the
difficulty of finding the busload of tourists from Topeka, but also aware
that if the hurdle is met, the signatory will win an action regardless of the
true merits of the case. Both parties will have to weigh the relative
merits of Tufflove statutes versus another state's statutes: as Yogi Berra
said, "I don't want to make the wrong mistake."
888
The Austin court presumed that Burger King had made the wrong
mistake; that the choice of law provision was included for the purpose of
bringing all litigation to Florida. Perhaps the court was correct.
Nevertheless, it was not necessarily the only benefit Burger King
anticipated, and even if an express contractual provision results in
unanticipated ancillary benefits, would the court imply a provision that
effectively negates the express provision? Unlikely, and the Austin court
admitted as much in footnote 24.
The real reason the court discussed fairness, I submit, is that just as
the Hartford Electric court was disturbed by the equities, so was the
Austin court. "Beguiling heresy" it may be, but courts do occasionally
go out of their way to indicate in dicta their distaste with franchisor
overreaching. Franchisors would do well to remember that legislators
would not find equitable appeals by aggrieved constituents to be heresy.
888. Webster's Electronic Quotebase (Keith Mohler ed., 1994) cited in Creative
Quotations from Yogi Berra, available at http://www.bemorecreative.com/one/64.htm
(last visited March, 2003).
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That is why more than 10% of the House of Representatives co-
sponsored the SBFA in 1999."'
VI. Regulatory Issues
A. Regulatory Capture 
890
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer is noted for his pursuit of
securities firms, and holds "the notion that the franchise marketplace is
like the securities marketplace in every respect."8 9 1 Echoing the FTC's
statement about not having a negative impact on franchise sales,8 92 the
Attorney General of New York states: "[w]e are here to create an
investment climate and a business climate that is friendly, hospitable, and
attractive."'8 93 That is not the priority expressed by Mr. Spitzer in his
regulation of the securities marketplace, but it is a priority which caused
the state's leading franchisor attorney 894 to compare Mr. Spitzer to
Superman.8 95 When you are a regulator and the leading attorney in your
state who represents the regulated industry has nothing but fulsome
praise for your efforts, the possibility of regulatory capture needs to be
considered. The two major securities acts were passed in 1933 and '34,
in the wake of the 1929 stock market collapse. The acts expanded the
scope of liability for issuers of securities, and the trend of implementing
regulations has been likewise. There are private rights of action, publicly
available filings, and requirements to affirmatively disclose information
the non-disclosure of which would constitute misrepresentation. By
contrast, the Franchise Rule was passed at a time when franchisors were
concerned about heading off passage of relationship legislation (such as
existed in the auto and gas franchise arena); the Chairman of the
American Assn. of Franchisees and Dealers (AAFD) observed:
889. See The American Franchise Association, www.franchisee.org/
legislative.htm#co (listing co-sponsors).
890. See generally, Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture
and Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435 (1991).
891. Kaufmann, supra note 22. Other regulators disagree, finding that "franchise
regulation has not matured to the same extent as securities regulation." Sparks, supra
note 74 (reporting views of Dale Cantone, of Maryland Attorney General's Office, and
Steve Toporoff, of FTC).
892. See infra note 951.
893. Kaufmann, supra note 22, at 7.
894. Kaufmann wrote the New York Franchise Act and went on to found the largest
franchisor law firm in the state. He also writes the practice commentaries for the Act as
found in McKinney's N.Y Statutes. Kaufmann also co-wrote an article with Attorney
General's office Franchise Section Chief Joseph Punturo and was a contributor to
Attorney General Spitzer's reelection campaign.
895. Kaufmann, supra note 22, at 7.
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It is important to recall that mandated disclosure was negotiated by
franchisors to provide a safe harbor to avoid being accused of fraud.
The purpose of the FTC Rule was to simply declare that
misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a franchise was a
fraudulent and deceptive practice covered by the Federal Trade Act.
In a compromise with the franchising industry, the FTC agreed to
allow franchisors to provide a disclosure statement to distance
themselves from "oral representations." In this light, and from the
perspective of a franchisee advocate, mandated disclosure (without
minimum standards of fairness) created a rule drafted for the
protection of the franchising industry and not the consumer.896
Regulatory capture is aided by regulators' perception of the
franchise industry. States see franchisors as benign contributors to the
local economy: the New York State Attorney General's Bureau of
Investor Protection & Securities says franchising is "one of the most
successful business techniques... a fabulous opportunity" to achieve the
"American dream." 897  The regulator echoes the theme of the IFA's
founder: "Franchising supports the great American dream. . . a road to
personal success is driven by individuals who take advantage of this
opportunity." 898 One franchisor even titled its program to convert store
managers to franchisees the "American Dream Ownership Program."899
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer personally reassures
investors-and misstates the law-stating his "notion" that: "the
franchise marketplace is like the securities marketplace in every
respect.'' 9°  This is true to the extent that the franchise marketplace and
the securities marketplace both provide access to the capital markets.
And franchise promoters pitch franchising as an alternative to stock
market investment. 90 1  The regulatory structure is quite different
however, and investor protection is commensurately lower in the
franchise marketplace than in the securities marketplace.
896. Letter from Robert L. Purvin, Jr., to Secretary, FTC (May 4, 1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/cormments/81purvin.htm (last visisted
March, 2003) (emphasis omitted).
897. Kaufmann, supra note 22 (quoting Eric Dinallo, Chief of the Bureau of Investor
Protection and Securities). Spitzer has created a fund-raising committee and is believed
to be running for governor. Gearing Up for 2006, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Jan. 27, 2003, at 6.
898. James Peters, Dunkin' Donuts Founder Receives NRN Innovator Award,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Oct. 19, 2001, at 60 (quoting William Rosenberg).
899. Dina Berta, Firehouse Subs Heats Up Managers' Franchise Dreams, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 17, 2001, at 20. This particular program is one case where the
franchisor is risking its own money by loaning it to the managers to buy their store.
900. Id. (quoting Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Attorney General).
901. Kristine McKenzie, IFE Promises Hot Concepts Here and Abroad, FRANCHISE
TIMES, April 2001, at 16 (statement made by the President of International Franchisor
Expo, "[p]eople are starting to see that the stock market is not the answer and that they
need to invest in themselves... an environment conducive to franchising").
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Regulators are more solicitous of the concerns of stock market
investors, and have exhibited more concern for wealthy stock market
investors than immigrant families targeted by franchisors. The contrast
between New York's regulation of the stock market and the franchise
market is mirrored in Indiana: in 2001 the Securities Commissioner
justified moving from a registration state to a mere notice filing state by
stating that his office felt that franchise complaints could be dealt with
through private rights of action and that Indiana received more
complaints involving general securities fraud issues and would redirect
resources formerly devoted to franchise registration review. 9°2 In an
article co-authored by the Wisconsin Administrator of the Division of
Securities, the position was on franchisors decidedly caveat emptor: "as
folks in Wisconsin are fond of saying, the cream rises to the top."
90 3
Wisconsin's position on penny stock promoters is likely different: In
1996, Wisconsin had made changes similar to Indiana and shifted
resources from franchise regulation to supervision of stock brokers,
consumer education, and assisting small businesses to raise capital.90 4
Unlike purchasers of stock, franchisees often invest their life
savings in pursuit of the "American dream." 905 This paper suggests that
Mr. Spitzer's notion should be implemented: the franchise marketplace
should be more like the securities marketplace. The AAFD Chairman
makes a reasonable proposal:
[T]he Rule in securities disclosures is that all material information
known to the seller must be disclosed, and the seller is liable (by
private right of action, no less) for misrepresentation . ... There is
no reason why franchisors should not be placed under the same or
similar mandate by the FTC franchise rule as issuers of securities
have long accepted.
90 6
There should be regulation governing not only the delivery of the
Offering Circular but in the ongoing relationship. The franchise
marketplace should import securities marketplace fiduciary standards,
and franchisors should not usurp opportunities of existing franchisees.
Just as purchasers of stock can sell the same product purchased, so too
should franchisees be permitted to sell the same product purchased:
902. James L. Petersen, Indiana Becomes a Notice Filing State, FRANCHISE L.J.,
Summer 2001, at 3.
903. James R. Conohan & Patricia D. Struck, Modified State Disclosure Regulation:
The Wisconsin Experience, FRANCHISE L.J., Fall 2000, at 7.
904. Id.
905. Cf, Jacob Bunge, Franchisee Finds Automotive American Dream, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Sept. 2002, at 21 (Greek immigrants overcome setbacks and ultimately triumph
with SpeeDee Oil Change franchise).
906. Purvin, supra note 180 (emphasis omitted).
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restraints should be placed on the ability of franchisors to unilaterally
alter the obligations of franchisees (and hence, the resale value of the
franchise). Just as the securities industry cannot wantonly dilute
shareholder investment, the franchise industry should not dilute
franchisee investment by means of encroachment. Just as purchasers in
the securities marketplace may bring suit in their local courts against
rogue corporate fiduciaries, so too should franchisees have that ability.
Just as shareholders can utilize class action suits to remedy corporate
malfeasance which would otherwise go unpunished, so too franchisees
should have the ability to act.90 7 As states have reduced their regulation
of the franchise industry, the industry practice of mandating arbitration in
distant fora and then barring class actions is troubling. As the Supreme
Court noted:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide
suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries
unremedied by the regulatory action of government. Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages,
aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they
may employ the class-action device.
90 8
Just as investors in the securities marketplace may not have their
investment taken without just compensation, so too should investors in
the franchise marketplace not have their investments taken away (by
means of encroachment or altering the economic obligations of
franchisees) without just compensation. Finally, just as regulators such
as Mr. Spitzer would not think of being cheerleaders for the securities
marketplace, or take a laissez-faire "cream rises to the top" attitude, they
should not submit to regulatory capture and neutering in the franchise
marketplace. Mr. Spitzer was not compared to the comic book character
"Superman" by an attorney for the securities industry, but by an attorney
for the franchise industry. 90 9 New York regulators may wax nostalgic for
the "American Dream," but a New York Congressman observed: "As
907. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will The Class Action Survive, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing for legislative
action to protect access to class action remedy); Jean R. Sternlight, Should an Arbitration
Provision Trump the Class Action? No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions
Through Mandatory Arbitration Would be Dangerous and Unwise, Disp. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring 2002, at 13. Contra, ALAN S. KAPLINSKY, ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS: A
CONTRADICTION IN TERMS, (2001).
908. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). However, the
argument that arbitration clauses prohibiting class actions are void has been rejected in
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000), and Bowen v. First Family
Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
909. Kaufmann, supra note 22 at 3, 7.
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franchising continues to grow, we hear persistent complaints from
franchisees that what, at first appeared to be a door to the American
Dream, was fraught with problems inherent in the franchising
relationship.'"
910
Paradoxically, the multi-billion dollar franchise industry has
avoided regulation of post-contractual abuse of mom-and-pop
franchisees on the grounds that it would deprive the victims of a chance
to enter into the very contracts which permit franchisor overreaching in
the first place. The industry has been successful in presenting the
proposition that (1) franchisees are small businesspeople, and
(2) multinational franchisors provide the key to the "American dream,"
and (3) the (misleading) impression that the Franchise Rule regulates the
franchise relationship:
Today, the franchise industry is one of the most important and
economically significant industries in America... there must
continue to be some oversight, monitoring and review of the "day-to-
day business practices" of the thousands of companies that offer their
vision of The American Dream to so many aspiring franchisees.
911
Regulators are deeply concerned about the interests of corporate
franchisors: according to the FTC's Steven Toporoff: "[w]e don't want
to have a negative impact on franchise sales. We're very cognizant of
that." 912 Given the FTC's unwillingness to bring post-sale (Section 5)
actions, Toporoff's solicitude for franchisors is especially disturbing.
Regulatory capture is an issue in franchise regulation. Capture is a
concern in government generally, but Toporoff presents a rather blatant
case; Harvey Pitt never made a similar statement about regulation of the
securities industry, even if he actually held such a belief. A high school
economics student could tell Toporoff that regulation of widgets will
have a negative impact on the sales of widgets; the proper question for a
regulator is to find an equilibrium which balances the interests of all
parties, not to avoid having a "negative impact" on the regulated
industry.
Although encroachment is the most contentious issue in franchising
today, and one which can ruin a franchisee, the FTC's A Consumer
Guide to Buying a Franchise does not mention the topic. The only
discussion of territory in the 21-page brochure is a single paragraph note
that "Franchisors may limit your business to a specific territory" and an
910. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 2 (statement of Hon. Jerrold Nadler,
D-NY).
911. Jeffers, supra note 796.
912. Nancy Weingartner, ABA Forum: Practice Makes Perfect, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Nov. -Dec. 2002, at 12, 13.
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explanation that this would benefit the franchisee by protecting them
from competition, albeit at the expense of "imped[ing] your ability to
open additional outlets or move to a more profitable location." 913 It does
not take a salesman to recognize this as a not-so-subtle sales pitch by the
FTC: a "negative" premised on franchisee profitability and resultant
desire to expand.
Courts are solicitous of the franchise industry position. The more
influential the franchise industry becomes in the national economy, the
greater the need to give free rein to franchisors:
Franchising is a bedrock of the American economy. More than one-
third of all dollars spent in retailing transactions in the United States
are paid to franchise outlets. We do not believe the antitrust laws
were designed to erect a serious barrier to this form of business
organization.
914
Indiscriminate invalidation of franchising arrangements would
eliminate their creative contributions to competition and force
suppliers to abandon franchising and integrate forward to the
detriment of small business.
915
Imperfections exist in any market. Disclosure does help to reduce
informational disparities between franchisor and franchisee, and
regulators should be cautious about over-regulating. But to regulate only
the pre-sale period and leave post-sale abuses to the corrective forces of
an ostensibly "free" market presupposes that a truly "free" market exists.
Congressman Dickey, the former Taco Bell and Baskin-Robbins
franchisee, notes that as a conservative, he doesn't favor interventionist
government but the realities of the franchise industry led him to support
some regulation of the relationship. 916 The "Chicago School" posits that
government regulation distorts the marketplace and thereby inhibits
economic growth. But as Mr. Spitzer himself noted, the Chicago School
"has missed some critical points" and "the marketplace does not function
without some degree of government intervention." 917 Spitzer went on to
913. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A CONSUMER GUIDE TO BUYING A FRANCHISE 4
(1994).
914. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 441. (3d Cir.
1997).
915. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 387 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
916. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 7-8.
917. William Rainbolt, Attorney General's Success Shows Flaw in "Chicago School"
Theory, N.Y.S.B.A. NEWS, March-April 2003, at 34 (quoting Spitzer speech to Judicial
Section annual luncheon). What exactly constitutes "Chicago" theory is open to debate:
Warren Grimes says that his is "post-Chicago" theory, and that Kodak is a "post-
Chicago" decision. Warren S. Grimes, Reply to Editor's Note, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 745,
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speak of the securities marketplace in terms which might be equally
applicable to the franchise marketplace, and the thousands of pages of
franchise litigation and franchisor testimony at Congressional hearings:
We've become more willing to accept the notion of self-regulation,
but the problem is that this has been an abject failure [in securities
regulation]. In looking at thousands of pages of documents, I can say
that no one ever said 'we have a structural problem, we have other
problems.
9 18
In May 1999 Attorney General Spitzer began referring errant
franchisors to the National Franchise Council (NFC) "Alternative Law
Enforcement Program"; the NFC is a group of the largest franchisors in
the United States.9 19  The securities marketplace may be like the
franchise marketplace, in which case the "abject failure" of self-
regulation will recur, this time in the franchise industry. Meanwhile,
permitting a private "Law Enforcement Program" creates an atmosphere
not conducive to franchisor self-restraint: franchisees to not have a
private right of action under the Franchise Rule, but franchisors have a
private right of correction. Spitzer's action was cited approvingly in an
amicus brief submitted in Texas by the NFC on behalf of a franchisor.
Author of that brief is David J. Kaufmann, counsel to the NFC.
Kaufmann founded the leading law firm in the country specializing in
franchisor representation. In May 1999 his firm donated $500 to
920
Spitzer's re-election campaign.
As a Deputy Attorney General, Kaufmann wrote the New York
Franchise Act, and he authors the influential Practice Commentaries to
the McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York. As a state regulator,
Kaufmann pioneered the regulation of franchisors, drafting a tough
disclosure law that remains one of the most comprehensive in the U.S.
As a private attorney advocating on behalf of franchisors, Kaufman is
politically astute. In an article co-authored with Joseph Punturo,
Assistant Attorney General in charge of franchise enforcement, Kaufman
wrote:
New York has gone from "worst to first" nationally when it comes to
franchise fraud enforcement activity since Joseph Punturo's elevation
to the post of the Attorney General's Franchise Section Chief, the
746 (2000).
918. Id.
919. Brief of Amicus Curiae, the National Franchise Council, in Support of the
Petition for Writ of Mandamus of Relators GNC Franchising Inc, available at
www.nationalfranchisecouncil.org/newsctr/briefs/gnc.htm (last visited March 2003).
920. Contributions of May 27, 1999, available at www.elections.state.ny.us/
finance/contributors.htm.
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election of Attorney General Spitzer, the appointment of his Chief of
the Bureau of Investment Protection and Securities, Eric Dinallo, and
the appointment of Assistant Attorney General William Estes.
92 1
Kaufmann discusses New York's involvement with the NFC in a section
of his amicus brief. The section is titled "The National Franchise
Council's Partnership with Government," and claims that the NFC
program is designed "to foster compliance with ... federal and state
laws... and in an effort to insure that franchisees enjoy the salutary
benefits of same. 922 Kaufmann fails to mention what the NFC itself
admits: "NFC hopes to enhance the effectiveness of existing franchise
sales laws to protect franchisees and thereby weaken arguments for
intrusive regulation offranchise relationships.,
923
If Attorney General Spitzer were referring wayward brokerage firms
to "alternative law enforcement" run by Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, his
actions with franchisors might be seen as part of his political philosophy.
Spitzer's regulatory approach to the franchise industry is remarkable for
the contrast to Spitzer's approach to regulation of other economic
sectors. There is merit to the argument that franchisee failure to unite
and wield the political clout that franchisors possess is the fault of
franchisees; legislators respond to well-financed lobbying efforts.
Regulatory capture of the "Law Enforcement Program" of a major state
is indicative of the power wielded by the franchise industry.
Regulatory capture is not simply a concern at the federal level.
With the exceptions of California, Maryland, and Iowa, states have
expressed waning interest in regulating franchise sales, let alone the post-
sale franchise relationship. 924 As chair of the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA), Maryland expressed a preference
for uniform state regulation mimicking the FTC model.925 But Maryland
has also recognized the crucial role of regulators in restraining abuse,
noting that as franchising continues to evolve so must franchise laws
921. David J. Kaufmann & Joseph J. Punturo, Recent Developments in Franchise
Law, N.Y. Bus. L.J., Fall 2001, at 13, 20.
922. Id.
923. About the NFC, NFC-FTC Partnership, available at
www.nationalfranchisecouncil.org/about/about.htm (emphasis added).
924. State filing is required in fourteen jurisdictions: California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. Franchise attorneys have praised the three
states that dropped even the registration requirement: Michigan (since 1984), Wisconsin
(since 1996) and Indiana (since 2001) now require mere notice filing. Rochelle B.
Spandorf, Exactly Who is Protected by Franchise Registration Anyway, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Sept. 2001, at 47.




evolve to protect the consumers who purchase franchises. 926  When
abuses in the janitorial franchise sector grew to the point where even the
FTC could no longer turn a blind eye, the warning brochure Buying a
Janitorial Services Franchise posted on the FTC website was actually
written by Dale Cantone of the Maryland Attorney General's office.927
American regulation of franchising has global effects for two
reasons. First, because American franchisors command the bulk of the
franchise market and attempt to standardize franchise terms worldwide;
as Professor Friedman notes, "If culture and trade globalize, law will
almost inevitably follow." 928 Second, the corollary that courts overseas
look to American franchise jurisprudence, particularly where the instant
franchisor is U.S.-based; 929 although this may change as foreign
jurisdictions develop a body of franchise law. 9 3  Foreign legislators may
also look to American legislation: the Japanese Diet has been lobbied by
franchisees influenced by "developments in the United States, with much
discussion of tying, of encroachment, and of the Iowa [franchise] law"
931
926. FTC Franchise Rule Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong.
107-116 (2002) (testimony of Dale Cantone).
927. Julie Bennett, Brochure Aims to Clean Up Janitorial Franchises, FRANCHISE
TIMES, Aug. 2002, at 5. The author also notes that due to personal guarantees,
franchisees who fail can lose their home or car, and many franchisees "disappear" to
avoid pursuit by franchisors. Id. at 6.
928. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 574 (2002).
He might also have added that if franchisors globalize, litigation will follow: famously
non-litigious Japanese have become adversarial franchisors/franchisees. See Philip F.
Zeidman, supra note 30. Even Palau now has two American franchisors. See Pohnpei
State Reports Economic Progress, MICRONESIAN INVESTMENT. Q. (1994). The growth in
global franchising is due in part to American firms advertising on the Internet. Press
Release, Federal Trade Commission, Growth In International Franchise Sales to be Topic
at FTC Workshop (Feb. 13, 1996) available at www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9602/worksh.htm.
The U.S. Dept of Commerce also promotes franchising overseas. See U.S. Franchising
Matchmaker Trade Delegation, available at www.ita.doc/gov/doctm/franaus.htm.
929. E.g., Ellis v. Subway Franchise Sys. of Can., [2000] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 999
(relating to Subway Sandwiches, unconscionability of arbitration in a distant forum, the
repeat player advantage of a franchisor, and citing four cases from the U.S. Second
Circuit). See also Far Horizons Pty Ltd. v. McDonald's Austl. Ltd., 2257 of 1996 (Sup.
Ct. of Victoria, Commercial & Equity Division, Aug. 18, 2000) (McDonald's
encroachment, citing three U.S. cases); Jima Ltd. v. Mister Donut Ltd., [1970] 13 D.L.R.
(3d) 645, rev'd, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 639, aff'd 40 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (first franchise case in
Canada; American and British cases cited). Also, an English court was invited to
examine an American decision involving the Ziebart franchisor, but deemed the case not
on point. Paperlight Ltd. v. Swinton Group Ltd. (Q.B. 1998) (Hearing Transcript).
930. E.g., Zvi Tamir, Franchising, in ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE
§ 7.04 (Alon Kaplan ed., 1996) (as more franchised outlets open, likely that "better legal
tools" will be found for franchise litigation). See also, Philip F. Zeidman, Franchising in
the Pacific Rim, FRANCHISE TIMES, Oct. 2001, at 57 (Asian "movement towards more
franchise-specific legislation").
931. Zeidman, supra note 30.
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and a Fulbright scholar left his position at the Tunisian Ministry of
Commerce to study franchising in the U.S. in order to "prepare the legal
framework" for franchising in Tunisia.932  The American franchise
industry trade group, the International Franchise Association (IFA) has
actively sought to ensure that overseas legislation, if any, covers only the
brief period prior to the signing of the franchise agreement and not the
franchise relationship itself, which can last for a period of 20 years or
more. According to a member of the UNIDROIT 933 committee drafting a
model franchising law, IFA support is necessary since it is the most
influential organization in franchising. 934 The IFA only supported the
UNIDROIT effort when it was clear that the model law would not create
new impediments to franchisor discretion in the franchise relationship.
935
But as we have seen, franchisor discretion has frequently been abused.
To use Attorney General Spitzer's framework, it would be as if the
Securities Act of 1933 was the only regulation and the Exchange Act of
1934 did not exist. Just as the securities marketplace could not be
effectively regulated under such conditions, neither can the franchise
marketplace. Passage of federal franchise legislation will reduce the risk
of regulatory capture at both federal and state levels, reminding
regulators of their obligation to regulate without fear or favor.
As previously discussed, franchisors often target immigrants and
other more vulnerable members of society. Such groups have less
money and less organization to protect their interests, even if the
collective action problem can be overcome: in economic terms,
franchisees are less capable of rent-seeking behavior. Elected officials
seek to rise to higher positions in their chosen profession; money and
votes are necessary to accomplish this. Although franchisees may have
all of their wealth tied up in a franchise and the family member's
dependent upon the franchise for their livelihood, franchisees lack the
monetary resources of franchisors, both individually and in the
aggregate. Immigrant franchisees may not even be eligible to vote, and
franchisees working 14-hour days are not likely to devote much time to
political activism. One difference between the franchise marketplace and
932. Fulbright Student to Study Franchising at St. Thomas, FRANCHISE TIMES, Oct.
2000, at 10.
933. See International Institute for Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/pr-main.htm (last visited May, 2004).
934. Attorneys Get Scoop at Legal Meeting, FRANCHISE TIMES, June-July 2001, at 4.
935. Id. One franchisor attorney who opposes any franchise legislation, nevertheless
comments favorably on the UNIDROIT Model Law due to the law's lack of regulation of
the franchise relationship and extensive limitations on the need for disclosure by
franchisors. See Mitchell Shapiro, The Unidroit Model Pros and Cons, 4 FRANCHISE L.,
Winter 2001, at 3.
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the securities marketplace is the constituency harmed by opportunistic
corporate behavior. When large voting blocks of middle-class New
Yorkers were harmed by corporate misbehavior, Attorney General
Spitzer did not tell them they could have avoided being harmed by
thorough investigation before investing, or that they were foolish to
believe the hype of brokerage firm "analysts." Instead, the Attorney
General moved quickly to take legal action and appear on national
television to ensure that the voters were aware of his concern.
Another way in which the regulatory debate has been slanted is due
to the success of the franchisor trade organization in image promotion.
In a press release announcing the International Franchise Association
(IFA) position on the GAO report, the IFA claims that: "IFA, the only
trade group that represents both franchisees and franchisors, was founded
in 1960 to promote good franchising practices that protect those who
pursue small-business ownership through purchasing a franchised
business., 936  The GAO report echoes the IFA's self-proclaimed
neutrality: "IFA primarily represents the rights and interests of
franchisors and franchisees. IFA represents about 800 franchisor
members, 2,000 individual franchisee members, and 30 franchisee
associations and councils representing another 30,000 franchised
outlets.
937
Given the 800-32,000 disparity, a reader might actually believe that
the IFA is controlled by franchisees when in fact for 40 years the IFA has
consistently fought against legislation and filed amicus briefs opposing
franchisees.938 Franchisee members of the AFA must pay to belong, but
franchisees do not have to pay to belong to the IFA if their franchisor is a
member. The IFA's claim to represent franchisees is not regarded as
credible by the AFA, whose Director of Public Policy quipped: "What
other organization ever let people in just because they're breathing?,
939
A Molly Maids franchisee noted that IFA was trying to boost the number
of franchisee members in order to claim that franchisees supported the
936. Franchise Rule Protecting Franchisees, Government Study Finds, IFA
FRANCHISE NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, available at http://www.franchise.org/news/
newsbriefs/08022001.asp. See also IFA Press Release, Franchise Rule Protecting
Franchisers, Government Study Finds, (Aug. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.franchise.org/news/pr/08012001.asp (last visited March 2003).
937. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 35.
938. Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (opposing franchisee
interpretation of Montana statute & arbitration); Susser v. Carvel Corp, 380 U.S. 930
(1965); Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126 (1999) (applicability of
Franchise Rule to non-U.S. purchaser).
939. Julie Bennett, What a difference a Year Didn't Make: Revisiting 2000's 20 to
Watch, FRANCHISE TIMES, Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 28, 29 (franchisees gain Internet access for
free but must pay $100 a year to get material in printed form).
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IFA's positions.9 40 The ability of the IFA to present itself to regulators,
legislators, and the media as a balanced "voice of franchising" is a
critical component to the success the IFA has had in thwarting regulation
of franchising. 941 The ability of the IFA to market itself to the public as a
quasi-regulatory organization forestalls pressure for legislation 942 and
assists franchisor salesmen, who can purchase (at $625 per thousand)
"Membership Verification Letters ... stating that the [franchisor] meets
IFA's membership requirements." 943 The historical revisionism of the
IFA was disputed by the founder of the organization, the late William
Rosenberg. When a trade publication presented an award to Rosenberg
in 2001, it quoted Rosenberg on the reason for the IFA's existence:
When people got hurt and lost money in a franchise agreement, the
first thing they did was to complain to their congressman or state
legislator. These guys, not knowing anything about franchising or
having any credible source of information, wanted to pass laws that
would make it difficult to survive as a franchisor.
944
The article continued: "To protect franchisors, Rosenberg and 18
of his peers gathered at a trade show in Chicago in 1959 to form the
IFA. ' 945  It is more than coincidental that the founding of the IFA
coincided with the passage of the first federal franchise legislation
(protecting auto dealers) 946 and the imminent threat of additional federal
oversight. The 1993 IFA decision to allow franchisees to be elected to
the IFA governing board took place as complaints of franchisor abuse
caused Congressional pressure to enact federal legislation.94 7 One
industry observer feels that franchisors will treat franchisees properly
940. Janet Sparks, FTC hearings a Nonevent? Not Exactly, FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept.
2002, at 41.
941. See, Franchising Today, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2002, at 7B (IFA is "Voice of
Franchising... launched... to protect, enhance and promote franchising .... During
Franchise Appreciation Day Sept. 24, franchisees and franchisors will ... meet with
members of Congress ... [and] present [the] 'Legislator of the Year' award ... ").
942. See GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 25 (IFA chief counsel told GAO that
"reliable" indicators of franchise problems were FTC enforcement data and complaints
alleging violations of IFA Code of Ethics).
943. IFA PUBLICATIONS, PRODUCTS, AND SERVICES CATALOG: 2003, at 17.
944. Rosenberg to Receive NRN Innovator Award, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS,
Sept. 10, 2001, at 4.
945. Id. (emphasis added). The article noted that Rosenberg is "[a] revered name at
the IFA ... honored as its first Hall of Fame Award recipient."
946. Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1956).
947. Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Focus on Franchising: LaFalce Gains Allies in House
to Halt Franchise Abuses, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1993, at B2. IFA called "for franchisors
to register their franchisees as members of IFA so that they have the power on Capital
[sic] Hill to say they truly represent franchising, not just franchisor interests." Nancy




since failure to do so will result in "a cancer eating away" at the brand.948
History has shown that franchisors such as Subway, Dunkin' Donuts,
Baskin Robbins, Burger King, and Holiday Inn can survive and prosper
notwithstanding poor franchisee relations, massive litigation, and
negative media reports in everything from the Wall St. Journal to the
West hornbook on Antitrust. The reality is that (with the notable
exception of Allied Domecq) franchisors have come to present a kinder
face because of rising pressure for Congressional regulation of the
franchise relationship. A legislative and judicial framework which
enables one party to oppress the second party is not conducive to
cooperation since the oppressing party knows that its discretion is
unfettered. Just as the franchise industry placated franchisees as
franchise relationship legislation gained support in Congress, so to will
the franchise industry become more amenable to cooperative dispute
resolution when the likelihood of courtroom victory is lessened.
It should be noted that the legislation enacted in 1956949 did not
make it "difficult to survive" as an automobile franchisor; cars are still
sold in America today. Legislation enacted in 1978950 did not put gas
stations out of business either. Rosenberg did set the tone in 1959 for the
IFA as it exists today: "people who got hurt" are not a "credible source
of information," but the franchisor members of IFA who get the hurt
people's money are the "unified voice of franchising," and not only does
the FTC not threaten the survival of franchisors, the FTC states that it
doesn't even want its regulations "to have a negative impact on franchise
sales."95 i.
Application of equitable principles is vital in the absence of federal
franchise legislation, since the Federal Trade Commission refuses to
regulate the post-sale relationship, despite having authority to do so.
Franchisees quickly discover-after they purchase-that the FTC only
concerns itself with pre-contractual disclosure and that arbitration clauses
preclude lawsuits and class actions are specifically prohibited. But one
would not know this from the FTC's answer to the "Frequently Asked"
question about filing a complaint, which begins:
We regret that you're having a problem with a franchisor or business
opportunity seller. We'd like to help, but can't guarantee we'll be
able to, because the Commission lacks the resources to investigate
every individual complaint it receives. For this reason, we urge that
948. Janet Sparks, Franchisee Associations: They're Not Going Away, FRANCHISE
TIMEs, Sept. 2001, at 12. Sparks takes a positive view of franchisee inclusion in IFA.
See "Franchise Inclusion" Takes on New Meaning, FRANCHISE TIMES, May 2001, at 14.
949. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1956).
950. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 etseq. (1978).
951. Weingartner, supra note 912, at 13.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
you also consider talking with a private attorney about the feasibility
of bringing a private lawsuit, or taking other individual or group
action that may help resolve the problem.
9 5 2
But as the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) explained, "In
general, only FTC, not private parties, can enforce violations of the
Franchise Rule or FTC Act," 953 and lawsuits can be barred by contractual
clauses, as can class-actions. The FTC has consistently taken a position
adverse to the small franchisees and in favor of the franchise industry,
going so far as to tell the GAO in 2001 that although "FTC's data are not
sufficient to assess" the incidence of franchise relationship problems,
"the isolated instances of franchise relationship problems do not justify
[the] FTC conducting a more widespread investigation,, 954 despite the
FTC's 1999 statement that there were "significant" relationship
complaints.955  In 1998, the FTC abdicated a portion of the
Commission's duties to a private franchisor group956 "represent[ing] the
rights and interests of large franchisors" 957 -foxes guarding the hen
house. Even where staffers conduct an investigation, there is little
danger to industry interests: out of 79 investigations which FTC
supervisors authorized to be closed without action, 77 were closed
without any explanation.958 Congress must intervene to restore the FTC
to its proper governmental role of a neutral regulator.
B. FTC Regulation. Statutory Basis For Enforcement
The FTC has two avenues for franchise regulation. The first,
Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures,959 came into effect in October 1979 and
is known as the 'Franchise Rule.' The Franchise Rule is the primary
federal vehicle for protection of franchisees and is conceptually based on
a disclosure regime. To the extent that the Franchise Rule is the limit of
the FTC's vision of regulatory mandate, the regulatory construct fails to
acknowledge the reality of relationship contracts. This is a fundamental
952. Federal Trade Commission, Franchise and Business Opportunity FAQs,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/faql.htm (reviewing FAQ #3, "How can 1
file a complaint against a company?").
953. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 7. Accord, Franchising Relationship,
supra note 49, at 23 (statement of Susan Kezios, President, American Franchisee Assn.).
954. Id. at 23.
955. Id. at 22 (citing Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,294, 57,296 (1999) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436).
956. Id. at 7.
957. Id. at 35.
958. Id. at 3.
959. Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 436 (1999).
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flaw whose importance cannot be overstated if one is to understand the
legal climate in which American franchising operates. The Franchise
Rule applies for as few as ten days prior to the signing of the contract.
Unless there is a disclosure violation, the Franchise Rule does not speak
to the franchise "relationship" 960 itself-potentially a period of 20 years
or more. This would not necessarily be a problem in a discrete contract:
a 20-year agreement to supply 10,000 widgets per year in return for
$10,000 per year is essentially one transaction with little room for
contractual discretion by either party. However, a franchise agreement is
not a discrete contract, and a lot can happen in 20 years. Furthermore,
when courts see nothing wrong with franchisees who lose their life
savings due to franchisor encroachment, the need for remedy for
relationship abuse is readily apparent.
The second possible avenue for regulation is Section 5 of the FTC
Act.961 This is a statute of broad applicability, permitting the FTC to
regulate unfair or deceptive practices. As a practical matter, however,
Section 5 is of little use to franchisees. During the period from 1993-
2000, the FTC brought six 9 6 2 Franchise Rule cases to court against
franchisors 963 and fourteen cases involving both Franchise Rule and
Section 5 cases. 964 In July 2001, the GAO reported that in the history of
the FTC there had only been two pure Section 5 actions, both of which
were closed without action. Section 5 was never an independent cause of
action against any franchisor-the Federal Trade Commission refuses to
regulate purely post-sale conduct despite the existence of statutory
authority.
According to the GAO, this is not an issue for concern:
Many states have a "little FTC Act". . . or some type of general
consumer protection or fraud statute that franchisees can use to
address contractual disputes. These statutes are referred to in
different states, for example, as consumer protection acts, consumer
sales acts, deceptive trade practices acts, and consumer fraud acts.
The states' franchise relationship laws and other consumer protection
or fraud statutes generally allow franchisees to file lawsuits in state
courts against franchisors for violations of these state laws.
9 65
960. Commonly accepted definition of "relationship issues" is that used by the GAO:
"those that arise after the franchise agreement has been signed (i.e., post-sale)." GAO
2001 Report, supra note 217, at 2.
961. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
962. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 49.
963. There were also cases brought against "Business Opportunity" companies, which
topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
964. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 52.
965. Id. at 44.
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Leaving aside that only 17 states have franchise relationship laws and
that franchisor-drafted contracts often specify choice-of-law, the "little
FTC Acts" may not cover franchisees as a matter of state law. The most
frequent barrier to franchisee redress under the Acts is that a franchisee
may not be "consumer" and/or the specific issue being litigated may not
be a "consumer transaction.,
966
Is the franchise dispute covered by the state little FTC Act? Yes,
say courts in Florida,967 Idaho, 96' and Illinois. 969  No, say courts in
970 97 97297Maine,97 ° Maryland,9 1 New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.973 Maybe, say
courts in New Hampshire (must be enumerated unlawful act and
construed in accordance with federal FTC Act),974 Tennessee (depends
on whether franchisee is corporate entity),975 and Texas (depending on
what was purchased and nature of claim).976 Probably not, say courts in
Georgia 9 77 and Louisiana.
978
C. GAO 2001 Report
Regulatory enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission is
limited in both scope and ambition: compromised by a narrow mandate
and succumbing to regulatory capture, the FTC fails to exert the
966. Even when the goods purchased from the franchisor might qualify the franchisee
as a consumer, the basis for the complaint must be the goods purchased, not wrongful
termination or the like. Americom Distrib. Corp. v. ACS Communications, Inc., 990
F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1993).
967. Luzim v. Phillips, No. 87 C 112, 1989 WL 30214, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
1987) (applying Florida law).
968. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 850 (D. Minn. 1989).
969. Scotsman Group, Inc. v. Mid-America Distrib., Inc., No. 93 C 7320, 1994 WL
118458, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 1994).
970. C-B Kenworth, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957 (D. Me. 1988).
971. Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D. Md. 1989).
972. J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal. Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F3d 1259, 1266 (3d
Cir. 1994).
973. Scarlata v. Siegel Bus. Serv., Inc., No. 88-02153 (Pa. D. & C. Chester, 1989).
974. Roberts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 643 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1994).
975. L.I.C. Corp. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4, at
*10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
976. Meineke Disc. Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding
trial court's dismissal of claim for intangible property). Cf Nelson v. Data Terminal
Sys., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1988) (giving rights to dealer
that purchased goods from the manufacturer under the texas little FTC).
977. O'Brien v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 699 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
(holding that even if franchisee was a consumer, refusal to approve sale/transfer on part
of franchisor did not constitute harm to the general consuming public).
978. Standing found in Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 916 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. La. 1996). But no standing in Popeye's, Inc. v. Tokita, 1993 WL 386260 (E.D. La.
Sept. 21, 1993), or Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.1. Case Co., 975 F.2d 1192, 1205 (5
th
Cir. 1992) (applying Louisiana law).
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prophylactic influence of more effective watchdogs and sometimes
defers to the regulated on violations within its mandate. FTC officials
are quick to point out-and are correct in doing so-that Congress sets
the FTC's mandate. Senators Cochran, Collins, and Grassley asked the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the FTC's enforcement of
existing law, and the GAO issued a report in July 2001 .979 Given that the
FTC does not pursue Section 5 enforcement, to the extent that the GAO
report dealt with FTC action the results were not surprising. Most
troublesome, and most indicative of regulatory capture, is the FTC's
assertions as to relationship issues not being a major problem in
franchising.
At the outset of this paper, it was noted that the American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law conflated regulation of the
franchise sale with regulation of the franchise relationship. Attorney
David Kaufmann, counsel to the National Franchise Council and major
franchisors, proceeds in a similar vein in his Practice Commentary
discussing the GAO Report:
[T]he initial premise of the AFA and other franchisee activists
seeking radical federal franchise legislation-that there are untold
numbers of franchisees complaining of FTC Rule violations who are
getting no response from the FTC itself-is utterly without merit...
the GAO Report makes clear that the FTC did, in fact, respond in a
meaningful fashion to all franchisee complaints it received over
which it had jurisdiction under the FTC Franchise Rule.
98 0
As with the ABA, the statement by Kaufmann erroneously links two
distinct issues. In public comments to the FTC's Advance Notice
(ANPR) and subsequent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR), many
franchisees advocated that the Franchise Rule should be done away with
since it did nothing but provide cover for franchisors and mislead
franchisees into believing that the FTC was there "to protect you.
'981
The complaint of the AFA and franchisees is that the FTC does not
exercise jurisdiction over the relationship-which is a Section 5 matter
not a Franchise Rule matter. As Kaufmann is well aware, the Rule
requires pre-sale disclosure. The point of the AFA is that since the FTC
will only consider Rule violations and not Section 5 violations,
979. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217. This is the second GAO report, the first
being FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssION: ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRADE REGULATION RULE ON
FRANCHISING, (July 13, 1993) available at www.gao.gov (last visited March 2003). The
first GAO report will hereinafter be referred to as "GAO 1993 Report."
980. David J. Kaufmann, 2001 Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y. GEN. Bus.
L. §§ 680-695 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
981. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 23 (statement of Susan Kezios,
President, American Franchisee Assn.).
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
relationship legislation is necessary. Kaufmann then quotes the section
of the GAO Report where the FTC staff says they feel that "franchise
relationship problems are isolated incidents."
Perhaps Mr. Kaufmann and the FTC staff would do well to speak
with franchisees who experience the reality of franchisor overreaching
every day in scores of nations around the world. American franchisees
know that it is pointless to complain to the FTC, and that is why they do
not do so. According to an FTC Table of "Section 5 Complaint
Allegations" from 1993-2000, the agency only received 10 complaints
about "exclusive territories" (Ranked #6). By way of contrast, the same
table notes 28 complaints about "Testimonials/References" (Ranked #2)
and 94 about "Earnings" (Ranked #1 ).982 Given the encroachment wars,
it is difficult to imagine that in 7 years there were only 10 complaints
about territory. Equally unlikely is that testimonials rank high on any
franchisee's list of concerns. If one assumes that each of the 261 Section
5 complaints over the period of the study (data from 1993 through June
1999983) came from a different franchise, this equates to less than 1
complaint per week during one of the most contentious decades in
franchise history. The FTC and franchisors draw the conclusion that the
data is evidence of bucolic bliss in franchiseland. The FTC interpretation
is flawed, but serves the political goals of the franchise industry. A more
plausible explanation of the data is that franchisees know exactly what
the FTC is concerned with-(1) earnings claims in the UFOC and
(2) keeping the franchise industry happy.
Although the FTC is concerned with disclosure issues, the GAO
report repeated the FTC's speculation as to relationship issues. Although
the GAO added the caveat that there was a paucity of empirical data and
a need for further study, this was quickly lost in the publicity blitz
mounted in the wake of the report. The head of the National Franchise
Council (NFC) (a militant offshoot of the IFA comprised of the largest
franchisors) remarked that the FTC wasn't interested in doing a further
study, and that if the SBA wanted to do a study it would have to get
money from Congress. The NFC, which boasts of its "partnership" with
government 984 was pleased with the GAO's inclusion of the FTC's
relationship ruminations; the NFC president boasted "When I'm on
[Capitol] Hill, I'll be carrying this around.,
985
982. Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Section 5
Complaint Allegations, in FRANCHISE & BusINESS OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM REVIEW 1993-
2000, 39 (2001).
983. Id. at 4.
984. See Amicus Brief, available at www.nationalfranchisecouncil.org/newsctr/
briefs/gnc.htm (last visited March, 2003).
985. GAO Report as Seen From Both Sides, FRANCHISE TIMES, Sept. 2001, at 5, 6
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The GAO report was the subject of much discussion within the
franchise bar both prior to and subsequent to its release. Apart from the
public relations value of the speculative portions of the report, is difficult
to understand why so much controversy. A cursory review of the 17-
volumes of cases in the CCH Business Franchise Guide will demonstrate
that most franchise disputes would be covered, if at all, under Section 5.
However, in the entire history of the FTC, the Commission has
conducted a mere two investigations based solely on Section 5. Both
investigations resulted in no action; the GAO noted, "for the FTC to find
unfairness, there must still be substantial injury that is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits." 986  Since franchise-specific Section 5
enforcement is an ancillary backwater of the Franchise Rule, and the
Franchise Rule applies only during the pre-sale phase, it borders on
tautology to say that any analysis of FTC activities would have little
relevance to most franchisees, given that relationship issues (e.g.,
encroachment, termination/renewal, sourcing) are not governed by the
Franchise Rule. One would expect to find the rare instance of legally
inadequate disclosure, or outright fraud, but most franchisors have
capable attorneys, and if they do not they can get a referral from the IFA
to franchisor counsel. The FTC might pursue the bit players, but the
major brands such as Dunkin' Donuts, Burger King, or Subway are not
likely to run afoul of Franchise Rule technicalities.
And that is precisely what the GAO report found. During the 1993-
2000 period, none of the six franchisors which were the subject of court
action are household names:
Building Inspector of America: 80 investors affected
Coverall North America, Inc. 2591
Direct Distributors, Inc. 290
Gingiss International, Inc. 209
Hillary's Gourmet Ice Cream Unknown
Jani-King International, Inc. 9o0987
Furthermore, all six actions commenced exclusively under the
Franchise Rule involved earnings claims. All 14 franchise actions
involving both Franchise Rule and Section 5 violations involved earnings
claims. 988  The 54 "Business Opportunity" cases brought under the
Franchise Rule all involved earnings claims. 989 The moral of the story is
(quoting Neil Simon, executive director of"Nat'l Franchise Association" [sic]).
986. GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 43.
987. Id. at 55.
988. Id. at 59-60.
989. Id. at 55-57.
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that if you want to avoid the FTC's wrath, simply refrain from making
earnings claims.
D. SBFA
Franchise industry supporters often make the case that franchising is
sui generis, and therefore franchisors should be exempt from laws that
would apply to other industries. 990 Even where pre-sale disclosure laws
are supposed to protect franchisees, franchisors need not fear government
enforcement: a 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) report found
that the Federal Trade Commission acted on less than 6% of the
complaints brought to the FTC about franchisor pre-sale violations of
law.99' Franchisors believe exemption from normal law applies to good
faith as well: at a recent Congressional hearing, Congressman Jerrold
Nadler (D-NY) asked the franchisor industry (IFA) representative
(Adler):
Every other business in this country operates under the UCC, has a
duty of good faith. Why-in a myriad of different kinds of business
arrangements, millions of different kinds of business arrangements-
why are franchisors so different that they should not operate under
some of the same laws that everybody else does?
99 2
The following exchange ensued:
ADLER: But let me give you a practical matter, as it is not a
normal contractual relationship. It is a partnership. I do not view-some
will differ with this-franchisees as my customers. They are my
partners. And it is-
NADLER: Yes, but partners operate under the UCC-
ADLER: [continuing] Like a family.
NADLER: [continuing] Under the UCC.
ADLER: What is that?
NADLER: Partners operate under the-partners are great until they
have a split, and then they have a bitter litigation. [Laughter]. Partners
also operate under the UCC and under the normal commercial laws and
under a duty of good faith.
ADLER: Well, I guess I am saying the current contract laws really
work. The percentage of franchisees in litigation I am guessing are less
990. Byron E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation-Solutions in Search of
Problems, 20 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 241, 246 n.15 (1995). See also, infra note 1140,
(property law in Brazil) and supra note 742 (property law in France).
991. Testimony of Adler, infra note 993.
992. Franchising Relationship, supra note 49, at 85.
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than a fraction of 1% right now. So the cases, if you peel them back, a
lot of the cases-the reality is the FTC has only investigated 6%. I have
no knowledge of that, but maybe the 94% didn't have substance behind
them.993
Partners have fiduciary duties to one another, 994 but franchisors
specifically object to provisions in the proposed SBFA imposing a
fiduciary standard on franchisors. 995  Conversely, franchisors cloak
themselves in the partnership mantle when speaking to prospective
franchisees or opposing statutory oversight: franchising is "not a normal
contractual relationship." Indeed, most franchisees would agree and cite
this as a good reason for franchise-specific legislation. IFA' s franchisor
members tell legislators and prospective franchisees that franchising is a
partnership, but no IFA amicus brief has ever taken the position that
franchising is a partnership, and one can search the Reporters in vain for
a single case in which an IFA member told a judge that franchising is a
partnership.
Congressman Nadler asks a simple question: Why can't franchisors
live by the same laws as everyone else? 996 The IFA representative avoids
a direct response, instead linking the concept of good faith with FTC
oversight in a manner suggesting that since the FTC was is aggressively
pursuing complaints against franchisors, there is no need for franchisors
to comply with standards of good faith and fair dealing applicable to the
rest of American business. In evaluating the franchisors' claim that they
should be held to a lower standard than other industries, it should be
remembered that "business" relationships already permit much greater
latitude for abuse than "consumer" before courts will step in.997 The IFA
993. Id. Michael Adler, President of franchisor Moto-Photo, spoke on behalf of the
International Franchise Association.
994. Partners may reasonably limit fiduciary duties by agreement. See comments 5
and 6 to RUPA § 103, supra note 128; comments 2 and 3 to RUPA § 404, supra note
128.
995. A limited fiduciary duty was proposed in Section 5 of the SBFA. A complete
text and discussion from a franchisee-side perspective is available at www.franchisee.org.
996. Note that unlike franchising, distributorship agreements are generally under the
UCC, with courts applying the "predominant purpose" test and finding the entire
agreement under the UCC, although a minority holds that only the goods portion of the
agreement is under UCC and the services portion under common law. Watkins & Son
Pet Supplies v. lams Co., 254 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying UCC but noting that
where service component predominated, UCC not applicable); SMR Tech. Inc. v.
Aircraft Parts Int'l Combs, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 923 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (applying
minority view: UCC applied to goods part of transaction and common law to sale of
services part); Continental Casing Corp. v. Siderca Corp., 38 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.
2001) (applying Texas law: UCC applies where essence of contract is sale of goods).
997. Compagnie de Reassurance D'Ille de France v. New England Reinsurance Corp.,
825 F. Supp. 370, 381 (D.Mass. 1993) (under § 11 "the objectionable conduct must attain
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representative also reiterates the canard that the franchisor relationship is
not a business relationship, but rather a partnership between members of
a family. Leaving aside for the moment the substantive merits of the IFA
representative's claim, many franchisees find themselves in bitter
litigation, where the procedure followed is not conducive to the
franchisee receiving the fruits of the contract anticipated at the signing of
the franchise agreement. A minority of franchisors do not oppose the
SBFA's requirement for franchisor behavior in conformity to that
followed in other industries, as the President of one franchisor noted: "I
don't think franchising should be exempt from such duties. If you're an
honest franchisor ... then a law like [SBFA] won't affect you. 998
Indeed, the Canadian province of Ontario now provides for regulation of
the franchise relationship with a law quite similar to the proposed
SBFA,999 and franchising has not met an untimely death in Ontario any
more than auto franchising or gasoline franchising were killed by U.S.
legislation regulating those franchises.
E. Beguiling Heresy: Equitable Principles of Good Faith &
Unconscionability
There is a relationship between good faith and unconscionability,
and some court decisions discussing good faith are more accurately
concerned with principles of hardship or unconscionability.'000 As with
good faith, "the role of unconscionability is better described than
defined."' 0 0' One court explained the doctrine:
[A]s in other areas of equity-related doctrine, conduct which is
"unconscionable" will commonly involve the use of or insistence
upon legal entitlement to take advantage of another's special
vulnerability or misadventure in a way that is unreasonable and
oppressive to an extent that affronts ordinary minimum standards of
fair dealing. 1
002
a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and
tumble world of commerce").
998. Bruce J. Major, Opinion: Two Points, FRANCHISE TIMES, Feb. 2001, at 11.
Major is President of Munchelinos and previously chief development officer for
Sandella's. Id.
999. For a description of the legislation, see Philip F. Zeidman, Just across the
Border, FRANCHISE TIMES, Jan. 2001, at 44.
1000. Pennington's Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 785 F.Supp. 1412, 1415-16 (D.
Mont. 1991).
1001. Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd.,
(2002) 169 A.L.R. 324 (citing Antonoviz v.Wolker (1986) 7 NSWLR 151, 165)
[hereinafter Berbatis].
1002. Id., citing Austl. v. Verwayen, (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394, 441.
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In one episode of the Australian epic Burger King Corp. v. Hungry
Jack's Pty Ltd, a disloyal franchisee employee actually working on
behalf of Burger King tells Burger King to use a "carrot and stick"
approach, the "stick" including "to get tough on sticking to the letter of
the law on existing agreements with legal sanctions to follow."' 00' 3 Given
the range of franchisor discretion in operation of the franchise and
modifications of the franchisees obligations, courts should look to
equitable principles.
Courts and legislatures are wary of equity in the commercial setting,
viewing the doctrines as a slippery slope toward contractual uncertainty.
This is not an unfounded concern. In 1976, an Australian commission
recommended against adopting the US Federal Trade Commission
prohibition of "unfair" conduct because of the uncertainty that would be
introduced onto commercial contracts, and the Australian 1986 Trade
Practices Revision Act prohibited "unconscionability" in consumer
transactions.100 4  Subsequently, a commission on small business
recommended the Act be extended to small business transactions, but the
Franchising Taskforce recommended against the Act's extension to
franchise transactions. 005 In 1991 the Act, while explicitly not extending
the concept, codified the equitable remedy and by 1999 a judge applying
the doctrines of good faith and unconscionability and upholding
termination of a Subaru dealer under the Franchising Code ruled: "I take
as the measure of unconscionability, conduct that might be described as
unfair."'100 6 Making matters more confusing is a Subway case in which
the Canadian court equated unconscionability in franchising with the
standard for undue influence in a donor-donee relationship.
00 7
In analyzing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
English experience is a useful guide. The integration of European
commerce has led English legal scholars to attempt to reconcile the
English common law system with the civil law systems of the continent.
In so doing, English scholarship has looked to the conceptual and
historical roots of the doctrine of good faith and has applied comparative
law analysis. In contrast, American commentary on the doctrine of
contractual good faith has focused on recent case law and avoided
foreign comparative analysis:100 8 American courts generally decline to
1003. Burger King Corp. v. Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd., 1998 Aust Fedct Lexis 602, at
**13-14. Note that this was one of many decisions in the multi-year litigation.
1004. Berbatis, 169 A.L.R. 324.
1005. Id.
1006. Id., citing Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Subaru (Aust) Pry Ltd., 1999
Aust Fedct LEXIS 495, at *24..
1007. Ellis v. Subway Franchise Sys. Of Can., 2000 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 999, at
**13-14.
1008. See, Ronald T. Coleman & Robert T. Joseph, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
venture beyond domestic case law. 100 9 Such a narrow focus fails to
provide a complete picture of franchise law; particularly implied
contractual terms in franchise agreements. Foreign legislatures are
beginning to pass franchising laws in response to the global expansion of
American franchisors; 10'l  global commercial norms will become
increasingly important to U.S. franchisors.
The degree to which good faith should be used to override the
express terms of a contract is a matter that has divided the courts long
before the advent of franchising. At one extreme is the Union Eagle
case, in which a ten-minute delay was held contractual breach sufficient
to warrant substantial forfeiture.'01' While the court frames the issue in
terms of unconscionability, the line between good faith/fair dealing and
unconscionability is a thin one, as evidenced in the court's views on
doing equity.
Quickly dismissing the arguments relating to specific performance,
Lord Hoffman turned his attention to the draconian sanction of forfeiture
due to a 10-minute delay. He observed that some of his peers believed
the court's ability to do equity is "unlimited and unfettered."'
0 1 2
Hoffman noted that such a position is "beguiling heresy": °03
It is worth pausing to notice why it continues to beguile and why it is
a heresy. It has the obvious merit of allowing the court to impose
what it considers to be a fair solution in the individual case. The
principle that equity will restrain the enforcement of legal rights
when it would be unconscionable to insist upon them has an
attractive breadth. But the reasons why the courts have rejected such
generalizations are founded not merely upon authority [citation] but
also upon practical considerations of business ... it is of great
importance that if something happens for which the contract has
made express provision, the parties should know with certainty that
the terms of the contract will be enforced. The existence of an
Dealing: What Standards Apply, in FRANCHISING: THE NEXT GENERATION (1997);
DeWitte Thompson, Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Contract is a Contract is a Tort, in
BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS: IMPLIED TERMS, LIABILITIES, AND DEFENSES IN
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING (2001). Construction contract litigation frequently
involves implied obligations. See Stanley Sklar et al., Implied Duties of Contractors:
Wait a Minute, Where Is That In My Contract, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Summer 2001, at
11.
1009. See generally William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of
Appeals 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 121, 156-57, tbl. 11, 13 (1995) (most citations in
court opinions are of local cases within the few years preceding the decision).
1010. BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE, supra note 673, at 7000, 7300.
1011. Union Eagle Ltd. v. Golden Achievement Ltd., 2 All E.R. 215 (P.C. 1997).
1012. Id., citing Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding, tAll E.R. 90, 104 (P.C. 1973).
1013. Id., citing Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 2
A.C. 694, 700 (P.C. 1983).
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undefined discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on the ground
that this would be "unconscionable" is sufficient to create
uncertainty... its mere existence enables litigation to be employed
as a negotiating tactic. The realities of commercial life are that this
may cause injustice which cannot be fully compensated by the
ultimate decision in the case.
10 14
This begs the question as to why it is important that the parties know
that the contract will be enforced, and whether the inherently uncertain
and unilateral nature of a relational franchise contract leads us to a
different result than Union Eagle. Enforcement of contracts as written
provides economic certainty. In turn, economic growth is fostered which
enriches the community and provides material comfort and social
stability through the expansion of the economic base. It is conceded that
movement towards a more flexible system which views "mom and pop"
franchisees as akin to consumers does increase uncertainty for
franchisors. 1015 Economics does not provide us with an end in itself, but
rather a means to an end; enforcement of contracts is a social good:
[I]nsistence on a good faith requirement in discretionary conduct in
contractual formation, performance, and enforcement is only the
fulfillment of the obligation of the courts to do justice in the
resolution of disputes between contending parties. 1
016
Individual parties seek to maximize individual utility through a
multitude of contractual relationships, and theoretically this will result in
a Pareto-optimal outcome which would be destroyed by judicial
intervention in the contractual obligations of the parties. Pareto-optimal
outcomes are unlikely where one party can alter the terms of the contract
ex post: an economically rational actor focused on maximization of
profit will be unconstrained by the economically rational actions of the
other party. This is the essence of Professor Hadfield's findings and the
rationale underlying Kodak. A response heard by the authors is that the
unfettered discretion and opportunism is known to potential franchisees
when entering into contract; one franchise lawyer noted that he wouldn't
sign his client's onerous contract but if someone else did they would
have to live with the consequences. This is the franchisor corollary to
1014. Id. 218-19 (emphasis added). In closing, Hoffman fires a parting shot at those
who would call the verdict unfair, noting that the seller had had been unable to sell the
property for five years, pending the outcome of the litigation Id. 222.
1015. Similar criticism has been leveled at the Restatement (Third) of Torts. W.
Kennedy Simpson, et al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liability, and
Consumer Law, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J., 625, 650 (2003).
1016. Gateway Realty Ltd. v. Arton Holdings Ltd., [1991] 106 N.S.R.2d 180, 192.
Note that the court took notice of "the unique interdependent nature" of the subject
matter; analogous to a franchise relationship. Id. at 211
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Andrew Selden's "power franchising" and is best described as
"sadomasochistic franchising."
American franchisors should take note that although the classic
English position has been opposed to good faith, the external social
climate has influenced the legislative and judicial climate.'0 17 As Britain
integrates into the European Union, the issue of "fairness" will play a
greater role in contracts-especially consumer contracts1018-a result of
both EU legislation and increased trade with nations whose legal systems
take statutory cognizance of fairness. ° 19  Currently, European
franchisees are presumed to be commercial entities. 10 20 This is in spite of
sale of franchises to individuals with little or no experience: the British
Franchise Exhibition is touted as having "something for everyone no
matter what the interest, previous experience, or budget may be."102 1 The
reality is that many small franchisees are consumers, and Hoffman's
rationale is less persuasive in the consumer context, particularly in
contracts of adhesion. Often the consumer does not read, let alone
understand, the contractual terms, and judicial or arbitral enforcement in
the event of breach is-for the franchisee-cumbersome and not cost-
effective. Moreover, when dealing with franchise agreements, it must be
noted that such contracts are relationship contracts and hence, inherently
uncertain. To the extent that franchisee duties are specific and can be
altered at the sole discretion of the franchisor, 1022 while franchisor duties
are limited, Hoffman's rationale becomes tenuous at best: the franchisee
does not truly know the "terms of the contract."
Interfoto v. Stiletto'0 23 is the clearest exposition of the difference
between the British and the Continental systems, and suggests a possible
solution to some American franchise disputes. Stiletto ordered
transparencies from Interfoto, which Interfoto delivered, along with a
note stating that transparencies not returned by a certain date would be
charged to Stiletto at a rate of £ 5 per day. When Stiletto returned the
transparencies late, Interfoto billed Stiletto. Ultimately, the court
1017. P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1985).
Atiyah was speaking specifically about British popular sentiment, but noted general
applicability to Western societies. Id.
1018. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L095) 29.
1019. See, CODICE CIVIL, art.l175 (Oceana Publishers ed., 1991) ("The debtor and
creditor shall behave according to rules of fairness.").
1020. Case 269/95, Benincasa v. Dentalkit Sri, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3767, 135 para 31
(citations omitted).
1021. Bill Cadger, Venture into Your Business Future, HERALD (Glasgow, Scotland),
June 21, 2001, at 29.
1022. By means of changes in the Operations Manual, selective enforcement of system
standards, franchisor exercise of discretion, etc.




allowed only one-tenth of the damages sought1024 and stated that since
the onerous provision had not been fairly and reasonably brought to the
attention of Stiletto, the provision was not part of the contract and
Interfoto was limited to quantum meruit. The opinion of Justice
Bingham is the more interesting because Bingham goes out of his way to
disclaim any intent to be "fair" to Stiletto, focusing instead on the actions
of Interfoto. In language suggestive of Burger King v. Scheck Bingham
suggests that better drafting (i.e., notice that is more prominent) would
have permitted egregious behavior: "The defendants are not to be
relieved of ... liability because they did not read the condition ... they
are to be relieved because the plaintiffs did not do what was necessary to
draw this unreasonable and extortionate clause to their attention."'
10 25
Bingham is aware that this is not the European view, and his
discussion begins with a comparison of attitudes toward good faith in
general and proceeds to an analysis of the application to onerous contract
terms:
[1]n most legal systems outside the common law world, the law of
obligations recognizes and enforces an overriding principle that in
making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith.
This does not simply mean that they should not deceive each
other.., its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed ... as "playing
fair," "coming clean" or "putting one's cards face upwards on the
table." It is in essence a principle offair and open dealing .... 1026
English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such
overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in
response to demonstrated problems of unfairness .... 1027
[c]ases on sufficiency of notice.., are concerned with a question of
pure contractual analysis, whether one party has done enough to give
the other notice of the incorporation of a term in the contract. At
another level they are concerned.., whether it would in all the
circumstances be fair (or reasonable) to hold a party bound by any
conditions or by a particular condition of an unusual and stringent
nature. 
10 2 8
At very least, the degree to which a condition is burdensome to the
other party should be a consideration in the prominence that condition is
1024. Id. (f 3.50 per transparency per week, instead of £ 5.00 per transparency per
day).
1025. Id. at 356.
1026. Id. at 352.
1027. Id. at 353.
1028. Id. (emphasis added).
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given in the written agreement. The English approach of addressing
unfairness through the application of an appropriate remedy is also one
which provides flexibility lacking under the (American) FTC Franchise
Rule. Finally, Bingham raises an equitable principle that has begun to
find support in recent American research into Behavioral Decision
Theory: targeting prospective franchisees and inducing false
expectations of trust or partnership should be a factor in judicial or
arbitral review.
F. Cognitive Process and The Disclosure Document: Proposalfor
Change
Much of today's legal scholarship is based on legal philosophies
that ignore human nature and human history. Good franchise salesmen
assess the motivations and vulnerabilities of their prospects, and
franchisors base their sales pitches on knowledge of human behavior, not
the rarified legal arguments presented by their counsel. A British
franchise salesman cites Jesus Christ in an effort to get prospective
purchasers to trust them, 10 29 and in the United States the CEO of Mail
Boxes Etc. tells franchisees that franchising's appeal "lies at the heart of
the American Dream"1'0 30 and also states: "I believe that God authors
dreams . . . . From that comes a collective power ... you can see it
throughout the world of franchising." '031  Franchisors may "leave
[morality] at the door," 1032 ask "when do we **** [the franchisee], 1 33
place encroaching stores "every place we ****ing can,"' 10 34 punish
franchisees who terminate adulterous affairs,10 31 "screw every one of
[their franchisees],' 0 36 celebrate in court the supremacy of the
integration clause and franchisors' "shrewd" business tacticsl 037 -but
when it comes to public relations, franchisors speak of God, Jesus, and
the American Dream.
The Chicago School may scoff at behavioral theory, but a number
of attorneys are finding that Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT) can
explain seemingly irrational contractual behavior, and distinguish
1029. ChemDry, supra note 122. The authors have been unable to locate any
contemporary record of Christ's views on the franchise industry.
1030. Franchising Veteran Jim Amos Prepares to Take the International Franchise
Association Helm, FRANCHISING WORLD, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 8, 10.
1031. James H. Amos Jr., IFA & the Power of the Dream, FRANCHISING WORLD, Apr.
2001 at 8.
1032. Behar, supra note 46.
1033. See id.
1034. Behar, supra note 46, at 130.
1035. See Vylene Enterprises, 105 B.R. at 45-46.
1036. Winslow, supra note 9.
1037. See infra Part IV, section f.
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between improper manipulation, fraud, and false advertising. 1038 While
fraud and false advertising have long been recognized by the courts,
improper manipulation can be just as harmful, and should be recognized
by the courts:
Sales techniques are sometimes knowingly designed to create the
impression that a relationship of trust exists, when, of course, it really
doesn't, and that this in turn triggers known biases such as the
cooperation bias, cognitive dissonance and the overconfidence bias,
which collectively cause the decision maker to underestimate risk, to
his or her detriment. Certainly people are responsible for the
decisions they make. But where it can be shown that, because of an
intentional manipulation of the ability to evaluate the circumstances
clearly, the decision maker has made an awful mistake, there is room
for an exception ... especially in the non-regulatory environment.I°39
Adaptive behaviors and societal norms remain integral to human
decision-making long after they have ceased to confer evolutionary
advantage: they remain even when they are a disadvantage, a
phenomenon known as "time-shifted rationality."''0 40  Even in the
Internet Age, trust conveys economic benefits,10 41 and trust was even
more critical to survival for most of human existence. At one time, in the
small settlements and villages where humans first settled, cooperative
behavior favored both individual and community, whose fates were
closely intertwined. 10 42 When a franchisee deals with "the franchisor,"
the franchisee is most often dealing with a local agent of the franchisor
corporation, who may not even be an employee of the corporate entity
but rather a local independent franchisee with the rights to develop a
particular territory. 10 43  Franchisors have spent considerable time and
expense to be seen as part of the local community, and the local agent is
the "face" of the franchisor corporation. The franchisee perceives that
the franchisor is part of the same community, and the evolutionary bias
towards cooperation and integrity affects contractual behavior in a
manner irrational for modem franchising. For millennia, Professor
1038. Paul Bennett Marrow, Behavioral Decision Theory Can Offer New Dimension
To Legal Analysis of Motivations, N.Y. ST. B.J., July-August 2002, at 46-48.
1039. Id. at 48.
1040. Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption
of Order, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2072 (2000). Cf, WILSON, supra note 713, at 106 ("Myth and
self-deception, tribal identity and ritual, more than objective truth, gave ... adaptive
edge.").
1041. Web of trust, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Sept. 21, 2002, at 10 (degree of trust among
citizens of given country accounts for two-thirds of differences in national usage of
Internet; trust is culturally and historically based and influences marketplace behavior).
1042. WILSON, supra note 713, at 183 (kin selection as epigenetic rule).
1043. For example, the Subway sandwich chain franchises in this manner.
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Posner's analysis of contractual behavior was true, and it remains true for
most franchisee behavior. However, in a complex society where parties
to a contract do not have the personal interaction of a pre-modern age,
societal norms are less effective. We have instead moved to an era of
human interaction thru litigation: franchisors do not bother to defend
their ethics but rather state that it is the fault of the franchisees that they
failed to read the fine print of the franchise agreement, UFOC, and
Operations Manual. Form is valued over substance; historically
respected social norms fall by the wayside and lawyers ponder what the
meaning of "is" is. Integrity and cooperation are quaint throwbacks to a
bygone era, and ADR proponents try to persuade clients that mediation is
not a sign of weakness. Even then, franchisors have turned tools of
conciliation into offensive weapons: arbitration as a means of avoiding
the consequences of opportunistic behavior and effecting the bankruptcy
of hapless franchisees.
If one holds a conception of the law as more than merely a branch
of economics, game theory has its limits: this is particularly true where
informational disparities lead to seemingly irrational behavior on the part
of prospective franchisees. Even absent informational disparities,
reputational damage may not affect all segments of the prospective
market for franchisors, and therefore lack prophylactic effect: Professor
Warren Grimes alleges that the Subway franchise may have suffered
reputational damage as part of a calculated strategy to grow short-term
royalties at the expense of long-term reputation. 1 44 If true, the strategy
worked well for the franchisor and poorly for the franchisees. As one
attorney noted of his Subway franchisee clients: "The fact is these
people were in business for just 18 months and they lost their shirts.
10 45
The market failure seen in the franchise sales industry is one which must
be addressed legislatively due to judicial reluctance to apply the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in franchise contracts. The
judicial reluctance has some basis, but legislators should not shy away
from preventing franchisor overreaching for fear of the economic clout
of the franchise industry.
Franchise regulation must take into account the psychology of
franchise sales. Currently, franchising is regulated primarily by means of
pre-contractual disclosure. Few states (Iowa is a notable exception)
regulate the actual franchise relationship, despite the fact that a franchise
relationship is more than the written agreement of two parties. As an
ongoing relationship of mutual benefits and obligations, there is a
1044. LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 258, at § 8.2 and n.45 (citing Marsh, Franchise
Realities, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1992, at Al.)
1045. Dwyer, supra note 70.
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reasonable expectation of contractual solidarity by the franchisee. It is
an expectation explicitly encouraged by the franchisor from the outset of
the relationship: the franchisee is in business "for yourself, but not by
yourself." The franchisor projects a pre-sale image of atomistic
entrepreneurship, but the post-sale reality is at best a benign dictatorship:
franchisees are no more "partners" than the "partners" who make your
espresso at Starbucks each morning.
The "partnership" misrepresentation by the franchisors is highly
effective and greatly complicates any attempt at statutory regulation of
the relationship. This is particularly true when the regulation consists of
pre-contractual statutes affecting only the "courtship" phase and not the
post-contractual "partnership." If the franchisee believes that the
"partner" is true and faithful, the franchisee will overlook flaws obvious
to the impartial observer. A 7-Eleven franchisee of 14 years explained:
The pre-sale process is a "honeymoon" period when the franchisor is
simply wooing a prospective bank account and the potential
Franchisee is hoping against hope that her or she will be "qualified"
or "accepted" to become part of the franchise system. When you are
on the threshold of living the American dream of owning your own
business, and the party with greater power holds the keys that unlock
that door, all you want is to be "accepted." Generally, you don't ask
the hard questions because you don't want to be perceived as a
"problem" before you even get the keys. 10 46
A frequent flaw is the difference between what the franchisor says and
what the franchisor puts in writing:
The only protection that a franchisee could have in those
circumstances would be to require that the standard form contract be
amended to reflect the representations prior to signing it. However,
this hypothesis ignores general business practicalities. Firstly, it
assumes a relative strength of bargaining position between franchisor
and franchisee which is not usual. Secondly, it ignores the natural
conclusion of the franchisor that this perspective [sic] franchisee is a
"troublemaker" and should therefore be avoided in the first place or if
taken on, should receive "special attention" and be a prime candidate
for replacement by someone more malleable.1
047
The 7-Eleven franchisee identifies a key reason why even the
additional disclosures proposed by the FTC (and opposed by franchisors)
would be insufficient to prevent post-contractual abuse at the hands of
1046. Letter from Teresa Maloney, National Coalition of Associations of 7-Eleven
Franchisees, to Secretary, Federal Trade Commission. (April 27, 1997) available at
http://www.ftc.govv/bcp/franchise/comments/final38.htm (last visited March 2003).
1047. Head v. Inter Tan Canada Ltd., 1991 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 513, at *45.
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franchisors. Most people do not enter into a "partnership" assuming the
worst. Just as a prospective bride or groom might balk if their betrothed
proposed an airtight prenuptial contract, so too might a franchisor have
legitimate concerns about a prospect who was focusing on the "hard
questions" since it is indicative of a "problem" franchisee. This is not
unique to franchising, but is a commonsense concern of any party
contemplating a relational contract. This author worked in the retail
sector on Wall Street. When a new client opens an account it is common
practice to verify with a compliance data service whether the client has
had any "problems" in the past. Many times there is an innocent
explanation of any "problem," but there are stockbrokers and brokerage
firms that will not do business with such a client and the client will not
be told the reason. Faced with a prospect that focuses on the minutiae of
a UFOC, a franchisor may wisely decide not to do business with the
prospect. The franchise agreement is a long-term relational contract
whose success depends on ambiguity and discretionary latitude sufficient
to respond to a changing market. In short, it is based on trust. Relational
contracts bear a remarkable similarity to social relationships, and the
response of the 7-Eleven franchisee would not surprise a sociologist:
Trust implies expectations that have an open-ended character. When
we trust a friend, we do not have a list of all the things she is
supposed to do; we trust her to do what is fitting and appropriate to
the circumstances and to our relationship, as situations change and
needs arise . . . . There are no guarantees, and it would be an
indication of lack of trust to look for them.'
0 48
The cooperative qualities that serve a franchisee well in daily life are the
opposite of the adversarial qualities that would keep them from buying a
pig-in-the-poke10 49  UFOC, something frequently overlooked by
franchise attorneys analyzing franchisee behavior expost.
The potemkin village of the franchisor does not need streets paved
with gold; the truly successful franchisor taps a deeper-non-monetary-
desire. As Professor Macneil noted: "organic solidarity is pinned on
psychology-not on sociology, economics, law, politics, or force, but
psychology."'' 50 Franchisors hold out the illusion of organic solidarity
1048. TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 4 (1997).
1049. The expression is as old as Chaucer (1386), and refers to not looking in the
"poke" (sack) before buying the pig; buying something of unknown value. Given that
most franchisors will not put earnings claims in writing, (UFOC Item 19) and reserve
significant and unilateral discretionary power post-contract, most franchisees have no
way of determining the true value of the franchise ex ante. See generally Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE
1124-30 (1974).
1050. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
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only to deliver the reality of an integration clause in a contract of
adhesion, and contracts of adhesion are pinned on law, politics, and
force.
Franchisors would maintain that society is comprised of
sophisticated and economically rational actors, but this is not true for
individuals, 1051 groups of individuals such as juries,'°52 or
corporations. 10 53 To the extent that franchisors target less-sophisticated
prospects, economically irrational behavior by prospects may be
greater; 1054 sunk costs such as found in franchising are one factor
skewing rational decision making. 10 55 Franchise agreements entered into
by such prospects is particularly susceptible to constraints of bounded
rationality. 10 56  If economic decision making is often irrational,
"dogmatic antipaternalism" exhibited by franchise regulators and courts
may be unwise. 1° 57  This is not to deny any influence of economic
reasoning, but rather to point out that there is at least as much emotion as
economics in the franchise purchase. Even if prospective franchisees
were economically sophisticated actors, risk assessment involves
assigning probability and magnitude values to the universe of potential
outcomes.10 58 Assignment of probability values based on turnover ratio
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 92 (1980).
1051. Jack Lucentini, A Game of Cash And Carry and a Grudge, NEWSDAY, July 9,
2002, at DI (experiment showing roles of envy and fairness resulting in economically
detrimental decision-making); Roger Lowenstein, Exuberance Is Rational, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Feb. 11, 2001, at 68 (findings of economist Richard Thaler). See also Eyal Zamir,
The inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation & Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 1710, 1793-95 (limited human cognitive capacity). See also discussion of
"bounded rationality," infra note 1056.
1052. W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547,
586 (2000) (mock jury response to cost-benefit analysis performed by defendant is
increased likelihood of punitive award to plaintiff).
1053. Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597, 625
(1989) ("Winner's Curse").
1054. WILSON, supra note 713, at 226-227 (inborn heuristics more influential among
less educated). Cf, Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2001, at C2
(actual discount rate 7% for Pentagon buyout plan. Servicemembers average valuation
exceeded 25%, highest among: enlisted, less educated, young, and minorities ).
1055. Roger Lowenstein, Exuberance Is Rational, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11, 2001, at
68, 70.
1056. Bounded rationality is the concept that finite capacity to process information
limits applicability of theory of the economically rational actor. See JOHN BLACK,
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 36-7 (1997). See also generally, Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211
(1995).
1057. Cf, Roger Lowenstein, Exuberance Is Rational, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11,
2001, at 68, 70 (Cass Sunstein observation on implications of Richard Thaler's findings
on privatization of Social Security).
1058. Cf William K. Lescher, Missile Defense Is for the Real World, in U.S. Naval
Institute, Proceedings, July 2001, at 50 (noting that further analysis necessary in cases
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will lead to an underassessment of risk by the prospective franchisee:
sunk costs and the difficulties-practical and psychological-of
addressing failure and returning to the traditional workforce lead to
franchisees remaining in marginal franchises. This leads to lower
turnover than in an analogous environment in the traditional workplace
that is the frame of reference for prospective franchisees contemplating
the move from employee to franchisee.
The regional agent of a major franchisor once told the authors that
franchisees complained to franchisor headquarters that the regional agent
ignored the franchisees and did not support the franchisees after the
franchise was opened for business. Leaving aside the merits of the
regional agent's complaint, the attitude of both parties involved
illustrates the nature of the difficulty in finding a legislative or judicial
solution. The franchise relationship is not a discrete transaction in an
efficient market; rather, it is an ongoing relationship commenced under
conditions of informational and economic disparity between the parties
and continued under conditions of economic and psychological
dependence by the franchisee upon the franchisor. The disparities are
exacerbated by a legal paradigm favoring clever drafting and onerous
venue and forum provisions disadvantageous to the weaker contracting
party. To the extent that the psychological aspect of the franchise sales
process is dealt with in the legislative and judicial processes, 0 59 any
solution will have to be sufficiently dramatic as to overcome the
cognitive dissonance 10 60 of prospective franchisees.
G. Red Hand of Disclosure
Data volume is not as important as the manner of data presentation,
and the disclosure process-not simply the UFOC-needs to reflect that
common-sense reality. Starting with the UFOC itself, conditions that are
where probability is low but magnitude high). The significance for franchisees is that
assuming, arguendo, franchisor statistics of probability, it is virtually impossible to assess
magnitude of loss less than total investment; therefore making it impossible to assess
expected monetary value of decision to purchase franchise. Further, the franchisee may
lose more than the cash investment if loans are collateralized, if the franchisor seeks
present value of projected royalties under the term of the original franchise agreement, or
if the franchisee dips into a trust fund or other tax accounts for operating expenses.
1059. This paper does not advocate application of psychological principles to override
statutes or case law. There are both moral and economic bases for bringing a balance to
the franchise relationship, and an understanding of the motivation for and psychology of
selling is a tool to draft legislation that would promote an efficient market in franchise
sales. Inquiry into the morals--or lack thereof-possessed by franchisors is not a
precondition to advocacy of such legislation. However, to the extent that the resultant
legislation embodies and shapes moral values, this would appear to be more in accord
with the general public's conception of the law than Justice Holmes' "bad man" theory.
1060. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962).
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onerous or unusual should be highlighted in a manner sufficient to
appraise the prospect that the conditions warrant attention. The degree to
which the condition needs to be highlighted would depend on the
circumstances, as one court explained:
[t]he more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must
be given of it. Some clauses which I have seen would need to be
printed in red ink on the face of the document with a red hand
pointing to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient.
10 61
Since franchise agreements are contracts of adhesion, it is not
unreasonable to require the franchisor to disclose on the front cover and
in large type pertinent data. Prominently printed in red should be a
notice' °62 to the franchisee of onerous terms, including an explanation of
the rights waived by the arbitration clause,' 0 63 the cost of arbitrating in a
distant forum, and the subjective nature of franchisor actions (such as
compliance reviews and site selection) which can effectively bankrupt
the franchisee. Any requirement must be by Congressional legislation:
when Montana required that the arbitration clause be "typed in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract ' 64 the U.S.
Supreme Court said this was invalid as preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act.' 
065
Current FTC regulations'0 66 require a cover sheet with an FTC
1061. J. Spurling, Ltd. v. Bradshaw, 2 All E.R. 121, 125 (P.C. 1956).
1062. In the securities industry, "red herring" refers to the offering circular for a new
issue of stock to the public. The circular is submitted for comment and revision to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Washington, D.C. After the SEC reviews
the circular, the circular requires revisions-often, several series of revisions-before it
can be shown to the public. The circular is also available at SEC reading rooms around
the country and on the Internet. In addition, most states have "blue sky" laws, which
make further demands on the securities issuer before money is taken from any resident of
the state. In short, an individual investing $100 in a stock is afforded more governmental
oversight and informational transparency than an individual investing $100,000 in a
franchise. The prophylactic effect of SEC "post-sale" enforcement is in marked contrast
to the Federal Trade Commission post-sale franchise regulation, which encourages
opportunistic franchisor behavior.
1063. Cf, Milnes v. Salomon, Smith Barney, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 22, 2002 at 29 (The
account application stated that the applicant had received notice of arbitration clause:
"clause itself.., buried in the fine print on page 3 of the Client Agreement." However,
there was no proof that the agreement was received, "or that it was called to [the
applicant's] attention and explained ... so that there was a meeting of the minds.").
1064. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).
1065. Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). But see Brinson v.
Martin, 469 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. App. Ct. 1996) (upholding forum selection clause in part
because of the prominence and typeface of the provision).
1066. Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (2000). FTC
Rules and Advisory Opinions are generally available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/menu-
fran.htm.
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disclaimer in 12-point boldface type.I°67 However, the substance of the
disclaimer is that the FTC does not know if any of the information in the
UFOC is correct and that the prospect should read the contract.
Although American courts may be reluctant to draw distinctions between
bargained-for contracts and contracts of adhesion, not all legal systems
agree. In 1942, Italy was the first European nation' °68 to recognize that
the contratto d'adesione was different, and Codice Civil Article 1341
provides that the terms are only effective if the other party knew or
should have known of the terms, using ordinary diligence. Even with
that protection, commentators have urged that 1341 be strengthened,
with judges reviewing all adhesive provisions and rejecting those
provisions that were not "fair and reasonable."' 
0 69
Franchise agreements should impose an ongoing duty of disclosure
with respect to changes which would affect franchisees under "agree to
agree" clauses. If franchisor organizations such as the IFA and
regulators such as the FTC truly believe in a disclosure regime, they
should not oppose a letter going out each time such a modification is first
introduced into new franchise agreements. For example, if a franchisor
is going to raise advertising fees by 1% in a franchise where net profits
average 3% to 5%, this is information which the franchisees should know
immediately. Current franchisees should be given notice of this fact not
later than the issuance of the first franchise agreement in which the
clause appears, together with a franchisor estimate as to when the
increase will take effect, or sufficient sales and turnover data to allow the
franchisee to estimate the effective date of increase.
The small businessman is a fixture of American folklore and
history. Benjamin Franklin owned a printing press and said that the
promise of America was that anyone could succeed through initiative, 070
and the man whose name became synonymous with the entrepreneurial
spirit-Horatio Alger-sold a staggering 20 million-plus books between
1868 and his death in 1899.07T IFA founder Rosenberg proclaimed:
"Franchising supports the great American dream of allowing multitudes
1067. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(21) (2004).
1068. Paolisa Nebbia, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: An Anglo-Italian
Comparison, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 179, 182 (Mark van
Hoecke & Frangois Ost eds., 2000).
1069. GIOVANNI CRISCUOLI & DAVID PUGSLEY, ITALIAN LAW OF CONTRACT 32-33
(1991).
1070. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND
SELECTIONS FROM His OTHER WRITINGS 222 (Modem Library ed., 1944).
1071. The first and most famous being HORATIO ALGER, RAGGED DICK; OR, STREET
LIFE IN NEW YORK WITH THE BOOTBLACKS (Library Resources, Library of American
Civilization 1970) (1868). See generally GARY SCHARNHORST WITH JACK BALES, THE
LOST LIFE OF HORATIO ALGER, JR. (1985).
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to own and succeed in their own businesses."' 10 7 2  Former Kentucky
Governor John Y. Brown, who bought franchisor Kentucky Fried
Chicken from Colonel Sanders, proclaims: "Franchising is more risky
today, but it's still the great American dream."'10 73 Franchisor advertising
taps this powerful myth, as does the popular press. The New York State
Attorney General's Office perpetuates the imagery:
It's one of the most successful business techniques for people who
want to get into [sic] the American dream. Franchising gives them
the ability to do that. In New York State, we have so many people
who are energetic, want to get involved in a legitimate business, and
a legitimate franchise is a fabulous opportunity for those people and
for the state as a whole.
10 74
Particularly in the case of immigrant franchisees, appeals to mythic
images of the American dream may be more persuasive than a thick
UFOC. The result is a franchisee perception of the environment at
variance with reality. When reality intrudes in the form of a lengthy
disclosure document in small typeface and legal language, dissonance
produces a tension, which the prospective franchisee seeks to lessen.
Litigation and Sourcing Requirements are the two most obvious
examples of this phenomenon. For example, the Subway sandwich chain
was involved in a rash of litigation during the 1980s and '90s. Not all
litigation need be disclosed in the UFOC, but the litigation that is
disclosed in a recent Subway UFOC runs for 148 paragraphs (some
paragraphs citing multiple cases), plus four state government actions.
The list runs 28 densely packed pages, and only includes cases where the
franchisor was a defendant.
Even less likely to be noticed by an unsophisticated purchaser is a
requirement for sole-sourcing, particularly where the requirement is not
currently in effect but is reserved to the discretion of the franchisor.
Sole-source vendors imposed by franchisors mean that franchisees are at
the mercy of the franchisorl°75: Queen City Pizza Inc. v. Domino's Pizza
Inc.10 7 6 alleged that franchisees were forced to pay 40% over market
price for the pizza dough essential to operating a pizza franchise. A
1072. Dunkin' Donuts, IFA Pioneer Rosenberg Leaves Legacy of Passion and
Innovation, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Oct. 7, 2002, at 23, 54.
1073. Bullish on Franchising, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 1, 2002, at 44.
1074. Kaufmann, supra note 22 (quoting Eric Dinallo of the New York State Attorney
General's Office).
1075. See generally, Symposium, The Law of Vertical Restraints in Franchise Cases &
Summary Adjudication: Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak,
Applying Post-Contract Hold-Up Analysis, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283 (1999) (debate
between Warren Grimes and Benjamin Klein).
1076. 124 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 1997).
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more cooperative approach was taken by the Subway franchisor in the
1990s, when it established an independent purchasing cooperative, which
in the first five years of operation saved $107 million for franchisees.
10 77
Franchisors have a legal "duty to make sure that the good or service
really is of consistent quality"'' 0 78 in order to keep the rights to their
mark, but the 20,000 unit Subway chain has found a way to manage this
in a manner which ensures the maximum benefit to its franchisees.
H. FTC Disclosure. Shield for Franchisors
The existing disclosure document is not only inadequate, it is
counterproductive to the ostensible goal of disclosure. The UFOC and
all other documents provided to the prospective franchisee need to be
viewed in the light of an unsophisticated consumer entering into a
contract of adhesion under conditions of huge informational and
bargaining disparities.
Information disclosure may be used in perverse ways. First, by
means of "information overload" 0 79-the likelihood of a legal document
being read in its entirety by a franchisee is inversely proportional to the
length and complexity of the document: Imagine War and Peace written
by a lawyer, and one gets a sense of what a UFOC is like.
10 80
Additionally, the volume of information may be used to "bury"
damaging information, which would stand out in a shorter document.
Prominence of a clause is not generally an issue in determining validity:
small typeface occupying 5/16 of an inch can constitute a waiver of
statutory rights.1° 81  Lengthy offering circulars which go unread by
franchisees relying on franchisor verbal representations can actually be
used to shield fraudulent actions by franchisors: "a party cannot
reasonably rely upon allegedly fraudulent promises which are directly
1077. C. Dickinson Waters, IPC Looks to Instill for Supply Chain Insight, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at 27.
1078. Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th
Cir. 1989).
1079. See, MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 211-212 (2000)
(selective attention and performance degradation resulting from input overload). Cf.,
Dale Hattis & Sue Swedis, Uses of Biomarkers for Genetic Susceptibility and Exposure
in the Regulatory Context, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 193-194 (2001) (costs of information
disclosure and information overload: "warnings will be disregarded because it is too
taxing for individuals to sift through it all").
1080. One attorney noted that the Arthur Wishart Act regulating franchise sales in
Ontario "does require that the disclosure statement be accurate, clear and concise, which
would indicate that many U.S. disclosure documents should not be used in Ontario."
Edward N. Levitt, How the Ontario Law Will Affect U.S. Franchisors, FRANCHISE TIMES,
Feb. 2001, at 42.
1081. EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, 814 n.l (1999) (King, J., dissenting),
rev'd on other jrounds, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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contradicted by the terms of ... a subsequently executed contract."
'10 82
A third way in which disclosure may have unintended consequences
is due to the manner of disclosure itself. Advertising is explicitly
designed to accentuate the positive, and consumers would be expected to
discount puffery accordingly. Even with regard to corporate
communications directed toward investors, courts have held that claims
may "be mere 'puffing' or sales talk upon which no reasonable person
could rely."'10 83 What is unique about the UFOC is that it is a large,
formal legal document which many prospective franchisees erroneously
assume is the end product of a process of governmental review: the




As Required By The
Federal Trade Commission'
0 84
Of course, if one reads the FTC statement inside, it does say: "We
haven't checked it, and we don't know if it's correct. . .. If you find
anything wrong or anything important that's been left out, you should let
us know about it.' 0 85 As noted during the 1999 Congressional hearings,
the FTC is a toothless watchdog. In fairness to the FTC, the required
FTC statement indicates that the FTC does not even bother to check the
UFOC; and "The FTC does not require filings of franchise and business
opportunity disclosure statements or offering circulars."'
0 86
Nevertheless, even a reasonably sophisticated reader might be puzzled by
the incongruity of the formal presentation versus the disinterested
ministerial tenor of a government regulator.
It is a legitimate debate as to whether the government should
regulate franchising at all. But when one is given an impressive
document "As Required by the Federal Trade Commission" given "To
protect you' 1 87 and given assertions by the franchisor that the franchisor
can't do certain things (such as make earnings claims) because the
government prohibits the franchisor from doing certain things-
1082. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 829 (D. Minn. 1989) (citing cases).
1083. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217 n.32 (1st Cir. 1996).
1084. Doctor's Associates Inc., FRANCHISE OFFERING CIRCULAR (lst ed. 2000).
1085. Id., first page (unnumbered).
1086. Federal Trade Commission, Franchise & Business Opportunity FAQs, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/faq l.htm.
1087. See also Susan P. Kezios, "To Protect You. "-The Franchisee View of
Pending Legislation, FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT, Oct. 2000, at 3.
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franchisors and the FTC are being disingenuous if they believe the
prospective franchisee is aware of the FTC's impotence. Moreover, it
may be true-as one FTC official asserted to this author-that the
mandate of the agency effectively ties the agency's hands (at best a
debatable assertion in light of Section 5). However, the FTC is hardly
clamoring for a broader mandate, 10 8 raising concerns as to whether the
agency's acquiescence is indicative of regulatory capture.'
0 89
I. Electronic Disclosure
Recent legislation will have significant consequences for the current
franchise disclosure regime. 0 90 The late 1990s were a heady time when
the "new economy" 10 91 (composed of "e," "i," "b2b," and "b2c"
businesses operating in "real time") created a need for a "new paradigm"
where "surfing" the "information superhighway" would carry the
"virtual" nation across the "bridge to the twenty-first century." Once the
hype and techno-babble died down, it turned out that the fundamentals of
business and human nature were unchanged. Ill-considered federal and
state laws enacted to encourage the growth of electronic transactions,
including franchise purchase transactions, are the statutory hangover of
the 1990's e-euphoria. 1
092
1088. On the contrary, the FTC told the GAO that it did not see the need to even
investigate relationship issues. See GAO 2001 Report, supra note 217, at 23. And, of
course, there is Mr. Toporoff's reluctance to harm franchisor sales. See supra note 891.
1089. A counter-argument might be that agencies simply do as directed by Congress,
but the reality is that Congress does listen to concerns of regulators, whose agencies do
lobby for expanded mandates and expanded budgets.
1090. See generally David W. Koch & Alan H. Silberman, Online Disclosure and
Contracting, in GATEWAY To THE FUTURE OF FRANCHISING, W- 11 (2001). See also
Devin Klein & David Koch, The Electronic Franchise Agreement [Became] Reality
October 1, in FRANCHISNG WORLD, Sept. 2000, at 21. A significant issue is the erosion
of privacy in the electronic age: franchisors soliciting EU residents are bound by privacy
statutes even if data stored in the US. See http://www.export.govv/safeharbor. Many US
franchisors operate in Canada, governed by similar Canadian law. See
http://www.privcom.gc.ca.
1091. A recent government conference discussed b2b-the most recent trend. See
Federal Trade Commission, Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World
of B2B Electronic Marketplaces (Oct. 26, 2000) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/1 0/b2b/report.pdf (report of June 29-30, 2000 conference).
1092. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 106-462 (1999) (discussing birth of information
society); H.R. REP. No. 106-341 (1999) (dollar volume of e-commerce); S.REP. No. 106-
131 (1999) (projections of growth in online transactions). The bubble burst the following
year. See Internet Shakeout Quickens During 'Brutal' First Half, WALL ST. J., July 5,
2001, at B7 (over 550 dot coms shut down in previous year and a half); Molly Williams,
Little Gain, Less Venturing: Company Investments Slow, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at C1
(write-downs of Internet portfolios, and noting that Wells Fargo alone took $1.13 billion
charge primarily due to such investments). See also, Toni Scott Reed, Bond Claims and
the Impact of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, the Uniform Computer
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Some law borders on the bizarre: computers can form binding
contracts without human knowledge or assent. 10 93 Documents affecting
interstate commerce, including most franchise agreements, 10 94 are
covered by the federal "E-Sign" act: 1095 Human beings wishing to "sign"
a contract may do so in any manner ranging from clicking on "I Agree"
to belching into their computer's microphone-the only question for the
court being whether the click/belch indicates the clickor's/belchor's
intent to be bound. 10 96 European Union states have implemented similar
legislation. 1097 What is not addressed by the new legislation is the effect
that electronic data will have on the disclosure process. Anyone who has
ever read a newspaper online realizes that it is a different experience
from reading one in paper format. It is questionable whether a
prospective franchisee would actually read an online UFOC, or whether
the franchisee would have any eyesight left if he or she did read several
hundred pages. It is equally questionable that shifting the burden of
printing the UFOC to the prospective franchisee would improve
disclosure over the prior requirement that the franchisor give a printed
copy of the UFOC to prospects. An additional problem arising in a 20-
year contract may be that electronic data becomes inaccessible. 1
098
E-Sign will have a broad impact on the traditional solemnity
associated with contract. 1099 Although the original purpose of the Statute
of Frauds (1677) was evidentiary,1100 the cautionary function of the
Information Transactions Act, and Other Technological Developments, 36 TORT & INS.
L. J. 735 (2001) This offers an overview of federal and state legislation. Note that
Appendix A, at 773-776, offers a summary of state law. Id.
1093. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 14 (1999) ("A contract may be formed by
the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or
reviewed the electronic agents' actions or the resulting terms and agreements."). Id.
Hereafter the act shall be referred to as "UETA."
1094. Kristine McKenzie, New Law Paves Way for Electronic Franchise Agreement,
FRANCHISE TIMES, Jan. 2001, at 39.
1095. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
229 (2000), codifiedat 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2000).
1096. See UETA, supra note 1093, at § 2, comment 7.
1097. Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 on a
Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, (December 1999), available at
www.netlaw.pl/e-podpis/esign-directive1999-en.html (last visited March 2003).
1098. New York State Bar Association, Does Discovery of Electronic Information
Require Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, N.Y. LITIGATOR, Summer
2001, at 20, 21 (computer museums consulted for obsolete software & hardware to
convert "Legacy data" to usable form). Issues also arise under Rule 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (form in which documents produced) (see Williams v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982)). Who bears the cost of production takes on a
new urgency when applied to legacy data (data stored in obsolete form) and metadata
(embedded data not readily apparent to one party viewing the data).
1099. Patrick A. Randolph Jr., Has E-Sign Murdered the Statute of Frauds, PROB. &
PROP., July-August 2001, at 23-27.
1100. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.1 (3d ed. 1999).
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statute is both beneficial to the parties and in the societal interest insofar
as it minimizes litigation arising from misunderstanding or hasty
decision-making. From the perspective of cognitive linguistics, a
persuasive argument can be made for ceremony and solemnity.' 1 Even
if one accepts the dubious proposition that electronic "signatures" are
less likely to be forged than physical signatures, 1 02 there is a
psychological impact from physically signing a contract and obtaining
the seal ll0 3 of the notary public. This psychological impact is not present
in electronic transactions: people behave differently when dealing
electronically.' 14 The instantaneous nature of electronic
communications has led to foolish behavior and legally damaging
consequences. Microsoft Corporation, epitome of the "new economy," is
a case in point with negative consequences in antitrust 0 5 and
employment discrimination'' 0 6 cases. Such flippancy can be seen in the
use of passwords and electronic signatures: when President Clinton
signed E-Sign into law, he did so using the electronic signature
"Buddy"-the name of his dog.
1107
The effect of E-Sign and its progeny will be to eliminate much of
the cautionary effect of traditional written communications, personal
signatures, and notarization of contracts. Hence, pre-contractual
oversight becomes increasingly important if prospective franchisees are
to be protected against abusive franchisors. Franchisors favor electronic
disclosure, but oppose "pre-consent" of the franchisee to receive such
disclosure, and McDonald's opposes a requirement that the franchisor
provide a mere 3-page paper summary.' 8 This is precisely the type of
issue in which regulators can distinguish between sophisticated and
unsophisticated franchise purchasers and impose differing requirements.
1101. The late Senator S. 1. Hayakawa discussed the origins, components, and modem
application of this concept. See LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 68-71(1990). On
decision making and signing ceremony as ritual activity, see JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER
ON DECISION MAKING (1994).
1102. Testimony of W. Hardy Callcott, Charles Schwab's General Counsel, H.R. REP.
No. 106-341, at Part 1 (1999); accord, Rebecca Porter, Do Electronic Signatures Mean
an End to the Dotted Line, TRIAL, Sept. 2003, at 52, 54-55 (ABA Science & Technology
Section claim of digital signature supremacy).
1103. Although state law may still require a notary, federal law provides that may be a
"virtual" notary in the ether of cyberspace. See 15 U.S.C. § 700 1(g) (2004).
1104. John Schwartz, Loose Lips Sink More Than Ships, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001, at 4
(examples of e-mail gaffes and why psychology differs from composition of written
letters or memos).
1105. Jerry Adler, When E-Mail Bites Back, NEWSWEEK., Nov. 23, 1998, at 45.
1106. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 856 F. Supp. 821, 825-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (sexually
explicit e-mail by Microsoft employee).
1107. Bill Zoellick, Wide Use of Electronic Signatures Awaits Market Decisions About
Their Risks & Benefits, N.Y.S.B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 10, 11.
1108. See Stachowiak letters, supra note 10.
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The FTC does not provide copies of UFOCs to researchers or
prospective franchisees. "0 9 One positive aspect of the Internet is that it
would be possible for franchisors to file their UFOCs in electronic
format (such as Adobe Acrobat) on the Internet in order that media and
academic analysis could be done, as well as enable the prospective
franchisee to compare franchises from across the nation, including some
which the prospect may not have previously considered. However,
franchisors are not likely to provide such informational access without
regulatory mandate, and neither the NASAA nor the FTC has expressed
a desire to impose a requirement.
VII. Conclusion
As this paper has shown, there is a history of franchisor abuse
transcending temporal and spatial boundaries. Franchisor acceptance of
the principles of good faith and fair dealing would go a long way to
creating a more harmonious and profitable relationship based on trust; as
a news article noted, the "invisible hand works because of the invisible
handshake."' 110  The franchise industry understandably opposes
regulation, and from an economic standpoint it would be more desirable
to have mutual cooperation rather than legislation and private rights of
action. A franchise chain in discord can be expensive for franchisor as
well as franchisee."" But the history of the franchise industry has been
one of cleaning up its act only when confronted with the risk of
legislative action. This accounts for the kinder, gentler, face of
franchisors recently.' 11 2 Significant revisions have been proposed'1 13 to
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) franchise disclosure
regulations.' 114 Any regulatory regime must confront the issue of moral
hazard. Too much regulation of franchisors would lead to franchisees
not assessing and managing risk: paternalism creates perverse
incentives.' 1 1 5 However, failure to regulate franchisors creates problems
1109. Federal Trade Commission. Franchise & Business Opportunity FAQs, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/faq1.htm.
1110. David Wessel, Invisible Hand Works Because of Invisible Handshake, WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2002, at A2.
1111. E.g., Shoney's Gets Debt Benefit in 2000; Capt. D's Comps Up, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Feb. 12, 2001, at 12 (Shoney's fiscal year 1999 litigation costs $14.5
million, contributing to Shoney's net loss of $28.83 million).
1112. Pundits Predict the Legal Trends, FRANCHISE TIMEs, Feb. 2003, at 28 (franchisor
attorney Jeffrey Letwin stating franchisors and franchisees more willing to address issues
in order to solve problems amicably and avoid national legislation).
1113. Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,294 (proposed Oct. 22, 1999). See also Public
Comments, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/comments/tabcomm.htm.
1114. FTC Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2000).
1115. As already discussed, franchisors are often paternalistic in the pre-contract phase
precisely to overcome franchisee concerns and sales resistance.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
as well: failure of the government to recognize the abusive conduct of
franchisors leads to a climate where franchisors are granted carte
blanche, limited only by the most permissive state forum which the
franchisor can justify in a choice-of-law clause. Even then, franchisor
abuse will not even be at issue in a judicial forum unless the franchisee
has the time and financial resources to bring the matter to light. Failure
to regulate franchisors in an economy which permits franchisors to
socialize the consequences of opportunism while benefiting from
government tax incentives and government promotion of franchisors
seeking to expand overseas also raises moral hazard issues, not to
mention the hypocrisy of franchisors feeding at the public trough while
championing the virtues of self-sufficiency.
Franchising has always been subjected to the threat of regulation
and litigation. 11 6 Most recently, the IFA adopted a franchisee-friendly
image in response to the growing threat of federal legislation, even
instituting an ombudsman program and inviting franchisees to participate
as members. Franchisors have always pressed the limits of the law,
seeking to exploit franchisee's sunk costs-tangible and intangible-in
the franchise.' 117 The earliest industry to adopt franchising as a
distribution model was the automobile industry. Inventor Henry Ford
established distributorships,11 8 and when he had a falling-out with some
of his original investors,1 119 two of them-the Dodge brothers-founded
a competing auto company modeled after Ford. It was not long before
Dodge Bros. litigated with an Atlanta franchisee'1 20 in one of the earliest
examples of abuse under a franchisor-friendly contract that rendered the
franchisee's investment "somewhat precarious."
1 21
Franchisor abuse continued apace in the auto industry, and by 1956,
1116. The earliest franchisor was Cyrus McCormick (McCormick reaper), and the first
franchising case was probably Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1853). Of historical
note is the Court's disapproval of the jury's "enormous and ruinous verdict"-it appears
that excessive awards are not a recent phenomenon. Id. at 491.
1117. A McDonald's franchisee of 41/2 years was required to buy-out his equipment at
a value determined by the contract formula as $590,668, despite that McDonald's
assessment of the market value was $315,000. When the franchisee failed to buy-out, the
franchisee was left with nothing to show for 4V2 years of work and McDonald's sold to a
new franchisee for $315,000. McDonald's Corp. v. Barnes, No. 92-36552, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23513, at *5 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 1993). The case illustrates one franchisor's
assessment of the hold-up value of a franchisee's sunk costs.
1118. David Gumick & Steve Vieux, Case History of the American Business
Franchise, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 37,45 (1999).
1119. Dodgev. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
1120. Ellis v. Dodge Bros., 246 F. 764 (5th Cir. 1917).
1121. Id. at 767. The lopsided contract is a precursor of the modem Franchise
Agreement. Of note are franchisee claims of detrimental reliance and sunk costs. Also at
issue was dealer termination that was arguably "unfair" even if permitted under the
written agreement-identical to claims by franchisees today.
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Congress was proposing legislation1122 to "balance the power now
heavily weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers"'1 123 that failed
"to act in good faith in complying with the terms of franchises or in
terminating or not renewing franchises with their dealers."' 124  The
legislative history makes findings virtually identical to many of the
complaints voiced by franchisees today: when the president of the
American Franchisee Association speaks of franchisor opposition to
legislation in the year 2000 as being "the same old tired explanation,"
' 112s
she draws on a long history of franchisor opposition. The auto dealer
legislation passed, and remains on the books today,"1 26 commonly known
as the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act (ADDCA). Early
challenges to the legislation address many of the issues raised by
opponents of SBFA, and are an indication of the precedent available to
courts ruling under a future version of SBFA.
Unfortunately, most franchisees remain in a "somewhat precarious"
state. A franchisee who falls into disfavor with his franchisor will find
the law to favor the wealthy franchisor. One favorite tactic is to place
competing outlets within close proximity of the targeted franchisee
(encroachment) in order to bankrupt the franchisee or at least force the
franchisee to sell his business. Allied Domecq was alleged to have
pursued such a tactic in Harford Donuts, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc.'
127
In granting the franchisor's motion for summary judgment, the court
took note of Dunkin's violation of its own Encroachment Impact Policy,
but found that "even if Dunkin' was obligated to operate in accordance
with the Policy, it confers no rights or obligations on the parties."
'1 128
With respect to the allegation that Dunkin' deliberately tried to force the
franchisee out of his business, the court responded:
Even accepting [the] allegations as true, [franchisees] still cannot
recover. Although Dunkin' may have engaged in some shrewd
business tactics, it was allowed to establish franchises wherever it
saw fit. [This] illustrates the inherent conflict between
franchisees.., and franchisors like Dunkin', who seek to achieve the
greatest market saturation possible .... 1129
1122. S. 3879, 84th Cong. (1956).
1123. H.R. REP. No. 84-2850 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4596, 4596.
1124. Id.
1125. Kezios, supra note 79, at 32.
1126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (2004).
1127. Harford Donuts, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., No. L-98-3668, 2001 WL 403473,
at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2001). How Dunkin' Donuts could be obligated to operate in
accordance with the policy and not have an obligation conferred on it is not explained.
1128. Id. at *5.
1129. Id. at n. 13 (emphasis added).
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The court identifies one of the key reasons why franchising is not a
family partnership: the interests of the parties are in opposition,
particularly in mature franchise systems. Franchisors make their money
from two primary sources: initial entry fees (including transfer fees) and
royalties.' As new franchises are purchased, franchisor revenue
increases. Unless sales increases outpace losses to encroachment,
franchisee margins decline since fixed costs must be spread over a
declining revenue base. At some point, incremental growth in market
share does not make economic sense to the party who bears the
consequence of declining or negative margins. This is particularly of
concern to franchisees in low margin industries such as quick-serve
restaurants (QSRs).
What the Harford court labeled "shrewd" is more accurately labeled
bad faith. When sophisticated franchisors assure prospects that the
franchise system has an encroachment policy, the franchisor is aware that
"the express provisions of a contract may grant the right to engage in
conduct that would otherwise have been forbidden by the implied
covenant of good faith."" 1  Thus, the franchisor knows that the
franchisee can be driven out of business at the whim of the encroaching
franchisor.
The absence of legal recourse to encroached franchisees is a serious
risk factor to a prospective franchise purchaser, who may be under the
fatal misimpression that the FTC Franchise Rule and FTC Act will
protect him. The authors met one franchisee who alleged a deceptive
trade practice on the part of his franchisor. The franchisee, a non-citizen
immigrant, had been told that the U.S. Government would do something
about this. The franchisee told the authors that he would be complaining
to the government, and showed a printout he had been given from an
Internet site which said that franchisor practices were regulated under
Section 5. Franchisees do believe that the FTC will protect them from
deceptive practices in the franchise relationship, and the authors have
never met a franchisee who has read the GAO report indicating
1130. For example, the Blimpie franchisor in 2001 had gross revenues of $30.7
million, of which $19.2 million came from continuing fees and $4.09 million from sales
of franchises and subfranchises/license fees. See Paul Frumkin, Private Investor Group
Set To Buy Blimpie for $26M, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Oct. 22, 2001, at 1, 71.
Royalties may be direct (percentage of sales) and indirect (built-in to the wholesale cost
of the product). While vendor "rebates" are not normally regarded as royalties, they
should be regarded as such because the economic benefit to the franchisor is the same.
Collection costs for this ongoing revenue stream are modest once the initial systems are
in place, making franchised outlets more profitable and predictable than company-owned
outlets.
1131. Richard L. Cohn & RLC Enterprises, Inc. v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 92 c 5852,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 334, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1994) ("A court can't redraft the




The conceptual disconnect between regulators and franchisees was
noted by one commentator who observed that the FTC had closed
without comment an investigation into the Subway sandwich chain.
1 132
The commentator then cited a Subway case involving a lawsuit between
a landlord and Subway in which the disgusted judge observed (a year
prior to Subway admitting to placing stores "any f'***ing place we
could"): 1133
[t]here can be little doubt that the real losers here are the subtenants
[Subway franchisees] who opened a Subway business only to be
subjected to inevitable failure because of unwarranted competition-
not from other fast food chains, but from their own. In my view
(obviously it is only mine, since the issue was not before the jury) if
anyone merited punitive damages it was the [Subway franchisees]
who lost everything .... 1134
Franchisors such as Subway now contractually limit arbitrator's ability to
award punitive damages, another disincentive to reining in franchisor
abuse. In striking down a waiver of punitives in arbitration the Alabama
Supreme Court observed that such limitations permit "rampant
fraudulent conduct with few, if any, legal repercussions."
'1 135
Regulatory equilibrium must take account of societal norms of
responsibility and fair play. Punitive damages express societal norms
and are imposed to deter abuse. Punitive damages are not a windfall for
the aggrieved franchisee, and restricting punitives gives a green light to
franchisors seeking to exploit franchisees. 11 6  Moreover, if the
legislature finds a pattern of punitives unjustly enriching a single
member of an aggrieved class, it may balance the interests of society and
the franchisee victim by means of a split-recovery statute. 1137
1132. Peter C. Lagarias, Relationship Abuses and the GAO Report: Taking Another
Look at the Findings, FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT, Sept. 2001, at 3.
1133. Behar, supra note 46, at 130.
1134. Lagarias, supra note 1132, at 3 (citing Jannotta v. Subway Sandwich Shops Inc.,
125 F.3d 503, 518 (3d Cir. 1997) (Manion, J., concurring)).
1135. Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 823 So.2d 1237, 1248 (Ala. 2001). See also id. at
1245 (decision of October 5, noting Alabama statute and public policy disfavor
enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses). The following week, the court expanded
its reasoning in holding that it would be just as violative of policy to waive the right to
punitives in a judicial forum. Exparte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2001) (decision of
October 12, withdrawn, rev'd on other grounds; provision barring punitives severed but
rest of mandatory arbitration clause enforced).
1136. See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and
Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1994) (potential punitive award deters business by
threatening profitability of wrongful action).
1137. Split recovery statutes provide that the state gets a portion of any punitive award.
See generally Tony Wright, Two Courts Uphold Statutes Giving Part of Punitive Awards
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Neither the Dunkin' nor the Subway franchisees would have
conceived that they were entrusting their life savings to persons who
were out to drive them into penury. In Harford Donuts, the franchisee
was shown a written Encroachment Impact Policy, which the franchisor
violated with impunity. Recently, one franchisor has begun to site stores
less than four blocks apart in New York City, effectively putting
franchisees in competition with each other in an already brutally
competitive, high-cost market. It should be noted that the friendly local
face of the distant franchisor is deceiving: In Harford Donuts, the court
questioned, sua sponte, the authority of the local Dunkin' Donuts
representative to bind Dunkin' Donuts. 1138 In the case of Subway, the
local franchisor representative (who is de facto a franchisee) is under
intense pressure to saturate the market, irrespective of objective business
conditions and damage to franchisees.1 39  McDonalds franchisees in
Brazil allege that not only did McDonalds encroach to the point of
"cannibalization" (a Sao Paulo franchisee claimed a 60%), but it did so
with company-owned stores whose rent was less due to the fact that the
franchisor effectively places a mark-up on franchisee rents which is of
course absent from direct landlord-franchisor agreements."1
40
Such overreaching echoes the attitude that led to the ADDCA and
PMPA. The response to SBFA exemplifies the attitude of franchisors
fighting to lower taxes on the estates of millionaires while fighting to
prevent raising a $5.25 per hour minimum wage.' 14 1 Certainly a case can
be made for repeal of the estate tax and the ability of workers to live on
$10,920 per year; the point here is that franchisors are wealth-
maximizing and rent-seeking just as most other interest groups-
to State, LAW. WKLY USA, Sept. 16, 2002, at 3 (citing DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d
1232 (Or. 2002)); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002). Only
Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon and Utah have split-recovery
statutes. Bills are pending in New Jersey, California, and Texas. Wright, at 3.
1138. Harford Donuts, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., No. Civ. L-98-3668, 2001 WL
403473, at n.9 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2001). The court adopts a belt-and-suspenders approach;
there is just no way the franchisee could have won in that court, though in fairness, it was
a motion for summary judgment. Id.
1139. In re Doctor's Assoc., Inc. and Tom O'Neill and Scott Linkletter, Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 12,098 (Resolutions LLC, Filed June 1, 2001).
1140. CCH No. 266, supra note 626. It should be noted that business conditions in
Brazil likely had a significant impact on the sales decline, but this is all the more reason
to avoid encroaching on already struggling franchisees. See McD Brazil Faces
Franchisees' Lawsuits, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, at 56 (noting forty-
four outlets in litigation, competing franchisee group disapproves of litigation).
1141. Fisher, supra note 305 (firm scheduled meetings to lobby Representative Tim
Holden (D-PA) against "Coble-like legislation. We have also lobbied against increases
on [sic] the minimum wage .... ). See also Sparks, supra note 948 (IFA letter to
franchisees soliciting franchisee members with promise that IFA will work to "protect
our businesses from.., minimum wage hikes").
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including franchisees. One key difference is that franchisees are
generally individual members of their local community and hence more
likely to be influenced by non-monetary social constraints."
42
Franchisors may couch their behavior in discussions of laissez-faire and
"the sacred principle of freedom of contract,"" 143 but the views espoused
are no more meritorious than are those of the franchisees. Determination
of the proper level of regulation necessarily involves value judgments:
to what extent are we as a society willing to permit the type of behavior
seen in Bolter and Vylene-when do we simply tell the victimized
franchisee: "Tough."
Harris Research (the ChemDry franchisor in Bolter) actually tells
prospective franchisees that it operates according to "Christian
Principles"' 144:
We always practice, "Do unto others as you would have done unto
you." To put this into its franchise context, you should never impose
anything on a franchisee that you wouldn't be happy to impose on
yourself. Be totally honest in all your dealings . . . . We ask
ourselves the question--"This may be legal, but is it ethical?"' '
1145
Florence Bolter probably asked herself the same question.
Public companies are subject to heavy regulation, and yet recent
events have shown a level of moral rot in American business. A
Delaware Chancery Court judge observed that:
The after-the-fact threat of federal and state law liability can never be
an efficient or adequate method by which to ensure corporate
integrity. And quite bluntly, it is questionable whether costly
government policies ought be directed at placing crutches under well-
heeled investors who can walk for themselves.
Franchise regulation will never serve as a panacea for post-sale abusive
practices by franchisors. Indeed, overregulation would be economically
inefficient and harm the very same class it purported to help. But the
current abdication of franchise regulation to the "reputational"
1142. Posner, supra note 95, at 153.
1143. Rupert M. Barkoff, Government Regulation of the Franchise Relationship in the
United States, 8 J. INT'L FRANCHISING & DISTRIB. L. 82 (1994) (noting that franchise
regulators have concluded the principle is inapplicable or inappropriate).
1144. ChemDry, supra note 122. The interviewee was likely meaning to cite Matthew
7:12, commonly known as the "Golden Rule." This same concept is found at Leviticus
19:18, in Rabbinic Judaism, the Analects of Confucius at 12:2, and the Buddhist
Dhammapada at 10:129-130. The Golden Rule has a universal basis, however scarce in
franchising. CHARLES PANATI, SACRED ORIGINS OF PROFOUND THINGS 95 (1996).
1145. ChemDry, supra note 122.
1146. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the
Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1402 (2002).
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constraints of the marketplace is not working, and is not a proper role for
any government regulator. A distinction can and should be made
between a corporate entity putting a $50 million hotel property under
franchised management and elderly Florence Bolter putting her life
savings into a Chem-Dry franchise.
With the exception of Maryland, no state Attorney General has
expressed concern about franchisor abuse of small franchisees less able
to fend for themselves. Many franchisees are not "well-heeled" investors
but middle class citizens and immigrants who get less protection
investing their life savings in a franchise than a corporate law firm senior
partner investing in 100 shares of IBM. One of the few states to
recognize this is California, which has sometimes declined to follow the
North American Association of Securities Administrators. However, a
leading franchisor lobbyist reports that industry discussions with
California regulators will likely result in a climate "much more pleasant
for franchisors."' 
14 7
An oft-quoted passage from The Federalist is James Madison's
observation that "If men were angels, no government would be
necessary." ' 48 Notwithstanding franchisor invocations of Jesus Christ,
franchisors are no angels. When the federal watchdog's priority is
avoiding "a negative impact on franchise sales," one wonders if the
watchdog has turned into a lapdog. If a government official tasked with
regulating the franchise industry believes that Mrs. Bolter should be left
to the tender mercies of a franchisor backed by an army of lawyers and
Washington lobbyists, then the regulator is more properly at home in
private practice. (The same would be true of a regulator who overly
favored franchisees, but with the possible exceptions of California and
Maryland no state regulator is regarded by franchisors as a serious check
on franchisor overreaching.)
At a Practicing Law Institute seminar on franchising, a law student
intern from the New York Attorney General's office was asked what he
had learned during the two days. He responded: "Don't buy a
franchise." The next time you meet a franchisor attorney, ask him or her
if they have ever owned a franchise. Ask whether they would tell their
brother or sister or neighbor to buy a franchise from one of the
franchisors they represent and whose contracts they draft. It is a poor
reflection on the franchising industry that increased knowledge leads to
more cynicism. Justice Thomas is correct that "Cynicism is one of the
1147. Well Worth the Wait: Wrapping Up 2002's 20 to Watch, FRANCHISE TIMES, Feb.
2003, at 8 (quoting Neil Simon of the National Franchise Council, a trade group of the
largest franchisors).
1148. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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leading causes of the death of dreams."'' 149 The franchise industry has
been relatively successful in keeping from the public and legislators the
true nature of what goes on in franchising, and for that reason highly-
respected politicians accept industry campaign contributions and oppose
regulation of the "American Dream." It would behoove the industry to
clean its house before truth leads to cynicism and the death of
franchisors' dreams of wealth. For Congress to depend on franchisors to
see that need for reform is to ignore half a century of history.
The auto and petroleum industries have balanced legislation which
provides all parties with a profitable relationship. The IFA protests that
this is not possible for non-auto/non-petroleum franchisors since, they
claim, franchising is not an industry and as the "voice of franchising,"
the IFA objects to the very notion. But just as the IFA takes positions in
Congress and in court on behalf of the franchise industry, so to can
Congress pass legislation governing the franchise industry.
This paper has shown a pattern by the franchise industry to claim
that franchising is a "unique" relationship, a "partnership" between
franchisor and franchisee. The case law has shown that the franchise
industry ceases making those claims as it enters the courthouse door. It
may be that "there's a sucker born every minute"1150 but this does not
excuse the conduct of abusive franchisors, nor the failure of franchisor
trade associations to take a position in favor of fair dealing. It is difficult
to define good faith and fair dealing, but far simpler to cite examples of
the bad faith all too common in the franchise industry.
Franchise legislation should not favor franchisors or franchisees. It
should embody principles of responsibility and fair play. No relational
contract can see twenty years into the future, and franchisors should have
the ability to exercise discretion in the mutual interest of all parties.
Franchisors will complain that relationship legislation, with its concern
with good faith and fair dealing, will inject an element of uncertainty into
the franchise relationship. But there is already an element of uncertainty:
it exists in the mind of the franchisee living each day with the knowledge
that a capricious franchisor may rob the franchisee of a life's savings-
with an approving nod from the courts and regulators. The Chem-Dry
franchisor said: "This may be legal. But is it ethical?"
1149. Clarence Thomas, Speech before the Savannah (Ga.) Bar Association Annual
Lunch, DeSoto Hilton (May 11, 2001) (on file with the author).
1150. Attributed to P.T. Barnum, but probably never said by Barnum. See
http://www.alt-usage-english.org/excerpts/fxtheres.html (last modified Sept. 19, 2001).
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